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Introduction 
Charles Asher Small 
In August 2010, the largest-ever academic conference on the study of antisemitism took 
place at Yale University. The conference, entitled “Global Antisemitism: A Crisis of 
Modernity,” was hosted and organized by the Yale Initiative for the Interdisciplinary 
Study of Antisemitism (YIISA) and the International Association for the Study of Anti-
semitism (IASA). The conference featured over 100 speakers from more than 20 coun-
tries from around the world. They included recent graduates at the beginning of their 
academic careers, experienced academics, and leading senior scholars who have dedi-
cated their intellectual pursuits to the study of antisemitism, as well as legal experts, 
practitioners and others. More than 600 people attended the conference, including 
undergraduate and graduate students, scholars from many universities, including Yale 
University, practitioners and members of non-governmental organizations, civil serv-
ants and diplomats interested in the policy implications of the subject matter, and 
members of the general public. This volume presents a wide-ranging selection of the 
many important and challenging papers presented at the conference. 
The Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy (ISGAP) was estab-
lished in 2004, with a network of scholars from around the world and the support of a 
group of dedicated philanthropists led by the humanitarian and professor of pharma-
cology William (Bill) Prusoff, in response to a clear and ominous increase in global 
antisemitism.1 In 2006, ISGAP approached Yale University with a view to establishing 
an academic research center within the university. After determining that the center 
would meet all the necessary administrative, financial, and academic requirements, Yale 
University inaugurated the Yale Initiative for the Interdisciplinary Study of Anti-
semitism (YIISA) in 2006. It was the first academic research center focusing on the 
interdisciplinary study of antisemitism to be based at a North American university.2 
ISGAP’s Board of Trustees supported and funded all of YIISA’s activities, co-sponsoring 
its seminar series and various other events and paying the salaries of its 14 employees. It 
also underwrote the August 2010 conference on which this volume is based.3 
                                                                                                                                                       
1 In his opening remarks at the United Nations conference “Confronting anti-Semitism: Educa-
tion and Tolerance and Understanding,” June 21, 2004, New York, Professor Elie Wiesel examined 
the rising levels and threat of antisemitism. The rise in contemporary global antisemitism is exam-
ined and substantiated in several chapters in this volume. 
2 The fact that the first interdisciplinary and fully fledged research center on antisemitism at a 
North American university was only established in 2006 ought itself to be a the focus of a research 
project, especially given the role antisemitism has played in Western civilization. 
3 ISGAP continues as a research center with its head office in New York. It develops academic 
programming at top universities, including McGill, Fordham (Lincoln Center Campus), Harvard 
Law School, and the Stanford’s Hoover Institution. 
© Charles Asher Small, 2013 | doi 10.1163/9789004265561_002 
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From 2006 to 2011, YIISA offered a successful graduate and post-doctorate fellow-
ship program. Each year, it welcomed a group of scholars from leading universities in 
the United States and around the world, including several senior visiting professors. 
YIISA had a robust programming agenda. It organized over 120 seminars, special 
events, a series of films, four international conferences, symposiums and other gather-
ings at Yale University in New Haven, as well in New York, Washington, and Berlin. Its 
scholars carried out research projects and published important material on the interdis-
ciplinary study of antisemitism. ISGAP and YIISA met the need to examine the changing 
contemporary state of and processes pertaining to global antisemitism. The fact that over 
100 speakers participated in the aforementioned 2010 conference, and that all but ten of 
them attended at their own expense, is testimony to the extensive interest in the study of 
contemporary antisemitism. 
The conference, “Global Antisemitism: A Crisis of Modernity,” offered an environment 
in which scholars from a wide array of disciplines, intellectual backgrounds, and perspec-
tives would be able to present their research and engage in interdisciplinary debate. The 
call for papers was inclusive and encouraged scholars from around the world to present 
their work. Without such a free exchange of ideas, any notion of academic freedom is 
tantamount to rhetoric. The subject of antisemitism is complex and controversial, as many 
students and scholars of this subject know. It was therefore important to YIISA to provide 
a forum in which this important issue could be freely discussed and explored.4 
                                                                                                                                                       
4 It is not uncommon for scholars of antisemitism, especially those engaged in the study of its 
contemporary manifestations, to be labeled as right-wing, neo-conservative, or Islamophobic. 
Likewise, despite their obvious and sometimes extraordinary credentials, their scholarship is often 
unfairly categorized as “advocacy.” Such accusations, which are often made by those who engage 
in advocacy themselves, actually constitute a form of antisemitism. Others simply embrace the 
“gatekeeper” role within the academy, which Cohen describes as an attempt to maintain the status 
quo on behalf of institutional interests. See Robin Cohen, The New Helots: Migrants in the International 
Division of Labour (Gower Publishing, Aldershot 1987) and E. Bonacich, “A Theory of Middleman 
Minorities,” American Sociological Review Vol. 38 (1973) pp. 583-594. This is reminiscent of the 
McCarthy era interference with academic freedom. At that time, a notable scholar, Nathan Glazer, 
took it upon himself to report on members the Jewish community to the “Committee” in order to 
silence political views that were deemed unacceptable at the time (Cedric Robinson, Black Marxism: 
The Making of the Black Radical Tradition (Zed Books, London 1983)). The academic activities of YIISA, in 
particular its work on state-sponsored antisemitism, Iran, and the Muslim Brotherhood, was 
denounced as “advocacy” by those with an interest in promoting the US administration’s general 
policy of “engagement” with Islamic states. Analogous views also found support within the Yale 
Corporation and administration, as well as among several tenured faculty, resulting in a de facto 
limitation of academic freedom. These perspectives were conveyed directly to my colleagues and 
me by leading members of the Yale administration and faculty members. It thus appears that the 
scholarly analysis of antisemitism in contemporary Middle Eastern societies infringed upon various 
political and economic priorities. Moreover, the possible investment of Gulf funds in Yale Univer-
sity, and other universities around the world, or fear of the discontinuation of such funding, is a 
question meriting unfettered research rather than a statement of fact. The question whether this so-
called “advocacy,” which allegedly affected research on antisemitism, ought to be replaced by 
kosher “non-advocacy” research that does not disturb governmental or foreign donor sensibilities 
must now be on the table as an open question for research. Additionally, against this background, 
the possibility that the term “advocacy” itself has become a euphemism for “research relevant to 
current affairs and therefore likely to offend some powerful parties” must be subjected to critical 
scholarly scrutiny. 
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In June 2004, the United Nations, an institution that emerged from the ashes of World 
War II and the Holocaust, held its first official conference on antisemitism. This gathering 
served as a formal acknowledgement of the re-emergence of antisemitism as a contempo-
rary matter of concern in a changing and globalizing world. It was hosted by UN Secretary 
General Kofi Annan and Nobel peace laureate Professor Elie Wiesel at the UN headquar-
ters in New York.5 Wiesel, the keynote speaker in a packed General Assembly Hall, noted 
that antisemitism is the oldest collective form of hatred in recorded history and that it had 
even managed to penetrate the United Nations itself. He questioned whether the world 
body, despite its role as a moral and political global leader, had forgotten the destructive 
and deadly impact of antisemitism. Some in attendance, Wiesel pointed out, actually 
endured its consequences: “We were there. We saw our parents, we saw our friends die 
because of antisemitism.” In my view, the 2004 UN conference on antisemitism marked a 
turning point in the response of academia to the subject of antisemitism. This renewed 
interest was a contributing factor in the establishment of ISGAP several months later. 
The YIISA conference addressed two inter-related and important areas of research 
that both encompass various disciplines, namely (1) global antisemitism and (2) the 
crisis of modernity currently affecting the core elements of Western society and civiliza-
tion. Is it possible that the emergence of the current wave of global antisemitism both 
reflects and forms part of a wider attack on the core elements of modernity, notions of 
Enlightenment, and Western civilization more generally by reactionary social forces 
empowered by the crisis of capitalism? Against this background, the participants in the 
conference addressed conceptual and empirical questions from a wide array of perspec-
tives and disciplines. The diversity in approach and opinion was itself a sign of academ-
ic health. 
* * * 
Antisemitism is a complex and, at times, perplexing form of hatred. Some observers 
refer to it as the “longest hatred.” It spans centuries of history, infecting different socie-
ties, religious, philosophical and political movements, and even civilizations. In the 
aftermath of the Holocaust, some have even argued that antisemitism illustrates the 
limitations of the Enlightenment and modernity itself. Manifestations of antisemitism 
occur in numerous ideologically-based narratives and in constructed identities of be-
longing and Otherness such as race and ethnicity, as well as nationalist and anti-
nationalist movements. In the contemporary context of globalized relations, it appears 
that antisemitism has taken on new complex and changing forms that need to be decod-
ed, mapped, and exposed. The academic study of antisemitism, like prejudice more 
generally, has a long and impressive intellectual and research history. It remains a topic 
of ongoing political importance and scholarly engagement. However, especially at this 
important historical juncture, unlike prejudice and discrimination directed at other 
social groups, antisemitism―in particular its contemporary forms and processes―is 
almost always studied outside an organized academic framework. 
The purpose of YIISA’s 2010 conference was therefore to explore this subject matter 
in a comprehensive manner and from an array of approaches and perspectives, as well 
as in its global, national, and regional contexts. The development of an interdisciplinary 
approach and consciousness, while encouraging analytical studies examining a preju-
                                                                                                                                                       
5 Professor Elie Wiesel is the Honorary President of ISGAP. 
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dice that remains widespread and but also appears to be experiencing a resurgence, was 
a key objective of the conference and YIISA’s general mission. The conference aimed to 
create a vibrant space in which high-caliber scholarship and open and free debate would 
develop, be nurtured, and have an impact.6 
The process of globalization has led to an increase in adversarial identity politics. In 
this environment, Israel, as a central manifestation of contemporary Jewish identity, and 
Jews more generally have become the focus of scapegoating and hateful rhetoric. At a 
more structural and socio-historical level, the old ideologies and tendencies of anti-
semitism have re-emerged and are being fused with anti-Zionism or what in many cases 
might be more appropriately described as Israel-bashing.7 The old theological and racist 
forms of European antisemitism are being amalgamated with anti-Jewish and anti-Israel 
pronouncements emanating in particular from the Muslim world, which is located mainly, 
but not exclusively, in and around the Middle East. Contemporary globalization and the 
related socio-economic, cultural, and political processes are being fused with these histori-
cal tendencies, creating the conditions that pose a threat to Jewish people and Jewish 
communities in the Diaspora. In addition, new structural realities within the realm of the 
international relations and the emergence of anti-Israel propensities appear to pose a threat 
to Israel and the Jewish people in a manner not seen since the end of World War II. Once 
again, in this age of globalization, the Jewish people seem to be caught between the “aris-
tocracy” or “wealthy establishment” (core) and the marginalized or disenfranchised 
masses (periphery), as they have been throughout most of history.8 
                                                                                                                                                       
6 The establishment of a research center similar to YIISA is urgently required within the academy. 
The approach of such an entity should be analogous to the one adopted by the Centre for Contempo-
rary Cultural Studies (CCCS) at the University of Birmingham (UK) and the Centre for Research in 
Ethnic Relations (CRER) at the University of Warwick (UK), yet with a specific critical  approach to 
antisemitism. Both centers adopted an interdisciplinary approach with an emphasis on critical con-
ceptual analysis based on solid empirical research. Currently, there are several small entities that study 
antisemitism, but they are all led by European historians with little or no background in the contem-
porary, regional, or interdisciplinary context. In fact, several of these scholars actually blame Israel for 
contemporary manifestations of antisemitism and underestimate the relevance of Islamism. This 
perspective is often based on “politically correct” views rather than rational scholarship. There is a 
need for vibrant analysis, study, discussion, and debate. A new entity for the study of antisemitism 
ought to combine an understanding of Western antisemitism and notions of “Otherness” with a 
willingness to tackle the contemporary changes sweeping the Middle East and knowledge of the 
region and its culture, including Islam and Islamism. The study of terrorism as it relates to contempo-
rary antisemitism is also very much required. All these issues should obviously be examined in the 
context of processes associated with globalization, as opposed to the more frequently-used and 
descriptive concept of global antisemitism. Descriptive work without a critical, comprehensive, and 
conceptual interdisciplinary analytical framework will not be effective in assessing the contemporary 
condition, nor in creating appropriate policy responses. Policy development is a recognized and 
respected field of study within academia. This must be stated, since many who analyze antisemitism 
are “gatekeepers” who dismiss this vital scholarship as advocacy. This is not only problematic but also 
hinders the finding of solutions to key issues, indirectly undermining the safety of many. 
7 For an analysis linking classical forms of antisemitism with contemporary Israel-bashing, see 
Edward H. Kaplan and Charles A. Small, “Anti-Israel Sentiment Predicts Anti-Semitism in 
Europe,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 50, No. 4, August 2006. 
8 See the Arab Human Development Report (United Nations Development Programme 2005). This 
report and other subsequent reports examine the impact of globalization on aspects of socio-
economic marginalization stability in the Arab world. 
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With the advent of the “socialism of fools,” a term describing the replacement of the 
search for real social and political equity with antisemitism that is frequently attributed 
to August Bebel, Jews continued to be targeted.9 In much the same way, the current 
marginalization of the Jewish people in the Arab world―or, more accurately, the mar-
ginalization of the image of the Jew, since most of them were pressured to leave or 
expelled from Arab countries between 1948 and the early 1970s after a strong continual 
presence of thousands of years―is staggering. As the social movements in the Middle 
East have turned to their own version of the “socialism of fools” (i.e., the antisemitism of 
radical political Islamism), they have incorporated lethal forms of European genocidal 
antisemitism as their fuel.10 However, many scholars, policy-makers, and journalists of 
record still refuse to acknowledge this fact and to critically examine the ideology and 
mission of this social movement. 
Anti-Judaism is one of the most complex and at times perplexing forms of hatred. As 
evident from the range of papers presented at the conference and in this volume, anti-
semitism has many facets that touch upon many subjects and scholarly disciplines. The 
term “anti-Semitism,” which was coined in the 1870s by Wilhelm Marr,11 is also contro-
versial and at times confusing. Yet despite its etymological limitations and contradic-
tions, it remains valid and useful. The term refers specifically to prejudice and 
discrimination against the Jewish people. Some incorrectly or for reasons of political 
expediency use the term to refer to prejudice against all so-called “Semitic” peoples, 
claiming that Arab peoples cannot be antisemites, as they are Semites themselves. This is 
fine in terms of etymological musing but not in terms of the history of language and 
thought, where terms acquire specific meanings over time that diverge from their 
etymological origins. In fact, antisemitism refers to a specific form a hatred that is 
mainly European in origin and focuses upon the Jewish people. Some scholars prefer to 
use the term antisemitism, without a hyphen and uncapitalized, since it refers to a form 
of hatred or a phenomenon rather than to a specific race or biologically determined 
group. Emil Fackenheim, for example, used the unhyphenated form for this reason.12 
This volume and all of ISGAP’s other work also follows this approach. 
Some scholars who have examined the complexities of antisemitism claim that it takes 
several forms, including social, economic, political, cultural, and religious antisemitism. 
                                                                                                                                                       
9 Steve Cohen, That’s Funny You Don’t Look Anti-Semitic. An Anti-Racist Analysis of Left Anti-
Semitism (Leeds 1984). The well-known saying “Anti-Semitism is the socialism of fools” (“Der 
Antisemitismus ist der Sozialismus der dummen Kerle”) is frequently attributed to Bebel, but 
probably originated with the Austrian democrat Ferdinand Kronawetter; it was in general use 
among German Social Democrats by the 1890s (Richard J. Evans, The Coming of the Third Reich 
(Penguin Group 2005)). For a discussion of antisemitism, including the notion of the socialism of 
fools, see David Hirsh, Anti-Zionism and Antisemitism: Cosmopolitan Reflections, The Yale Initiative 
for the Interdisciplinary Study of Antisemitism Working Paper Series, Editor Charles Asher Small, 
Vol. 1, No. 1 (2007). 
10  In Islamism and Islam (Yale University Press 2011), Bassam Tibi makes the important distinc-
tion between antisemitism that was European in origin and genocidal, on the one hand, and the 
kind of anti-Judaism that was discriminatory in nature, which was historically prevalent in the 
Middle East and Islamic context, on the other. 
11  Shlomo Avineri, Karl Marx on Colonialism and Modernization (New York 1968). 
12  Emil Fackenheim, “Post-Holocaust Anti-Jewishness, Jewish Identity and the Centrality of 
Israel,” in Moshe Davis, ed., World Jewry and the State of Israel (Arno Press 1977). 
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René König, for example, contends that these different forms of antisemitism demonstrate 
that the origins of antisemitism are rooted in different historical periods and places.13 
When religion, in particular Christianity, represented the dominant way to perceive 
reality, the Jews were regarded as followers of the wrong religion. It was also believed 
that their refusal to accept the Christian messiah disqualified them from any form of 
redemption and even that Jewish stubbornness hindered world redemption. Finally, it is 
hardly necessary to recall that the Jews were accused of deicide. When the dominant 
manner in which Europeans perceived reality was based on the nation state and biologi-
cal notions of race and ethnicity, the Jews were constructed as belonging to another, 
inferior race. According to the Nazis and others who subscribed to racist beliefs, for 
example, they were perceived as polluting the Aryan race and needed to be removed 
completely in order to save the purity of the “race” and “nation.” 
At present, some argue for religious reasons that the self-determination of the Jews—
the non-Muslim “Other”—on so-called Islamic land is a sin and should not be tolerated. 
Others, in the West, see Jewish stubbornness as the cause of radical Islam, Jihadism, and 
the instability in the region. When it comes Israel’s policies and existence, they believe 
that if only the Jews would change the problems in the region and in international 
relations as a whole could be resolved.14 If taken to its logical conclusion, this perspec-
tive could lead to great destruction, like other historical manifestations of antisemitism, 
since its aims is the eradication of Israel or any semblance of Jewish self-determination 
in the region.15 Despite the complete rejection of the Jewish narrative by the Iranian 
regime, Hamas, Hezbollah, and other Salafists and Islamists, many observers focus on 
the “Other” and are content to blame the “victim” of this ideology without properly 
examining it. In fact, attempts to critically examine these reactionary views are often 
deemed politically unacceptable. This contemporary form of antisemitism has many 
layers. New forms are mixed with older ones, such as conspiracy theories about Jewish 
power and culture, apocalyptic theories concerning the Jews. For example, the Protocols 
of the Elders of Zion, which played a key role in creating the conditions for the Holocaust, 
as well European antisemitism more generally, has now become part of the political and 
cultural mainstream in several Arab and Muslim societies.16 
The above-mentioned complexities make it difficult to define the different forms that 
antisemitism takes. This in turn makes it problematic to address and analyze the subject 
matter. It is no wonder, then, that contemporary forms of antisemitism have always 
                                                                                                                                                       
13  René König, Materialien zur Krimalsoziologie (VS Verlag 2004). 
14  It is important to note that, in the contemporary US context, some political realists certainly 
fall into the category of those who blame Israel for all the problems in the region and beyond. 
15  Cf. Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process (2000) (originally published as Über den Prozess der Zivili-
sation in two separate volumes in 1939 by Haus zum Falken, Basel). Refusing to recognize the Other 
and insisting on changing them fundamentally will inevitably lead to violence and even destruction. 
16  See Bassam Tibi, Islamism and Islam (Yale University Press 2011); Neil Kressel, The Sons of Pigs 
and Apes: Muslim Antisemitism and the Conspiracy of Silence (Westview Press 2012). Bassam Tibi was a 
Visiting Professor and Neil Kressel a Visiting Fellow at YIISA. As Israel becomes the focus of 
contemporary discourse and manifestations of antisemitism, even in the United States, the notions 
of “dual loyalty” and the “Jewish lobby,” which were previously articulated mostly by extremists, 
have gained credibility with the publication of a controversial book on the subject by Walt and 
Mearsheimer in 2007 (The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy) and the approach of some “realists” 
who have gained influence in the past several years in the media and policy circles. 
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been difficult if not impossible to acknowledge, study, measure, and oppose. One hopes 
that it will not only be future historians who come to understand and address today’s 
lethal forms of antisemitism, too late to affect policy, perceptions, and predispositions. 
The context of contemporary global antisemitism, on which the conference focused, 
covers international relations, which are increasingly in a state of flux and turmoil, as 
well as notions of tolerance, democratic principles and ideals, human rights, and robust 
citizenship. These values appear to be receding within many institutions and societies, 
while the international community seems to be less strident in trying to defend them. It 
would appear that the Jew, or perhaps more importantly the image of the Jew or the 
“imaginary Jew” as described by Alain Finkielkraut,17 is at the middle of this global 
moment. Both historically and today, antisemitism is a social disease that begins with 
the Jews but does not end with them, making the Jewish people the proverbial canary in 
the coalmine. This deadly strain of hatred often turns against other groups, such as 
women, homosexuals, moderate Muslims, and other sectors of the population who are 
perceived as not being ideologically pure, as well as against key democratic notions such 
as robust citizenship, equality before the law, and religious pluralism. Antisemitism is 
consequently a universal human rights issue that should be of importance to all. 
In view of its character as the “longest hatred,” with a destructive power that is both 
well known and well documented, the historical lessons of antisemitism ought to reach 
beyond the Jewish people and concern scholars from a wide range of disciplines, both 
academic and policy-oriented. In fact, antisemitism should be perceived as a key aspect 
in the development of Western civilization, yet it is often perceived as a Jewish or 
parochial issue.18 This perception forms an impediment to the study of antisemitism in 
current academic culture, which favors the universal over the particular. In fact, the 
study of antisemitism is often regarded as unworthy of consideration or even as an 
enemy of the progressive universalistic worldview that is currently in vogue. 
Certain members of the academic community, especially those who claim to espouse 
progressive and/or postmodernist views, often perceive the study of antisemitism as an 
attempt to undermine criticism of the State of Israel and accuse those engaged in this 
study of being political advocates rather than pursuers of real scholarship.19 In fact, in 
this postmodern age, this is a fairly common view in academic and intellectual circles.20 
It is therefore important to embark on a systemic critique of the intellectual and political 
impact of this philosophical movement not only with regard to the safety and security of 
the Jewish people and their right to self-determination but also with regard to the 
integrity of the Enlightenment project and perceptions of modernity. 
The contemporary canon includes a critique of the traditional “Western” cannon, for 
example by Michel Foucault and Edward Said, that has also helped to demonize Jewish 
cultural and historical narratives in relation to Israel and beyond. This perspective is 
now an integral component of many “good” university curriculums throughout the 
                                                                                                                                                       
17  Alain Finkielkraut, The Imaginary Jew (University of Nebraska Press 1994). 
18  The members of ISGAP specifically established YIISA, the first-ever research center focusing 
on the interdisciplinary study of antisemitism at a North American university, to create a space to 
engage in this subject matter freely. 
19  See Judith Butler, “No, it’s not anti-semitic,” London Review of Books, August 21, 2003. 
20  See Robert Wistrich, From Ambivalence to Betrayal: The Left, the Jews, and Israel (University of 
Nebraska Press 2012). 
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West.21 Foucault welcomed the Iranian Revolution of 1979 as a triumph of spiritual values 
over the profanity of Western capitalist materialism. He perceived this Islamist revolution 
as a critique of Western culture and a protest against the political rationality of moderni-
ty.22 This sympathetic view of the Islamist revolution has been largely ignored, but it 
undoubtedly influenced the subsequent philosophical discourse and scholarship. Said, 
who was in Paris in 1979, fondly recalls spending time with Foucault and notes that they 
both hoped that the Iranian Revolution would develop into what the French Revolution 
was to Kant two hundred years earlier. Despite its violence, they hoped that the revolution 
would be a crucial step toward progress and emancipation for the people of Iran and the 
oppressed peoples of other nations.23 Their critique of modernity and Western colonial 
power, combined with the lack of an ethical alternative, prevented these early postmod-
ernists from criticizing the excesses of the Iranian revolution and its failure to recognize the 
‘Other’ as an equal and respected member of society. The works of Foucault and Said have 
thus helped to lay the foundations for the failure of many contemporary intellectuals to 
condemn the rise of Islamism as a social movement,24 especially in relation to its lack of 
acceptance of basic notions of “Otherness” within Islamic society, a cornerstone of demo-
cratic principles, and its vitriolic prejudice against the Jewish people and Israel. This 
intellectual development should also be considered in the context of global politics and the 
prevailing environment in many academic institutions, where the need for funding unfor-
tunately appears to be having a growing impact on the curriculum. 
Furthermore, Said’s attempt to undermine the legitimacy of Jewish self-determination 
in Israel and the Jewish historical narrative in the Diaspora needs to be critically exam-
ined with regard to its role in the re-emergence of antisemitism among intellectuals and 
within the academy. Such a critique of the critique is especially urgent at this time, as 
there seems to be little possibility to address antisemitism forcefully within the academy 
or to express outrage and concern regarding the recent successes of Islamism despite its 
reactionary agenda and worldview.25 Instead, these ideological and philosophical 
foundations enable leading and respected scholars such as Judith Butler to argue that 
Hamas and Hezbollah ought to be viewed as part as the progressive global left. It also 
encourages some observers, including scholars of antisemitism, to blame Israel for 
antisemitism throughout the world.26 
                                                                                                                                                       
21  Charles Asher Small, “The Gaze of the Colonial and Post-Colonial: Judeophobia, Empire and 
Islamism,” Conference: Orientalism Revisited: Art and the Politics of Representation, Paul Good-
win, Curator, Tate Britain, London, June 2008. 
22  See Janet Afary and Kevin Anderson, Foucault and the Iranian Revolution: Gender and the Seduc-
tion of Islamism (University of Chicago Press 2005). Afary and Anderson examine Foucault’s 1978 visit 
to Iran where he met with leaders of the Iranian-Islamist revolution, including Ayatollah Khomeneini. 
The authors document how this period influenced the philosopher’s understanding of issues such as 
the Enlightenment, homosexuality, and his quest for the notion of political spirituality. As the book 
demonstrates, this topic, which has been largely overlooked, is worthy of consideration. 
23  Ramin Jahanbegloo, Iran: Between Tradition and Modernity (Lexington Books 2004). 
24  For an analysis of social movements, which are transformational, and protest movements, 
which are reformist, see Manuel Castells, City, Class, and Power (MacMillan, London 1978). 
25  Daniel Sibony, Freud, Edward Said and Israel (forthcoming). 
26  Id. It is fascinating to note that Jewish scholars who blame Israel for various crimes and even 
antisemitism itself often enjoy much attention and popularity, more so than scholars doing the 
serious analysis and research. In fact, this is a common phenomenon with regard to the politics of 
hatred more generally and historically. 
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Even in the aftermath of the Holocaust, and despite the academy’s preoccupation 
with colonialism, racism, sexism, socio-economic, political, and cultural inequality, 
domination, and critical understandings of “Otherness,” antisemitism, especially its 
contemporary manifestations, does not exist as an area of study in the mainstream 
academic curriculum.27 Unlike other forms of discrimination, antisemitism is not an 
issue of significant concern. These developments have had the effect of placing attempts 
to defend the Jews—and their legitimate connection to Israel and Jerusalem—outside the 
realms of what is acceptable and proper. This is most troubling, given that the legacy of 
antisemitism in the academy and in Western civilization more generally has yet to be 
understood and addressed in the same way as other forms of discrimination and hatred. 
The contemporary perception in some quarters of the Zionist movement as an unfash-
ionable, intellectually defunct, and morally bankrupt remnant of Western colonial racist 
culture—a perception that pays no attention to the competing narrative of Jewish na-
tional aspirations or the Jewish people’s millennia-spanning history in the region—is 
therefore a recipe for disaster. At the very least, it creates an uncritical blind spot for the 
role that antisemitism plays in the contemporary Middle East. To engage in the study of 
antisemitism is somehow perceived as supportive of the Zionist narrative, while the real 
threat that antisemitism poses is not understood and no polices are developed to ad-
dress it, let alone to help thwart it.28 
In this environment, it is more acceptable to study the role of the Church or the role 
of fascism in antisemitism rather than its contemporary manifestations.29 In fact, if one 
looks at the history of antisemitism, it was never acceptable to study or examine con-
temporary forms of antisemitism at the time in which they occurred. The true challenge 
of effective and insightful scholarship is to understand the real threat that antisemitism 
poses to people and society today and to develop policies to protect ourselves against 
this threat. However, it is not uncommon to find scholars and institutions that are 
opposed to the study of contemporary antisemitism yet still blame Israel for its renewed 
prevalence without research to back up these claims. This response is not based on sound 
                                                                                                                                                       
27  It is worth recalling that during the rise of Nazism the German academy as an institution 
voluntarily cleansed itself of Jews. See Saul Friedlander, The Years of Persecution: Nazi Germany and 
the Jews 1933-1939 (Phoenix, London 2007). While I do not wish to compare the German academy of 
the Nazi era to the present academy, the role of the academy in studying, combating, or promoting 
contemporary antisemitism ought to be critically examined, regardless of the period. At present, the 
university campus atmosphere is once again becoming increasingly hostile in terms of the pressures 
facing Jewish students. In fact, US universities have a history of questionable relations with dubious 
interests, including the Nazi regime and Islamist interests. See Stephen Norwood, The Third Reich in 
the Ivory Tower: Complicity and Conflict on American Campuses (Cambridge University Press 2009) and 
Mitchell Bard, The Arab Lobby: The Invisible Alliance That Undermines America’s Interests in the Middle 
East (Harper Collins 2010). 
28  For a clear example of this sort of conflation, see Joseph Massad, “Palestinians, Egyptian 
Jews and propaganda,” Aljazeera, January 7, 2013. 
29  A good example of this phenomenon is Paul Gilroy’s book, Between Camps: Nations, Cultures 
and the Allure of Race (2001), which begins with a heavily nostalgic and sympathetic look at the 
Jewish refugees that fled Nazi Europe and arrived in the London cityscape of Gilroy’s childhood. It 
seems uncourageous, and is reflective of a general tendency within the academy, to condemn the 
horrible racist antisemitism of an era past while turning a blind eye to contemporary manifesta-
tions. 
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academic analysis but nonetheless finds appreciative academic audiences and in some 
cases enjoys the blessing of university administrations eager to receive funding from 
Gulf states and/or to avoid confronting inconvenient truths of the contemporary condi-
tion.30 For instance, at a recent gathering at Yale University, a group of historians of 
French society concluded that Jihadist antisemitism should really be understood as a 
metaphor used for rhetorical and political impact. None of the scholars in question were 
students of Arabic, the Middle East, Islam, contemporary political or social movements, 
or contemporary or post-Holocaust antisemitism. However, this did not stop them from 
adopting a position that would no doubt be welcomed by their institutions and gate-
keepers. 
* * * 
Daniel Sibony, the French philosopher, provides insights into the above-mentioned 
attitudes, which appear to have taken hold in many elite academic institutions in the 
West.31 In fact, Sibony contends that deep down those who insist on ignoring Islamism 
and its reactionary agenda are actually anti-Muslim themselves. The silencing of schol-
ars and human rights activists who are concerned about antisemitism and human rights 
in Middle Eastern societies is a manifestation of a deep fear, or phobia, of the Islamic 
world. This fear, which is combined with guilt over the West’s colonial legacy in the 
Middle East, is powerful.32 As a result, there is a tendency in certain circles to tolerate 
and justify reactionary Islamic attitudes, including sexism, homophobia, and anti-
semitism, despite their own liberal views. It is thus more convenient to blame the Jews 
for the stalemate in the Middle East and other related problems. Sibony traces this to the 
colonial mentality of not expecting the peoples of the Middle East and other parts of the 
world to adhere to the same criteria of human rights and civility as the “civilized” West. 
He also points out that those who continue to highlight these contradictions and dangers 
eventually come to be perceived as the problem and are targeted instead.33 
Sibony goes further, stating that there is an emerging fascination in the West with the 
genocidal antisemitic narrative of radical Islamism as expressed by the Iranian regime, 
the Muslim Brotherhood, and other Salafists.34 In a similar vein, Colin Shindler argues 
that the growing red-green alliance has come to see the displaced and marginalized 
members of the Islamic world as the new proletariat, who deserve Western liberal 
support and admiration. Anyone perceived as being critical of the new Islamic proletari-
                                                                                                                                                       
30  See Alex Joffe, “Follow the Money,” Jewish Ideas, March 2, 2011; Ben Cohen, “Scholarship and 
Antisemitism at Yale,” Jewish Ledger, Hartford, Connecticut, March 28, 2012. 
31  Daniel Sibony, Freud, Edward Said and Israel (forthcoming). 
32  An example of the manifestation of this fear occurred when Yale sociologist Jeffrey Alexan-
der, speaking on National Public Radio (NPR), compared the work of YIISA to that of the Black 
Panthers. Such an irrational, ahistorical, and reductionist comment pertaining to the African 
American condition and to the complex issues of both racism and antisemitism provides an insight 
into the sort of hurdles that are prevalent in the academy with regard to this subject. “Yale Shuts 
Down Antisemitism Program,” National Public Radio, June 17, 2011. 
33  Daniel Sibony, L’Enigme antisémite (Seuil 2004). See also Daniel Sibony, “The Essence of Anti-
semitism: Is It Too Simple to Be Understood?” ISGAP Seminar Series, McGill University, October 
16, 2012. 
34  Daniel Sibony, “The Essence of Antisemitism: Is It Too Simple to Be Understood?” ISGAP 
Seminar Series, McGill University, October 16, 2012 and Harvard University, October 17, 2012. 
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at is immediately branded a reactionary.35 In this intellectual climate, voices condemning 
brutality, anti-democratic practices, sexism, homophobia, opposition to minority rights, 
and other violations of universal human rights are silenced, while expressions of geno-
cidal antisemitism are dismissed as poor translations and/or hysterical rhetoric fash-
ioned by the Zionist defenders of Israel. This is what makes the task at hand, namely to 
produce high-caliber scholarship and effective policy development and analysis for 
dealing with contemporary antisemitism—in particular its potentially genocidal varie-
ty—all the more challenging but also all the more urgent. 
* * * 
The crisis of modernity refers to the crisis of capitalism itself. Regardless of one’s defini-
tion, the crisis is causing problems at local and global level and has become a key aspect 
of the contemporary condition. Institutions that play a key role in society, especially the 
state, are under increasing pressure. The crisis is affecting everything from the core to 
the periphery. Those in the periphery are experiencing high levels of socio-economic, 
political, and even cultural marginalization. In some areas of the world, the economic 
and political crisis in is so severe that it is causing failing and even failed states. Several 
states in the Middle East and North Africa, as well as several other Islamic states, are 
currently in this predicament.36 When such states fail, marginalization increases. The 
resulting power vacuum is increasingly being filled by radical Islamism, whose adher-
ents, like those who follow neo-liberalism, actually detest the state, perceiving it as a 
vestige of the colonial era and Western imperialism. In many cases, the political actors 
and interests that are rising to power subscribe to ideological worldviews that are also 
extremely hostile toward Jews. 
In the context of the conference title, the term “modernity” refers to the processes 
that led to the emergence of the specific and distinctive characteristics of modern society. 
In this context, the concept of “modernity” does not simply refer to a phenomenon of 
contemporary origin. It posses an analytical and conceptual value that embodies the 
defining characteristics of modern societies. According to Stuart Hall, these characteris-
tics include: 
(1) The dominance of secular forms of political power and authority and conceptions of 
sovereignty and legitimacy, operating within defined territorial boundaries, which 
are characteristic of the large, complex structures of the modern nation-state. 
(2) A monetarized exchange economy, based on the large-scale production and con-
sumption of commodities for the market, extensive ownership of private property 
and the accumulation of capital on a systemic, long-term basis. […] 
(3) The decline of the traditional social order, with its fixed social hierarchies and 
overlapping allegiances, and the appearance of a dynamic social and sexual division 
of labor. In modern capitalist societies, this was characterized by new class for-
mations and distinctive patriarchal relations between men and women. 
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(4) The decline of the religious world-view typical of traditional societies and the rise of 
a secular and materialist culture, exhibiting those individualistic, rationalist, and in-
strumental impulses now so familiar to us.37 
The emergence of modern societies was spurred by new intellectual movements that 
developed during the Reformation, the Renaissance, the Scientific Revolution of the 
seventeenth century and the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century. The transfor-
mation of Europe’s intellectual, philosophical, and moral framework was significant and 
played an important part in the formation of modern societies as encapsulated by 
capitalism and the rise of the nation state. In addition, Hall contends that the construc-
tion of cultural and social identities is an important aspect of the formation process. This 
then plays a key role in creating “imagined communities” and symbolic boundaries that 
define who belongs and who is excluded as the “Other.”38 
In the context of the YIISA conference, the “crisis of modernity” refers to the current 
breakdown of the political and economic system. However, this crisis also operates at a 
philosophical level, raising issues that are just as important as economic and political 
uncertainty. In fact, the uncertainty created by the crisis is eroding the moral and ethical 
rudder of Western institutions by creating a philosophical vacuum that is being filled by 
the moral relativism of postmodernism. 
On one level, modernity offered a different vision of humanity, society, and the uni-
verse, but it also required a narrative to establish the legitimacy of its vision. This narra-
tive constructed an image of the “Other,” living in darkness and irrational ignorance due 
to his so-called primitive religious beliefs. In contrast, the so-called Enlightened thinkers 
and scientists succeeded in liberating man from his material and philosophical poverty 
and placed him on the path to progress and perfection.39 This narrative, which was 
dominant in seventeenth and eighteenth century Europe, also provided the foundations 
for modernity’s racism, slavery, and—as some argue—even the Holocaust. 
The “crisis of modernity,” then, is the recognition of the weakness of this narrative 
and the uncertainty of everything that has emerged from it, including the existing social 
order, ethical standards, and even our perceptions of ourselves. In this postmodern 
moment of uncertainty and competing relativist narratives, thinkers are prevented from 
thoroughly examining and speaking out against the forms of discrimination openly 
advocated by radical reactionary social movements, including but not limited to anti-
semitism, that challenge notions of equality and robust citizenship.40 Another result of 
the “crisis of modernity” is the emergence of the aforementioned red-green alliance, 
                                                                                                                                                       
37  Stuart Hall, “Introduction,” in Stuart Hall et al., eds., Modernity: An Introduction to Modern 
Societies (Blackwell Publishers 1996) p. 8. 
38  Id. 
39  Id. 
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which is gaining ground among scholars, practitioners, and activists, as well as within 
the political establishment. 
* * * 
Much of the scholarship on antisemitism is descriptive in nature, especially concerning 
its contemporary manifestations. However, there is also a need to analyze antisemitism 
in the context of other processes—socio-economic, political, cultural, and ideological—
and the impact of globalization. Few scholars contextualize their studies in this manner. 
There is therefore a need to combine empirical and conceptual analysis of antisemitism 
within an interdisciplinary framework. The contemporary condition, which is character-
ized by the crisis of modernity, the processes of globalization, which are governed by a 
neo-liberal approach, the weakening of the state, the emergence of radical political 
Islamism as an effective social movement, the reluctance of Western intellectuals to 
critically engage these processes, and the re-emergence for the first time since the Holo-
caust of a deadly form of antisemitism, requires the development of a creative, interdis-
ciplinary, critical approach within a cooperative research entity to begin to assess this 
phenomenon in all its manifestations and implications. This is especially true at a time 
when―for all sorts of reasons―such an entity has many opponents. 
Globalization has a direct bearing on contemporary antisemitism. During the last 
several decades, nationalism and new forms of identity politics have exacerbated exist-
ing social, economic, and political cleavages. The causes of this emerging crisis include 
the extension of global competitive markets and the effects of structural adjustment, the 
intensification of socio-economic inequalities, the blurring of international and domestic 
political conflicts, and the world-wide escalation of adversarial “identity politics.”41 The 
extension of information technologies and travel possibilities has created a new network 
of “global spaces” within the interstices of metropolitan life across continents, inhabited 
by a growing coterie of transnational professionals and specialists. From the perspective 
of this high-rise corporate economy and corporate culture, the city down below appears 
to be inhabited by immigrant populations competing for low-wage jobs in an increasing-
ly informalized urban economy, as the state retreats from its welfare functions. The 
combined economic and political imperatives of globalization seem to sweep away 
particularities of time and place to generate common outcomes everywhere: growing 
ethnic racial and cultural heterogeneity, coupled with social and spatial polarization. 
At the most general level, it is possible to think of globalization in terms of move-
ment and circulation, a complexity of criss-crossing flows: some of it capital and trade, 
some of it people, and some of it signs, symbols, meanings, and myths. A common 
thread which runs through the existing body of literature is the idea that such flows and 
mobility across space have accelerated, speeded up, or gained a new momentum in the 
contemporary era, captured in such key phrases as “time-space compression,”42 “time-
space distantiation,”43 and “intersecting scapes.”44 Thus the concept of globalization 
does not imply a shift from one period to another in the form of an historical rupture, as 
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Local and Global Forces (Sefer Academic Press, Ibadan, Nigeria 2007). 
42  D. Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity (Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1989). 
43  A. Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Polity/Blackwell, Cambridge 1990). 
44  A. Appadurai, Globalization (Duke University Press, Durham, N.C. 2001). 
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do other encompassing terms most frequently used to describe contemporary metropoli-
tan experience, namely post-Fordism.45 and postmodernity.46 Rather it denotes an 
intensification and stretching out of movements and flows, as captured for instance in 
Giddens’s definition of globalization as “the intensification of world-wide social rela-
tions which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by 
events occurring many miles away and vice versa.”47 
Some social groups initiate flows and movement, while other do not; some are more 
on the receiving end of it than others; some are effectively imprisoned by it. There is 
thus a dimension of movement and circulation; there is also a dimension of control and 
initiation. The ways in which different social groups are re-inserted into, placed within, 
and seize upon these flows, which are themselves differentiated, can both reflect and 
reinforce existing power relations; it can also undermine them. What does not follow 
from the considerations above, and yet continues to inform much of the literature on 
global flows, is the social imaginary of a borderless world. Inherent to the concept of 
global flows, differentiated and differentiating, is the capacity to transgress taken for 
granted boundaries between nation states, between racial, ethnic, and gender groups, 
and between the public and private spheres. This does mean, however, an increasingly 
order-less world, one in which boundaries have lost their meaning. On the contrary, 
borders have become the locus of struggles among a variety of social actors, mobilized 
to reassert or redefine their boundaries vis-à-vis other relevant actors, and translate onto 
the space of the metropolis. 
Globalization divides as much as it unites. Alongside the emerging planetary dimen-
sions of business, finance, trade, and information flows, a localizing, space-fixing pro-
cess is set in motion. Between them the closely interconnected processes sharply 
differentiate the existential condition of entire populations and of various segments of 
each one of the populations. What appears as globalization for some means localization 
for others; signaling a new freedom for some, upon many others it descends as an 
uninvited and cruel fate. Some of us become fully and truly global; some are fixed in 
their locality. Being local in a globalized world is a sign of deprivation and degradation. 
An integral part of the globalizing process is progressive spatial segregation, separation, 
and exclusion. Neo-tribal and fundamentalist tendencies, which reflect and articulate the 
experience of people on the receiving end of globalization, are as much legitimate 
reactions to globalization as the widely acclaimed hybridization of top-culture—the 
culture at the globalized top. There is a break down in communication between the 
globalized elites and the ever-more localized rest.48 
* * * 
It is in this context that contemporary antisemitism emerges. In a real sense, Israel is in 
the middle of a region in which societies are experiencing critical levels of marginaliza-
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tion, and in some cases collapse, threatening social cohesion and further complicating 
international relations. As mentioned above, globalization―through migration, trade 
and business, and advances in technology and telecommunications―is connecting 
people as never before, but it is also dividing them as much as it unites them. In the 
midst of these processes, contradictions, and emerging cleavages, antisemitism is once 
again flourishing in the form of the demonization of Israel and, by extension, Diaspora 
Jewry, with its real and supposed associations with the State of Israel.49 During five 
years of interdisciplinary programming and research projects conducted at the highest 
levels of scholarship, several YIISA scholars examined the emerging socio-economic, 
political, and cultural vacuum that is being filled by the burgeoning social movement of 
radical political Islamism. This movement embodies the most pernicious forms of 
antisemitism, including a consistent call for, and incitement to, genocide against the 
Jewish state, consistent with its ideological and religious worldview. Many scholars and 
policy makers do not recognize or acknowledge these developments. It is within this 
context that Israel is emerging as the “Jew among nations,” finding itself geographically, 
politically, and metaphorically in the center of this process, as well as on the frontline of 
a conflict over basic relations of the state and notions of democracy. Like the Jews of 
Europe during the interwar period, the Israel and―perhaps more so―Jewish people in 
Diaspora communities around the world will find themselves separated from the elites 
on one side and the working classes on the other. They will be more separated political-
ly, culturally, and economically in the middle of competing forces as the crisis of mo-
dernity continues to evolve and its manifestations deepen. As Bernard-Henri Lévy 
contends, it is the role of the intellectual to shed light where there is darkness. It is the 
study of contemporary antisemitism and the struggle to develop social policies that will 
promote human dignity and respect for all that is once again an urgent calling for 
scholars.50 With this in mind, it is important to consider the following three points: 
(1) The failure to recognize antisemitism studies as a valid academic discipline contributes 
to the ongoing mood of apologetic lethargy concerning this long-lasting prejudice. 
Now more than ever, there is a need for a vibrant, critical, open interdisciplinary re-
search center to develop research projects and interdisciplinary curriculums. Policy 
and policy development are respected areas of study that need to be included in the 
area of contemporary antisemitism studies. Those who dismiss this as advocacy are 
pushing an regressive political advocacy agenda of their own. 
(2) The failure of academia to assert its independence from funding sources and gov-
ernment influence in the study of human rights and efforts to combat hatred is a 
failure worthy of research in itself, as it goes to the heart of free debate and demo-
cratic principles and practice. 
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(3) Antisemitism is a major issue in the study of globalization, modernism, and post-
modernism and also needs to be acknowledged as a legitimate issue in Middle East-
ern studies. The study of contemporary antisemitism from an interdisciplinary 
perspective is crucial to scholarship, policy, and the protection of human rights, hu-
man dignity, and democratic principles, especially in these times of silence. 
As Ruth Wisse has summarized the issue with insight and power: “Jews in demo-
cratic societies are not merely the proverbial canaries sent into the mine shaft to test the 
quality of the air: they function rather as the kindling used to set the system aflame. 
Why stop at the Jews?” In other words, the study of antisemitism is not a parochial 
matter, but a complex and explosive phenomenon that is bound up with matters of 
human rights, the protection of democratic principles, and citizenship, as well as notions 
of dignity. In the contemporary context of globalization, combined with the rise of 
reactionary social movements, we must not only examine and come to understand these 
complex processes as they relate to antisemitism: it is also incumbent upon us to develop 
approaches to safeguard and solve these attacks against all humanity. 
* * * 
This book will be of interest to students and scholars of antisemitism and discrimination, 
as well as to scholars and readers from other fields. Rather than treating antisemitism 
merely as an historical phenomenon, this book places it squarely in the contemporary 
context. As a result, the papers presented in this volume also provide important insights 
into the ideologies, processes, and developments that give rise to prejudice in the con-






“New Europe,” Holocaust Memory,  
and Antisemitism 
David M. Seymour.* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper is part of a larger research project that examines the ways in which the 
Holocaust comes to be subsumed within a discursive framework of contemporary forms 
of antisemitism. Here, I examine this tendency as it plays itself out at the intersection of 
two interrelated narratives: the construction of the “new Europe” and its self-
legitimizing through the transmission of “Holocaust” to “Holocaust memory.” 
Drawing on the concept of “Holocaust dissolution” and its connections with the proc-
ess of commodification that I have developed elsewhere,1 I argue that the Holocaust 
memory of the “new Europe” rests ultimately on dissolving its specifically Jewish dimen-
sions of genocide into an overarching concept of “modernity”—a modernity now tran-
scended, but thought to capture the essence of the “old” Europe. Two consequences follow 
from this initial premise. The first is the strict equation made of genocidal antisemitism and 
modernity, and the second, intimately related consequence is the theoretical inability to 
recognize non-genocidal antisemitism not only in the “old” Europe but also in its new 
incarnation. I argue, finally, that it is this lack of recognition of even the possibility of 
antisemitism that accounts not only for the denial of claims of contemporary European 
antisemitism, but also the intensity with which those claims are sometimes met and the 
accusations of “bad faith” and Jewish “particularism” that accompany them. 
2. NEW EUROPE, THE HOLOCAUST, AND HOLOCAUST MEMORY 
Writing in his recent essay,2 Robert Fine offers a succinct account of the nature of Holo-
caust memory within the legitimizing practices of the new Europe. It is worth quoting at 
length, 
After 1989, the “Europeanization” of Eastern Europe drew the former satellite coun-
tries of the Soviet bloc into the orbit of Holocaust commemoration. The Holocaust and 
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Auschwitz became universal references for absolute evil. In this context, one temptation 
is to give the story of European antisemitism a happy ending and to pay tribute to the 
success of the new Europe in transcending its longest hatred. Antisemitism is tucked 
safely away in Europe’s past, overcome by the defeat of fascism and the development of the 
Soviet Union. The rise of political antisemitism in the late 19th century and its consoli-
dation as an exterminatory antisemitism in the 20th century, are associated with the 
ethnic nationalism that prevailed in Europe at that time, especially in Germany and 
Eastern Europe; while the end of antisemitism is associated with the universal civil val-
ues now embodied in the European Union and European Convention on Human 
Rights…. This reassuring narrative looks back to an era in which antisemites saw them-
selves as guardians of the ethnically pure nation-state and forward to a post national Europe 
in which antisemitism is remembered, but only as a residual trauma or a museum piece…. 
Thus, the idea of Europe as the civilized continent is rescued from the wreckage.3 
Fine’s account of the distinction between the old and new Europe includes a series of 
strictly demarcated binary oppositions, the nation-state/Europe, nationalism/cosmo-
politanism, fascism/human rights, politics/civil society, and genocidal antisemitism/ 
pluralism. The new Europe, in short, defines itself through its overcoming and neutraliz-
ing of the first term of each of these couplets and their “safe” consignment to the past. In 
this context, Holocaust memory and the Holocaust itself become a bridge or hinge 
between the old and the new Europe. 
This last point is articulated by Levy and Sznaider in their project on the connections 
between the Holocaust, Holocaust memory, and human rights, 
The Holocaust constitutes an epochal break. It has, therefore, the potential of challenging 
basic national assumption (like sovereign law in its own territory) and creating a cos-
mopolitanized public and political space that reinforces moral dependencies…. [W]hat 
has pushed the Holocaust to such prominence in public thinking has been the indispen-
sable role it has served in the transition from a world of national sovereignty to a new 
world of interconnectedness and toward a more cosmopolitanized global society, of 
which the proliferation of human rights regimes is a prominent manifestation.4 
Here, the Holocaust is cast in the role as “epochal break” between the old and the new and 
as containing the potential of bringing into existence the “new” (whether in Europe or 
elsewhere), but we also see a further oppositional couplet, that of Holocaust and Holocaust 
memory. Again the first term is consigned to the past and the second is seemingly rooted 
in the present. However, in the content of their representation of the Holocaust both in 
itself and in the context of the new Europe’s Holocaust memory, there is a line of continu-
ity that crosses the assumed demarcation. That strand of continuity is what I refer to as 
Holocaust dissolution and its associated commodification. More specifically, I argue that 
the presentation of the Holocaust as Holocaust memory dissolves the praxis of genocidal 
antisemitism into a general or universalized account of the “old Europe” in such a way 
that any recognition of the particularities that may account for the genocide are lost along 
with the ability to recognize non-exterminatory forms of anti-Jewish hostility. 
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3. HOLOCAUST DISSOLUTION: THE COMMODIFICATION OF THE NEW EUROPE’S 
HOLOCAUST MEMORY 
In keeping with the new Europe’s post-modern and post-national framework, it is not 
surprising that its representation of the Holocaust should draw from that critical tradi-
tion. This connection is evidenced by Levy and Sznaider’s reference to “national sover-
eignty” and “national assumptions” as the operative causes of genocidal antisemitism. 
As such, this aspect of their work draws on the writings of Zygmunt Bauman,5 Michel 
Foucault,6 and Giorgio Agamben.7 Despite the important distinctions that exist between 
these works, a common unifying theme is the connection this school of thought makes 
between the Holocaust, the nation-state and an overarching concept of modernity. 
For these thinkers, genocidal antisemitism is integral to the modernist “project” that 
is the defining characteristic of the modern nation-state. In terms of content, this project 
is characterized as an obsession with the needs of national order and/or the health of the 
national population. It is in this context that the Jews are cast as the “Other,” as the 
embodiment of the threat to such order and health. This project of order and health is 
both inaugurated and managed by the state; it is the state that classifies the population 
under its domain according the criteria of those who contribute to the health of society 
and those who pose a threat, that is, “those who shall live” and “those who shall die,” 
respectively. Inscribed within the very essence of modernity itself, genocidal anti-
semitism becomes the expression of this policing of boundaries and the expression of the 
very nature of modern national sovereignty. For Agamben, in particular, the classifying 
and its genocidal practice are present within the praxis of national law and the juridical 
rights inherent within it. 
Although not fully theorized, Levy and Sznaider’s account of the Holocaust draws 
on accounts of this kind for an understanding of its causes. This point is evident in their 
belief, noted above, that the compulsive impulse to modern genocide is overcome by 
and in the post-national and post-modern Europe and its emphasis upon the praxis of 
cosmopolitan human rights that is said to constitute the juridical basis of a new transna-
tional European civil society. Yet, it is precisely in this account that Levy and Sznaider’s 
presentation of the Holocaust exhibits the tendency to Holocaust dissolution and com-
modification that is also characteristic of the critical thinkers whose work they echo. By 
dissolving the Holocaust into the concept of modernity itself, it is not so much anti-
semitism that is overcome (since it is robbed of any autonomous existence) but, rather, the 
old (i.e. modern) Europe itself. 
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This last point comes to the fore in the following ways. First, and most obviously, in 
a mirror image of the new Europe, the placement of genocidal antisemitism within the 
overarching concept of modernity, serves to deterritorialize and dehistoricize the his-
torical actuality of the Holocaust. It cannot but overlook any consideration of why the 
Holocaust occurred at a specific time and specific place (Germany in the mid-20th 
century). In so doing, it dissolves the Holocaust’s specificity into the more abstract and 
universal framework of the modern European nation-state. 
Implicit in this initial tendency of the dissolution of the particularism of genocidal 
antisemitism into the abstract universals is the positivist presentation of its conceptual 
schema. As no more than internal expressions of the “modern project” and of the praxis 
of biopolitics and racism, the aims and outcomes are read into modernity from its 
inception (including genocide). Related concepts, such as law, rights, the nation, Jews, 
antisemitism, and so forth appear on the scene in an equally ahistorical and static form. 
These concepts’ form and content, seemingly complete in meaning from their origin are, 
in other words, simply posited—the product of a seemingly omnipotent power. They 
take on the appearance of “brute facts.” This presentation of modernity’s (and so too the 
Holocaust’s) operative concepts adopts the positivist mantra that what is, simply is. In 
so doing, they take on the aura of a force and fate of nature that cannot, nor could be 
otherwise. It is in this positivism that any notion of internal conceptual development is 
correspondingly abjured and all external relations are represented as innate and natural 
properties of the concept itself. To put the matter in slightly different terms, all the 
concepts relating to the Holocaust are presented as always already containing within 
them, both jointly and severally, the same inherent propensity of extermination found in 
the overarching concept of modernity itself. 
It is in this context that the historical actuality of the Holocaust comes to be dissolved 
within the nature of “modernity” itself. However, as the above comments indicate, this 
does not lead to the position that the new Europe has transcended (modern) anti-
semitism. The claim that having transcended the modern Europe, we have, almost as a by-
product, overcome the seemingly natural propensity to genocidal antisemitism says 
little about antisemitism that is neither nationalist, genocidal, nor political in origin. As 
the critique above indicates, the possibility of the presence of a non-political, non-
nationalist, and non-genocidal antisemitism remains simultaneously invisible and 
untheorized. 
The danger of such an account is that, since antisemitism (now defined only as geno-
cidal antisemitism or the Holocaust) has not only been relegated to the past but has also 
been overcome by the legitimizing force of the new Europe, any claim of contemporary 
antisemitism that draws on its memory is deemed illegitimate from the outset. It calls 
into question the anti-anti, or, rather, post-antisemitic image of the new Europe. It is, I 
believe, the potentially destabilizing effect of claims of contemporary antisemitism on 
the new Europe’s gilded self-image that goes some way to explaining not only the 
denials of claims of contemporary antisemitism but also the intensity of those denials. 
4. HOLOCAUST MEMORY, COMMODIFICATION, AND THE MORAL ECONOMY OF 
THE “NEW EUROPE” 
As we have seen, all that remains in post-national and post-modern Europe is the 
memory of the Holocaust. But it is less a memory of the Holocaust itself than a memory of 
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the modernity into which the Holocaust has been dissolved. Separated from the struc-
tural conditions that made it possible, the Holocaust of the new Europe’s memory 
becomes nothing more than a symbol. It is a symbol, however, not of antisemitism, 
genocidal or otherwise, but of the old Europe itself, a Europe fragmented into nation-
states along with its concomitants of national sovereignty, nationalism, and the geno-
cidal impulse that is said to inhere within it. 
Expressing its distance from the world that made the Holocaust possible, the new 
European symbol of the Holocaust is recast in the language of morality. The symbols’ 
purpose and function is to serve as a warning to be sounded whenever and wherever 
any of the tendencies of the old Europe threaten to reappear. The moral imperative 
contained in this symbolism of the Holocaust is contained in the maxim, “Never Again, 
Auschwitz.” It is to this symbolic value that Dubiel refers in his article The Remembrance 
of the Holocaust as a Catalyst for a Transnational Ethics?,8 when he notes that, 
For the Holocaust now provides the meta-narrative for sufferings inflicted for politi-
cal reasons. It has turned into the supra-denominational passion story of late-
modernity. Concepts, symbols and images are taken out of their immediate context 
and are employed to code, in a single term, the collective pain that people inflict on 
others. The symbolic repertoire has been adopted by political groups all over the 
world who are subject to extreme pain and distress. It is present in the political de-
fense of human rights, in the re-moralizing of diplomacy, and in the turning away of 
the morally neutral Realpolitik.9 
We see here an example not only of Holocaust dissolution and its re-surfacing as post-
national and post-modern symbol but also of its resurfacing within the register of 
morality. Symbolic representation within this register forms the context in which claims 
of contemporary antisemitism are denied and creates the conditions for the particular 
intensity of those denials.10 
Perhaps the most concise way to explain this aspect of Holocaust dissolution is by 
analogy with Adorno and Horkheimer’s critique of commodification.11 For them, com-
modification is the process whereby unique and distinct elements of nature are caught 
up within the near universal realm of exchange. As a condition of entry, each individual 
element has to become exchangeable for all others. As a consequence of this demand, 
any specific or particular quality that inheres within them, and which obstructs that 
exchange, has to be expunged. It is only when emptied of such content and reformulated 
in strictly formal and, hence, universal terms that an element becomes a commodity and 
can take its place within the exchange realm of the economy. 
This notion of commodification marks discussions of the new Europe’s adoption and 
adaptation of genocidal antisemitism as a moral symbol and explains the dissolution of 
the specificities of the Holocaust into formal universal terms. This point can be detected 
in Levy and Sznaider’s work on Holocaust memory. 
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Depicting its symbolic value in terms of its “abstract nature of ‘good and evil,’”12 
the Holocaust can only serve its role as universal warning and call to action once it has 
been abstracted from or, rather, emptied of its particularist elements of its historical 
occurrence, including, of course, its specifically Jewish dimensions (amongst which is 
the presence of antisemitism). 
It is only in such circumstances that the Holocaust, now presented in abstract, for-
mal, and universal terms is free to play the symbolic role allocated to it. In such a form it 
takes its place as an ethical commodity within the exchange realm of the new Europe’s 
moral economy. It is only at this stage, therefore, when the Holocaust becomes freely 
exchangeable for any other number of situations, that its dissolution—a dissolution 
inherent in its symbolic value—is complete. 
It is as a consequence of such “commodification” and the dissolution of which it is a 
part that, as Levy and Sznaider note, 
The Holocaust is now a concept that has been dislocated from time and space pre-
cisely because it can be used to dramatize any injustice, racism or crime perpetrated 
anywhere on the planet.13 
However, as Adorno and Horkheimer argue, what cannot be contained within the 
commodity—that is, those particular aspects of the natural element that resist and 
obstruct its universalization—reappears in the image of a threatening and unpredictable 
“untamed nature.” Whilst, on the one hand, the commodity’s formal attributes permit 
its inclusion in the realm of exchange, on the other hand, its now expunged specificities 
(that which obstructs such entry) are recast as nothing more than an irrational remnant 
of the past or as no more than a superstitious myth having no place in the increasingly 
rationalized (i.e. commodified) world. These specificities are rejected in that world; they 
become that which cannot be recognized and subject to the status of exclusion and 
taboo.14 
Let me now make this analogy between Holocaust memory and the twin aspects of 
Adorno and Horkheimer’s conception of commodification more direct, so as to shed 
light upon the intense denials by many to claims of contemporary antisemitism. Read 
into the very fiber of modernity, of the old Europe, genocidal antisemitism takes on the 
appearance of a natural phenomenon and is raised to the status of a law of nature. From 
the perspective of the new Europe, whose self-representation turns on the transcendence 
or overcoming of such antisemitism, any recognition of its existence, whether as a 
continuation of past manifestations or as a new phenomenon, serves to undermine its 
defining claim. This factor alone goes some way to understanding the intensity of the 
denial of contemporary claims. To this initial point, however, a further element can be 
identified. 
In an era in which antisemitism is deemed a thing of the past, claims of its contempo-
rary presence appear to be no more than claims to see an irrational legacy of the past, of 
less enlightened times. Now that the Holocaust has become commodified, its now 
expunged content—its specificities and particularities, its potential continued existence 
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as “untamed nature,” its antisemitism—takes on the aura of superstition and taboo along 
with the prohibitions and sanctions that attaches to such abject phenomena. 
5. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, I have sought to understand why claims of contemporary antisemitism are 
met with such intense denial. Looking at the problem within the context of the “new 
Europe,” I have argued that the underpinning cause of the intensity of denial is that the 
account of the Holocaust as an inherent outcome of “modernity” and its reframing as 
“Holocaust memory” and universal moral symbol required dissolving the particularities 
of its Jewish dimensions, including dissolving the phenomenon of antisemitism into 
more universal and generalized concepts. 
First, in the new Europe’s political reading of the Holocaust, antisemitism is recast as 
genocide. As a consequence, any consideration of modern antisemitism that does not fit 
into this genocidal concept remains both unseen and untheorized. In many ways, if such 
antisemitism does appear in these accounts, it is often presented as no more than a 
remnant from premodern times and hardly worthy of reflection. 
Second, a similar dissolution is present in the new Europe’s moralizing of the Holo-
caust. Certain of its overcoming of genocidal antisemitism, the new Europe reduces the 
Holocaust to the symbolic value of an abstract and formal, universal, moral imperative. 
Again, however, this universalizing is dependent on the expulsion of that aspect of the 
Holocaust’s specifically Jewish content. 
In both these instances, claims of antisemitism, genocidal or otherwise, are seen as no 
more than remnants of a previous age, an age now safely overcome and all but impossi-
ble to credit with any degree of seriousness. However, and more fundamentally, anti-
semitism as a “autonomous” phenomenon, one whose meaning, direction, and outcome 
are not determined by what amounts to an omnipotent political will to power, that is, 
one whose causes and responsibility are not so contained (and containable), is written 
out, not only of the structure of the new Europe itself but also of the old Europe that it is 
said to have overcome. In this context, therefore, the abject denial of antisemitism and 
the claims of bad faith associated with such denial may not be surprising. From the 
perspective of the new Europe, not only does antisemitism not exist today, but it has, as 




Antisemitism and Anti-Capitalism 
in the Current Economic Crisis 
Nicolas Bechter.* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In the current crisis of the economic system, many critics of capitalism feel confirmed in 
their views. They include radical leftists, who have always known that capitalism does 
not work, mainstream politicians, who do not question capitalism as such but only its 
neoliberal outbursts, and right-wing groups, who want to strengthen national states 
against a frenetic global economy. 
As important as it is to radically question the structures of our society, it can turn out 
to be dangerous if it is not done properly. The crucial word is “radically.” With its Latin 
origin radix (meaning “root”), in the field of social sciences it implies digging to the roots 
of social phenomena and thereby exposing and criticizing their foundations. Inspired by 
Karl Marx and his Critique of Political Economy, Theodor Adorno made this his life’s work 
in various fields, including philosophy, sociology, and musicology. Adorno was also 
aware of the dangers of radical critique: 
Not everything that tends towards extremes in whatever dimension can be consid-
ered radical, but only what attacks the negative situation at the root in an “inconsid-
erate critique of the status quo.”(Adorno 2003: 92) 
This is especially important in the field of economic critique, as a superficial analysis of 
the structures and processes in an economic system can lead to premature verdicts. Such 
verdicts are never able to push through the ideological undergrowth and, for reasons 
that I will discuss later, often produce antisemitic consequences—whether consciously 
or unconsciously.  
The first part of this paper identifies the societal structures and historical tendencies 
that make it possible to blame “the Jews” for the problems of the capitalist system. This 
is followed by a case-study of an Austrian right-wing newspaper as proof of the ideas 
presented. 
2. POLITICAL ECONOMY 
Two aspects of Marx’s Critique of Political Economy are relevant to the various anti-
semitism theories discussed in this paper, namely the process of surplus production and 
abstract domination. 
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Marx starts his analysis of modern capitalist societies by analyzing the notion of 
commodity. This is surprising, as it would seem more obvious to start the examination 
with money. However, Marx realized that it is the commodity, not money, that is the 
basic unit of a capitalist economy and society. Money—the general equivalent—can then 
be deduced. Consequently, Marx’s critique of the bourgeois society is not a critique of 
money alone but of the whole process of capitalist production. He shows that surplus 
value, or profit, is not produced in the circulation sphere by selling the commodity at a 
higher price than the price at which it was bought but that it is produced by the workers 
in the production sphere and only realized by the capitalist in the circulation sphere. 
Another important point of Marx’s critique of the political economy relates to the 
change in forms of domination. Whereas in the past there used to be a personal form of 
domination, such as the master-slave or landlord-bondsman relationship, in capitalism 
this domination has been transformed into an abstract form of domination. The mem-
bers of modern societies are formally free, but unfortunately 
free in the double sense, that as a free man he can dispose of his labour-power as his 
own commodity, and that on the other hand he has no other commodity for sale, is 
short of everything necessary for the realization of his labour-power. (Marx 1995: 109) 
3. ANTISEMITISM AND ANTI-CAPITALISM 
Antisemitism has a strong affinity with anti-capitalism. From Shylock the reckless 
usurer, via the court Jew and Baron Rothschild, to the East Coast bankers, antisemites 
have frequently held the Jews responsible for the burdens of the (proto-)capitalistic 
society.1 It is crucial for the understanding of antisemitism to be aware of this link and to 
interpret it correctly. First and foremost, it is important to comprehend that antisemitism 
has nothing to do with real-life Jews, their behavior, or their habits. As the German 
author Ulrich Enderwitz puts it: 
antisemitic judgements are, because of their own structure, not reactions to real outer 
experience, but projections of an inner conflict, not the empirical product of a process 
of perception and cognition, but a symptomatic expression of a discrepancy and re-
sistance within the percepting and cognizing subject. (Enderwitz 1998: 11) 
For Adorno and Horkheimer, this projection is an important point in their antisemitism 
theory.2 In the third thesis of the “Elements of Anti-Semitism” in the Dialectic of Enlight-
enment, they make a connection between antisemitism and capitalism: “Bourgeois 
antisemitism has a specific economic cause: the concealment of domination in produc-
tion” (Horkheimer & Adorno 2004: 182). This is the connection to Marx and the trans-
formation of domination. The Jews, because of their historic position within the 
European economic system, were scapegoats for discontent with capitalism. Since some 
Jews were involved in the circulation sphere, they were the visible elements of the 
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economic process. “[The Jewish merchant] is the bailiff for the whole system and shoul-
ders the hatred for all the others” (Horkheimer & Adorno 2004: 183). 
So we can see that blaming the Jews for the shortcomings of capitalism is an abbreviat-
ed critique of capitalist structures that stops at the sphere of circulation instead of going to 
the root of the problem, which is located in the sphere of production. It is a “conformist 
rebellion” (Claussen 2005) in which the antisemites can live out their thwarted ambitions 
without attacking the system as a whole or challenging the ruling class. 
However, this failure to understand capitalist production is not just a subjective 
problem but is based within the structure of the society itself. “The responsibility of the 
circulation sphere for the exploitation is a societally necessary pretense.” (Horkheimer & 
Adorno 2004: 183) These necessities are strongly linked to such terms as fetish-character.3 
and ideology, which were used by Marx to describe capitalist society and were then 
employed by Moishe Postone, among others, to analyze antisemitism. 
Postone’s understanding of the relationship between antisemitism and capitalism is 
a development of certain aspects of Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s theory. For him, the 
identification of the Jews with the circulation sphere was true in the case of traditional 
antisemitism but is no longer valid in the case of its modern form: 
It is not that the Jews merely were considered to be the owners of money, as in tradi-
tional anti-Semitism, but that they were held responsible for economic crises and 
identified with the range of social restructuring and dislocation resulting from rapid 
industrialization. … In other words, the abstract domination of capital, which—
particularly with rapid industrialization—caught people up in a web of dynamic 
forces they could not understand, became perceived as the domination of Internation-
al Jewry. (Postone 1980: 107) 
Postone explains antisemitism by referring to Marx’s concept of the fetish of the commodi-
ty, understood as a 
mysterious thing simply because in it the social character of men’s labour appears to 
them as an objective character stamped upon the product of that labour; because the 
relation of the producers to the sum total of their own labour is presented to them as a 
social relation, existing not between themselves, but between the products of their 
labour. (Marx 1995: 43) 
This means that the relation between humans expresses itself in an objectified form, 
rather than a social form, because of the fetishism and the double character (value and 
use-value) of the commodity form. Thus, the commodity expresses and veils social 
relations at the same time. The abstract foundations of capitalist organization are veiled, 
and what is left are the concrete, sensual forms. 
One aspect of the fetish, then, is that capitalist social relations do not appear as such 
and, moreover, present themselves antinomically, as the opposition of the abstract 
and concrete. Because, additionally, both sides of the antinomy are objectified, each 
appears to be quasi-natural. The abstract dimension appears in the form of abstract, 
universal, “objective,” natural laws; the concrete dimension appears as pure “thingly” 
nature. (Postone 1980: 107) 
                                                                                                                                                       
3 For a longer discussion, see Grigat (2007) and Postone (1993). 
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This is the crucial point in Postone’s theory. He thinks that modern antisemitism does 
not identify the Jews with the circulation sphere but rather with its other side: the 
abstract dimension of value as such. 
When one examines the specific characteristics of the power attributed to the Jews by 
modern anti-Semitism—abstractness, intangibility, universality, mobility—it is strik-
ing that they are all characteristics of the value dimension of the social forms analyzed 
by Marx. Moreover, this dimension, like the supposed power of the Jews, does not 
appear as such, but always in the form of a material carrier, such as the commodity. 
(Postone 1980: 108) 
The concrete dimension (labor, artisanry) can then be constructed as natural and 
ontologized as a constant and everlasting pillar of humanity. Antisemitism as an anti-
capitalist outburst illegitimately separates the concrete and abstract dimension of capi-
talist society and focuses on agitating against this abstract dimension, against the money 
and financial capital personalized in international Jewry. In this fetishized perception, it 
is possible to pit honest manual labor against the exploitative, parasitic financial capital 
that biologizes capitalism. 
The “anti-capitalist” attack, however, does not remain limited to the attack against 
abstraction. Even the abstract dimension also appears materially. On the level of the 
capital fetish, it is not only the concrete side of the antimony which is naturalized and 
biologized. The manifest abstract dimension is also biologized—as the Jews. … Mod-
ern anti-Semitism involves a biologization of capitalism—which itself is only under-
stood in terms of its manifest abstract dimension—as International Jewry. (Postone 
1980: 112) 
4. AUSTRIAN NEWSPAPER DIE AULA.4 
I have chosen Die Aula as a case study of how anti-capitalism and antisemitism are often 
linked for various reasons. First, it is not just some small publication but the monthly 
newspaper of an organization with very close ties to the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) 
(Gärtner 1993: 262ff) and a monthly circulation of 11,000 copies.5 The Freedom Party is a 
right-wing party that was established as the third party in post-war Austria and was 
more or less openly the party of the (former) Nazis. The Freedom Party became interna-
tionally infamous in the late 1980s and 1990s as the party of Jörg Haider (Bailer & 
Neugebauer 1993). It became part of the federal government in 2000 and five years later 
split into a pragmatic liberal-right party (BZÖ) and a hard-line right-wing party (FPÖ) 
(Luther 2006; Stephen Roth Institute 2005). The main topics of the FPÖ are currently 
immigrants, especially Muslims, and the neoliberal rulers in Brussels. However, anti-
                                                                                                                                                       
4 I would like to thank Willi Lasek, Nedim Mujanović, and Heribert Schiedel of the Documen-
tation Center of the Austrian Resistance (Dokumentationsarchiv des österreichischen Widerstandes—
DÖW) for providing me with literature and copies of Die Aula and for helping me to contextualize 
this material within the Austrian extreme right scene. 
5 Die Aula do not make official statements on their circulation. However, the ÖZV, the Austrian 
periodical newspaper association, provides this figure on its website, at: <http://www.oezv.or.at>. 
According to Heribert Schiedel, an expert on the Austrian right-wing and neo-Nazi scene, this 
figure appears to be accurate, as Die Aula claimed to have 9,000 subscribers in the 1990s. 
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semitism, in the past as well as in the present, is a constant topic of FPÖ politicians 
(Schiedel & Neugebauer 2002). The proportion of votes received by the Freedom Party 
varies significantly but seems to be stabilizing between 15 and 20 percent. It is therefore 
not just a marginalized group on the edge of the democratic spectrum. 
The authors of Die Aula are sometimes FPÖ party members, like MEP Andreas 
Mölzer, but mostly people from the political environment of the Freedom Party: Nazi-
romantics, neo-Nazis, Holocaust deniers, and German-national student fraternities 
(Gärtner 1996: 151-227). The main topics of Die Aula are the Verbotsgesetz, the “death” of 
the Austrian/German people due to “mass immigration” (Überfremdung), the general 
decline of art, culture, and civilization, the excesses of EU bureaucracy, “Usrael,” and the 
economic crisis. According to the Documentation Center of the Austrian Resistance 
(DÖW) Die Aula has moved increasingly toward neo-Nazism in recent years.6 Even 
though Die Aula sees itself as a newspaper of the political right, it has no problem 
supporting left-wing or Muslim politicians, as long as they follow a strict anti-Israel 
foreign policy. Die Aula therefore supports Hugo Chavez in his struggle against an 
alleged “Usrael” conspiracy, backs Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in his 
support of radical Islamist groups and his pursuit of nuclear weapons, and acknowledg-
es the “courage” of two MPs of the German leftist party Die Linke who refused to ap-
plaud Israel’s President Simon Peres after he delivered a speech in the German 
parliament. 
For this paper, I have examined all issues of Die Aula from 2008, when the economic 
crisis became manifest with the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, to May 2010. Many 
articles during this period dealt with antisemitic topics, such as the “witch-hunt” against 
the Holocaust-denying bishop Richard Williamson of the St. Pius Society and the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. In this paper, however, I will only deal with antisemitic statements 
concerning the economic crisis. 
Die Aula dedicates a lot of its coverage to the economic crisis. It has published special 
issues on the crisis and crisis-related topics appear in nearly every issue. 
The basis of the critique of capitalism in Die Aula is a fetishized understanding of 
how capitalism works, characterized by an inability to distinguish between the essence 
and manifestation of capitalist relations. Unable to comprehend the abstract domination 
of the value and internal antagonisms of capitalism, the newspaper’s contributors 
project these abstract societal processes onto the visible agents of these processes, name-
ly the Jews. They imagine the Jews as the puppet masters of the modern economy who 
pull the strings behind the scenes to their own advantage. This picture of the puppet 
masters takes various forms, from subtle antisemitic codes to very explicit antisemitic 
phrases: 
– “the globalists and their accomplices” (Die Aula 02/2008: 20); 
– “worldwide oligarchic structures” (Die Aula 04/2008: 37); 
– “jumping jacks of big money” (Die Aula 04/2010: 38); 
                                                                                                                                                       
6 The difference between the extreme right and neo-Nazism is that the former is allowed by 
law, whereas the latter is regarded as a crime against the Verbotsgesetz, a law prohibiting the 
glorification of the National Socialist regime. The boundary between these two terms is often fluid 
and difficult to determine. Moreover, these terms are controversial within the scientific community. 
For a discussion, see Schiedel (2007: 23ff.). 
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– “as is well-known, in the United States, politics is being made behind the scenes: 
elites, dubious circles, high finance and various lobbies (e.g. AIPAC) are the financial 
backers and the true rulers” (Die Aula 04/2010: 23); 
– “a convention of the grand lodges” (Die Aula 06/2010: 16); and 
– “the architects of the financial-Shoah, who sent Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Lehman 
Brothers, Meryll Lynch, AIG and Washington Mutual into the credit-crematoria” 
(Die Aula 04/2009: 24ff).7 
All these accusations are opaque and inaccurate. They leave room for interpretation, 
which is part of the conspirative logic: not naming something exactly only makes it more 
mysterious, as even experts are unable to see the whole picture. This conspiracy arises 
from a misunderstanding of the economy and an inability to recognize abstract forms of 
domination. Postone identifies this way of thinking as crucial to modern antisemitism: 
In modern anti-Semitism [the imagined Jewish power] is mysteriously intangible, ab-
stract and universal. This power does not usually appear as such, but must find a 
concrete vessel, a carrier, a mode of expression. Because this power is not bound con-
cretely, is not “rooted,” it is of staggering immensity and is extremely difficult to 
check. It stands behind phenomena, but is not identical with them. Its source is there-
fore hidden—conspiratorial. The Jews represent an immensely powerful, intangible, 
international conspiracy. (Postone 1980: 106) 
Another frequently used metaphor in Die Aula consists of biologized descriptions of 
capitalist structures. This usually takes the form of comparing the old, sane, natural form 
of capitalism to a despicable, abnormal growth that has to be brought under control: 
– “the venom of global neoliberalism” (Die Aula 04/2008: 37); 
– “financial investors as locusts” (Die Aula 11/2008: 26; 02/2009: 22); 
– “predator-capitalism,” “Hydra” (Die Aula 03/2009: 32, 40; 06/2010: 25); and 
– “banks as ravenous wolves” (Die Aula 06/2010: 25).8 
These comparisons fit into the practice of biologizing capitalist structures as mentioned 
by Postone. A similar line of reasoning can be found when the newspaper’s contributors 
deal with problems of interest. The concentration on this particular branch of capitalist 
production is typical of a shortened, superficial analysis of capitalism. Furthermore, the 
critique of interest provides an excellent example of how the various aspects mentioned 
above can be combined: the fetishized critique of capitalism, the alleged Jewish influence 
in the sphere of circulation, and the concept of parasitic and unnatural growth. 
5. SILVIO GESELL AND HIS FOLLOWERS 
This idea of abnormal outbursts of capitalism leads us to an alternative economic system 
that some contributors to Die Aula have in mind. Starting from the demonization of 
interest, they end up at the Natürliche Wirtschaftsordnung (Natural Economic Order), 
which is based on theories developed by Silvio Gesell (Die Aula 03/2009: 34; 06/2009: 16ff; 
11/2009: 10ff). Inspired by the early anarchists (in particular Proudhon), Gesell (1862-
                                                                                                                                                       
7 All quotes have been translated by the author. 
8 Ibid. 
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1930) argued that money and interest were the main obstacles to the true liberty of 
humankind. Whereas all workers and farmers have to work for their income, capitalists 
and landowners do not and live parasitically off unnatural interest. His solution to this 
problem was to introduce interest-free money, known as Freigeld or free money. The 
main difference between Freigeld and regular money is that Freigeld has an expiry date. It 
loses a certain percentage of its value every month. This is meant to prevent money 
owners from hoarding, thus keeping the money in constant circulation. 
In a contemporary context, Gesell’s theory forms the basis of so-called exchange circles 
and regional money initiatives. These exchange circles became known to the wider public 
in Argentina during the economic crisis that struck the country around 2000. After a 
couple of months, these circles collapsed spectacularly. At a theoretical level, Gesell’s ideas 
are still discussed in academic circles. Furthermore, Gesell’s followers have tried to become 
an accepted current within (radical) left-wing discourses by committing themselves to the 
anti-globalization movement. In Germany, for example, at least two such groups are 
official members of Attac Germany: the Initiative für eine natürliche Wirtschaftsordnung 
(INWO) and the Christen für eine gerechte Wirtschaftsordnung (CGW). In addition, Gesell’s 
theory is often used by radical right-wingers as well as esoteric groups. 
This paper is not the place to criticize Gesell’s theory in detail (for such a critique, see 
Rakowitz 2003). However, it is a striking example of a fetishized understanding of the 
economy, and it shows quite clearly why this is so interesting to right-wing authors. The 
first point is certainly that the whole program has a racist—or at least social-Darwinist— 
component: 
Natural selection in its full, miraculous effectiveness is then restored. … No matter 
how great the quantity of abnormal material resulting from the propagation of defec-
tive individuals will be, that is brought into nature, natural selection can cope with it. 
Medical art can then delay, but it cannot stop eugenesis. (Gesell 1922: xi) 
Of greater relevance to this paper, however, are the theoretical affiliations between right-
wing ideology and Gesell’s theory. 
(i) The whole idea that there is such a thing as a natural economic order is very tempting to 
antisemitic agitators. Gesell’s followers often use biological metaphors to promote their 
theory, such as the idea of a natural growth process. Everything in nature grows until it 
reaches a natural boundary, such as human organs. If they kept on growing forever, we 
would eventually die. In contrast, interest grows without a natural boundary and keeps on 
growing forever. Furthermore, it does not grow naturally but in an exponential manner. 
Gesell’s followers claim that nothing in nature grows exponentially, except cancer cells. 
Therefore, interest equals cancer and must be cut out of the organism. 
(ii) The focus on only one aspect of the capitalist economy facilitates the personalization of 
economic processes and leaves room for conspirative, antisemitic interpretations. I do not 
claim that all Gesell’s followers are antisemites; I just want to show that this theory is 
structurally antisemitic and therefore dangerous. The whole theory is not a radical critique 
of capitalist society but just a critique of one aspect of it. There is nothing intrinsically 
wrong with this, but the problem is that Gesell’s theory exudes the aura of a revolutionary 
movement, of establishing paradise on earth, when all it does is to make a small adjust-
ment to the current system. Marx described this form of critique as being “within the limits 
of what is permitted by the police and not permitted by logic” (Marx 1989: 29).  
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6. CONCLUSION 
The notion of a radical movement that is actually not radical at all is precisely the kind 
of conformist rebellion referred to in the introduction that tends to include antisemitic 
aspects. When Adorno and Horkheimer state at the very end of “Elements of Anti-
Semitism” that “it is not just the antisemitic ticket which is antisemitic, but the ticket 
mentality itself.” (Horkheimer & Adorno 2004: 217), this is also true of the critique of 
capitalism. It is not just the shortened and explicitly antisemitic critique of capitalism 
that is antisemitic but the shortened critique as such. 
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Equations in Contemporary Anti-Zionism: 
A Conceptual Analysis 
Shalem Coulibaly* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This article, which is based on several articles and research projects, aims first and 
foremost to present the criminogenic nature of contemporary antisemitism, which certain 
people, including people of African descent, have unfortunately adopted—through 
mimicry or imitation—as a result of ignorance or political calculation.1 It forms the final 
part of a larger work entitled “Africa and Antisemitism: From Indifference to Tempta-
tion and Antisemitic Speech.” It is resolutely opposed to antisemitism, especially among 
some Africans who have contributed to diatribes against Jews in France. 
2. FALSE EQUATIONS BETWEEN ANTI-ZIONISM AND ANTISEMITISM: 
THE ART OF MISREPRESENTING HISTORY AND POLITICS 
Many intellectuals who cannot be suspected of antisemitism reject the equation of anti-
Zionism with antisemitism. The questions that I wish to raise in this context are as 
follows. Have they reflected on the contours of Durban I? Have they taken the time to 
decipher the logic of the anti-Zionist discourse, its critical ambiguities and the silence 
that it tends to impose on any defense of the Jewish cause? For me, the contemporary 
anti-Zionist discourse encompasses a dangerous performative contradiction. Combating 
antisemitism amounts to accepting the need to demonstrate the conceptual limits of the 
most objective criticisms. When anti-Zionists claim that they are not antisemites, how is 
one to interpret or gauge their scathing attacks on the legitimacy of the State of Israel? 
How is one to understand their calls for sanctions against Israel and the very existence of 
Jews in Israel! And not just in Israel but elsewhere. There are dangerous forms of objec-
tivity. America is not Zion, but anti-Zionists are silent when the American flag and the 
Israeli flag are burned side by side with the same rage. This demonstrates the primary 
and basic anti-Americanism of the anti-Zionists, if not a performative contradiction. 
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Visiting Scholar, YIISA, Yale University. 
1 In 2006, during a Paris march in support of Lebanon organized by anti-Zionists, many young 
Africans among the protesters chanted the slogan: “Zionism is the criminal DNA of mankind.” 
Marches in support of the Lebanese people also took place in several African countries. In Senegal, 
for example, the Israeli flag was burned by a mob that included several elected politicians. 
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Anti-Zionism thus does what it claims not to do, namely to be against the Jewish state 
but not against the Jews. We must remain lucid. Is it not so that the denial expressed by 
the prefix “anti” in anti-Zionism and antisemitism nowadays follows the same logic as 
the hatred of Jews and the desire to wipe them of the face of the earth? Until we have 
conceptualized and deconstructed the equation of these two terms, we must treat them 
as identical in the fight against antisemitism. Even a critical and objective anti-Zionist 
knows very well that, in a conflict, one cannot innocently set oneself up as a critic or 
judge of the protagonists. In fact, the differentiation between anti-Zionism and anti-
semitism is formalistic and specious, because, strictly speaking, they involve the same 
intent, the same hatred of the Jews. In L’Imprescriptible,2 Jankélévitch explains that anti-
Zionism is a form of linguistic trickery to justify antisemitism. An anti-Zionist, he 
argues, is a person who gives himself the right to be democratically antisemitic and to 
democratically popularize his hatred. Jankélévitch observes: 
Anti-Zionism is in this respect an unexpected windfall, because it gives us permission 
and even the right—even the duty—to be antisemitic in the name of democracy. Anti-
Zionism is justified antisemitism, finally put at the disposal of all. It grants permission 
to be democratically antisemitic. 
In reality, anti-Zionism has the same target as antisemitism, namely the Jews. Otherwise, 
why plant bombs in synagogues in Paris or murder children and teachers at a Jewish 
school in Toulouse? Paris is not Jerusalem. Toulouse is not Tel Aviv. The era of globali-
zation would thus appear to be an opportunity for anti-Jewish ideologies to prosper. 
Africans must understand this anti-Zionist hoax in order not to misunderstand this 
quagmire of antisemitism, which fraudulently posits the following equations: Zionism = 
colonialism, Zionism = apartheid and Zionism = racism.3 These equations, which are 
genuine historical travesties, relate to problems about which all Africans should be 
deeply concerned. They amount to nothing more than a revisionist form of African 
history and suffering. After all, have the people who come up with these equations even 
considered the history of colonialism and the desire of colonizers to civilize the savages? 
When have the Jews ever wanted to Hebraicize Palestinians so that they become Jews? 
Those who deceitfully establish these false equations should re-read Aimé Césaire’s 
Discourse sur le Colonialisme! 
In order to prove that this so-called objective criticism of Israel’s is actually a refusal 
to engage with the Jews, I will analyze another anti-Zionist equation, which posits that: 
economic boycott of Israel = Middle East peace. 
3. THE ANTI-ZIONIST ECONOMIC BOYCOTT AND THE REJECTION OF PEACE IN THE 
MIDDLE EAST 
The era of globalization that characterizes the 21st century is a period of homogenization 
of modern economic, political, and cultural habitus. This bold global desire to transcend 
                                                                                                                                                       
2 Vladimir Jankélévitch, L’Imprescriptible (1986), pp. 19-20. 
3 These equations are an unwholesome form of revisionism. After a visit to the Middle East, 
Desmond Tutu compared Palestine to a ghetto and Israeli democracy to apartheid. There can be no 
doubt that this was a misrepresentation of history and a sell-out of African suffering in the name of 
the Palestinian cause. 
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borders and achieve economic rapprochement between states has been accompanied by 
many upheavals placing contemporary attitudes between light and darkness, between 
hope and confusion. Likewise, the ideals of brotherhood and interhuman equality have 
stumbled over isolationism and communitarianism, religious fanaticism, and the blind-
ness of terrorism, which is also global in nature. It is true that the contradictions and 
negative consequences of economic globalization are obvious and indisputable. The 
increasing impoverishment of many newly independent countries gives rise to the 
clamor of despair and revolt, while the economic crisis weakens the social and political 
foundations of the richest and most powerful states. But these economic consequences, 
while tragic, can still be fixed. This is because the essence of economics is exchange. 
Economic exchange, whether in the form of barter or capitalist speculation, even when 
forced and unevenly balanced, still constitutes a favorable opportunity for each of the 
participants. Economic exchange is thus a path to dialogue. Indeed, as men trade and 
exchange items and goods among themselves, they are bound to and have duties toward 
one another; as men are driven by quantitative interest, they can gradually correct their 
mistakes and significantly reduce inequalities born of economic games and challenges. 
Here, the commercial spirit remains open to other competitors and rivals, without 
rejecting them. Economically, the face and the existence of others are still significant, 
despite the usual selfishness that rules the business world. The economic interest re-
quires collaboration and negotiation. Even at the height of apartheid, the boycott of 
South Africa was never so barbaric or insane, let alone systematic. States that currently 
support the boycott of Israel never stopped trading with South Africa, African countries 
included. Why then this harshness and intransigence toward Israel? Do the people who 
advocate and organize the global boycott against Israel really want peace between 
Israelis and Palestinians? Why do they not boycott the Palestinians when they set off 
bombs and launch missiles against unarmed Israeli civilians? 
Finally, if economic exchange, as already noted, is not simply a process for circulat-
ing goods but also a fundamental means for interacting with each other, as well as a 
practical method for maintaining fairness, how should we interpret these boycotts of 
Israel? How can we deconstruct the false equations that the anti-Zionists use to stigma-
tize Israel? Is there desire for a quick peace in the Middle East? I doubt it! This is no 
longer a secret to anyone. Sympathy for the Palestinian cause, the pretext for contesting 
the State of Israel, is no more than a political accessory for the anti-Zionists, whose 
psyches are filled with anti-Jewish hatred, as well as disapproval and denial of very idea 
of a Jewish state, a state for the Jews. Clearly, the anti-Zionists/antisemites refuse to 
acknowledge their rejection of the existence of a free, autonomous, and independent 
Jewish state in the middle of the Arab world. What is emerging in the globalization of 
anti-Zionism, even in its objective and critical manifestations, is thus the political relin-
quishment of the Jews to condemnation and terrorism. I can endure these little 
unpleasantries. If this form of antisemitism can help Africans understand what it is that 
is outrageous about the attitudes of anti-Zionists, I believe it is important, as an African 
who has witnessed European and African antisemitism, to summarize my views on 
antisemitism in Europe over the past twenty years. It was this approach to antisemitism 
that enabled us—my colleagues and me—to create an association for dialogue between 
Jews and Africans (JUAF) in the 1980s, at a time when the far-right parties were demon-
izing the Jews, although nobody had foreseen intercommunity conflicts, especially 
between black extremists or Afro-Europeans and European Jews. 
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4. A BRIEF PHENOMENOLOGY OF CONTEMPORARY ANTISEMITISM 
Antisemitism should not only be studied by sociologists and historians or left only to 
politicians to tackle. Philosophers should be the first to take an interest in it. The founda-
tions of Western antisemitism are certainly theological, but there is a long list of the 
philosophers who have written about the Jews, from Kant to Sartre, by way of Hegel 
and many others. Antisemitism must be subjected to a multidisciplinary and multina-
tional or global approach. 
A. Antisemitism is not a disease 
With friends, we spent many nights discussing the question whether antisemitism was a 
Western disease. A disease that, as a result of colonialism and now globalization, has 
been inoculated into the victims of colonialism and is now manifesting itself in strange 
and astonishing ways. But this idea of a disease was and remains unacceptable to me, 
due to the Levinasian concept of responsibility. Indeed, how can a sick person be held 
fully responsible for his actions? I objected that, if antisemitism was a disease, it would 
have been impossible to hold Hitler, his acolytes, and his followers in Europe responsi-
ble and culpable. Why did Jaspers take up arms against Nazi Germany while Heidegger 
was sympathetic to Nazism? There is no inevitability to becoming antisemitic. In other 
words, one embraces antisemitic theories by choice and out of conviction. Similarly, I 
rejected the idea that a victim of colonialism could use the evils of colonialism as an 
excuse to support and participate in antisemitic hatred. Having been a victim of coloni-
alism does not annul our responsibility or the key choices we make in life. Despite these 
theoretical differences, we agreed that antisemitism was contagious—hence its expan-
sion. It remained for me to find a definition that would encompass the permanence of 
antisemitism, its re-emergence and its adoption by colonized peoples—victims, as 
Levinas says, of the “same hatred of the other man,” the same racism “of which anti-
semitism would be the prototype” for all “policies of internment and social oppres-
sion.”4 Starting from Levinas’ thinking, I recorded my own perceptions of the surround-
ing antisemitism. For my part, I came up with three intersecting definitions of 
antisemitism, which I will discuss below. 
B. Antisemitism is a problem of alterity, a rejection, and a stubborn resistance to 
the presence and free existence of the other 
Antisemitism is not simply a manifestation of hostility or Judeophobia. As Levinas 
writes, antisemitism “is the repugnance felt towards the unknown of the other’s psyche, 
the mystery of his interiority.”5 That is to say that, for the antisemite, the Jew must lose 
his foreignness, at the very least that which makes him a Jew: Judaism, Zionism, Israel, 
and so forth. It is this entire logic of assimilation and exclusion that Levinas sums up 
and criticizes in his words. With this definition, we come face to face with a problem that 
is at once epistemological and existential. At the existential, intersubjective level, we are 
dealing with the repulsion of the other—the Jew in his capacity as a Jew. At the episte-
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liberté (1984) p. 201. 
5 Emmanuel Levinas, L’Au-delà du verset (1982), p. 22. 
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mological level, the repugnance felt toward the mystery of the interiority of the Jew is a 
product of the classical and modern Western concept of the composition of knowledge. 
The rapport that the antisemite wishes to establish with the Jew is therefore part of the 
same paradigm as the relationship between subject and object. The antisemite, being a 
subject par excellence, a traditional or transcendental ego,6 wishes to be the master and 
the owner of the relationship with the object—the Jewish being. From the perspective of 
the existential dialectic, it is the antisemite who creates the Jew and the Jew’s existence. 
Sartre was not an antisemite but an objective, engaged intellectual, indeed a philosemite. 
As already noted, objectivities and intellectual prowess can be costly. 
In this kind of relational structure, subject and object remain in a state of difference 
that only the subject is able to manage and control. Nietzsche described this type of 
differentiation as the pathos of distance. The subject, who is master and owner, conserves 
his interiority, which is impregnable but always sealed to the object, whose alterity he 
incorporates without ever merging with the object. This constitution of the object by the 
subject should be understood as a characteristic and a specificity of civilization. To 
illustrate this proposition, let us consider the issue of translation. For Rémi Brague, an 
expert on the Middle Ages, every translation simultaneously comprises aspects of 
transport, imitation, and rivalry. For Western civilization, according to Brague, these 
three actions, which are inherent to translation, hinge on the method of inclusive diges-
tion, which includes the object while maintaining its alterity or foreignness, while the 
subject conserves its interiority.7 In this regard, Brague notes: 
Within the genus “appropriation,” we can distinguish two manners of appropriating. 
I propose to call them “inclusion” and “digestion.” … In the case of an artificial inclu-
sion, the enclosed object is maintained in one particular position, chosen because it 
facilitates observation. … This produces a paradoxical relationship between the inte-
rior and the exterior, the inherent and the foreign. What becomes the interior does not 
lose its alterity for all that. It is even, precisely by its internalization that the object is 
conserved in its alterity. … European civilization, according to my thesis, is based on 
the model of inclusion. 
These words sum up perfectly the Jewish people’s various connections with Europe, and 
European civilization, from their expulsion from Spain until the Holocaust. In contrast 
to the full digestive appropriation of the object (e.g., Hitler’s final solution), inclusive 
appropriation (a symbol of the subtlety of post-Nazi antisemitism!) utilizes the denial of 
the object without a final solution. In this pathos of distance, the subject keeps its object 
under imperial control, where mastery, exclusion, and repulsion are always repeated. 
This ontological mastery of the self borders on total, totalitarian control. From this 
perspective, the Jew, in contrast to the Westerner, despite more than 2,000 years of 
coexistence, will remain other and foreign, like the object before the subject. Whatever 
his contribution to European society, the Jew—a “foreign” cultural and textual object 
that has been included and digested theologically and is politically tolerated and assimi-
lated—will always be maintained in his original difference, not of his own volition but 
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phenomenology of the Jewish being. 
7 Rémi Brague, Au moyen du Moyen-Age: Philosophies médiévales en chrétienté, judaïsme et islam 
(2006), pp. 264-284. 
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purely due to the desire of the subject. He cannot change his status or claim the status of 
the subject. Finally, it is worth remembering that contemporary antisemitism is the 
desire to reduce the other to the image and the will of the Subject or the Self. Reduction 
always reflects the taste of the day. Like the antisemite, the anti-Zionist does not wish to 
brutally eliminate the Jews. Politically, he wants to determine the place of the Israelis, 
not only in the Middle East, but everywhere. He wants to control the Jewish destiny. 
Against this background, the consequences for the Jewish state are more than obvious…. 
In response to a civilization that insists on affording good treatment to the alien within 
its gates, another civilization states “become what I want you to be, because you are in 
my home.” 
C. Antisemitism is a language and a worldview 
Albert Camus said: “My language is my homeland.” This definition of a mother tongue 
is similar to an aphorism in the West African Bambara and Dioula languages, which 
states: kouman yé douniale yé (speech is the world). In other words, the world is language, 
a language through which people construct the world they have inherited in their 
image. This implies a performative language, speech taking shape within intersubjectiv-
ity and social horizontality. Language does not only create the world, it is a worldview 
that is constantly rebuilt by speakers. Maternal or paternal, language is inherited from 
others. Language is the first humanization of our being. Contemporary antisemitism is a 
language that is transmitted from place to place, from Western civilization to others 
nations. This language perfects itself but never changes its nature. Despite their evolu-
tion and their reciprocal borrowing, French and English will never become the same 
language, each preserving its morphology and particular worldview. Antisemitism is a 
language of differentiation that endorses difference to the point of controversy and 
endless conflict. Put simply, antisemitism is the constantly renewed meta-narrative of a 
civilization founded on the rejection of peaceful and generous coexistence with the Jews. 
Combating contemporary antisemitism requires us to collectively rethink all the codes of 
modernity, along with religious hermeneutics. 
D. Contemporary antisemitism is not new: it is simply performed by new people in 
new places 
Antisemitism represents a stagnation in the development of world history. It is an 
extension of the same logic of Jew-hatred and the same machinery that popularizes 
Jewish stereotypes: stereotypes of religious and secular antisemitism adopted by other 
peoples. As a result, what is incorrectly referred to as the new antisemitism is merely a 
change of signs and signifiers. Through their speech and based on their own historicity, 
the new antisemites are expressing and updating inherited antisemitic signs. It is clear 
that the signified “Jew” remains identical, whatever the new signifiers of exclusion and 
hatred. The expressive and performative differences between contemporary forms of 
antisemitism do nothing to change the permanence of antisemitic stereotypes, which are 
scattered and transported around the globe. Antisemitism continues to this day. This is 
precisely because of the permanence of the Name used by antisemites. Antisemitic 
signifiers that are transferred elsewhere take on local color. The themes of this language 
may be changed or recreated indefinitely without any change to the signified “Jew” or 
its stigmatizing stereotypes. This aggressive permanence confronting the signified “Jew” 
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is not just political or historical. I believe that it is precisely at the sociological level that 
one becomes aware of the specific problem of the Name “Jew,” through the entangle-
ment of the low antisemitism of the poor and the high antisemitism of the rich and the 
elites. Moreover, African elites form no exception. Globalization places condemnation of 
Israel, which is treated as a rogue state, in the mouths of every people and every coun-
try.8 
Contemporary antisemitism is thus not new, or a renewal of past forms of anti-
semitism, but a simply a globalised intensification of a timeless phenomenon. New 
political actors and peoples are appropriating the themes of religious and secular anti-
semitism that have established the Name “Jew” as a problematic signified or an issue to 
be resolved. Whether one is looking at Sodom, Athens, Rome, Crown Heights, Belleville, 
Brussels, or Durban, it is always the same antisemitic language that is performed dialec-
tically by local languages. The new antisemites merely fan the thematic flames of persis-
tent antisemitism. This universalization explains—but does not justify—the inanity of 
the antisemitism of the African Diaspora in Europe and the United States and the temp-
tation of antisemitism for the African continent, where anti-Zionism is following the 
global trend. In other words, all peoples and communities can freely use antisemitic 
speech, with or without the addition of only a specific emphasis. 
Antisemitism metamorphoses without ever changing its nature. Just like a venomous 
snake that sheds its skin still remain remains a venomous snake, antisemitism retains its 
harmfulness and its criminogenic logic. This global proliferation of antisemitism ex-
plains—but does not justify—the antisemitism found among Africans and other peoples. 
5. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, it is worth noting that contemporary anti-Zionism is etched into Western 
civilization as it is in other human cultures. It is the typical Western way of approaching 
the Jewish “being,” who has thus been turned into a global scapegoat. Culturally, 
politically, and theologically, antisemitism is reprehensible and must be combated. 
Economic globalization, which goes hand in hand with global shrinkage as a result of 
new information and communication technologies, will give rise not only to a new 
antisemitism but also to the continuous adaptation and adoption of anti-Zionism by 
other peoples. This process of delocalization and relocation has already taken place 
between America, which is home to the antisemitism of the Nation of Islam, and Afro-
European radicals and activists such as the Tribu Ka group and other expatriate African 
nationalists, who are known as Ethiopianists. It is also poised to expand to Africa. Due 
to the criminogenic nature of antisemitism, it is important to spare Africa as much as 
possible. Because of the tragic history of black Africans, which is often compared to that 
of the Jews, black antisemitism is incomprehensible and unacceptable, not to mention 
outrageous. Afro-European extremists have spread their tentacles to Africa. They de-
scribe all blacks or Africans who enter into dialogue with Jews as traitors. The Tribu Ka 
website states that that all pro-Zionist Africans should simply move to Israel. Africa has 
known religious, theological, and political antisemitism for a very long time. Islamic and 
Christian antisemitism has a long history. What will become of it in future with the rise 
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student. Without hesitation, he counted Israel among the states that fail to respect international law. 
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of religious fanaticism? At present, it is clear that anti-Zionism and antisemitism are 
increasingly converging around the world. 
The definitions of antisemitism that I have provided here, which are frequently harsh 
and unpleasant, are primarily addressed to Africans. Apart from South Africa, where 
trade unionists and political figures openly demand a boycott of Israel, African anti-
Zionism has hardly been the subject of systematic study. This gap must be filled. It is 
important to determine what can be done to tackle this antisemitism in the future, 
because the evil—or venom—that it represents could be fatal, first and foremost, to the 
Africans themselves, especially to African states already weakened by ethnicism. Any 
involvement or complacency on the part of Africans in the face antisemitism is a nega-
tion of their own history, because the arguments used by Third-Worldists and anti-
Zionists contain elements of African historicity. This leads me to the following ques-
tions.9 How can any African be antisemitic in the name of the Palestinian cause or for 
any other reason? Will the antisemitism of the African Diaspora find similar expression 
in Africa? How should we judge and evaluate antisemitism in Africa? What analytical 
tools can be used for this purpose? Which Africa are we talking about?10 Despite the lack 
of statistics on antisemitism in black Africa, should African antisemitism be regarded as 
an important or a very small phenomenon or epiphenomenon. Is anti-Zionism, a mod-
ern mask for Jew-hatred, effective among African intellectuals in black Africa? Are there 
other ways to properly understand and describe antisemitism in Africa and among 
Africans? Given that America has Americanized European antisemitism and Afro-
Europeans have Europeanized African-American antisemitism, is it not likely that black 
Africa will soon Africanize the antisemitism of its Diaspora? When some African-
American nationalists adopted the antisemitic discourse in the 1960s and 1970s, there 
was talk of an epiphenomenon. When young blacks in France openly confessed, in front 
of the camera, to being antisemitic and proud of being so, there was also talk of an 
epiphenomenon, until these young people started prowling the streets of Jewish neigh-
borhoods to beat up Jews. In the African context, it is not true that those who dare to 
describe antisemitism as an epiphenomenon are indirectly responsible for attacks on the 
synagogues of African Jewish converts? Is it possible that Africa is seeing the birth of a 
new antisemitism—the antisemitism of tomorrow? 
                                                                                                                                                       
9 These guiding questions are taken from a presentation I gave at Yale University. In this arti-
cle, I have chosen to focus on anti-Zionism, but a larger work on antisemitism is in progress. 
10 The issues discussed in this article relate to sub-Saharan Africa. There are many different Af-
rican Diasporas, but they are all defined by their common African roots, hence Afro-American, 
Afro-Brazilian, Afro-Caribbean, and even Afro-European. 
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Antisemitic Metaphors 
and Latent Communication 
Bjoern Milbradt* 
The National Socialists—in their antisemitic propaganda—made substantial use of 
metaphors with which they dehumanized their victims, including metaphors of plague, 
cancer, octopuses that encompass the whole world with their tentacles, and different 
sorts of insects and parasites. In contemporary anti-imperialist and Islamist caricatures, 
a lot of similarities with “classic” antisemitic illustrations are quite obvious (ADL, 2010). 
These similarities are indications of parallels not only in iconography but also at the 
heart of the underlying ideology. 
In recent years, something different happened in Germany. Metaphors of parasites 
appeared in political discourse without being linked to “the Jews” or to antisemitic 
ideology. What is up for debate is whether those illustrations and metaphors are none-
theless connected to antisemitic ideology or whether—as their advocates assert—they 
are nowadays completely harmless and in no way problematic. 
1. DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTISEMITISM—A “FLEXIBLE PREJUDICE” 
Especially—but not only—in Germany, we are confronted with changes in antisemitic 
resentment. In the country that is responsible for the systematic extermination of the 
European Jews, contemporary research on antisemitism has developed concepts that take 
into account that, since 1945, it is no longer possible for antisemites to utter their hatred in 
an open manner as was common in Nazi Germany. Werner Bergmann and Rainer Erb 
(1984) have described this phenomenon as a form of latent communication, pointing out 
that the social taboo triggered changes in the content of the stereotype. Antisemitism did 
not vanish but could only be uttered in private situations. Alternatively, antisemites had to 
make a detour in order to clearly express their thoughts and feelings. 
The latter is achieved by avoiding “classic” antisemitism in public discourse, for ex-
ample by switching to more accepted resentments, such as the so-called “critique of 
Israel,” which in Germany and elsewhere often comes along with and is closely linked to 
anti-Zionist antisemitism. But this change does not mean for a moment that the classic 
antisemitism has become insignificant: A lot of researchers stress that some or all ele-
ments of it are merely being renewed or put into a new form, which means that they 
may serve as the basis of a consensus among different groups, as Robert Wistrich points 
out. This conspiratorial vision of Zionism, he argues, 
                                                                                                                                                       
* Graduate School on Group Focused Enmity, Philipps-University Marburg. 
© Bjoern Milbradt, 2013 | doi 10.1163/9789004265561_006 
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC 4.0 license.
BJOERN MILBRADT 46 
assumed the existence of a dangerous, shadowy international conglomerate with its 
political headquarters in New York and Tel Aviv. The terminology of this post-1945 
anti-Jewishness would no longer be predominantly Christian, fascist, or racist but 
neo-Marxist, Islamic, or anti-globalist. Nonetheless, there were similarities and conti-
nuities between the old anti-Semitism and the new anti-Zionism. (Wistrich, 2010: 496) 
Research has therefore dealt with the fact that antisemitism is not an invariant stereo-
type but that it adapts to concrete historical circumstances and could be described as a 
“flexible prejudice” (Adorno, 1969). The current literature on antisemitism provides a lot 
of evidence to substantiate this assumption. If we interpret antisemitism as a stereotype 
that consists of a certain, historically rather invariant form that flexibly adopts a different 
content relative to specific historical circumstances (see, e.g., Haury, 2002), we are able to 
more adequately conceptualize the changes we observe in a theoretically sophisticated 
framework. 
The stereotypical form of antisemitism consists of certain elements that have already 
been described in some detail. Thomas Haury identifies a Manichean world view, the 
personalization of complex matters, conspiracy theory, ethnification, and the goal of 
extermination (Haury, 2002). We can find these structural elements, for example, in anti-
Zionist antisemitism. This exemplifies the assumption that the form is getting a new 
content and adapts to new (e.g. geopolitical) circumstances. 
With regard to the contemporary economic and financial crisis, this formal approach 
may indicate that the potential for a widespread renewal of antisemitism as a world 
conspiracy theory is possibly much larger than the focus on the mere content is able to 
reveal. In the case of Germany, the results of an empirical study conducted by the 
Project on Group Focused Enmity show that a substantial amount of people attribute the 
cause of the crisis to “the bankers and the stock brokers” (Becker, Wagner & Christ, 
2010).1 An additional alarming finding is that this causal attribution is significantly 
correlated with overt antisemitism, while the effect is moderated by the perceived 
impact of the crisis on the individual situation (see ibid.). 
Theoretically, this phenomenon could be grasped as a prejudiced, false reaction to 
the development of capitalism and capitalist modernity. Moishe Postone (2005) links this 
false reaction to the general constitution of capitalist societies. According to Postone, 
people tend to attack only the abstract, “unproductive” elements of capital (e.g. financial 
capital) and to personalize them in the form of the alleged evil character of “the Jew”, 
while uncritically glorifying so-called “productive capital” (e.g. industry and agricul-
ture). Postone states that people tend to personalize what they perceive as threatening 
developments within modern society, such as rapid urbanization, modern culture, and 
the general disintegration of traditional social relations and social life. In this regard, the 
development from religious anti-Judaism to modern antisemitism can be seen as being 
closely associated with the crisis-laden development of modern capitalist societies. 
As for Germany, we are able to prove by means of quantitative data that the hatred 
against the State of Israel is one of the dominant aspects of antisemitism (Salzborn, 2008; 
Heyder, Iser & Schmidt, 2005). On the other hand, the above-mentioned perception of 
the ongoing financial and economic crisis and the frequent causal attribution of blame to 
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“bankers and stock brokers” (and the accompanying correlation with antisemitism) 
point toward the possibility that there may be a large group of people who, while not 
openly blaming “the Jews” for the economic distortions, show patterns of thought that 
may be transformed into a renewed image of the “world Jewish conspiracy”. The wide-
spread talk of a “real,” “honest,” and productive economy that is opposed to the “para-
sitic” and “greedy” financial economy that is said to be controlled by “the Jews” is, as 
we know (not only) from Postone, one of the elements of antisemitism. What we see 
today in Germany as well as in other parts of the world are world views that contain 
those elements without directly linking them to “the Jews”—they make use of the form 
of antisemitic resentment without giving it manifest antisemitic content. Thus, we have a 
stereotypical critique of modern society that consist, in part or in full, of formal elements 
that could easily be found in manifest antisemitism but are not yet linked to it. Nonethe-
less, a critical and cautious approach to antisemitism suggests that this connection could 
easily be established either by right-wing movements, agitators, and politicians or 
through “associational transition” (Adorno, 2003: 44) in everyday discourse. This im-
plies that a certain stereotypical critique has to be affiliated with an image of “the Jew” 
or a “world Jewish conspiracy.” 
2. METAPHORS AND ANTISEMITISM 
In 2005, Franz Muntefering, a member of the German Social Democratic Party who at 
the time was also the German Secretary of Labor, decried private equity funds as “lo-
custs” that did not care about German workers and German industry. He argued that 
that were anonymous, that they did not take any responsibility for Germany, that they 
had swarmed over Germany, exhausting its economy, and that they were greedy and 
money-crazed. 
In recent times, talk of “parasites” has once again taken up a firm place in public dis-
course and political debate in Germany. The concept of the “locust” is especially preva-
lent, not only in political parties from the far left to the extreme right but also in labor 
unions and groups from the anti-globalization spectrum, such as the NGO “Attac”. In its 
monthly magazine, the biggest German labor union—“IG Metall”—published an article 
that described US financial investors as “bloodsuckers” that swarm over the country, 
attacking and exhausting German companies. The caricatures accompanying the article 
where probably the most striking example of the suspicion that certain iconographic 
elements of antisemitic, Nazi caricatures are once again being used in contemporary 
Germany (Ruegemer, 2005). Criticized for this, campaigners usually point out that they 
definitely not referring to “the Jews,” thereby avoiding further discussion. 
In light of this, students of antisemitism should examine the possibility that—despite 
this emphatic denial of any kind of antisemitism—these metaphors convey elements of 
antisemitic resentment in the sense of latent communication and/or unintentionally. 
To tackle this problem, it may be helpful to have a look at some philosophical 
thoughts on the topic of metaphors. How do metaphors work? According to Max Black 
(1962: 44), the “metaphor works by applying to the principal subject a system of ‘associ-
ated implications’ characteristic of the subsidiary subject.” Transferred to our example, 
this means that some characteristics of a parasite (the bloodsucker) are applied to anoth-
er subject (US enterprises). A basic characteristic of a parasite is probably that it lives “at 
the expense” of other organisms, for example by sucking them dry. Thus, applying 
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images of vermin or parasites to something that is not biological but basically social is to 
draw a distinction between productive members of society and those who are unproduc-
tive. While Germany’s economy is depicted as productive, honest and self-consistent, an 
unproductive and greedy enemy is intruding it in order to exhaust it in a parasitic 
manner. 
This is clearly not a case of antisemitic ethnification. IG Metall did not mean to iden-
tify “the Jews” as the “bloodsuckers” who are savaging the German economy. But, on a 
more formal or structural level, we are now able to identify some of the elements that—
according to Thomas Haury—are characteristic of antisemitic resentments. Complex 
matters of (capitalist) societies are personalized and attributed to the viciousness and 
greed of the parasitic intruders. In a Manichean world view, everything that is evil 
attacks from the outside (not from the inside by German capitalists!). Finally, the German 
economy is depicted as basically productive, while the invaders are greedy, unproduc-
tive, and merely reaping profits. 
Such a metaphorical view of society is this not necessarily manifest antisemitism, but 
it also cannot be regarded as completely harmless. Max Black writes that we must not 
“neglect the shifts in attitude that regularly result from the use of metaphorical lan-
guage. A wolf is (conventionally) a hateful and alarming object; so, to call a man a wolf 
is to imply that he too is hateful and alarming…” (Black, 1962: 42). Additionally, para-
sites are disgusting, disseminate disease, and suck blood and other fluids. This implies a 
view of society that distinguishes between good, productive members of society and 
those who are evil and unproductive (e.g. bankers and stock brokers). So, in a certain 
sense, metaphors create similarities rather than describing pre-existing ones (ibid., at 37). 
3. CONCLUSIONS 
As a result, we are now able to say that the use of those parasite metaphors is not neces-
sarily antisemitic. Nonetheless, they convey a very problematic view of society that 
should under no circumstances be regarded as harmless. “The metaphor selects, empha-
sizes, suppresses and organizes features of the principal subject by implying statements 
about it that normally apply to the subsidiary subject” (Black, 1962: 44-45). Thus, using 
the term “bloodsucker” to describe social mechanisms or people is to apply metaphori-
cal features that have were previously used in Nazi hate speech to dehumanize its 
victims. 
In this sense, they can form the basis for cross-party consensus. This already appears 
to have happened to some extent in the case of the term “locust” in Germany. When 
using this term, right-wing extremists really mean “the Jews” without having to say “the 
Jews” in their propaganda, while left-wing anti-globalization activists, for example, may 
“only” mean hedge funds. 
These metaphors contain some or all formal elements of antisemitism without openly 
blaming “the Jews.” They constitute a very widespread ideological form of world views 
that are either latently antisemitic or at least easily adaptable to manifest antisemitism. 
Finally, they are capable of transferring ideas and ideology from Nazi antisemitism to 
our own time, by serving as a medium for passing on elements of antisemitic ideology 
under the conditions of social taboo and the need for antisemites to adapt to latent 
communication. 
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Economic and Behavioral 
Foundations of Prejudice 
Arye L. Hillman* 
1. ANTISEMITES AS ADHERENTS OF AN IDEOLOGY 
In 1998, Kenneth Arrow, a Nobel Prize winner in economics (1972), published a paper 
with the title: “What has economics to say about racial discrimination?” The background 
was racial discrimination in the United States. The topic of this paper is: What has 
economics, and in particular behavioral economics, to say about antisemitism?1 
Behavioral economics is the interface between economics and psychology and intro-
duces feelings and emotions into the human behavior that economists study.2 The 
behavioral concepts of dissonance, envy, and fear assist in understanding contemporary 
and also past antisemitism. 
Antisemitism is a term invented by a secular European, Wilhelm Marr, in the 19th cen-
tury to describe antipathy to the Jewish people that is not based on traditional religion-
based prejudice. Antisemites do not disparage the Semitic languages, which is the other 
context in which the term “Semitic” is commonly used. The term “antisemitism” places 
prejudice against Jews in the category of an ideology—like capitalism and socialism. 
It is characteristic of an ideology that defining premises take priority over intellectual 
discourse and factual information. Given the commitment of antisemites to their ideol-
ogy, we should not expect to change an antisemite’s views. 
The underlying principle of the ideology of antisemitism is that Jews should suffer or 
disappear. A definition of antisemitic behavior predicated on the principles of the 
ideology has three elements: (1) “big lies”; (2) demonization; and (3) denial to Jews of the 
right of self-defense. 
Antisemites have used “big lies” in the course of history to accuse Jews of collective 
crimes, such as killing a god (deicide) or killing non-Jewish children for ceremonial 
purposes (the blood libels). In a continuation of past accusations, contemporary “big 
lies” in the new antisemitism accuse Jews collectively of wrongdoing through the Jewish 
                                                                                                                                                       
* Professor of Economics, Bar-Ilan University. I wish to thank Michael Aronson, Raphael Franck, 
Dror Goldberg, Joel Guttman, Daniel Levy, Manfred Holler, Niklas Potrafke, Avichai Snir, Nicolas 
Tideman, Warren Young, and Mor Zahavi for comments on drafts of this paper. 
1 Antisemitism has been extensively studied in the social sciences. The literature includes Sartre 
(1948), Katz (1980), Lewis (1986), Aronson (1990), Fischer (1998), Julius (2010), and Wistrich (2010). 
2 On behavioral economics, see, for example, Kahneman (2003). Daniel Kahneman received the 
Nobel Prize for economics in 2002 for research with Amos Tversky that introduced and developed 
the field of behavioral economics. 
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state. Political correctness can prevent people from restating the past big lies about the 
Jewish people. The surrogate is the new antisemitism directed at the Jewish state as the 
symbol of the Jews. 
Contemporary Western antisemitism is for the most part rhetoric. Because of the ex-
istence of the Jewish state, that is all it can be, with the exception of isolated instances of 
personal violence. 
Antisemitic rhetoric can reflect guilt. Using the big lies, there are antisemites who 
accuse the State of Israel of being no better in its treatment of Palestinian Arabs than the 
government of Adolph Hitler and collaborating regimes were in their treatment of Jews. 
The accusation alleviates guilt about the past behavior of the accuser’s family and 
people. Jews in general do not accuse contemporary Europeans of complicity in past 
inhumane actions. However, some Europeans accuse themselves and alleviate their guilt 
by accusing Jews of doing what their grandparents and others may have done. 
Religion is a more general basis for antisemitic ideology. Historically, the Church 
was concerned that seeds of doubt about Church doctrine could be spread because Jews 
did not accept deification of a Jew as a savior who, in exchange for belief, offers the 
afterlife. Jews cannot perceive of a god as descending to the level of a man or woman. 
Rather, Jews perceive the human objective as being for people to raise themselves up, to 
improve themselves, and to improve the world. The Jewish view contrasts with the 
Christian doctrine of the fall from grace and the worthlessness of man and woman in 
need of salvation. The Church confronted the problem that the Jews could not be con-
trolled through the threat of excommunication. With Jews accepting neither the teach-
ings nor the authority of the Church and not capable of being threatened with 
excommunication and eternal damnation in the world to come, other means were used 
against them. Here enters the basic ideological premise that Jews should suffer. The 
suffering demonstrates the consequences in this world of not accepting the savior and 
rejecting the authority of the Church. Not all Jews were to be killed. According to this 
doctrine, some Jews should always be left alive, so that the personification of evil could 
exist on earth and be contrasted with good. 
There were also economic motives for the persecution of the Jews. The taxes that the 
Church could collect depended on the willingness of the masses to accept Christian 
doctrine. The Jews, in rejecting the teachings of the Church, set an example for others to 
follow that would diminish the tax base of the Church. The suffering imposed on the 
Jews was a lesson for those who might contemplate not accepting the temporal power of 
the Church and not paying the Church’s tithe. 
Doctrinally for the Church, the Jews had been superseded. The reappearance of the 
Jewish state after 1,878 years—there was no Jewish state between 70 CE and 1948 CE—
introduced a special problem. The Jewish people, who by doctrine and ideology should 
wander and be punished eternally, had returned to their homeland. The re-emergence of 
the State of Israel has thus created an essential dissonance. A prosperous secure Jewish 
state is an affront to the ideology that Jews should suffer and also contradicts the theory 
of supersession whereby the Jews should have been superseded by the Church. 
Antisemites making accusations and seeking to diminish or end the Jewish state are 
prevalent in European Lutheran societies, although religiosity in these societies may not 
be high. Scandinavian governments and populations were very sympathetic to the State 
of Israel when the precarious pre-1967 ceasefire lines prevailed but overall became 
hostile after the Six-Day War of 1967. One interpretation is that Scandinavians are kind 
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people who support the underdog, which after 1967 was no longer perceived to be the 
Jewish state. Another interpretation is based on the Protestant doctrine of predetermina-
tion, whereby success in this world presages success in the world to come, and vice 
versa. As long as the Jewish people in Israel lived precariously and miserably within 
indefensible borders, sympathy could be offered for the outcomes observed in this 
world and the outcomes anticipated in the next. The change to Jewish success in this 
world is inconsistent with the doctrine that Jews are damned. Again there is dissonance. 
Generally speaking, whether in Scandinavia or elsewhere, in cases where popula-
tions have abandoned religious belief, past behavioral premises of ideology can be 
culturally transmitted between generations and retained in collective memory. If the 
content of cultural transmission is that Jews are meant to suffer and should be inferior, 
there is dissonance when Jews are successful and capable of self-defense. 
Like the antisemitism of the “right,” the antisemitism of the “left” is based on ideol-
ogy—in the case of the left on universal values. Jews benefited from the “emancipation” 
of the Enlightenment but were criticized for using the opportunities provided by the 
new economic freedom to apply their abilities to enrich themselves, while not satisfying 
the requirement that they adopt the universal values of the enlightenment and cease 
adhering to their identity as Jews. Failure to embrace universal values is correspondingly 
the basis of the antisemitism of Communist and Socialist ideology.3 Marxist ideology 
calls for the creation of new men and women who divest themselves of their past identi-
ties. Jews, even if professing to be communists and socialists, have in general often not 
entirely divested themselves of their Jewish identity. 
Modern economic analysis recognizes the roles of entrepreneurship and finance 
(money lending) in facilitating economic activity. Marxist ideology views the activities 
of merchants, middlemen, and financiers as socially unproductive and therefore regards 
Jews in traditional occupations of trade, business, and finance as not contributing 
productively to society.4 The left also blames the Jews for being instrumental in the 
introduction of capitalism by establishing the foundations for market activities.5 Because 
Jewish identity is visibly manifested in the State of Israel, the left is active in the new 
antisemitism of propagating big lies, demonizing, and delegitimizing the Jewish state 
and objecting when Jews defend themselves.6 
There is merit in an example from the many manifestations of the antisemitism of the 
left. Discrimination against women and girls in Muslim countries is well documented.7 
                                                                                                                                                       
3 On the Enlightenment as the origin of the contemporary antisemitism of the left, see Hertz-
berg (1990). 
4 Thus, when Jews imbued with socialist ideology began to return to the land of Israel at the 
end of the 19th century, they divested themselves in various degrees from Jewish identity by 
removing Jewish traditions from their lives and forming collectives (or kibbutzim) and becoming 
farmers. 
5 On attribution of capitalism to Jews, see Sombart (1951). Jews have also been criticized for 
introducing and supporting communism and socialism, although the Jews who were communists 
and socialists were often seeking to use the new universal values to escape their Jewish identity. 
6 If not violent themselves, antisemites of the left support the physical violence of others 
against Jews and the Jewish state through rhetoric and funding. See, for example, reports at: <http:// 
www.ngo-monitor.org/articles.php?type=whatsnew&article_type=reports>. 
7 See, for example, Norton and Tomal (2009) and Cooray and Potrafke (2011). 
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Democracy has also been absent from Arab states.8 If true to its liberal principles, the left in 
Western societies would be critical of the gender discrimination and absence of democracy 
under Islam and supportive of the gender equality and democracy found in Israel. Fred 
Gottheil (2000), a professor of economics at the University of Illinois at Urbana, asked 
academics who had signed an anti-Israel petition presented to Barack Obama to sign 
another petition condemning adverse treatment of women and girls in Arab countries. The 
original petition had apparently been signed by some 900 academics, of whom Professor 
Gottheil was able to confirm the existence of 675. To these, he sent his new petition. Only 5 
percent were prepared to sign the petition condemning acts against women in Arab 
countries such as wife beating, honor killings, and female genital mutilation. The signato-
ries of the original petition (those whose existence could be confirmed) reported a dispro-
portionate number of academic affiliations (one quarter) in the field of gender studies. 
Criticism of ill-treatment of women and girls in Arab countries would have constituted an 
implicit recognition of Israel as a democratic society with gender equality. 
For the Jews who adopt the ideology of the left, the persistence of the State of Israel 
can hinder their personal shedding of Jewish identity and be an impediment to their 
hope that all Jews will cease to identify themselves as Jews and will, like themselves, 
accept the universal values of the left.9 Left-wing academics in Israel have been at the 
forefront of calls to boycott of their own country.10 
2. WHAT DOES ECONOMICS SAY ABOUT PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION? 
Against this background of antisemitism as an ideology of the right or the left, let us 
now consider what economics has to say about prejudice and discrimination. The 
literature classification system of the academic economics profession is that of the Journal 
of Economic Literature and includes a category of “economics of minorities and races: 
non-labor discrimination.” The literature describes prejudice and discrimination with 
reference to people’s “tastes” or preferences.11 The preferences may be with regard to the 
“types” of employees that employers wish to have. For example, if a Jew is the most 
qualified person for a job but the employer refuses to hire a Jew, the prejudiced em-
ployer incurs a cost in hiring a less qualified employee. In this literature, the preferences 
underlying prejudice are taken as given and unexplained. The discrimination could also 
be due to the preferences of other employees rather the employer, in which case, again, 
costs are increased if the most suitable people are not employed.12 The relevant inference 
is that antisemites are prepared to incur personal costs to disadvantage or harm Jews. 
A second approach to prejudice in economic analysis describes “statistical discrimi-
nation” or “profiling” based on the average attributes of a group.13 For example, because 
                                                                                                                                                       
8 See Borooah and Paldam (2007), Rowley and Smith (2009), and Potrafke (2011). 
9 Podhoretz (2009) describes Jews who do not wish to remain traditional Jews as following a 
new religion based on the universal principles of the ideology of the left. For a review of Podhoretz 
and interpretation in terms of identity and expressive behavior, see Hillman (2011). 
10  See, for example, <http://articles.latimes.com/2009/aug/20/opinion/oe-gordon20>. 
11  See Becker (1957). 
12  See Arrow (1998). 
13  See, for example, Arrow (1972, 1998) and Phelps (1972). The subsequent extensive literature 
includes Schwab (1986), Altonji and Pierret (2001), and Borooah (2001). 
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of group norms of behavior, people belonging to a group may have attributes that 
employers find undesirable, such as arriving late for work or randomly taking days off.14 
Or because women marry and have children, employers may discriminate by not hiring 
women because of the cost of training women who will not remain with the employer. 
Statistical discrimination does not explain the prejudice of antisemites: an antisemite 
would seek to disadvantage or harm Jews even if the attributes of each individual Jew 
were known. 
We can turn to behavioral economics to seek foundations for the behavior of anti-
semites. We thereby recognize the role of emotions and feelings in explaining human 
behavior. With the existence of dissonance between observed outcomes and the ideology 
that Jews should suffer (the right) or disappear (the left), the behavior of antisemites 
appears to reflect fear and envy. 
3. FEAR AND ENVY 
Charles de Gaulle has left us with a forthright statement of fear of Jews and fear of the 
Jewish state. De Gaulle had prepared an epitaph for the Jewish state in anticipation of 
the demise of Israel in the 1967 Six-Day War. Unexpectedly for de Gaulle, Israel won. 
Reflecting on the Jewish victory, De Gaulle declared: 
Some people even feared that the Jews, until then scattered about, but who were still 
what they had always been, that is, an elite people, sure of themselves and domineering, 
would, once assembled again on the land of their ancient greatness, turn into a burn-
ing and conquering ambition.15 
The observation was that Jews are elitist, ambitious, and overly successful, and also 
domineering, that their ambition and abilities are to be feared, and that all the character-
istics of the Jews that are to be feared are manifested in the return of Jews to the land of 
Israel. 
Fear of Jews is an historical phenomenon.16 Jews in Europe were feared because of 
their ongoing survival in the face of discrimination, pogroms, and expulsions. The 
survival of the Jews was explained by their being in league with the devil.17 Jews were 
regarded as having the ability to bring on the plague and also magically protect them-
selves against the plague (in fact, this protection was partly the consequence of the Jews’ 
hygienic standards, which are part of Jewish law). The Hebrew alphabet, in which 
Yiddish, the language of European Jews, is written, was feared as indecipherable and 
magical. Jews were also feared because of the retribution that antisemites believed 
would follow if Jews were ever in a position to take revenge for the suffering that had 
been imposed upon them.18 Fear is expressed in contemporary declarations that Jews 
                                                                                                                                                       
14  On individual attributes and group norms, see, for example, De Bartoleme (1990). 
15  Press conference held at the Elysée Palace on November 27, 1967. From The Scribe, autumn 
2001, available at: <http://www.dangoor.com/74049.html>. 
16  The term Judeophobia has been used to describe fear of the Jews. See Fischer (1998). 
17  Thus, for authenticity, the 2009 film “Sherlock Holmes” showed the words of the devil writ-
ten in Hebrew. 
18  Retribution is described, for example, in the opera La Juive by Fromental Halévy. I thank 
Manfred Holler for this observation. 
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control capital markets (although this could also be envy). The Protocols of the Elders of 
Zion, a 19th century Russian imperial forgery that retains contemporary antisemitic 
appeal, describes Jews as to be feared because of their conspiratorial intent to “control 
the world.” 
As expressed by Charles de Gaulle, there is a link between fear and the State of Is-
rael. There have been no large-scale European pogroms against Jews since the estab-
lishment of the modern Jewish state in 1948. The last European pogrom took place in 
1946.19 The availability to Jews of the means of self-defense is a break from tradition that, 
for antisemites, evokes dissonance but also fear.20 
Altruistic people feel better off when others are better off. Envious people feel worse 
off when others are better off.21 People need not envy but, on the contrary, may admire 
the achievements of others. If they do envy, they may focus their envy on particular 
individuals. An antisemite is envious of Jews in general. Antisemites may envy Jews 
who are actually quite poor. 
An object of envy may or may not be transferable (see Elster, 1991). In the past, when 
antisemites have envied Jews’ transferable possessions, because of the Jews’ lack of 
means of defending their possessions (and defending themselves), antisemites have 
simply appropriated Jews’ possessions. In response, Jews took measures to make their 
investments and possessions non-transferable through appropriation. Knowledge (also 
known as human capital) is not appropriable by transfer to others. Contemporary 
antisemites confront the problem, combined with dissonance and fear, that much re-
garding Jews that is envied cannot be transferred through appropriation. 
Michael Aronson (1973) described the combination of envy and fear in 19th century 
Russia: 
There are notes of admiration and envy as well as fear and anger in the anti-
emancipation officials’ descriptions of the characteristics of Jewish businessmen. A 
number of terms recurred repeatedly. Jewish businessmen were characterized as: 
cunning, dexterous, energetic, enterprising, keen-witted, persistent, and resourceful 
in the pursuit of profit. (p. 148) 
Most of these terms, if not applied to commercial activities, and especially if not ap-
plied to Jews, would undoubtedly have had positive connotations for the officials 
who used them. When applied to the commercially oriented Jews, though, they took 
on a negative connotation with the implication, “danger, beware.” (p. 149) 
4. OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE, EDUCATION, AND “CLEVERNESS” 
Non-appropriation is reflected in the occupational structure of Jews in Europe. Jews 
were traditionally not engaged in agriculture and were not peasants or serfs. They 
invested in “human capital” (personal skills and abilities), rather than “physical capital” 
                                                                                                                                                       
19  The pogrom took place in Kielce, Poland against Jews who had survived the Holocaust. There 
was state-sponsored repression of Judaism in the Soviet Union and other communist countries. 
20  Symbolic of the availability of the means of defense is the over-flight of Auschwitz by planes 
of Israel’s air force. The symbolism is in that, had the State of Israel been in existence, the atrocities 
at Auschwitz and other locations would not have been allowed to take place. See: <http://www. 
israelnewsagency.com/auschwitzisrael.html>. 
21  For an economic analysis of envy, see Mui (1995). 
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or land, and engaged in activities in which “working capital” turned over quickly. They 
were also middlemen, not directly producing physical output but facilitating output 
being produced and facilitating goods reaching final consumers. Jews were also physi-
cians and wealthier Jews were financiers. 
In a case study of the town of Pereiaslav in the Ukraine in 1881, Michael Aronson 
(1978) describes Jews as predominantly tradesmen and merchants, not manual workers. 
Jews also tended to be active in competitive markets in which individual skills were 
more important than connections. Yehuda Don (1990) reported that, in pre-Holocaust 
Central and Eastern Europe, economic activities of Jews were disproportionately in 
competitive retail markets and in professions and activities that did not require physical 
capital, and, again, that Jews were not active in agriculture. For example, in Eastern 
Europe, tailoring was a Jewish profession. 
A characteristic of the occupational structure of Jews was therefore that losses from 
appropriation would be low. Similarly, the costs of having to leave quickly were low. 
Jews engaged in commerce and trade because of economic networks based on com-
munal trust (Greif, 1989, 1993).22 The facilitating role of Jews in economic activity is 
expressed in the economic decline of Spain during and after the Inquisition. The depar-
ture of expelled Jews contributed to Spain’s decline, but Spain also declined because of 
the withdrawal of clandestine Jews from the traditional Jewish activities of commerce 
and trade, so as to hide their Jewish identity. Continuing to use the network of European 
Jewish communities to trade and to travel for reasons of commerce would have been 
evidence that Jews who had professed to convert to Christianity had in fact retained 
their Jewish traditions and identity (Landes, 1989). Spain and also Portugal declined 
after the expulsion and forced conversion of Jews. In other locations, the Jews were 
welcomed by rulers as initiators of commerce. Julius Carlebach (1978, p. 13) observes: 
Prussia’s great elector (later Friedrich Wilhelm I) permitted not only Jews, but also 
some 20,000 Huguenots, to settle in Prussia, and if anything would have regarded the 
protests of Christian traders—that Jews used innovatory aggressive trading methods 
as opposed to their own sedate and settled methods—as full vindication of his inten-
tions. 
Local governing elites thus had reason to welcome Jews and indeed might support 
Jews against complaints of “unfair” competition from Christian competitors. For exam-
ple, when Christians and Jews competed in food processing, the greater efficiency of 
Jews reduced the wage that Christian industrialists needed to pay Christian manual 
workers, and demands by Christian food processors for protection against Jewish 
competitors were denied.23 
The economic activities of Jews were beneficial for the broad non-Jewish population. 
For example, Jewish middlemen financed agricultural production by buying crops still 
growing in the fields, so enabling Russian peasants to pay taxes that were due (Aronson, 
1990). The Jewish middlemen took a risk because they did not know the eventual market 
price when they purchased the still-growing crops. 
                                                                                                                                                       
22  On the role of trust or social capital in economic development more generally, see, for exam-
ple, Bjørnskov (2006) and Baliamoune-Lutz (2011). 
23  Reported by Aronson (1978). 
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Aronson (1978, p. 201) observed that: “The Jews’ most vigorous enemies were un-
doubtedly their petty-bourgeois competitors in the towns.” Dennis Carlton (1995) of the 
University of Chicago has described how economic contact can create a predisposition of 
dislike. He called such predispositions “hostility externalities” and noted that “through-
out the centuries, middlemen who happen to belong to a minority in a country have 
been singled out for hatred and have had their property destroyed.” Hence “when the 
middlemen comprise an identifiable group, there can be trouble.” Carlton therefore 
proposes that the roles of Jews in economic activity as “middlemen” resulted in “the 
stereotype of Jews as greedy and fanned the flames of antisemitism.”24 
Basically, the antisemitism reflected envy. Jews earned incomes from the organiza-
tion and distribution of production rather than from working the land. From the per-
spective of antisemites, Jews added value “without working” and were overly 
successful. 
Jews were often excluded from occupations that required university certification. 
The denial of access to universities and restrictions on occupations of Jews were in-
tended to diminish income-earning opportunities, which was consistent with the ideol-
ogy that Jews should be inferior and should suffer. Yet, in the course of economic 
development, the heritage of occupational restrictions became a source of economic 
advantage for Jews. Had Jews been allowed own land and be peasants, tendencies might 
have been put in place for them to remain so.25 Although denied admittance to universi-
ties, the Jews retained a traditional emphasis on literacy. There was a requirement to be 
literate to fulfill obligations of study of Jewish law and treatises. Cognitive ability 
depends on continuation of intellectual activity.26 With Jews being required to educate 
children beginning from an early age as part of the requirement of being a Jew,27 the 
transmission of the obligation to educate and to learn was the basis for a comparative 
advantage in activities requiring reliance on memory, reasoning, and initiative in prob-
lem solving. In contemporary times, the high regard for literacy and education has 
resulted in disproportionate creative contributions by Jews. In general, Jewish popula-
tions in cities around the world are also visibly prosperous.28 Despite limited natural 
                                                                                                                                                       
24  Simon Kuznets (1960, 1972) proposed that occupational patterns reflected the desire of Jews 
as a minority to retain their identity by maintaining specialization in selected “Jewish” occupations. 
Be this as it may, Jewish life is communal, which affected occupations by requiring Jews to live 
together in urban or village environments in which the ten men required for a “minyan” or quorum 
in the synagogue were readily available. 
25  Botticini and Eckstein (2005) investigated occupational change of Jews living under Islam in 
the first millennium of the common era and concluded that the transition of Jews from agriculture 
to urban occupations is explained by comparative advantage due to the Jewish emphasis on literacy 
and education. They report that Jews faced few if any occupational restrictions under Islam. Indeed, 
under Islam rulers would have wished Jews to be productive so that Jews could pay the special tax 
levied on Jews and Christians. See Borooah (1999) for another study of religion and occupation 
involving different Christian denominations. 
26  In countries in which the retirement age is lower, the decline in cognitive ability of the popu-
lation is also greater (Rohwedder and Willis, 2010). 
27  See Carlton and Weiss (2001) on Jewish education. 
28  There are many economic studies of the links between religion and income. For example, for a 
broad ranging study, see Bettendorf and Dijkgraaf (2010), who find that religious observance is 
associated with higher incomes in high-income countries and lower incomes in low-income countries. 
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resources and the need to allocate disproportionate resources to defense, the State of 
Israel has been economically successful, with high income and high values of human 
development indicators such as literacy, gender equality in education, and life expec-
tancy.29 Through the kibbutz, Jews also confounded predictions that collective property 
(socialism) cannot succeed.30 
The antisemitic criticism that “Jews are too clever” reveals envy. Colleagues in Eng-
land have reported that “Jews are too clever by half.” The bounty on the head of Albert 
Einstein was justified by Einstein being “too clever.”31 
5. GROUPS AND IDENTITY 
People discriminate by favoring others in their group and disfavoring those in other 
groups.32 Such behavior occurs when people who previously did not know one another 
are arbitrarily assigned to different groups.33 People appear to obtain “expressive util-
ity” from confirming their identity as a member of their own group and also by confirm-
ing that they are not a member of the other group.34 
When people live in small identifiable communities or groups, trust and cooperation 
allow economic and social outcomes to be achieved that are usually not possible for the 
broader population. Jews as minorities within larger populations may be envied—and 
feared—because of their ability to overcome the problems of distrust and disincentives 
for collective action present in the larger groups.35 
The opportunity may be present to join groups. People may, for example, choose to 
join groups that support a political party, or they may join different types of clubs. If 
Jews are a successful group, we envisage that people would wish to join the group. 
In the case of a country club, people pay a membership fee; however, even if they are 
willing to pay the membership fee, they may be excluded. Jews as a people cannot and 
do not exclude. However, in the context of the traditional criteria, non-Jews cannot 
simply declare themselves to be Jews. Personal investments are required because of the 
need to learn and demonstrate knowledge of the obligations and responsibilities of 
being a Jew. There are also restrictions on behavior in being a Jew. In present times, non-
Jews do choose to join the Jews notwithstanding the high personal investment. In 
                                                                                                                                                       
29  On the economic success of the State of Israel, see Senor and Singer (2009). In 2010, Israel 
joined the OECD (the organization of developed high-income countries). Israel also ranks high 
among countries on human-development indicators. For example, life expectancy in Israel exceeds 
that of most OECD countries and exceeds that of all but four other countries worldwide (Cher-
nichovsky, 2010). 
30  The success of a kibbutz has generally been limited to no more three or four generations, af-
ter which private property and personal incentives have been introduced. The kibbutz movement 
has also required public funds over the course of time for survival. 
31  See Fischer (1998), noted by Cameron (2005, p. 156). Of course, not all Jews are “clever.” 
Ability is distributed in the population. Moreover, “cleverness” appears often to decline with 
generational distance from traditional Jewish values, confirming the role of intergenerational 
transmission of family values and attitudes to learning and critical enquiry. 
32  See, for example, Sherif (1966) and Yan Chen and Sherry Xin Li (2009). 
33  See Tajfel and Turner (1979). 
34  See Hillman (2010). 
35  On group characteristics and the effectiveness of collective action, see Olson (1965). 
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previous times, because of antisemitism, it was uncommon for a non-Jew to wish to join 
the Jewish people. Historically, because Jews were required to live in designated per-
missible areas (ghettos), separateness was also an enforced consequence of Jews being 
required to live apart from the rest of the population.36 
The differences in identity associated with separation and belonging to different 
groups can evoke a sense that the groups are engaged in a contest.37 When Jews are 
successful, antisemites view the contest as having resulted in an inexplicable and unde-
sirable outcome that is the source of dissonance—and envy and fear. 
6. POLITICAL LEADERS 
Difficulties have arisen for Jews when governments and rulers have been antisemitic. 
Jews as a defenseless group have then been confronted with the harm that governments 
can do. Dennis Carlton (1995) observed that political leaders can organize the antisemitic 
sentiments of individuals in a population into collective hostility. Edward Glaeser (2005) 
of Harvard University similarly suggested that politicians and leaders use hate to form 
supportive political coalitions. In the most visible case of a government organizing harm 
of defenseless Jews, Hitler faced political competition (see Aleskerov, Holler, and Ka-
malova, 2010) and hence had need of political support from the population. The evi-
dence is that Hitler did not need to convince an impressionable population that they 
should be antisemitic. Demonization or “satanizing” of Jews was deeply embedded in 
European culture (Katz, 1980; Carmichael, 1992). Goldhagen (1996) documents Hitler’s 
willing helpers. In contemporary times, it is uncommon for Western political leaders or 
parties to define themselves overtly as antisemitic with respect to intentions regarding 
the Jewish people, but the Jewish state as a collectivity representing the Jews allows 
expression by political leaders of antisemitic sentiment. The antisemitic rhetoric of 
                                                                                                                                                       
36  In economic analysis, the “theory of clubs” describes inclusion in and exclusion from groups. 
A “club” in general terminology describes people coming together for a common purpose, which 
can be to enjoy themselves or to benefit others through charitable acts. Economic theory has 
formalized the idea of a “club” as a means for people to benefit collectively in ways that they could 
not do alone. The theory applies to people confirming common identity. Club theory was intro-
duced by Buchanan (1965), with the assumption that people can choose to join any club that they 
might wish. The possibility of exclusion was introduced by Ng (1973) and Helpman and Hillman 
(1977), and was further developed in terms of willingness to pay for entry by Hillman and Swan 
(1983). Cameron (2009) reviews how the theory of clubs can be applied to explain prejudice. 
Iannaccone (1992) uses the theory of clubs to describe membership of groups defined by adherence 
to religion. Berman (2000) describes orthodox Jews as belonging to a club for which the price of 
admission is strict adherence to Jewish traditions and engaging in subsidized full-time Jewish 
learning. He also notes that a consequence of membership is high fertility. The implication is that 
orthodox Jews are willing to pay the price of admission, which includes time, but other Jews are not 
(not all Jews are of course orthodox). An alternative explanation is that orthodox Jews obtain 
expressive utility from their Jewish learning, from their strict adherence to Jewish traditions, and 
from their children. In that case, in distinction to Berman’s hypothesis, orthodox Jews do not 
perceive themselves as making a “sacrifice” in being orthodox. They view adherence to Jewish 
traditions as a source of personal benefit rather than a personal cost. 
37  For elaboration on contests involving groups, see Tan and Zizzo (2008). On divisiveness as-
sociated with groups, see Makowsky (2011). Konrad (2009) provides an overview of the economic 
theory of contests. 
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politicians is an indication that the rhetoric is favorable for political support. Political 
leaders can also signal antisemitic sentiment through voting in international bodies.38 
7. WHY DOES PREJUDICE DIFFER AMONG POPULATIONS? 
Why does prejudice against Jews differ among governments and populations? The 
rhetoric of antisemitism is prevalent in Europe, and European governments have in 
general exhibited lack of sympathy for the Jewish state. In the United States, anti-
semitism is a marginal phenomenon outside of the ideological (and principally aca-
demic) left and some fringe groups on the right. Protestant groups in the United States 
in particular are principal defenders of the Jewish state against the new antisemitism. In 
the United Nations, it has been the Security Council veto of the United States that has 
saved Israel from enmity that in general includes votes of European governments. The 
popular belief in the United States is that personal success is primarily the consequence 
of effort. In Europe, the popular belief is that personal success is due primarily to luck. 
The belief in luck underlies envy of people who, through “luck,” have undeserved 
rewards. The preference for social equality is also greater when people believe that 
personal outcomes are due to luck rather than effort.39 Egalitarian preferences disfavor 
success through effort. Europeans work fewer hours and take more vacations, and 
retirement is on average earlier than in the United States.40 Europeans have exhibited 
greater tolerance in their welfare states for people who have been “unlucky,” without 
enquiring into the reasons for lack of self-reliance. Europeans have also exhibited sym-
pathy for immigrants independently of the productive contributions of the immigrations 
to the home society, ostensibly on the grounds that the immigrants have been “unlucky” 
in having been born in the countries from which they came.41 
In the United States and other countries of settlement, such as Australia and Canada, 
where effort rather than luck is viewed as the primary reason for personal success, old 
and new antisemitism find less expression than in Europe. People envy less and they 
fear less the success of others. Indeed they tend to admire rather than envy success. In 
these societies, where effort rather than luck is viewed as the basis for success, Jews and 
the Jewish state have been broadly admired for their successes. Among European 
populations and governments, Israel is more often criticized than admired.42 
                                                                                                                                                       
38  The United Nations is the leading international forum for antisemitic rhetoric and voting 
(see US Department of State, 2008). Bayefsky (2004) estimated that 25 percent of UN resolutions 
have had the purpose of criticizing Israel. 
39  See Alesina and Angeletos (2005). 
40  See Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote (2001, 2005) and Blanchard (2004). 
41  See Nannestad (2007). 
42  The United States has often independently exercised its UN Security Council veto in defense of 
Israel. However, not all US presidents have been sympathetic to Israel, and the State Department has 
often been a source of enmity. On the records of US presidents’ support for Israel, see Podhoretz 
(2009); on the State Department and other US government agencies, see Loftus and Aarons (1994). 
With regard to Europe, traditional indigenous Europe is in demographic decline (see, for example, 
Berman, Iannaccone, and Ragusa, 2007, and Azarnert, 2010). The demographic change is documented 
to be accompanied by a change in the proportion of the population for whom work ethic is a primary 
value (see, for example, Nannestad, 2004). Reference to the demographic change is often silenced by 
invoking the guilt of past treatment of Europe’s Jews. A question that can be asked is whether Euro-
pean elites blame the Jews for the path of demise of indigenous European society. 
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8. PEOPLE BELIEVE WHAT THEY WANT TO BELIEVE 
Professor Bryan Caplan of George Mason University has described how people choose 
to believe what they want to believe and choose the beliefs that give them the most 
personal satisfaction (Caplan, 2007). Or they choose an ideology and maintain views and 
behavior specified by the principles of the ideology that they have chosen. If this is the 
case, on encountering an antisemite, there is no point in presenting evidence that count-
ers antisemitic beliefs. Antisemites choose what they want to believe about Jews and the 
Jewish state. They predicate their beliefs on the “big lies” that are used to justify de-
monization or, depending on the tone, “criticism” and recommend to Jews that they take 
actions or “make concessions” that compromise the personal safety of Jews. 
Referring, for example, to the population exchange between Arabs and Jews from 
Arab states that took place in the early years of the Jewish state will not move an anti-
semite to stop condemning Israel “for creating refugees.” Sustaining the 1948 refugees 
and their families as perpetual refugees is part of antisemitism. As long as the “refu-
gees” continue to exist, the Jewish state is threatened.43 
There is also no point, for example, in drawing a comparison with the population 
exchanges of Hindus and Muslims that took place when the Indian sub-continent was 
partitioned and the states of India and Pakistan were created around the same time as 
the creation of the modern State of Israel. Parallel circumstances and information do not 
matter for antisemitic sentiment and rhetoric.44 
9. THE MEDIA 
The media should in principle inform. However, people often seem to choose to be 
informed by media whose positions they know beforehand and whose views they know 
they will find agreeable and appealing and will reinforce their own predispositions.45 
The rhetoric of antisemitism is profitable for the media in attracting an audience that 
obtains satisfaction from confirming pre-existing antisemitic sentiments. In a society 
with sufficient antisemitic sentiment and with people believing what they want to 
believe, the media may, for reasons of profit, choose to report the “big lies,” demonize 
Jews, and describe Jewish self-defense as aggression.46 
                                                                                                                                                       
43  The United Nations provides intergenerational continuity of refugee status only to Arabs 
displaced as a consequence of the modern independence of the Jewish state. 
44  The behavior of people believing what they want to believe can be present at the highest os-
tensible intellectual levels. Time preference is an economic concept describing willingness to defer 
gratification. People with a low rate of time preference succeed because they invest for future 
benefit rather than consuming in the present. Peart and Levy (2005, p. 24) describe the reaction of 
the statistician Karl Pearson on finding that, contrary to the outcome he wished for, data appeared 
to show a lower rate of time preference for the Jews than for the British. Jews were therefore 
“superior” to the British in patience in waiting for future benefits and in not behaving impulsively, 
but Pearson nonetheless chose to interpret his data as revealing deficiencies of Jews—confirming 
that people believe what they want to believe. 
45  See Iyengar and Hahn (2009) and also Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) on the “market for 
news.” 
46  The new antisemitism can be present in media in which left-wing Jews determine content 
and in which Jews are obliged to follow reporting guidelines. 
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10. CONCLUSIONS 
Jews, like other peoples, do not like to be disliked. Where there is a problem, it is natural 
to seek a solution. With antisemites believing what they want to believe, and with 
governments and media in many countries responding to and reinforcing the culturally 
transmitted prejudice against Jews—and focusing the prejudice on the Jewish state—the 
“problem” does not have a mutually acceptable solution. Antisemites are therefore left 
to remain unhappy because of dissonance, as well as envy and fear. There is an incon-
gruity in simultaneously envying and fearing Jews. This incongruity is expressed in the 
claim, for example, that Albert Einstein belonged to a population of inferior people or 
“Untermenschen.” The incongruity reflects antisemites’ attempts to resolve their disso-
nance. 
Antisemites are, of course, but a part of the populations in which they are to be 
found, albeit with different levels of prominence. In any society, antisemitism is viewed 
as a prejudicial and self-demeaning ideology by people whose nature it is not to envy 
and who admire rather than fear the success of others. 
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Antisemitism and the Victimary Era 
Adam Katz* 
In this paper, I will offer an account of contemporary antisemitism in terms of Eric Gans’s 
“originary hypothesis” regarding the origin of language and culture. The originary hy-
pothesis extends and revises Rene Girard’s analysis of mimetic rivalry: according to the 
originary hypothesis, the first sign emerged in a single event, a mimetic crisis in which the 
(proto) human group arrested their common and self-destructive convergence upon a 
common object by putting forward what Gans calls an “aborted gesture of appropriation.” 
Representation, then, is the deferral of violence, as is, therefore, all of culture. History is the 
ongoing process of preserving and, where necessary and possible, replacing such means of 
deferral (languages, rituals, beliefs, moralities, art, and so on), which are intrinsically 
fragile and under constant threat from mimetic desire, rivalry, and violence. 
In a series of books, beginning with The Origin of Language in 1981, through The End of 
Culture, Science and Faith, and Signs of Paradox,1 to mention a few, and his on-line column, 
Chronicles of Love and Resentment on his Anthropoetics website,2 Gans’s “new way of think-
ing” has developed an account of history according to which the market system, and now 
the world market system, best realizes the reciprocity achieved on the originary scene. 
History is the liberation of humanity from attachment and “enslavement” to the singular 
object on the originary scene toward the universal exchange of objects within the market 
system. It is in the context of the market system that Gans first situates antisemitism: 
The Jew is not in some undefined sense a scapegoat for the larger society’s frustrations. 
He serves as a model of the inexistent and unfigurable center of the market system … 
the Jew, having rejected the incarnation, incarnates the truly unincarnable—
mediation…. In the postritual world of market exchange, the Jew is a paradoxical con-
struction who regulates the self-regulating market, who fixes the prices determined 
by the interaction of supply and demand; we must eliminate him to gain control over 
this “inhuman” mechanism.3 
                                                                                                                                                       
* Instructor of Writing, Quinnipiac University. 
1 See Eric Gans, The Origin of Language: A Formal Theory of Representation (University of Califor-
nia Press, 1981); Eric Gans, The End of Culture: Toward a Generative Anthropology (University of 
California Press, 1985); Eric Gans, Science and Faith: The Anthropology of Revelation (Roman & Little-
field, 1990); and Eric Gans, Signs of Paradox: Irony, Resentment, and Other Mimetic Structures (Stanford 
University Press, 1997). 
2 See Eric Gans, Chronicles of Love & Resentment, available at: <http://www.anthropoetics.ucla. 
edu/views/Chronicles_home.cfm>. 
3 Eric Gans, “Chronicle No. 74: Gangsters and Jews,” Chronicles of Love & Resentment, January 4, 
1997. 
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Gans’s allusion to the Jews’ rejection of the incarnation already suggests that the suit-
ability of the Jews for such a “model” of the unfigurable center of the market has roots 
that precede modernity. Antisemitism, for Gans, is ultimately predicated upon the 
paradox of the Jewish discovery of monotheism: the Judaic revelation presented knowl-
edge of a single God beyond the means of control of totemic religions and a single 
humanity whose knowledge of God is most profoundly revealed in the reciprocal 
relations between humans; at the same time, this very revelation is granted to a single 
people, “chosen” to work out before the world the implications of this understanding of 
the divine. The spread of monotheism, already inscribed in its universalistic origin, 
could hardly take place other than through resentment toward those who both gave this 
God to humanity and “selfishly” claimed an exclusive relation to Him. 
What Gans calls Jewish “narrative monotheism” lays the groundwork for the even-
tual emergence of the modern market not only by de-fetishizing local totems but by 
separating faith in God and the obligation to follow the law from the national power and 
success of the Jewish people. If the defeats and even destruction of the nation are given 
meaning by demands and promises that transcend those temporal events, then moral 
meaning can be found in the contingencies of history, rather than the maintenance of a 
closed ritual space. But this contribution of Judaism to modernity collides with the more 
specifically Christian contribution or, rather, the revision of Christianity constitutive of 
modernity. According to Gans, “[w]here Jews had understood that the real center was 
inhabited by the Being of the sign, the Christians realized that this Being was generated, 
and could be generated anew, by an act interpretable as a victimization.” In other words, 
while Jewish victimization was already a sign of Jewish chosenness, this was a burden 
borne by Jews alone; for Christianity, the persecution of Jesus is imitable and identifica-
tion with it the source of salvation. But this also meant that Christianity provides the 
model for antisemitism: “[t]he anti-Semite compels the Jew to enter the infernal circle of 
rivalry and persecution in order to reenact his own Christian conversion: he is the new 
Paul, and the Jew is the Saul he used to be.”4 
The consequence of this privileging of victimization and identification with it as a 
moral model is clarified by Gans’s account of the role of Romanticism in the develop-
ment of the modern market. Gans speaks of the “constitutive hypocrisy of Romanti-
cism,” wherein the Romantic individual performs his rejection of the market system and 
proclaims his persecution by all those situated within that system only in order, ulti-
mately, to create a compelling self capable of circulating effectively within the market. In 
abiding tension with this individualistic gesture is the formation of nationalism along 
analogous lines, through the martyrdom of the nation and its heroes at the hands of its 
oppressors; oppressors that are, of course, simultaneously mimetic models. So, Gans 
argues, 
anti-Semitism intensifies in the bourgeois era because it is at this point in history that 
persecution, which grants significance, comes to be preferable to indifference…. At 
this point the Jews’ indifference to Jesus is no longer a veil covering his guilt for the 
Crucifixion; it is itself the ultimate persecution. To opt out of the theater of national 
life is ipso facto to operate in the hidden realm of conspiracy. The Jew is the ultimate 
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dandy whose detachment from society—in principle, regardless of fact—is the sign of 
his omnipotence. The anthropological meaning of anti-Semitism may be expressed in 
terms of the market, but only insofar as the lesson of the modern market is itself un-
derstood as a transhistorical revelation concerning human exchange. The Jew is des-
ignated the “subject” of the market because, faithful to the empty center revealed by 
the burning bush, he remains in principle indifferent to the object—whether of perse-
cution or adoration—that he finds there.5 
The fury of the Nazi’s assault against the Jews gathered together all these threads of the 
anti-market revolt within a desperate attempt to displace the primacy of the Jews and 
“falsify” their narrative: “[e]nraged at the Jews’ monotheistic equanimity in defeat and 
disaster, the Nazis hoped to inflict on them a catastrophe so great that it could not be 
understood as a message of God to His people.” 
The ultimately omnicidal potential for human violence revealed by the Holocaust 
introduces something new into this equation. The Holocaust marks the beginning of the 
victimary era, in which we are now living. The virulent hatred of the Nazis toward the 
Jews drew the world into a cataclysmic struggle, the like of which we will not survive 
again in the nuclear age. The eschewing of such hatred must be the center of the new 
system of deferral constructed after the war: whatever “looks like” the Nazi-Jew relation 
must be uncompromisingly proscribed. This, of course, creates an incentive to make 
one’s own grievance fit that model: post-colonial, anti-racist, feminist, environmentalist, 
and so on struggles are all cast in terms of the perpetrator/victim/bystander configura-
tion extracted from the Holocaust. 
The Jews are once again placed in a paradoxical position. First of all, the response on 
the part of the Jews to the consequences of their utter defenselessness in the Holocaust is 
to create and, with growing unanimity, support a Jewish nation-state. But the nation-
state, with its ethnic exclusivity, preparedness for belligerency and narrow self-interest, 
is one of those things that “looks” very much “like” Nazism. Second, the victimary 
principle can only be universalized if the Jewish monopoly on Holocaust guilt is bro-
ken—the best way to do so is to present the Jews as oppressors, at least just like the rest 
of us, at worst uniquely so, insofar they have exploited the world’s guilt so as to per-
petuate the very conditions that enabled their own victimization, only this time at the 
expense of others. Finally, then, the emergence of a new victim, the Palestinians, the 
victim of the Jews, completes the victimary metaphysics first set in motion by the essen-
tially theological response to the Holocaust. The victimary system, then, depends upon 
this new, expanded antisemitism, in which the Jews are scapegoated for the crimes of 
the West as well as for the intensifying resentments toward the West, coming now, in 
particular, from the most bitter if not the oldest of those resentments: that of Islam. 
It was the Israeli victory in the 1967 war that made it possible to maneuver the Jews, 
ideologically, out of the victimized and into the victimizer position. But this maneuver-
ing might have gone no further than the kind standard anti-colonial critique applied to 
the United States in Vietnam or the European powers without the increasing abandon-
ment of nationality on the part of Western Europeans and the rise of radical Islam. In 
this context, as Gans says, we are, first of all, 
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struck by the similarity between medieval and modern Christian antisemitism. In both 
cases, the Jew is accused of remaining behind in the “old” Israel rather than entering 
the New Israel of Christianity. It is by this suspicious archaism that he betrays his 
immoral preference for honoring the historical memory of his monotheistic discovery 
over its inherent promise of universality. Whether well-poisoner or Protocol-
worshiper, the Jew is accused of refusing to “love his [non-Jewish] neighbor” as him-
self.6 
Earlier, I suggested that we could attribute to the modern market a “Jewish” and a 
“Christian” component: the former being the location of meaning in one’s “patient” 
action within history and the latter in the processes of individual singularization of the 
player on the market. It would, in that case, be the “Jewish” component that insists upon 
the regularization of exchange by the rule of law within what would inevitably be a 
national framework—which is to say the same paradox of universality and exclusivity 
long associated with the Jewish place in the world. Only the United States has fully 
embraced this paradox and the burdens it implies, which not only accounts for the 
alliance between the United States and Israel but also that of antisemitism and anti-
Americanism. In that case, the contemporary European attempt to transcend nationality 
is not so much a rejection of the modern market in the manner of Nazi and Communist 
totalitarianism as it is a rejection of one of the critical elements of the market, the nation-
state under the rule of law, and an evasion of the paradoxes and resentments involved in 
the articulation of nationality and the world market. 
With the most politically influential currents of contemporary Islam, meanwhile, we 
do most emphatically see a rejection of the market. Gans sees Islam, in its origins and 
today, as the monotheism of an “excluded majority,” forged out of resentment against 
the first monotheism and the prevailing, dominant one: “the Hebrews discovered 
monotheism as the source of communal harmony independent of political power; the 
Muslims discovered it as a means for mobilizing the margins of the decaying imperial 
provinces to overpower them.”7 Hence the Islamic notion of the “uncreated Koran,” a 
direct rebuke to the potential for interpretation and supersessionism (“distortion”) built 
into the Jewish and Christian scriptures. Today, though, this resentment places Muslims 
at the margins of the global market, which they cannot avoid, and, indeed, through the 
oil-producing states participate in substantially, but in such a way as to minimize the 
transformations in the division of labor that would reflect genuine cultural and ethical 
integration. The identification of Jews with the subject controlling the uncontrollable 
marketplace inherited from modern Western antisemitism is in a sense radicalized in the 
Muslim world, which can create a political identity against the market itself from the 
outside. In the course of an analysis of a 2004 speech by former Malaysian Prime Minis-
ter Mahathir Mohamad, Gans contrasts modern European antisemitism, which sees 
itself as occupying the same world as the Jews, with 
Mahathir’s world [where], on the contrary, the Jews occupy a different world from us, 
and their hidden domination of that world is at the root of that world’s open domina-
tion of Islam. By setting up the Jews as the all-powerful enemy, he is encouraging 
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Muslims to forget their military and economic inferiority to the West and focus on the 
infinitesimal number of their “real” masters. The only thing our billions need in order 
to vanquish these few million Jews is a collective will to power.8 
Gans focuses more on the global Muslim “umma” in these reflections I am working 
with, than Muslims living within the Western countries, but following the line of his 
argument one could suggest that the convergence of this mutated form of Islamic 
antisemitism and the revival of antisemitism in the West along with the consolidation of 
White Guilt is creating a particularly intractable new strain. As Gans says, the anti-Israel 
contingent in the West does not distribute copies of The Protocols of the Elders of Zion but 
they respect the right of Muslims to do so. We might say that the Western Left plays the 
role of defense attorney to Islamic terrorism: it does not approve, but it is determined to 
see that the accused receive due process. “International law,” as the latest supersession-
ist project of the West, thereby becomes a vehicle for this new brand of antisemitism: as 
reflected in the Goldstone Report in particular, post-colonial, postmodern international 
law can readily be interpreted in such a way as to render any conceivable form of Israeli 
self-defense illegitimate; how else can we translate this project than in terms of a simple 
imperative: die! 
The conclusion, I think, is that we cannot effectively address this emergent anti-
semitism without addressing the pathologies surrounding the global market. On the one 
hand, the form taken on the marketplace by what Gans calls Jewish “firstness” is that of 
the centrality of the entrepreneur, who organizes capital, introduces a new division of 
labor, and creates new desires. Despite claims of consumer supremacy, one source of the 
mysteriousness of the market’s workings is precisely that new products enter the market 
before anyone has been asking for or has even thought of them—tales of consumer 
manipulation take on their plausibility from this fact. Similarly, the solicitation of in-
vestment capital, from the outside, inevitably looks conspiratorial, especially when 
heavily regulated markets require political maneuvering before new projects can get off 
the ground. We can see exploitative and deceptive entrepreneurial practices as excep-
tions to the rule in a fundamentally beneficial market process; or we can see the honest 
worker and consumer as, a priori, the victims of malevolent and unaccountable market 
players: which perspective we adopt will determine the way we think about regulating 
economic institutions, and only a fundamentally benevolent view will make it possible 
to accept the basic asymmetry between producers and consumers, capital and labor, and 
resist the search for scapegoats for our disappointments in the market. 
Second, though, as I suggested earlier, Jewish firstness is represented by a willing-
ness to endure historical contingency, adhere to the moral law (even if no one else does), 
and ask for no recognition or “proof.” of election. I should make it clear that even if this 
possible relation between law, morality, and history was invented by the Jews, it can, of 
course, be adopted by anyone (as, for example, in “American exceptionalism”). At any 
rate, this form of firstness takes the form of an embrace of normalcy—not at the expense 
of eccentricity, innovativeness, or otherness in general, but certainly as a rejection of the 
a priori victimary stance that artificially inflates the value of alterity. The location of 
cultural exemplars among the upholders of everyday middle-class values and common-
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sense patriotism and the social prioritization of such values might prove even more 
difficult than rehabilitating the figure of the entrepreneur. Without such a cultural turn 
in which we come to see entrepreneurialism and normalcy as the modes of deferral they 
are rather than as exploitation and indifference to the other, though, antisemitism will 
continue to attract and direct the resentments generated by the world market. 
POSTSCRIPT 
The term “antisemitism” has a direct competitor on today’s ideological and political 
“market” for designating hate, one which, if it was not, could very easily have been 
designed to undermine attempts to identify antisemitism—I am referring to the newly 
coined concept of “Islamophobia.” I would like to add a brief critique of the concept of 
Islamophobia to my paper because that concept has become an essential part of contem-
porary antisemitism. While sitting through panel after panel at the YIISA Conference on 
the “crisis of modernity” represented by contemporary antisemitism, I considered that it 
would be easy enough to compose hate speech laws aimed at preventing “Islamopho-
bia” that would have enabled the whole lot of us to be rounded up. If “Islamophobia,” 
or, more broadly, “hate speech” against Muslims, involved generating fear or hatred of 
Islam or Muslims, would it not be easy to make a case that directing such sustained, 
unvarnished, unapologetic attention to the virulent forms of antisemitism at large in 
Muslim communities today makes one guilty as charged? In other words, we are in-
volved in another asymmetrical conflict here: the more antisemitism spreads and goes 
unchallenged in the Islamic world, the more those who simply point it out can be 
presented as purveyors of hatred. There is, ultimately, within the victimary framework 
that sees the “West/White/Capitalist” as intrinsically oppressive, a perfect identity 
between accusations of antisemitism and Islamophobia (even if we are accusing Western 
leftists, we are only doing so because they defend the Islamists, making even that cri-
tique indirectly “Islamophobic”). 
It may be tempting for those of us who see antisemitism as the primary evil in today’s 
world to reverse these terms, complete the polarization, and proclaim charges of “Islamo-
phobia” to be intrinsically antisemitic. It is better to pursue the implications of this cannily 
chosen term, which piggy-backs on the also relatively recently invented “homophobia” 
(rather ironically, because it is hard to see how the manipulators of these respective 
charges could avoid ultimately hurling them at one another). Entrance into the modern 
marketplace and liberal political system involves surrendering the right to avenge oneself 
upon those who have offended one. Nothing could be more basic than the notion that 
crimes and violations be addressed to law enforcement rather than “enforcers” within the 
community itself (with the exception of immediate self-defense, of course). But this condi-
tion cannot simply be imposed upon individuals—it must be imposed upon communities, 
first of all at the beginning of any process of modernization, but subsequently with the 
entrance of each new group into that process. There are various signs that a community 
might need substantive reform in its practices, and the individuals in that community 
protection from its authorities, to make such integration possible: these signs will ulti-
mately point back to some kind of “honor” culture, in which dominant men within the 
community consider themselves and are considered by others obliged not to let insults, 
collective or individual, stand, and to police effectively the actions of those who serve as 
“tokens” of the community’s honor—women in particular. 
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I am not in a position to argue that Muslims in the West are still primarily organized 
as honor communities, although it does seem to me that in those parts of the world that 
are majority Muslim they clearly are. What I can argue, though, because any citizen can 
thus argue, is that we need to discuss whether or not that is the case. In other words, the 
assumption by default that each individual is prepared to enter the liberal order is no 
longer a tenable guide for policies regarding immigration and religious freedom. But we 
are very ill-equipped to have such discussions. Point out potentially dangerous elements 
of “honor” in particular immigrant communities (not only Muslim, but only in Muslim 
communities are such features aggravated by a universalistic religious culture so sensi-
tive to offenses against its honor as to evolve totalitarian features) and you simply enter 
the game of noting equivalent features in every community: what about those Christians 
who bomb abortion clinics, do orthodox Jewish women really want to go around in 
wigs, etc. And, indeed, there are enough superficial similarities to stifle the discussion. 
Our notions of religious freedom and cultural diversity have gotten us to the point 
where even raising such questions, or making observations that could lead to such 
questions, is considered invidious. We see the same asymmetry once again: those who 
have banished honor altogether as “prejudice” are especially feckless in dealing with 
those for whom it is a daily reality. 
The only viable response, I think, is to recall that liberalism does not really banish 
honor—rather, it redirects it toward the defense of innocent victims, victims of the 
violation of equal human rights, or the right to enter the market and the political sphere. 
For us, honor is located in the police officer who will defend a family against predators, 
but will also defend members of a family from predators within it. In the United States 
in particular, part of the legacy of slavery and abolitionism is that our openness to the 
most radical claims to individual freedom is balanced against a suspicion that certain 
forms of freedom entail a “separatism” that can be used to imprison others. Our negotia-
tion of this boundary leads us to train our vision upon the entanglement of “separatist” 
forms of freedom with various and novel forms of coercion. A cultural shift that empha-
sizes, before any other principle, the right of individuals to leave groups and communi-
ties would effectively counter charges of “Islamophobia.” In other words, we need a 
visible, confident cultural consensus that tells the Muslim who wants to convert to 
Christianity, or to marry whom she wants, or to speak out against the community, that 
we will protect them without qualification. Such a defense of the “other” (whom we are 
really just proclaiming to be one of us) would also stiffen our spines in defense of “our-
selves”—so that we would be spared the shame of censoring our own books and enter-
tainment in accord with Islamic law. 
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The Antisemitic Imagination 
Catherine Chatterley* 
The scholarly study of antisemitism has been a small, specialized enterprise overshad-
owed and absorbed by the larger field of Holocaust Studies. In fact, many of the classic 
studies of antisemitism were precipitated by the rise of Hitler and can be seen as at-
tempts to explain the Nazi culmination of this millennial hatred. Scholars such as James 
Parkes (writing from 1930), Cecil Roth (1938), Joshua Trachtenberg (1943), and Leon 
Poliakov (1955) were engaged in an investigative process of trying to comprehend how 
six million Jews could be annihilated in the very heartland of modern civilization. 
Historically, the field has interpreted antisemitism as a Western phenomenon, a product 
of Christendom, although one influenced by ancient anti-Jewish attitudes expressed 
largely by writers of the Roman Empire in the period between Nero and Hadrian (54-138 
CE). With our focus shifting today to so-called “new” forms of antisemitism, especially 
to that of the Islamic world, it is important to re-examine our assumptions and clarify, 
once again, our definition of this phenomenon. 
Jewish tradition explains antisemitism as natural to the structure of human existence. 
Quite simply, Esau hates Jacob. This primal hatred of the Jews exists in all places and in 
all times, independent of culture or religion or socio-economic circumstances. The rabbis 
did not contextualize antisemitism, it was not understood as a cause and effect phe-
nomenon, but existed as an eternal aspect of existence bound up with the destiny of the 
Jewish People. This traditional rabbinic understanding of antisemitism rests upon a 
conception of Gentiles as an undifferentiated mass, whose inner core—or Esau-ness—
remains consistent across time and space despite historical and cultural differences. It is 
also true that this conflict was perceived as a case of mutual hostility, rivalry, and compe-
tition rather than a simple one-sided assault against Israel. While there is much to be 
learned from this traditional reading of antisemitism, and one can certainly understand 
the perspective of the rabbis given the persistent and irrational nature of Jew-hatred, this 
kind of ahistorical interpretation is fundamentally inadequate. 
Antisemitism is not a seven-headed hydra, popping up in different places at different 
times, as some kind of constant presence in human history. One of humanity’s most 
culturally specific and historically determined phenomena, antisemitism is the product of 
the rancorous separation between Judaism and the Jesus Movement of the first century. 
During the following four hundred years, Rabbinic Judaism and Christianity were finally 
and irrevocably divorced with the Church in control of the state and its legal code as the 
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new imperial religion. In this period, we know that the Church worked relentlessly to 
purify itself by rooting out “judaizers”—those individuals still sympathetic to Judaism—
and to separate Christians and Jews to prevent them from celebrating holidays, and 
observing Shabbat, together. The Church’s Theology of Separation was seen as necessary to 
establish its authority over society and became the basis for European legislation regulat-
ing Jewish existence under Christendom for centuries. Natural and inevitable, the separa-
tion between Jews and Christians was not. Retrospectively, we know that the triumphant 
and controlling position of Christianity in the empire and eventually throughout Europe 
led to the systematic exclusion of Jews, as a collectivity, from mainstream Christian society, 
to their deep and abiding marginalization, eventual demonization, and to their peculiar 
positioning in Western societies as middlemen associated with the despised money occu-
pations. What we see in the history of antisemitism is a compounding of stigmatization 
and hatred, which over time results in the production of a composite character that com-
bines extremely negative characteristics associated with, and resulting from, a variety of 
European anti-Jewish religious and economic accusations. 
By approximately 1000 CE, the continent of Europe was Christianized, albeit un-
evenly and idiosyncratically in many places. The period of the High Middle Ages (1000-
1300 CE) was in fact the actual laboratory that created what we know as the antisemitic 
imagination, and it was during these specific centuries that antisemitism first became a 
popular mass phenomenon. This vivid, image-obsessed imagination was Catholic and 
was fed not just visually but also aurally. It had a character at its center that appeared to 
have the power and determination to control the world, to influence events, and to 
wreak utter havoc in society. That character, that figment of the European Christian 
imagination, is “the jew.” He is the tormentor and killer of Christ—the Savior of univer-
sal humanity, according to Christian theology—who continues until the end of time to 
work against the Church and its Gospel; he is the ritual murderer and host desecrator 
who compulsively re-enacts the crucifixion with these homicidal anti-Christian Jewish 
rituals; the well-poisoner and the magician, both of whom are in league with Satan 
against Christian society; and of course the usurer who recalled Judas Iscariot, the tax 
collector and archetypal traitor of the Gospels. It is this character of “the jew” that 
populates the antisemitic imagination; it is by the appearance of this character that we 
know we are in the presence of antisemitism and not some form of xenophobia or hostil-
ity, be they the product of culture, politics, or even personal conflict. 
It is important that we acknowledge the paradox at work in the history of anti-
semitism. The phenomenon itself is not transhistorical. It is first created, and determined, 
by the history of Christianity and its relationship to the Jewish people, and continues to 
evolve in correspondence with the historical development of specific cultural and 
economic relationships unique to different regions of Europe. At the same time, how-
ever, the basic characteristics of the caricature that this history produces and releases into 
the world from the 12th century on are remarkably consistent across time and place. 
Regardless of European region, denomination, language, or nationality, the characteris-
tics of “the jew” are consistent. In other words, we see shifts in the articulation of perception 
over time in different contexts but not in the basic perception itself.1 This continues to be the 
case today with contemporary forms of antisemitism. 
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So, while it is true that antisemitism is not a naturally occurring human phenome-
non, the worldwide diffusion of Christianity and Western culture through European 
imperialism brought with it, implicitly, the character of “the jew” and therefore also 
introduced antisemitism to the world. Nothing else can explain the presence of this 
character—and the hatred for it—among indigenous peoples on several continents, sub-
Saharan Africans, and the Japanese, or account for its absence in parts of the world 
unaffected by European imperialism or where European missionary efforts failed to 
have any significant effect like China and India. 
Antisemitism is carried inside Western culture in the most complex ways because 
“the jew” is sewn into the fabric of the Christian imagination. It is crucial that we re-
member that until the last quarter of the 20th century, the West was a Christian civiliza-
tion, and however secularized and multicultural Western societies are today, they 
remain saturated with Christian symbol, metaphor, and imagery. One might argue that 
one aspect of Christianity that has been retained after the Holocaust, despite the waning 
of religious belief and practice in Western societies, is a deep ambivalence and unease 
about the Jewish people and one’s relationship to them. Although we cannot quantify 
these attitudes, we know there is still suspicion, resentment, contempt, and ongoing 
hatred for Jews in parts of the population. 
The central story of Western civilization is Christ’s Passion—understood until per-
haps a generation ago as his suffering and death at the hands of the Jews or at the hands 
of Rome at the conspiratorial manipulation of the Jews—which is clearly accepted as fact 
in the four Gospels of the New Testament. For centuries, every generation of Europeans 
met the Jewish People through this story—through their extremely negative depiction in 
this text. If Europeans knew no Jews personally (and one has to realize that this is the 
reality for the vast majority of people then and now, regardless of location, due to the 
reality of human demography) this is the only exposure they were given to the Jewish 
people. In other words, “the jew” of the New Testament becomes the real existing Jew, 
with no accompanying awareness that this character is a creation of the Christian imagi-
nation. Over centuries of telling and retelling in Europe, the Gospels create a character 
who is a composite of several extremely negative figures (Caiaphas, Judas, the crowd—
particularly as represented in the Book of Matthew) who retain their Jewish identity and 
therefore actually come to define Jewishness for Christians, while Jesus, his disciples, the 
Holy Family, Simon, and Veronica are freed of their Jewishness and are perceived as 
Christians instead. You have generations of Christians who do not know, because they 
are never taught, that Jesus, his mother, and the disciples are Jewish, or for that matter 
that his beautiful and humane teachings emanate from Judaism. Rather, the Gospels 
depict “the jew” as conspiratorial; vengeful; hateful; unrelentingly cruel and unforgiv-
ing; arrogant; blind to the truth; corrupted, especially by money; treasonous; criminal; 
and, at bottom, evil. Every one of these characteristics is recognized as fundamentally 
antithetical to good Christian behavior; instead, these dark qualities come to define the 
one tiny group in Europe that remains conspicuously outside the universal religion of 
humanity. This dialectical relationship between Christians and Jews, rooted in theology 
and characterized by a psychological splitting between good and evil, is one of the 
pivots of Western history and is actually the central dynamic at work in Christian 
identity formation. In other words, Christians are conditioned over millennia to define 
themselves against, and in specific opposition to, “the Jew.” To be Christian, then, is to 
not be Jewish. 
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The history of antisemitism is a process of reconfiguration, the basic template of which 
is Christian. The characteristics of “the jew,” of this figment created by Christianity, 
remain consistent despite their secularization in the West during the 18th and 19th 
centuries, their Islamization from the middle of the 20th century, and their globalization 
via the Internet and satellite television since 2001. Ironically, these later reconfigurations 
of Christian antisemitism have their own bible of sorts: The Protocols of the Learned Elders 
of Zion. Today, again, we have a world that meets the Jewish people through a libelous 
text, sold around the world in a record number of editions, promoted by certain gov-
ernments and religious leaders, educators, and academics as an “historical text.” The 
book is again used today to explain the workings of international economics and politics 
and now also the ongoing war between Israel and the Palestinians, very much like it was 
used by Hitler to explain the supposed war between Germany and “the jews” and to 
illustrate “Jewish machinations” across the planet. This Czarist forgery reinforces all the 
same New Testament characteristics of “the jew”—he is conspiratorial, cruel, powerful, 
hateful, dishonest, immoral, selfish, arrogant, and most significantly—he is a victim-
izer—once again engaged in his own particularistic assault on universal humanity. In the 
antisemitic imagination, now as in the past, “the jew” is a nihilistic creature, obsessed 
only with himself, whose selfish Jewish interests make him an enemy of humanity and 
of any universal religion or movement for the broader interests of the world’s peoples. 
This is the classic and consistent dynamic of antisemitism, which is in essence a hatred 
of Jewish particularity. Historically, Jewish religion and nationalism have both been 
perceived as dangerously exclusive and hopelessly particularistic, and therefore hostile 
to humanity. One can see how any movement that sees itself as universal—be it Christi-
anity, Islam, Marxism, or the contemporary international campaign for Human Rights—
will have difficulty (to say the least) with Judaism and Zionism as they are (mis)under-
stood by most people. 
Whether in the West or the Middle East, be it termed old or new, classic or contem-
porary, we are dealing with a vicious, dehumanizing, and libelous phenomenon. Post-
Christian forms of antisemitism all have at their core a caricature that far too many 
people believe corresponds to actually existing Jews. We take the word caricature from 
the Italian verb caricare, which means to exaggerate, but also tellingly to attack and to 
rouse. One of the truly frightening and dangerous aspects of antisemitism remains the 
provocative and threatening nature of the character at its centre—”the jew.” This charac-
ter, by his very nature, provokes resistance in the form of attack from those who believe 
he exists. The violence, be it physical or rhetorical, that one perpetrates against “the jew” 
is always justified because it is conceived by its very nature as a protective act of self-
defense. All antisemites, regardless of time and place, see themselves as victims of “the 
jew.” 
In general, the world remains ignorant about the religion of Judaism, the modern po-
litical movement of Zionism, and the trajectory of Jewish history, and this is part of the 
problem. If the only information people have about Jews is based upon the caricature 
produced by the antisemitic imagination then Jews will continue to face real hostility 
and aggression in the world. One thinks of Ayaan Hirsi Ali’s admission that she thought 
Jews were demons, as her grandmother had taught her and her siblings in Somalia, until 
a friend in Amsterdam told her they were sitting in a Jewish neighborhood and she 
realized that Jews were actually human beings. This, of course, is precisely why the 
brutal antisemitic lies about Jews peddled by the media today throughout the Islamic 
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world are so dangerous. These lies have a direct impact on the hearts and minds of their 
audience—particularly children—just as they did, again, for 12 years under Hitler. Much 
of the content we see in Middle Eastern media is indistinguishable from Nazi propa-
ganda, except that today’s sophisticated technology is that much more manipulative. 
Ignoring this reality, as so many critics of Israel in the West do, is not only fundamen-
tally irresponsible but also irrational. In a post-Holocaust world, we know where these 
libelous ideas about Jews can lead. Given this ongoing failure of comprehension, one 
must reasonably conclude that despite the Holocaust, the West has learned nothing 
about the nature of antisemitism and our responsibility for it. 
I would like to conclude by discussing the possible reasons for the persistent appeal 
of this character, especially outside its original theological context. One thing we can say 
with certainty now is that antisemitism is no longer strictly a Western phenomenon. It 
no longer requires Christian theology or culture, however secularized, to function or to 
resonate with the masses. This is a new development for the study of the history of 
antisemitism and it is worrying. As ugly as Christian antisemitism is, we could at least 
take comfort in the fact that it only made sense in a Christian, or post-Christian, context 
and could therefore be contained. 
Antisemitism, unfortunately, is not only a function of religious theology or of cul-
ture, but is a phenomenon that taps into our nature as human beings. As a species, we 
have a general reluctance to examine ourselves critically and to admit our own faults, 
limitations, and mistakes. We have great difficulty taking responsibility for our own 
negative circumstances, our own suffering, and for our own role in, at least, partially 
creating these conditions. It is far easier and soothing to the ego to conceive of oneself 
solely as a victim, as someone who has been mistreated and exploited, through no fault 
of one’s own. This operates on an individual basis but also collectively, and the dynamic 
increasingly affects all forms of contemporary political culture. In an increasingly 
complex global economic environment, in an ever-changing bewildering world, it is 
simply convenient—and therefore appealing—to blame a very well established and 
precedential “Jewish Conspiracy” for the fate of the world and for one’s misfortune 
however conceived. This is far easier than engaging in the hard work of investigating 
the complex social, political, economic, and historical relationships that surround us, 
and that we ourselves influence. 
Nietzsche had a name for this process, where human beings attach blame for their 
own failures and frustrations onto others: ressentiment. While this dynamic has always 
helped fuel antisemitism, it seems to be ever more central to contemporary reconfigura-
tions of the phenomenon. 
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The Communication Latency of Antisemitic 
Attitudes: An Experimental Study 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
There might not be a discourse of more significance for the political culture of Western 
countries than the one grappling with the crimes of National Socialism against the Jews. 
The project of “re-education” not only had to fight the strong tradition of antisemitic and 
authoritarian resentments in Germany, but necessarily became an act of self-definition of 
liberal societies. Antisemitism research has elaborated its views on modern antisemitism 
since 1945 and has developed theoretical enhancements of classical approaches.1 Recent 
forms of antisemitism like “secondary antisemitism” (Schönbach 1961; Adorno 1997), 
“anti-Zionism” or “new antisemitism” (Rosenbaum 2004; Rabinovici et al. 2004) and 
“structural antisemitism” (Haury 2002) can be understood as reactions to the heightened 
public awareness and ostracism of antisemitic prejudices. The persecution and social 
sanctioning of antisemitic attitudes and opinions has influenced theoretical concepts and 
explanations within antisemitism research to some extent. However, it has had only a 
weak effect on methodological considerations such as how to obtain valid measures of 
antisemitic attitudes. 
Sensitive questions in surveys are often perceived as too intrusive or even threaten-
ing, since they potentially require the interviewees to disclose behaviors or attitudes that 
violate social norms: “A question is sensitive when it asks for a socially undesirable 
answer, when it asks, in effect, that the respondent admits he or she has violated a social 
norm” (Tourangeau & Yan 2007: 860). Based on survey research, it is known that direct 
measurement of behaviors and attitudes that violate social norms yields socially desir-
able responses (Stocké 2004; Schnell et al. 2005; Diekmann 2008; Krumpal 2009, 2010). 
Interviewees tend to misreport on sensitive issues such as criminal behavior or unsocial 
attitudes (Van Koolwijk 1969; Lee 1993).2 
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The question must therefore be raised how antisemitism, being a “sensitive topic,” 
can be measured at all if we assume that (at least) a subset of antisemitic interviewees 
are aware of the public norm of anti-antisemitism, interpret surveys as public situations, 
and therefore underreport their antisemitic attitudes. Previous research concludes that 
in the context of population surveys, antisemitic attitudes are reported truthfully on the 
whole (Bergmann & Erb 1991a, 1991b). This conclusion is based upon empirical findings 
indicating that interviewees who perceive the topic “Jews” as “sensitive” nevertheless 
show high levels of agreement with items reflecting antisemitic attitudes (Bergmann & 
Erb 1991b: 282). 
We argue that questions about the perceived sensitivity of the topic “Jews” can be 
considered as sensitive as the ones asking about actual opinions toward Jews. It is 
possible that underreporting already occurs when questions about the perceived sensi-
tivity are being asked, i.e. a subset of antisemites might give socially desirable answers 
to the questions about their actual opinion toward Jews as well as to the questions about 
the perceived sensitivity of the topic “Jews.” The possible conclusion of the researcher 
about the existence of antisemitic attitudes drawn from a defensive stance against the 
topic “Jews” might not be that difficult for the common perception as presupposed by 
Bergmann and Erb. 
Previous methodological and social-psychological studies show that the survey design 
and the question context may have an impact on socially desirable response behavior 
(Schwarz & Bayer 1989; Strack 1992; Tourangeau & Yan 2007). Following these findings, 
we use an experimental design to demonstrate the effect of question context on socially 
desirable response behavior in a survey on antisemitism. We experimentally manipulate 
the temporary cognitive accessibility of antisemitic primary group norms by randomly 
assigning interviewees to complete an antisemitism scale either before or after assessing 
the attitudes of their friends (peer group networks of friends are assumed to be the respec-
tive primary group in our case).3 We demonstrate a significant interaction effect between 
question order and primary group norms on the propensity to self-report antisemitic 
attitudes. Our results indicate that the interviewees are more likely to reveal antisemitic 
attitudes when their friends share an antisemitic norm and when this norm is cognitively 
activated before self-assessment. Section 2 will outline the theoretical connection between 
antisemitism theory and survey psychology, and section 3 will present the results of our 
empirical study in more detail. We will draw some final conclusions in section 4. 
2. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
2.1 Concept and theory of antisemitism 
Although we can distinguish several theoretical approaches that attempt to explain 
modern antisemitism before 1945, most of them insisting on its peculiarity both in 
comparison to the older anti-Judaism and other forms of racism (see Fein 1987; Berg-
mann 1988; Salzborn 2010), the development of a comprehensive theory dealing with 
                                                                                                                                                       
3 Such variation of question order is assumed to trigger “context effects” (also known as “halo-
effects,” see Nisbett & Wilson 1977) of previous questions on the answer process of subsequent 
questions by cognitively activating information in the previous questions that is relevant for 
answering the subsequent questions. 
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antisemitism after the Shoah is still in its infancy. In Germany, the first efforts in this 
regard were made by the “Critical Theory of Antisemitism” and particularly the empiri-
cal studies of the re-emigrated Frankfurt Institute of Social Science, which brought to 
light not only that antisemitic attitudes have remained present since 1945 on a more 
private level, although they are seemingly combated on the surface of public decision 
making (see Böhm 1955), but also argued that guilt and its suppression forms a new 
reservoir for aggression against Jews within German society (this is what Schönbach in 
1961 first called “secondary antisemitism”; see also Adorno 1997). Also, within the 
“German Left” (Broder 1976; Brumlik 1986), we find the first self-critical discussions 
about anti-Zionism as a new and more accepted form of antisemitism that emerged from 
the New Left in the 1960s and has also become popular in radical Islamism. This “new 
antisemitism” (see Rosenbaum 2004; Chesler 2005; Rabinovici et al. 2004)—the label 
under which it is mainly discussed in the Anglo-American context—is, just like secon-
dary antisemitism, a reaction to the sanctioning of genuine antisemitism and stems 
partly from new sources, but remains connected to the old resentment to a certain 
degree. 
Bergmann and Erb (1986) grasp anti-Zionism as a form of “detour communication” 
for genuine antisemitism. Their concept of “communication latency” tries to accentuate 
the social latency of antisemitism after 1945 in contrast to a mere psychological latency. 
“Latency” is explicitly used in regard to social and not psychological functions. The 
communication latency of antisemitism in the German Federal Republic offers the basis 
for integration within the Western alliance without actually having to deal with the past. 
In this regard, the media and the education system are supposed to carry on the new 
raison d’état of anti-antisemitism in making clear what to say in public discourse and 
what not. 
The differentiation between communication latency and psychological latency postu-
lates that antisemitic attitudes remain conscious but are not articulated publicly. Anti-
semites have the urge to articulate their attitudes, but such communication occurs 
beyond the public level (Bergmann & Erb 1986: 230). New communication channels 
need to be found for the expression of antisemitism. The authors discuss two possibili-
ties: “consensus groups” (such as right-wing networks) and “detour communication” 
(such as anti-Zionism). 
If the focus merely rests on genuine antisemitic prejudices expressed publicly, the 
fact that antisemitism persists latently will be ignored. It is this persistence that is of 
relevance for the study of new forms of antisemitism and their relation to genuine 
resentments. The simple replacement of the term “Jew” with the term “Israeli,” for 
example, is often used to camouflage what can be detected, when examined more 
closely, as a clear case of antisemitism. Without such a closer examination it might be 
mistaken as rational critique of Israel’s foreign policy. In regard to standardized meas-
urement instruments, this examination implies that we have to develop a better meas-
urement instrument that is able to reproduce the actual attitude of the interviewees 
more validly. 
2.2 The difference between actual and communicated attitudes 
The implicit note of Bergman and Erb (1986) about reference groups (which they refer to 
as “consensus groups”) and their impact on the willingness to communicate publicly 
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sanctioned attitudes such as antisemitism may help us to determine the relevant mecha-
nisms of the generation and communication of antisemitic attitudes. Let us start with 
some assumptions. 
First of all, we distinguish analytically between a public norm and a primary group 
norm. The public norm is the commonly shared expectation that antisemitism shall not be 
articulated in public situations. Hence, there is only one parameter value that can be 
taken for granted: we speak of a “public norm against antisemitism.” The primary group 
norm is the shared expectation of a small definable private group (in our case the peer 
group of friends) whether antisemitic attitudes shall be articulated or not. The parameter 
values of such a norm can be located on a continuum with the endpoints (1) “norm 
against antisemitism,” implying that members of the primary group judge antisemitic 
expressions as being inappropriate, and (2) “antisemitic norm,” representing a position 
of antisemitism within the group. Ambivalence and indifference toward Jews can be 
located between these endpoints. 
On the level of attitude generation, though both the public norm against antisemitism 
and the specific primary group norm influence the actual attitude, we assume that the 
primary group norm carries relatively more weight. If individuals hold attitudes that are 
not in accordance with the primary group norm, cognitive dissonance will occur. Ac-
cording to the theory of cognitive dissonance (see Festinger 1957), this is likely to be 
reduced by adapting the attitude to the primary group norm. Keeping this in mind, the 
primary group norm can be seen as better predictor of the actual attitudes of interview-
ees than the public norm. 
On the level of attitude communication, however, we assume that the relative influ-
ences of the public and primary group norms are shaped by the definition of the situa-
tion. In public situations, the public norm of anti-antisemitism suppresses the 
communication of antisemitic statements, while in private situations the respective 
primary group norm is of higher relevance. If the primary group norm and the public 
norm diverge, it can be assumed that a discrepancy between public and private situa-
tions will occur. In public situations, individuals holding antisemitic attitudes of a rele-
vant degree will not communicate their attitudes in a straightforward manner, but will 
adjust their communications toward the public norm. In private situations, the public 
norm has a relatively weaker influence and the primary group norm is of greater rele-
vance. Thus, it is assumed that antisemitic individuals with a primary group sharing 
similar attitudes will communicate their antisemitic attitudes in private situations but 
will deny their attitudes in the public. We then face the problem of a difference between 
actual attitudes and communicated attitudes in public situations, which then diminishes 
in private situations. 
If we assume that interviewees interpret surveys as public situations, a significant 
difference between the actual attitude and the communicated attitude would be the 
result. This difference could be interpreted as a social desirability bias. To decrease this 
difference, we could influence the interpretation and framing of the survey situation in 
such a way that it is in higher accordance with the private situation of the interviewee. 
For this purpose, we suggest cognitively activating the primary group norms via “con-
text effects,” i.e. the influence of previous questions on the answering process of latter 
questions (see Schwarz & Sudman 1992). In this regard, we expect a “priming effect” 
(see Sloman et al. 1988) of previous questions to activate relevant information that is 
used for interpretation and answering of the subsequent questions. “This information is 
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either contained in the previous question or activated by the respondent in order to 
generate an answer to the previous question. Merely by having been activated before, 
the information subsequently becomes more accessible. Moreover, this process can occur 
without the respondent’s awareness…” (Strack 1992: 25ff.). 
2.3 The impact of primary group norms on the communication of antisemitic 
attitudes 
The answering of questions concerning one’s own antisemitic attitudes can principally be 
based on different, potentially relevant information and cognitive contents. Following 
psychological considerations, we can assume that from all possible information, the subset 
most easily accessible at the time of answering a question will have the strongest impact on 
the answering process (see Schwarz & Bayer 1989). If we want to increase the validity of 
our measurement, it is reasonable to embed the sensitive items measuring antisemitism in 
the private, primary group context of the interviewees. This means we have to increase the 
cognitive availability of primary group norms by activating respective cognitions before 
self-assessment. We will not provide this information to interviewees, but ask for it di-
rectly. Therefore, a self-generated cognitive anchor will serve the interviewees as the basis 
for the answering of the following questions: “By making a particular dimension, norm, or 
standard of comparison salient, context can … alter how respondents make their judg-
ment. For example, prior items may trigger the application of a norm that is carried over to 
a later item” (Tourangeau 1992: 38). We predict that interviewees with antisemitic attitudes 
of sufficient strength might be more willing to give socially undesirable answers because 
the salience of the primary group norm is supposed to weaken the relative influence of the 
public norm. If, in contrast, such an anchor is not available, interviewees’ response behav-
ior might be more strongly influenced by the public norm, which in turn would result in 
more socially desirable answers. 
From these considerations, two hypotheses can be derived. They will be tested via an 
experimental design varying the question order. The treatment group will complete an 
antisemitism scale after assessing the attitudes and norms of their primary group. The 
control group will complete the same antisemitism scale before answering questions 
about their primary group (reversed question order). 
Hypothesis 1: The strength of the correlation between primary group norms and commu-
nicated antisemitism will increase if the questions regarding the primary group norms 
are asked before those concerning the subjects’ own attitudes. 
Hypothesis 2: Subjects with an antisemitic primary group will report more antisemitic 
attitudes if the questions regarding the primary group norms are asked before those 
concerning the subjects’ own attitudes. 
2.4 Further determinants of the communication of antisemitic attitudes 
It has been postulated that the willingness to communicate antisemitic attitudes varies 
depending on the cognitive availability of respective primary group norms. In addition, 
further determinants of the communication of antisemitic attitudes can be discussed. 
The strong and robust correlation between education (within a democratic society) and 
antisemitic attitudes can be considered a desideratum of the empirical research (see Weil 
1985 for an international overview). Political interest could be considered another 
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determinant, since the public norm of anti-antisemitism is mediated not only through 
the educational system but also through the medial discourse. Another robust finding of 
antisemitism research indicates a strong association between right-wing attitudes and 
antisemitism (see Porat & Stauber 2010 for an international overview). Overall, education, 
political interest and political attitudes are three variables that, in addition to influencing 
actual attitudes, might have an impact on the communication of antisemitic attitudes. 
The following three hypotheses capture these considerations. 
Hypothesis 3: The higher a subject’s level of education, the less likely it is that he or she 
will communicate antisemitic attitudes. 
Hypothesis 4: The stronger a subject’s political interest, the less likely it is that he or she 
will communicate antisemitic attitudes. 
Hypothesis 5: The more right-wing a subject’s political attitudes, the more likely it is that 
he or she will communicate antisemitic attitudes. 
The differentiation between communicated attitudes and actual attitudes might seem 
fussy at this point, since surveys merely display the communicated attitudes (and not 
the actual ones) in any case. From the vantage point of communication latency, however, 
the distinction has to be taken into consideration for another reason. If we assume that 
our determinants mainly impact the communication of antisemitism (and not the actual 
attitudes), the strong correlation between the mentioned determinants and antisemitic 
attitudes might have been overestimated in the previous research. 
We will illustrate this point via a gedankenexperiment. Let us assume that the actual 
extent of antisemitic attitudes in the group of higher educated interviewees is only 
slightly smaller compared to the group of lower educated interviewees. Let us further 
assume that the public norm of anti-antisemitism has a stronger impact on higher 
educated subjects than on less educated ones because the former are more aware of the 
public norm. Based on these assumptions, the likelihood of a socially desirable answer is 
expected to be higher for the group of higher educated interviewees than for the group 
of less educated ones. In other words, we expect that higher educated subjects are more 
likely to conceal antisemitic attitudes in an interview situation. The same reasoning can 
be used for the variable “political interest.” Finally, an even more basic finding of 
previous research on antisemitism can be put into perspective, namely the strong corre-
lation between right-wing attitudes and antisemitic attitudes. In terms of the former 
gedankenexperiment, it could be postulated that the public norm against antisemitism 
might have a stronger influence on leftist individuals than on right-wing ones who are 
not afraid of “breaching the anti-antisemitic taboo.” 
Therefore, we might ask whether the influence of the abovementioned determinants 
might have been overestimated. The following section will present the empirical tests of 
our hypotheses. 
3. EMPIRICAL STUDY 
3.1 Research design 
In order to test our hypotheses, we conducted a randomized experiment. We experimen-
tally varied the temporary cognitive accessibility of antisemitic primary group norms by 
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randomly assigning interviewees to complete an antisemitism scale either before or after 
assessing the attitudes of their friends. Half our sample was first asked about “a 
friend’s” attitude toward Jews and later asked about his or her own attitudes. The other 
half of our sample completed a questionnaire with a reversed question order.4 The 
following operationalization was used: 
– Treatment condition: “The following questions deal with a completely different 
matter, namely with the standing of Jews in today’s world. But to start with it is not 
about your own opinion but about that of a friend. If you are not sure what exactly 
he or she would answer imagine the following situation. The two of you are sitting 
in front of the TV and a famous actor states one of the following sentences. To what 
extent do you think your friend would agree with the statement?” 
– Control condition: “The same statements again, but this time it is about the opinion of 
a friend. If you are not sure what he or she would answer imagine the following 
situation. The two of you are sitting in front of the TV and a famous actor states one 
of the following sentences. To what extent do you think your friend would agree 
with the statement?” 
By using a randomized experimental design, the actual extent of antisemitic attitudes, as 
well as all known and unknown covariates, are constant between the two groups. The 
principle of randomization guarantees that there are no systematic differences between 
the two experimental groups except for the experimental treatment, i.e. the degree of 
cognitive availability of primary group norms. Differences between groups with regard 
to the reported antisemitic attitudes, our dependent variable, can then be interpreted as 
being causally influenced by the cognitive availability of primary group norms. 
The following study was conducted in April 2008 in Mittelschulen (secondary schools 
that do not prepare students for university admission) and Gymnasien (secondary 
schools that prepare students for university admission) in East Germany. A sample of 
241 students between the ages of 14 and 18 were interviewed via standardized, paper-
and-pencil questionnaires. 
3.2 Description of the sample 
Let us first consider the distribution of the socio-demographic variables: 3 percent of the 
interviewees were aged 14, 46 percent were aged 15, 33 percent were aged 16, 16 percent 
were aged 17, and 2 percent were aged 18. Furthermore, 52 percent were male and 48 
percent were female. The variable education was operationalized via the question, “What 
kind of graduation do you expect to achieve?” The empirical distribution of education in 
our sample was as follows: 18 percent of interviewees expected to achieve a Hauptschule 
graduation (9 years of school, no university admission), 30 percent expected to achieve a 
                                                                                                                                                       
4 The primary group norm was operationalized by asking for the perception of a “friend’s 
opinion” regarding antisemitic statements. Our interviewees were all juveniles. Our operationaliza-
tion of primary group norms using “the opinion of a friend” is based on the assumption that 
mainly “typical friends” are remembered who could be seen as representatives of the opinion 
within the primary group. We assume that the interviewee will think of a “typical friend” and not 
of an “extreme friend” from whom he or she would tend to set him or herself apart. In this context, 
we expect an adjustment of the interviewee’s self-assessment to the preliminarily activated opinion 
of a “typical friend.” 
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Realschule graduation (10 years of school, no university admission), 3 percent expected to 
achieve a Fachhochschulreife graduation (11 years of school, with specific university 
admission), and 48 percent expected to achieve a general Abitur graduation (12 years of 
school, with general university admission). 
Antisemitic attitudes were measured via specific items often used in standard an-
tisemitism scales. Statements III and IV (see Table 1) have a reversed polarity to avoid 
acquiescence (see Schnell et al. 2005). The empirical distributions of the single items are 
displayed in Table 1. These items are the basis for the construction of an additive index 
ranging (like the single items) from 1 (no antisemitic attitudes) to 6 (strong antisemitic 
attitudes) with a mean of 2.6 and a standard deviation of 1.2. 












I. More than other people, Jews 
use nasty tricks to achieve what 
they want (see Decker & Brähler 
2006).  
39 23 17 11 5 5 
II. Jews have too much influence 
in the world. (see Bergmann & 
Erb 1991a).  
25 24 31 9 6 5 
III. I think it is good that more 
Jews live in Germany again.  
10 7 15 31 22 15 
IV. The Jewish culture has to be 
protected against its enemies.  
7 8 16 26 27 16 
V. Due to their behavior, Jews 
bear part of the guilt for their 
persecution (see Heyder et al. 
2005).  
50 18 11 12 5 4 
Note: Values are percentages. The number of cases varies between 237 and 241 due to item non-
response. A factor analysis of these items yields one factor with an eigenvalue greater than 1 (exact 
value: 3.23) and explains 65 percent of overall variance. Factor loadings range between 0.7 and 0.9. 
Reliability analysis of the index yields a Cronbach’s alpha value of 0.86. The index values range 
from 1 to 6 (like the single items). Higher values indicate stronger antisemitic attitudes. 
The additive index regarding the friend’s attitude is based on the same items with a mean 
of 2.9 and a standard deviation of 1.1. Based on the two indices, the sample distribution 
of antisemitic attitudes is as follows: 70 percent of the interviewees (61 percent of 
friends) can be classified as unprejudiced (index values ≤ 3), 19 percent (24 percent of 
friends) show latent antisemitic attitudes (values > 3 and ≤ 4) and 11 percent (15 percent 
of friends) show strong antisemitic attitudes (values > 4). 
Beside education, we introduced the covariates political interest and political attitudes. 
Political interest was measured via the following two items: “How often do you discuss 
politics with your family, friends, and acquaintances?” (mean = 2.8; standard deviation = 
1.1) and “How often do you watch the news (television or internet) or read the news in 
newspapers?” (mean = 3.7; standard deviation = 1.0). The answers were “never” (11 
percent for the first question and 1 percent for the second), “rarely” (30 percent and 11 
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percent), “medium” (30 percent and 27 percent), “often” (21 percent and 40 percent) and 
“very often” (8 percent and 21 percent). The variable political attitudes was operational-
ized via a 10-point self-rating scale, where the value 1 equals “left” and 10 equals 
“right.” Ten percent of the students can be labeled “extremely left” (values 1 or 2), 27 
percent “left” (values 3 or 4), 48 percent are in the centre of the political spectrum (val-
ues 5 or 6), 11 percent can be labeled “right-wing” (values 7 or 8) and 4 percent “ex-
tremely right-wing” (values 9 or 10). 
3.3 Empirical test of the hypotheses 
In this section, we will test our hypotheses empirically. Hypothesis 1 states that the 
correlation between the self-reported attitude and the primary group norm will increase 
if the latter is cognitively activated. To test this hypothesis let us first look at the correla-
tion coefficients between the own attitude and the friend’s supposed attitude in both 
groups. The control group, the group in which the friend’s attitude has not been acti-
vated shows a Pearsons correlation coefficient r = 0.75 (p = 0.00). In contrast, the treat-
ment group displays a stronger correlation of r = 0.86 (p = 0.00). The between-group 
difference is statistically significant (Fisher’s z = 2.397, p < 0.05). Thus, hypothesis 1 can 
be confirmed. As expected, the reported own attitude is more congruent with the pri-
mary group norm if we activate the latter before asking about the subjects’ own atti-
tudes. 
Hypothesis 2 states that subjects with an antisemitic primary group will report more 
antisemitic attitudes if the questions regarding the primary group norms are asked before 
those concerning the subjects’ own attitudes. To test hypothesis 2, we divided our 
sample into two categories: subjects with unprejudiced friends (61 percent of interview-
ees) and subjects with slightly or strongly prejudiced friends (39 percent of interview-
ees). For both categories, we compared the means with respect to the subjects’ own 
antisemitic attitudes (control group v. treatment group). Our results support hypothesis 
2. In the first category, interviewees with antisemitic friends, the control group (the 
group in which the primary group norm had not been activated) had a mean of 3.3 (N = 
49). In contrast, interviewees with antisemitic friends in the treatment group showed a 
mean of 4.0 (N = 40) indicating a higher level of self-reported antisemitism. This differ-
ence is statistically significant (p = 0.00). In the second category, interviewees with 
unprejudiced friends, no significant difference between means can be observed: 1.9 in 
the control group (N = 63) v. 2.0 in the treatment group (N = 77). Our results indicate that 
the interviewees are more likely to reveal antisemitic attitudes when their friends share 
an antisemitic norm and when this norm is cognitively activated before self-assessment. 
The expected negative correlation between education and the willingness to self-
report antisemitic attitudes (see hypothesis 3) can also be confirmed (r = -0.47; p = 0.00). 
Students with a higher level of education express antisemitic attitudes less frequently. 
Regarding hypothesis 4, the empirical findings are somewhat ambiguous. In view of the 
perception of political events (“How often do you watch the news (television or internet) 
or do you read the news in newspapers?”), no statistically significant correlation (r = -
0.02; p = 0.80) can be observed. However, when looking at the participation in political 
discussions (“How often do you discuss politics?”), a statistically significant correlation 
(r = -0.16; p = 0.01) showing the expected negative sign can be observed. The more 
students discuss politics, the less antisemitic attitudes they express. Hypothesis 5 can 
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also be confirmed empirically. The more right-wing the interviewees’ political attitudes, 
the more often they express antisemitic attitudes. In this case, we observed a strong, 
positive correlation r = 0.60 that is statistically significant (p = 0.00). 
Hypotheses 3-5 are largely supported by the bivariate analyses. However, as we al-
ready argued in the context of our gedankenexperiment, the strength of the correlations 
between education, political interest, and political attitudes on the one hand and anti-
semitic attitudes on the other is possibly overestimated. Taking into account the cogni-
tive activation of (potentially antisemitic) primary group norms, we expect that better-
educated, more interested, leftist individuals will reveal more antisemitic attitudes, thus 
decreasing the strength of the correlations. 
To test these considerations empirically, we estimate two multiple OLS-regression 
models. Model 1 displays coefficients without controlling for the primary group norm. 
This reduced model confirms the bivariate findings and shows that the effects of our 
covariates are robust in a multivariate framework. Model 2 displays coefficients control-
ling for the cognitive accessibility of the primary group norm. Adding the question order, 
the primary group norm, and the respective interaction term, we find that hypotheses 1 and 
2 are again supported. Regression model 2 indicates a strong, positive effect of the 
primary group norm (0.49 units change on the “antisemitism scale” per one-unit change 
on the “primary group scale”). The strength of the effect further increases when the 
primary group norm is cognitively activated before self-assessment (significant interac-
tion effect between question order and primary group norms yielding an additional 0.31 
units change on the “antisemitism scale” per one-unit change on the “primary group 
scale”). The negative algebraic sign of the coefficient regarding the influence of the 
question order indicates that the willingness to self-report antisemitic attitudes will only 
increase in cases where the primary group norm exceeds a certain degree of anti-
semitism. In other words, a sufficiently strong antisemitic primary group norm is neces-
sary to cause the predicted higher value of self-reported antisemitism. To summarize, 
the interviewees are more likely to reveal antisemitic attitudes when their friends share 
an antisemitic norm and when this norm is cognitively activated before self-assessment. 
Let us now turn to our determinants of hypotheses 3-5 again. In model 2, the effects 
of education, political interest, and political attitudes decrease substantially if we take 
into account the interaction effect between question order and primary group norms. This 
means that, if primary group norms are activated in the cognitive frame of the inter-
viewees, the variables education, political interest, and political attitudes lose explanatory 
power. We suppose that the explanation for this finding is that once interviewees with a 
higher level of education and so forth frame the survey situation in a more private way, 
the difference between them and interviewees with a lower level of education and so 
forth decreases. Although education and political attitudes are of importance too, the 
primary group norms (and their cognitive activation) have the strongest effect on the 
willingness to self-report antisemitic attitudes as suggested by regression model 2. These 
findings confirm our gedankenexperiment, stating that the strength of the effects of the 
other determinants (education, political interest, and political attitudes) are possibly 
overestimated. 
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Table 2: Determinants of self-reported antisemitic attitudes (multiple OLS-regressions) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Education 





Discussions about politics (Political Interest I) 





Reception of news (Political Interest II) 






















Primary group norm 














Adjusted R2 0.46 0.70 
N 211 211 
Note: * significant on 5 percent level; non-standardized coefficients, t-values in parentheses; 
dependent variable is self-reported antisemitism (1 = no antisemitism; 6 = strong antisemitism). 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
We can conclude that a better measurement of antisemitic attitudes does not only offer a 
more valid picture of the extent and the consequences of today’s antisemitism but also 
helps us to investigate the causes of antisemitic attitudes in a more reliable way. In this 
regard, it might not be very surprising that primary groups have such a strong influence 
on antisemitic attitudes. Considering the previous research, it seems worth mentioning 
that antisemitism is not merely a favorite toy of poorly educated neo-Nazis (which it is 
nonetheless). 
The persistence of antisemitism in a private and latent realm has challenged both 
theoretical and empirical research on antisemitism. If quantitative antisemitism research 
does not take the sensitive character of antisemitism into account, it will systematically 
underestimate the extent of it and overestimate the correlations with known “state-of-
the-art” determinants. And since these (potentially biased) empirical results are often 
discussed in the public media, we have to be very careful with our interpretations and 
conclusions. This is all the more true given that these empirical findings also influence 
the theoretical study of antisemitism. Only if we have a reliable picture of genuine 
antisemitism will we be able to analyze its relationship with indirect forms of anti-
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Jewish prejudices such as anti-Zionism or secondary antisemitism. Whether anti-
Zionists, for example, still hold genuine antisemitic attitudes but hide them in public is 
of great interest for the sociological and psychological study of this phenomenon. 
Our empirical study is based on a relatively small sample and therefore can only be 
generalized to a limited extent. Future studies are encouraged to investigate larger and 
more representative samples of the general population and might also experiment with 
more sophisticated cognitive stimuli. They should also include items measuring anti-
Zionism and secondary antisemitism to study the relationship with genuine anti-
semitism. To summarize, our experimental study has shown the importance of a well-
designed measurement instrument that goes hand in hand with the theoretical study of 
the mechanisms of recent antisemitism. 
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The Definition of Antisemitism 
Kenneth L. Marcus* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Defining antisemitism has always been complicated by the disreputable origins of the 
term, the discredited sources of its etymology, the diverse manifestations of the concept, 
and the contested politics of its applications. Nevertheless, the task is an important one, 
not only because definitional clarity is required for the term to be understood, but also 
because conceptual sophistication is needed for the associated problem to be resolved. 
This article will explore various ways in which antisemitism has historically been 
defined, demonstrate the weaknesses in prior efforts, and develop a new definition of 
antisemitism. 
Building on the work of such thinkers as Jean-Paul Sartre, Theodor Adorno, Helen 
Fein, and Gavin Langmuir, this article demonstrates that a theoretically sophisticated 
definition of this term must fully account for antisemitism’s ideological, attitudinal, and 
practical qualities; its persisting latent structure within Western cultures; its continuities 
and discontinuities with analogous phenomena; its chimerical quality; its potentially 
self-fulfilling character; and its role in the construction of Jewish identity. Most impor-
tantly, the definition must account for the participation of antisemitic discourses and 
practices in the construction of the individual and collective “Jew,” both as false image 
and as actual being. This process is equally critical to the understanding of antisemitism 
and to the development of means of counter-acting what might be called antisemitism’s 
chimerical core. 
2. ANTISEMITISM AS RACISM 
The first and most treacherous intuition of many commentators is to begin with etymol-
ogy. To this day, some commentators insist that antisemitism cannot mean hatred of 
Jews, when the term “Semites” refers to speakers of a language family consisting of 
many historical Middle Eastern languages, including not only Hebrew but also Arabic. 
From the beginning, however, antisemitism has always meant hatred of Jews, not hatred 
of Arabs or Semites.1 Bernard Lewis has debunked the canard, sometimes offered on 
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behalf of Arabs, that they cannot be antisemitic, since they themselves are Semites. “The 
logic of this,” he responded,  
would seem to be that while an edition of Hitler’s Mein Kampf published in Berlin or 
in Buenos Aires in German or Spanish is anti-Semitic, an Arab version of the same 
text published in Cairo or Beirut cannot be anti-Semitic, because Arabic and Hebrew 
are cognate languages. It is not a compelling argument.2 
The etymological approach is more broadly problematic because the term was coined (or 
at least popularized) by a self-confessed antisemite, Wilhelm Marr, who hoped that it 
would facilitate greater adoption of the racial hatred of Jews and Judaism which he and 
his compatriots promoted.3 Early definitions stressed the relationship between Jewish 
racial distinctness and repugnant moral attributes. For example, one 1882 German 
dictionary defined an antisemite as “[a]nyone who hates Jews or opposes Judaism in 
general, and struggles against the character traits and the intentions of the Semites.”4 
The racial dimension is even clearer in a definition offered five years later by one of the 
architects of modern political antisemitism, who explained the concept as follows: 
“anti—to oppose, Semitism—the essence of the Jewish race; anti-Semitism is therefore 
the struggle against Semitism.”5 In recent years, no reputable authority would embrace a 
definition, like these, which assumes that Jews actually possess the character traits 
which their antagonists attribute to them.6 
Nevertheless, some authorities continue to define the term in a manner that stresses the 
racial element in some forms of this animus. Those who define antisemitism this way tend 
to emphasize that racial Jew-hatred has been qualitatively different than other forms of this 
animus. They may point to the unique horrors of the Holocaust or argue that racist hatreds 
are more dangerous than other animus, such as religious bias, since racial characteristics 
cannot be eradicated other than by extermination. This approach has various disadvan-
tages, such as its exclusion of even the most virulent forms of religiously motivated hatred 
of Jews and Judaism. More profoundly, such definitions have been criticized on the 
ground that that they appear to accept, or at least to assume, the discredited “Aryan myth” 
that Jews can be meaningfully described in terms of “race.”7 
3. ANTISEMITISM AS ETHNIC PREJUDICE OR XENOPHOBIA 
Many modern formulations have defined antisemitism, instead, as a discrete but largely 
generic form of a more general phenomenon such as ethnic prejudice or xenophobia. For 
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example, Webster’s Dictionary has influentially defined antisemitism as consisting of 
(any) “hostility toward or discrimination against Jews as a religious, ethnic, or racial 
group.”8 Indeed, some historians have characterized antisemitism in terms that suggest 
that it is merely a manifestation of xenophobia, rather than a specific form of hatred. In 
one strong version of this formulation, antisemitism is defined as being merely “the 
dislike of the unlike.”9 Such definitions treat antisemitism as distinguishable only in its 
objects from other forms of discrimination such as anti-black racism or anti-Hispanic 
ethnocentricity, rather than identifying a peculiar characteristic of the hatred of Jews. 
This tendency to blur the lines among forms of prejudice has certain practical advan-
tages. Analytically, it facilitated research, particularly in the period immediately follow-
ing World War II, which demonstrated similarities among the divergent forms of hatred 
directed at different groups.10 Politically, it provides a basis for coalition-building 
activities by various minority groups. Legally, it supports the development of parallel 
regulatory regimes to protect persons who face discrimination under different suspect 
classifications. In Europe, where Jews are the paradigmatic case of a persecuted minor-
ity, other historical outgroups may seek legal protections by comparing their lot to the 
Jewish condition. In the United States, however, where African Americans are the 
paradigmatic case, other groups tend to achieve protection by comparing their status to 
that of American blacks. Understandably, general definitions of antisemitism, i.e., those 
that stress antisemitism’s continuities with analogous phenomena, have proliferated 
because they serve a number of practical objectives at times and in places where opposi-
tion to the persecution of Jews is perceived to be weaker, standing on its own, than if 
combined with other forms of anti-racism, multiculturalism, or human rights activity. 
The problem with such general definitions, however, is that they suggest that anti-
semitism may be different only in the choice of persecuted outgroup, rather than in the 
nature or intensity of hatred. Historian Ben-Zion Netanyahu recognized this difference 
in intensity when he defined antisemitism as an animus that combines “hatred of the 
other, hatred of the alien and hatred of the weak” but “in a more forceful and consistent 
form than in any other form of hatred of minorities.”11 This recognition of intensity 
levels is important, but it neglects the difference in character that might explain the 
difference in virulence. Gavin Langmuir expressed this insight when he admonished 
that the kind of hatred symbolized by Auschwitz must be distinguished in more than 
intensity from the hostility represented by a swastika on the Eiffel Tower.12 The chal-
lenge, then, is to expand the definition of antisemitism in a manner that reflects the 
peculiar virulence to which it has been inclined. 
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4. ANTISEMITISM AS IDEOLOGY 
One difference between antisemitism and some other forms of animus is that it encom-
passes not only attitude and practice (i.e., Webster’s “hostility … or discrimination”) but 
also ideology. This ideological dimension was well-articulated in Theodor Adorno’s 
mid-century definition: “This ideology [of antisemitism] consists … of stereotyped 
negative opinions describing the Jews as threatening, immoral, and categorically differ-
ent from non-Jews, and of hostile attitudes urging various forms of restriction, exclusion, 
and suppression as a means of solving ‘the Jewish problem.’”13 This dimension is impor-
tant because it illuminates the extent to which antisemitism has become pervasive in 
some cultures. This pervasiveness may in turn help to understand the ferocity of atti-
tudes and practices that it has generated. 
Helen Fein’s well-known definition further develops this cultural conception, defin-
ing antisemitism  
as a persisting latent structure of hostile beliefs towards Jews as a collectivity mani-
fested in individuals as attitudes, and in culture as myth, ideology, folklore, and imagery, 
and in actions—social or legal discrimination, political mobilization against Jews, and 
collective or state violence—which results in and/or is designed to distance, displace, 
or destroy Jews as Jews.14  
Fein’s sociologically informed definition reflects the insight that the ideology of anti-
semitism is not merely a matter of a personal belief system but rather a more complex 
network of “myth, ideology, folklore, and imagery,” which is closely related not only to 
individual attitudes but also to discriminatory, political, and even violent actions. 
5. ANTI-ZIONISM AND ANTISEMITISM 
In 1966, Merriam Webster provided a secondary definition for antisemitism that has 
become important to understanding the ideology underlying this animus. According to 
this definition, antisemitism can also mean “opposition to Zionism: sympathy with 
opponents of the state of Israel.”15 It is significant that this definition appeared one year 
before Israel’s military victory in the 1967 war, when the Jewish state was still positively 
perceived in the Western world as a liberal democratic country whose enemies could 
reasonably be accused of antisemitism.16 In the current climate, few if any serious 
commentators would equate all opposition to Zionism with antisemitism.17 Neverthe-
less, there is clearly a relationship between the two concepts.18 
                                                                                                                                                       
13  T.W. Adorno et al., The Authoritarian Personality (1950), p. 71 (emphasis omitted). 
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In many cases, age-old antisemitic stereotypes and defamations are recast in con-
temporary political terms, describing Israel and Zionism in ways historically applied to 
Jews and Judaism.19 In this way, Israel (mordantly characterized as the “Jew of the 
nations”) is represented as demonically powerful, as conspiratorial, and as a malignant 
force responsible for the world’s evils. Theodor Adorno’s definition, discussed above, 
provides a useful means of exploring this phenomenon. While the influence of Adorno’s 
early work on prejudice has suffered from the passage of time, his definition shows 
disquieting freshness as a characterization of the relationship between antisemitism and 
anti-Zionism, as long as the word “Israel” is substituted for “Jewish” and “the Jews.”20 
Thus, the ideology of antisemitism would include: stereotyped negative opinions describing 
the Jewish state and its members, supporters, and coreligionists as threatening, immoral, and 
categorically different from other peoples, and of hostile attitudes urging various forms of restric-
tion, exclusion, and suppression as a means of solving the “Israel problem.” The fluidity and 
resonance of this substituted language illustrates not only that the same “stereotyped 
negative opinions” classically directed against Jews are now directed against Israel but 
also that these stereotypes are applied for the same purposes of “restriction, exclusion, and 
suppression” as a means of resolving the “Jewish problem.” Similarly, Fein’s definition 
prods us to consider the use of anti-Israel “myth, ideology, folklore, and imagery” that 
mediates between anti-Jewish attitudes and anti-Israel social, legal, political and military 
action. 
6. THE EUMC WORKING DEFINITION 
In an important modern reformulation of the definition of antisemitism, the former 
European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) established a working 
definition of antisemitism that is notable for its explicit recognition that “such manifesta-
tions could also target the State of Israel, conceived as a Jewish collectivity.”21 The US 
Department of State has announced that “this definition provides an adequate initial 
guide by which anti-Semitism can eventually both be defined and combated.”22 In 
particular, the EUMC definition provides several recent examples of antisemitism in 
public life, the media, schools, the workplace, and religious institutions that relate to this 
collectivity, including the following:23 
- Making mendacious, dehumanizing, demonizing, or stereotypical allegations 
about Jews as such or the power of Jews as collective—such as, especially but not 
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20  For a discussion of the waning influence of The Authoritarian Personality and an example of 
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21  European Forum on Antisemitism, Working Definition of Antisemitism, available at: <http:// 
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visited Mar. 17, 2009). 
22  US Dep’t of State, Office to Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism, Fact Sheet: “Working Defi-
nition of Anti-Semitism” (2007), available at: <http://web.archive.org/web/20070429125033/http:// 
www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/56589.htm>. 
23  Ibid. 
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exclusively, the myth about a world Jewish conspiracy or of Jews controlling the 
media, economy, government or other societal institutions.24 
- Accusing Jews as a people of being responsible for real or imagined wrongdoing 
committed by a single Jewish person or group, or even for acts committed by non-
Jews.25 
- Denying the fact, scope, mechanisms (e.g. gas chambers) or intentionality of the 
genocide of the Jewish people at the hands of National Socialist Germany and its 
supporters and accomplices during World War II (the Holocaust). 
- Accusing the Jews as a people, or Israel as a state, of inventing or exaggerating the 
Holocaust. 
- Accusing Jewish citizens of being more loyal to Israel, or to the alleged priorities 
of Jews worldwide, than to the interests of their own nations.26 
These examples demonstrate the EUMC’s insight that the putatively political or anti-
Israeli cast of much anti-Israelism shrouds significant continuities with antecedent forms 
of the “longest hatred.” In addition, the EUMC working definition provides the follow-
ing examples of “the ways in which antisemitism manifests itself with regard to the State 
of Israel taking into account the overall context”:27 
- Denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination.… 
- Applying double standards by requiring of it a behavior not expected or demand-
ed of any other democratic nation. 
- Using the symbols and images associated with classic antisemitism (e.g., claims of 
Jews killing Jesus or blood libel) to characterize Israel or Israelis. 
- Drawing comparisons of contemporary Israeli policy to that of the Nazis. 
- Holding Jews collectively responsible for actions of the state of Israel. 
The EUMC emphasizes, as do virtually all commentators, that criticism of Israel similar 
to that leveled against other countries does not constitute a form of antisemitism.28 
Indeed, virtually all commentators agree that criticism of Israel is not a form of anti-
semitism per se. 
The criteria by which antisemitic criticisms of Israel may be distinguished from other 
criticisms have now become largely conventional.29 They include the use of classic 
antisemitic stereotypes, such as the demonization of Jews or the Jewish state; the use of 
double standards for Israel and all other nations, including denial of national self-
determination only to the Jews; and holding Jews collectively responsible for Israeli 
policy. What these criteria have in common is that they all indicate when facially anti-
Israeli expressions are in fact an expression of an underlying anti-Jewish animus. 
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7. JEWS AS JEWS 
Whether antisemitism is directed at Jews individually or in collectivity, it consists of 
more (and in a sense less) than negative attitudes, ideologies, and practices directed at 
Jews. Jews form a diverse group, and they may face disadvantage because they are also 
gay, communist, old or disabled, and so forth. For this reason, it is sometimes said that 
antisemitism must be directed against “Jews as Jews,” rather than as individuals or as 
members of the various other groups to which individual Jews may belong. 
However, this caveat may be insufficient to the extent that it does not account for the 
irrational quality of prejudice. In order to address the possibility that some anti-Jewish 
attitudes may well be deserved, the definition must exclude “realistic” assumptions. 
These may be understood roughly as assertions that are based on the same assumptions 
as those used to describe the ingroup and its members.30 At a minimum, then, the 
negative attitudes, practices, and ideologies directed toward Jews as Jews must be based 
upon erroneous assumptions that flow from the application of double standards. 
One implication of this principle is that anti-Israelism, to be considered antisemitic, 
must instantiate negative attitudes, ideologies, and practices directed at the Jewish state 
as a Jewish state. As with other forms of antisemitism, this form of anti-Israelism is 
based upon erroneous assumptions that flow from the application of double standards. 
This definition, then, would exclude anti-Israelism that is not based on the state’s Jewish 
character, which is not factually erroneous, or which does not entail the use of double 
standards. 
8. JEWS AS NOT JEWS 
Based on these insights, we may be tempted to define antisemitism as a set of negative 
attitudes, ideologies, and practices directed at Jews as Jews, individually or collectively 
(sustained by a persisting latent structure of hostile erroneous beliefs and assumptions 
that flow from the application of double standards toward Jews as a collectivity, mani-
fested culturally in myth, ideology, folklore, and imagery, and urging various forms of 
restriction, exclusion, and suppression). The problem with this developing definition, 
however, is that its elements are in tension with one another. On the one hand, this 
definition asserts that antisemitism must be directed at “Jews as Jews.” On the other, it 
insists that this animus is based on erroneous assumptions and beliefs about Jews. The 
question, then, is whether antisemitism is directed at Jews or whether it is directed at a 
set of hostile and erroneous assumptions and beliefs about Jews. 
While antisemitism is certainly directed at Jews as Jews, it occurs in a context in 
which Jews are perceived as being something other than what they actually are. In this 
sense, antisemitism is directed not at Jews as Jews, but rather at Jews as not Jews.31 The 
original insight here is Jean-Paul Sartre’s: it “is … the idea of the Jew that one forms for 
himself which would seem to determine history, not the ‘historical fact’ that produces 
the idea.”32 Slavoj Žižek elaborated on Sartre’s insight, explaining that what antisemites  
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find intolerable and rage-provoking, what they react to, is not the immediate reality 
of Jews, but the image/figure of the “Jew” which circulates and has been constructed 
in their tradition…. [W]hat the anti-Semite tries to destroy when he attacks the Jew, 
the true target of his fury, is this fantastic dimension.33  
This insight is reflected in Israel Gutman’s entry on antisemitism for the Encyclopedia of 
the Holocaust: “Throughout the generations, concepts, fantasies and accusations have 
stuck to the term that portrayed a negative cognitive and emotional web, at times 
independent of Jewish society as it was fashioned and existed in realty.”34 
While the object of antisemitic attitudes may be imaginary, the object of antisemitic 
practice is all too real. This is the gist of Jean-François Lyotard’s remark that, the “Jews” 
(or, as he calls this construction, the “jews”) are the object of misrepresentations with 
which actual Jews, in particular, are afflicted in reality.35 In other words, the antisemite 
may throw a punch at an imaginary “Jew,” but it is a real Jew who takes it on the chin. 
While antisemitic attitudes and ideologies are typically directed at a social construct 
consisting of images, perceptions, stereotypes, and myths, antisemitic practices fall upon 
real Jews. 
This insight has come slowly to otherwise perceptive students of racism. For exam-
ple, in his 1995 book on The Racist Mind, Harvard racism scholar Raphael S. Ezequiel 
finds it necessary to inquire whether leaders of the white racist movement in the United 
States could possibly hate Jews—and insists, rather astonishingly, that the answer “is 
not obvious.”36 After all, Ezequiel reasons, these racists do not know what Jews are 
really like. Instead, Ezequiel finds that American white racists direct their hatred at a 
wildly unrealistic notion of what it means to be Jewish. 
As I think about it, I see that by “the Jew,” the organizer means the construct he car-
ries in his head, a rather medieval figure who lurks behind the scenes and secretly 
makes conspiracy. That figure he does fear and hate with an extreme intensity. That 
figure is blurred in his mind with all Establishment figures in general—the heads of 
corporations, the heads of publishing companies, the heads of political parties, the 
heads of mainline churches—and he fears and hates the Establishment with passion.37 
From this, Ezequiel initially infers “that the leader doesn’t really hate Jews, since the 
figure he has called ‘Jews’ is an imaginary one.”38 He is, it seems, initially unaware that 
this ignorance is precisely what confirms the racist’s antisemitic character. It is only 
when it dawns on him that the figure that he is calling a “black man” similarly has 
nothing to do with real black people that Ezequiel is able to conclude that leaders of 
white racist movements hold “an extreme position as a hater of Jews.”39 Reflecting on 
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the parallels between anti-black racism and antisemitism, Ezequiel says that the racist 
“hopes to build on a white base of mass dislike and fear of African Americans; he hopes 
to build on mass anxiety about economic security and on popular tendencies to see an 
Establishment as the cause of the economic threat; he hopes to teach people to identify 
that Establishment as the puppets of a conspiracy of Jews.”40 
9. RAMIFICATIONS OF CHIMERICAL ANTISEMITISM 
Several interesting observations have been derived from this way of thinking about 
antisemitism. The first is that antisemitism consists of confusing Jews with their false 
images. “Thinking that Jews are really ‘Jews,’” in this formulation, “is precisely the core 
of antisemitism.”41 In a similar formulation, it has been argued that antisemitism con-
sists of the difference between the real Jew and the imagined “Jew” and the political 
ends to which this delta is applied.42 Dina Porat has aptly illustrated this position by 
contrasting the pitiful state of European Jews at the outset of World War II with the 
Nazis’ perception of omnipotent Jewish power.43 
The second observation is that the “chimerical” basis for antisemitism—i.e., its foun-
dation upon fictional rather than realistic or xenophobic assumptions—is what makes it 
so virulent. Langmuir distinguishes “chimerical” prejudice from xenophobia on the 
ground that chimeria “present fantasies, figments of the imagination, monsters that, 
although dressed syntactically in the clothes of real humans, have never been seen and 
are projections of mental processes unconnected with the real people of the outgroup.”44 
In other words, chimeria “have no kernel of truth.” Antisemitism is the best exemplar of 
this concept, since hostility toward Jews is based not on actual Jews but on what the 
name of “Jews” has come to mean for non-Jews.45 This is a general formulation of Alain 
Badiou’s observation that Nazism’s construction of “the word Jew as part of a political 
configuration is what made the extermination possible, and then inevitable.”46 This 
“chimerical” antisemitism is unusually virulent for the same reason ascribed to racist 
antisemitism, i.e., because there is nothing that can be done with actual Jews that can rid 
them of these imaginary characteristics short of extermination. 
The third observation is that this same principle underlies global antagonism toward 
Israel.47 In other words, chimerical antisemitism consists of hatred aimed at false images 
of Israel, generally deriving from historical antisemitic stereotypes and defamations, and 
the extent of its potential virulence can be seen in the difference between image and 
reality. The latter can be seen in the contrast between Israel’s global image and its true 
power and status reflects the extent of antisemitic animus.48 
Anti-Israelists do not harbor animus against the actual State of Israel, nor do they 
address the actual historical ideology of Zionism. Rather, they direct their ire at complex 
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social constructs that stand in for the State of Israel and for the idea of Zionism, just as 
classical antisemites direct their hostility at false constructs of the Jewish people. Thus, 
Robert Wistrich argues that  
[m]uch of this anti-Semitic world view has infected the body politic of Islam during 
the past forty years. Its focus has become the “collective Jew” embodied in the State of 
Israel. Its geographic center of gravity has moved to the Middle East, but the tone and 
content of the rhetoric, along with the manifest will to exterminate the Jews, are virtu-
ally identical to German Nazism.49  
As with classical antisemitism, however, these ideologies and attitudes do manifest in 
actions undertaken against actual Jews, both individually and in such collectivities as 
the State of Israel and those organizations that are perceived to support it. 
The fourth observation is that the chimerical definition of outgroups invariably stands 
side-by-side with an equal and opposing chimerical definition of the ingroup. In this way, 
Badiou explained that the “Nazi category of the ‘Jew’ served to name the German interior, 
the space of a being-together, via the (arbitrary yet prescriptive) construction of an exterior 
that could be monitored from the interior.…”50 In constructing the “Jew” as a despised 
other, both Christian and Muslim antisemites and nations have created an “interior space” 
for the “being-together” of their respective groups. The same function is played, in the 
development of both regional blocs and a new global politics, by the construction of 
“Israel” as a “collective Jew” with perceived sinister traits of racism, nationalism, chosen-
ness, elitism, aggression, and criminality. By constructing and excluding a chimerical 
image of “Israel as a collective Jew,” anti-Israel globalists can create a space of “being-
together” that is constructed from an equally chimerical image of global anti-racism, post-
nationalism, egalitarianism, pacifism, human rights, and so forth. 
Finally, it must be observed that the power of a chimerical animus is often strong 
enough to bring some outgroup members within its ambit.51 “The catch, of course,” as 
Žižek has explained, “is that one single individual cannot distinguish in any simple way 
between real Jews and their antisemitic image: this image overdetermines the way I 
experience real Jews themselves, and furthermore it affects the way Jews experience 
themselves.”52 That is to say, some Jews, like their neighboring gentiles, have suc-
cumbed to the stereotype that antisemites have developed about them, and they may 
consciously or unconsciously fear that they will personally resemble the stereotype.53 
10.  JEWS CONSTRUCTED BY ANTISEMITISM 
When we adjust our working definition to reflect Sartre’s insight, we are left with the 
definition of antisemitism as a set of negative attitudes, ideologies, and practices di-
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rected at Jews as Jews, individually or collectively, but based upon and sustained by a 
persisting latent structure of hostile erroneous beliefs and assumptions that flow from 
the application of double standards toward Jews as a collectivity, manifested culturally 
in myth, ideology, folklore, and imagery, and urging various forms of restriction, exclu-
sion, and suppression. This is a helpful refinement, which reflects the unquestionable 
principle that antisemitism is based upon stereotypes and defamations rather than true 
facts about Jews. Unfortunately, however, it is ultimately difficult if not unsustainable to 
maintain a dichotomy between the truth of Jewish existence and the manner in which it 
is socially constructed. To the extent that a definition of antisemitism relies upon this 
dichotomy, it requires further development. 
The problem, in simple terms, is that group defamations can become self-fulfilling 
prophesies. The extent to which even Jewish identity is constructed by antisemitism 
poses a difficult problem. When antisemites treat Jews as inferior, or demonical, they can 
influence the development of inferior attributes in their socio-symbolic identity. Ulti-
mately, the “actual” Jew cannot be meaningfully distinguished from the “constructed” 
Jew. To some immeasurable extent, the Jew unavoidably becomes, in some meaningful 
sense, the object of social perceptions. Antisemitic ideology is thus said to exert a per-
formative efficiency: it is not merely an interpretation of a pre-existing condition of 
Jewishness but also an imposition of characteristics onto the social existence of the 
people who are interpreted. 
In American sociology, this follows from W.I. Thomas’s theorem that “if men define 
situations as real, they are real in their consequences.” Robert K. Merton reformulated 
this definition to say that the “self-fulfilling prophesy is, in the beginning a false defini-
tion of the situation evoking new behavior which makes the originally false conception 
come true.”54 Gavin Langmuir modified Merton’s definition and applied it to anti-
semitism as follows: “the self-fulfilling prophecy is, in the beginning, a motivated 
definition of an outgroup as inferior in one fundamental way that is accompanied by 
treatment that evokes new behavior in members of the outgroup that seems to corrobo-
rate and strengthen the original judgment of inferiority.”55 That is to say, when ingroups 
(non-Jews) have sufficient power, outgroups (Jews) may be forced to comply in impor-
tant ways to the ingroup’s representations. 
In European philosophy, the origin of this idea can be found in Sartre. Sartre did, af-
ter all, most famously assert that “it is the anti-Semite who makes the Jew.”56 Moreover, 
Sartre expounded that the antisemite “makes the Jew” not only as a figment of the 
imagination but also in the sense of shaping the actual reality of the Jewish people. In 
Sartre’s materialist analysis, the antisemite shaped Jewish identity by creating economic 
conditions in which Jews are forced to comply with the representations that antisemites 
create of them. For example, when Russian Czars treated Jews as inassimilable—
butchering them in Moscow and Kiev to prevent dangers to Russia while favoring them 
in Warsaw to stir up dissension among the Poles—Sartre asks, “Is it any wonder that 
[the Jews] behaved in accordance with the representation made of them?”57 
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More recent thinking would suggest that the self-fulfilling quality of outgroup mis-
representations arises from the use of language itself and not only from economic 
conditions. Some, following Heidegger, have argued that the being of the despised 
object cannot be distinguished from the image that we make of it. Rather, as Martin 
Heidegger taught, the being of things is disclosed only in the “house of being” that 
language makes for them.58 In this sense, the animus that antisemites harbor toward the 
Jew is baked into the very name of the “Jew,” as Jewish people are symbolized in the 
house that others’ language makes for them. In one version of this argument, certain 
harmful linguistic practices “constitute their addressees at the moment of utterance; they 
do not describe an injury or produce one as a consequence; it is, in the very speaking of 
such speech, the performance of the injury itself, where the injury is understood as social 
subordination.”59 Language has this peculiar power both to create and to destroy be-
cause human beings are to some significant extent creatures of language, beings who 
require language in order to be. Human vulnerability to language is in this sense seen as 
a consequence of the human condition in which people and groups are beings defined 
within its terms.60 
Both Christian and Muslim antisemitism construct an ideological vision of Jews that 
distorts Jewish reality, just as Western and Eastern countries distort one another’s 
reality. Violence is directed at the web of symbols, icons, values, and attitudes that have 
become part of the perception of Jews. Powerful emotional currents, sometimes merging 
with waves of frustration and despair, are condensed into images such as the supposed 
murder of Palestinian children. This condensation, some have argued, is a basic charac-
teristic of language, which follows from the construction and imposition of specific 
symbolic fields.61 
These insights on the social construction of Jewish identity require a further refinement 
of our definition. Under this refinement, antisemitism may now be viewed as a set of 
negative attitudes, ideologies, and practices directed at Jews as Jews, individually or 
collectively, but based upon and sustained by a persisting and potentially self-fulfilling latent 
structure of hostile erroneous beliefs and assumptions that flow from the application of 
double standards toward Jews as a collectivity, manifested culturally in myth, ideology, 
folklore, and imagery, and urging various forms of restriction, exclusion, and suppression. 
11.  ANTISEMITISM AND RESISTANCE 
There are significant dangers, however, in this emphasis on antisemitism’s potentially 
self-fulfilling character. In the first place, some versions of this argument overstate the 
extent to which antisemites shape the image and reality of what it means to be a Jew. 
This is because other actors play a role in this process. Second, even when antisemitism 
shapes the reality of Jewishness, it sometimes does so in a manner opposite to what one 
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might expect. In some cases, in fact, antisemitism can be self-defeating rather than self-
fulfilling. Finally, the process of Jewish identity-formation remains open-ended. This 
creates opportunities not only for defeating antisemitism but also reversing the effects 
that it has had on constructing Jewish individuals and collectivities. 
Sartre was correct in one sense to assert that it is the antisemite who makes the 
“Jew.” The problem with this analysis, however, is that the meaning and being of 
Jewishness are determined not only be antisemitic constructions but also by the con-
structions imposed by Jews themselves and by others who may be philo-Semitically 
disposed. Hannah Arendt provided the strongest rejoinder that Jewish identity is not 
exclusively shaped by antisemitism: 
[E]ven a cursory knowledge of Jewish history, whose central concern since the Baby-
lonian exile has always been the survival of the people against the overwhelming 
odds of dispersion, should be enough to dispel this latest myth in these matters, a 
myth that has become somewhat fashionable in intellectual circles after Sartre’s “exis-
tentialist” interpretation of the Jew as someone who is regarded and defined as a Jew 
by others.62 
Indeed, there is no reason to suppose that of all of the positive, negative, and neutral 
myths, ideologies, folklore, and imagery surrounding any population group that it 
should only be the negative—and indeed the chimerically hostile—ones that shape the 
identity or self-identity of even the most despised of people (other than in extreme 
circumstances such as Nazi Germany at the height of the Holocaust). In the Jewish case, 
some significant account must be made for the extent to which Jews developed and 
retained a distinctive and independent culture and heritage throughout Christian 
Europe and in the other places where Jews have lived throughout the diaspora.63 
Moreover, Sartre himself was careful to emphasize that antisemitism has not only 
self-fulfilling but also self-negating capacities. In other words, many Jews are deliber-
ately reinforced in their inclination to be “generous, disinterested, and even magnifi-
cent” by their desire to resist the stereotype of the Jew as avaricious, venal, and 
rapacious.64 In the same way, many non-Jews react negatively to antisemitic stereotypes, 
taking pains to counteract the effects of bigotry. In this way, antisemitism can also be 
self-defeating. 
12.  CONCLUSION 
Antisemitism is a set of negative attitudes, ideologies, and practices directed at Jews as 
Jews, individually or collectively, but based upon and sustained by a persisting and 
potentially self-fulfilling latent structure of hostile erroneous beliefs and assumptions 
that flow from the application of double standards toward Jews as a collectivity, mani-
fested culturally in myth, ideology, folklore, and imagery, and urging various forms of 
restriction, exclusion, and suppression.  
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Embracing the Nation: Jewish Assimilationist 
and Anti-Zionist Responses to Modernity 
C.R. Power.* and Sharon Power.** 
1. JEWS AND THE “MODERN QUESTION” 
With the idealization and proliferation of the secular Christian nation-state in Europe in 
the modern era, power and legitimacy were for the first time seen to flow up from the 
people, rather than down from G-d through his sovereign. Enlightenment and post-
Enlightenment thinkers adapted Hellenic democratic theory to re-imagine the polis as a 
nation whose citizens were organic members of a body politic with its own, presumably 
unique, democratic will. The normative idea that a “people” should be self-governing, 
that in fact any other form of political arrangement was inherently unenlightened and 
oppressive, informed the new delineation of states, borders and sovereignty. Member-
ship in a people, one’s personal sense of collective identity, became of crucial political 
importance. One people, one nation became the rule. Thus arose “The Jewish Question,” 
a consideration of what the presence of the Jews meant for the modern conception of 
nationhood. 
The idea of the Israelites representing a distinct “people” became a key problem of 
modernity. As the universalism of Enlightenment thinking was transformed by 19th 
century socialist thinkers, Jewish difference, as collective difference, remained a central 
problem, deemed anathema to the socialist project, this time preventing the realization 
of the international socialist collective rather than of the liberal democratic nation. 
Socialists see the coming post-capitalist era as, by definition, a post-Jewish era. Thus 
Jewish and non-Jewish post-Enlightenment thinkers alike, from Voltaire to Hegel to 
Marx, realized that the new modern forms of political organization could be – and 
perhaps needed to be – articulated through resolution of the “Jewish Question.” 
Inverting our perspective from the majority to the minority group, we can see how 
the Enlightenment brought with it for the Jews what we might call the “Modern Ques-
tion.” The implicit question of modernity was an existential ultimatum: are you one of 
“us,” a legitimate member of the “people” of a given nation-state or international collec-
tive – which is by definition non-Jewish – or are you a separate “people,” an alien 
presence on the body of the nation? Jews have responded to this ultimatum in various 
ways, but two strong and conflicting answers were to emerge. 
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The first response is the reaffirmation and reframing of Jewish difference that came 
to be expressed as Zionism. In an era when all rights flow from “peoplehood” and 
citizenship in a “nation,” one way for Jews to access those rights is by asserting their 
difference, breaking off from the nations in which they live and demanding equal rights 
as a separate “people.” This response eventually led to the founding of a modern Jewish 
nation-state, Israel. 
The second response, which is the primary focus of this paper, is the negation of Jew-
ish difference, which we classify as an assimilationist response. The new nation-state 
model held out the inherent promise of equality to Jews, since citizenship rights were 
granted to all simply by virtue of one’s belonging to the “people.” The secularizing 
impulse of modernity also meant that religious difference became privatized and osten-
sibly depoliticized. Under these conditions, Judaism could be tolerated as long as it was 
exclusively a personal faith. Thus, as a logical part of their assimilationist strategy to 
obtain equal civil rights, Jewish Reformers and maskilim worked to reformulate Jewish-
ness exclusively into an expression of personal faith, with absolutely no national or 
political affiliation. Our proposal in this paper is that the major Jewish assimilationist 
responses to modernity, from the Enlightenment’s liberal and Reformist responses 
through 20th-century socialism, universalism and anti-Zionism, are driven by this 
impulse to deny Jewish difference and Jewish collectivity. 
It is crucial here to define our use of the term assimilationist as a central element of 
our analytical framework. Some scholars use “assimilationism” in a way that might 
more accurately be termed “adaptationism”: the impulse of Jews to divest themselves of 
particular signs of difference in order to adapt to mainstream society. For our purposes, 
assimilationism is not merely a passive adoption by Jews of non-Jewish cultural, linguis-
tic or national identity markers, but rather an active ideological compulsion towards the 
eradication of Jewish difference. Thus, one might be a highly assimilated Jew, but not 
necessarily an assimilationist. The unending need to identify, vilify and ultimately 
negate threatening Jewish difference is the key distinguishing marker of assimilationism 
as an active, politically salient ideology. 
These two primary orientations, the one Zionist, the other assimilationist, character-
ize the ongoing Jewish response to the “Modern Question.” They are also perceived, 
particularly by assimilationists, as existentially threatening to one another. If Jews do 
indeed share some sort of national, and therefore political, association, how can they 
rightly demand access to belonging, and its attendant civic rights, in another nation or 
international collective? The question of Jewish “dual loyalties” persists to this day, 
although the language may have shifted from conflicting “Jewish loyalty” to conflicting 
“Zionist loyalty.” The assimilationist response, in its purest expression, has remained 
profoundly hostile to Zionism as an expression of Jewish difference, as it must indeed be 
hostile to any expression of Jewish difference. By tracing the major strategies that Jewish 
post-Enlightenment thinkers have utilized in their quest for political emancipation, we 
can gain a broader understanding of the connections between early assimilationist 
responses to the “Modern Question” and contemporary Jewish anti-Zionist thought. 
2. ASSIMILATIONIST STRATEGIES 
The rest of our paper outlines the major types of Jewish assimilationist strategies, which 
we have divided into three categories: the first is political apostasy, the personal renun-
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ciation and emphatic negation of Jewish “peoplehood”; the second is the “moderniza-
tion” of religious Judaism so as to make it represent Enlightenment values; and the third 
is the strategy of positioning oneself as the “good Jew” in a “good Jew/bad Jew” dichot-
omy. 
A. Political apostasy 
Political apostasy eventually came to replace religious apostasy as a means for Jewish 
assimilation and emancipation. In the secularized modern world, a world where reli-
gious affiliation had ostensibly been subordinated to the political, the source of Jewish 
difference was re-centred onto the political as well. Whereas, in the Medieval era, 
conversion to Christianity theoretically allowed Jews to neutralize Jewish difference, 
promising an end to religious persecution, political apostasy carries with it a promise to 
end Jewish political persecution. All one has to do is reject one’s political difference 
through the emphatic negation of Jewish “peoplehood.” This can be clearly seen, for 
example, in the Statement to Napoleon made by the Assembly of Jewish Notables in late 
18th century France, in which the Assembly stated: 
France is our country; all Frenchmen are our brethren…. At the present time, when 
the Jews no longer form a separate people, but enjoy the advantage of being incorpo-
rated with the Great Nation (which privilege they consider as a kind of political re-
demption), it is impossible that a Jew should treat a Frenchman, not of his religion, in 
any other manner than he would treat one of his Israelite brethren.1 
Similar statements of political apostasy can be found throughout the Western European 
debates on “The Jewish Question,” in which many Enlightened Jews hastened to claim 
their rights as emancipated citizens of the states in which they lived by denying any 
separate national or political claims as Jews. 
Another aspect of political apostasy is the defence of Judaism as exclusively religious 
in nature to renounce all threatening political difference. This became a core tenet of the 
radical Reform Judaism movement of 19th century Germany and America. At the 
Second Reform Rabbinical Conference at Frankfurt in 1845, where the president charged 
speakers to “beware of creating any doubt concerning their allegiance to the state,” one 
speaker, Rabbi Samuel Holdheim, saw Zionism as contradicting German Jews’ patriotic 
“feeling for the fatherland.”2 He asserted, “Our nationality is now only expressed in 
religious concepts and institutions…,” cautioning that, with respect to Judaism in 
Germany, “One must not mistake a national for a religious phenomenon, otherwise 
many abuses could be justified.”3 The same strain carried through the radical Reform 
movement in America into the late 19th and 20th centuries. The Platform of the Reform 
Rabbinical Conference in Pittsburgh, the basic statement of Reform Judaism from 1889 
until 1937, included a principle rejecting Zionism and any restoration of laws formerly 
pertaining to the Jewish state based on the premise, “We consider ourselves no longer a 
                                                                                                                                                       
1 The Assembly of Jewish Notables, “Answers to Napoleon” (1806), in The Jew in the Modern 
World: A Documentary History, edited by Paul R. Mendes-Flohr and Jehuda Reinharz (New York, 
Oxford University Press 1980) p. 116. 
2 The Reform Rabbinical Conference at Frankfurt, “The Question of Messianism” (1845), in The 
Jew in the Modern World, supra note 1, at p. 163. 
3 Ibid., p. 164. 
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nation but a religious community….”4 Even after the Second World War, by which time 
the mainstream Reform movement had rejected many of its earlier assimilationist and 
anti-Zionist positions, the earlier radical Reform version of political apostasy continued 
in a small segment of American Reform organizations, such as the staunchly patriotic 
and anti-Zionist American Council for Judaism. 
For socialist and universalist Jewish thinkers, who reject nationalism on the basis of 
Enlightenment universalist values, the same impulse has led them to advocate political 
assimilation into an implicitly non-Jewish international proletariat. The important 
impulse to note here is not the type of collective into which the Jew is “assimilating,” but 
rather the Jewish collective that is being negated in the process. Marx, being one of the 
earliest “post-Jewish” internationalists, and certainly the most influential, adapted the 
assimilationist strategy to international socialism. When religious conversion proved 
insufficient to convince his fellow thinkers that he was not a Jew, Marx seemed com-
pelled to negate his own Jewishness by promoting an end to all Jews, as Jews, every-
where. His famous statement, “The emancipation of the Jews is the emancipation of 
mankind from Judaism,”5 can be read as a personal secular declaration of apostasy from 
political Jewishness, as well as a statement of orthodox international socialist dogma. 
Universalist Jewish thinkers throughout the 20th century have echoed Marx’s politi-
cal apostasy, asserting, as did Marx, that the disavowal of Jewish difference is the first 
necessary step in the eradication of all political difference. Isaac Deutscher, who coined 
the term “non-Jewish Jew” in a lecture given to the World Jewish Congress in 1958, 
deeply admired those Jews who had, in his view, risen above Jewishness to approach 
the greatness of universal human values. For Deutscher, Jews such as Spinoza, Heine, 
Marx, Rosa Luxemberg, Trotsky, Freud and himself belonged to a Jewish tradition of 
dissent against Jewish separateness. Deutscher said that these “non-Jewish Jews” “went 
beyond the boundaries of Jewry. They all found Jewry too narrow, too archaic, and too 
constricting. They all looked for ideals and fulfilment beyond it, and they represent the 
sum and substance of much that is greatest in modern thought….”6 
B. “Modernization” of Judaism 
A second, related, assimilationist strategy is to reformulate and represent Judaism as a 
thoroughly modern faith, an expression of the political, cultural and ethical ideals of the 
Enlightenment. For early radical Reformist Jews and for secular universalist Jewish 
thinkers, Judaism needed to be expunged of any threatening non-Enlightenment as-
pects, particularly tribalism, separatism and exceptionalism. Some 19th century Jewish 
thinkers, such as Martin Buber, while remaining committed to some form of Jewish 
spiritual and even national collectivity, nonetheless set about modernizing Jewishness 
by arguing that Judaism itself, properly realized, was actually the truest expression of 
universal Enlightenment values of rationality, justice and individual freedom. Isaac 
Deutscher uses this strategy in the abovementioned quote about “non-Jewish Jews.” 
                                                                                                                                                       
4 Conference of Reform Rabbis, “The Pittsburgh Platform” (1885), in The Jew in the Modern 
World, supra note 1, at p. 371. 
5 Karl Marx, “On the Jewish Question,” in The Marx Engels Reader, 2nd edition, edited by 
Robert C. Tucker (New York, W.W. Norton & Company 1978) p. 49 (original emphasis). 
6 Isaac Deutscher, “The Non-Jewish Jew” (1958), in Isaac Deutscher, The Non-Jewish Jew and 
Other Essays, edited by Tamara Deutscher (London, Merlin Press 1981) p. 26. 
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Deutscher believed that Jews’ unique positioning on the borderlines of nations and 
cultures grants them special access to universalist values that reject as oppressive the 
very existence of different nations, cultures and religions. 
Building on the work of earlier Enlightenment Jewish thinkers who modernized Ju-
daism in this way, contemporary Jewish anti-Zionist “post-identity” thinkers have 
thoroughly modernized Judaism and stripped it of all notion of separate collectivity. 
Judith Butler’s “Jewishness” conforms to this model. When she asks the question, “But 
what if one criticises Israel in the name of one’s Jewishness, in the name of justice…?”7 
“Jewishness” in this quote becomes synonymous with Justice and, for Butler, whose 
body of work has been dedicated to self-proclaimed subversive activist politics, “Jew-
ishness” becomes synonymous with “dissent.” She writes that it is wrong “to suppose 
that criticism is not a Jewish value, which clearly flies in the face not only of long tradi-
tions of Talmudic disputation, but of all the religious and cultural sources that have been 
part of Jewish life for centuries.”8 In so doing, she decontextualizes the Jewish tradition 
of oral dispute such that the entirety of Judaism itself becomes, in practice, this “disputa-
tion” [read dissent]. It is this decontextualized practice of Jewish dissent, emblematic of 
certain Enlightenment values, that becomes for universalist Jews the true Judaism in 
which they clearly sees themselves, but not Zionists Jews, reflected. 
C. Being a “Good Jew” 
The third major strategy used by assimilationists seeks to allow a certain sub-set of Jews 
to gain access to non-Jewish national or international belonging by insisting on a differ-
entiation between the “good Jew” and the “bad Jew.” When used as an assimilationist 
strategy, the “good Jew” is that Jew who has been stripped of any and all threatening 
signs of Jewish difference, which are then displaced onto the “bad Jews.” The “good 
Jews” can point to those “bad Jews” who insist on Jewish separateness, using them as a 
foil to prove their own successful assimilation into the non-Jewish collective. 
This strategy is necessary because of the “double bind” identified by Sander Gilman. 
The Enlightenment held out the promise of emancipation if only Jews would disavow 
their difference, and yet at the same time this promise proved to be false.9 A Jew always 
somehow remains a Jew, different, foreign, no matter how strenuously they may protest 
otherwise. The next logical move is to claim: I may be Jewish, but I am not like “those 
Jews.” Unable to de-Judaize themselves through political apostasy and secularization, 
these “non-Jewish Jews,” to use Isaac Deutscher’s terminology, have typically fallen 
back on the strategy of loudly and even violently distancing themselves from other Jews, 
whom they represent as “those Jewish-allied Jews,” the “bad Jews.” 
Since the Enlightenment in Western Europe as well as in America, it has often been the 
Eastern Jew, stereotyped as religious, poor and backward, who served as the “bad Jew” in 
this dichotomy. In 18th and 19th century Germany, the maskilim sought to differentiate 
themselves from the religious and backward Eastern European Jews, while in France and 
                                                                                                                                                       
7 Judith Butler, “No, it’s not anti-semitic,” London Review of Books 25(16) (August 2003) p. 19. 
8 Ibid. 
9 For a detailed discussion, see the first chapter of Sander Gilman, Jewish Self-Hatred: Anti-
Semitism and the Hidden Language of the Jews (Baltimore, MD, The John Hopkins University Press 
1986). 
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Holland Sephardim fought for emancipation on the grounds that in dress, refinement, 
morality and intellect they were completely unlike and superior to the German and Polish 
Ashkenazim, who were largely viewed as unmodern and external to the nation. 
In the latter half of the 20th century, Jewish anti-Zionist thought has also emerged to 
rely heavily on the good Jew/bad Jew strategy. In this case, the bad Jews are the back-
ward, tribally oriented Zionists, while the good Jews are those enlightened few who 
have moved beyond Judaism to join in the universal movement against Israeli state 
power. All contemporary Jewish anti-Zionist thinkers emphasize that the Jewish com-
munity can be divided into two groups: the Zionist majority and the oppressed anti-
Zionist minority. They stress that the main strategy of the Jewish anti-Zionist movement 
must be, in Butler’s words, to “widen the rift between the State of Israel and the Jewish 
people in order to produce an alternate vision of the future.”10 
Much like how some of those assimilationist Jews who used this strategy in centuries 
past tacitly, or even overtly, justified discrimination and hatred of certain “bad Jews,” so 
too do contemporary anti-Zionists justify and even advocate antisemitism against 
Zionist Jews. Indeed, one of the primary arguments of Jewish anti-Zionist thought is that 
Zionism is the main cause of antisemitism in the world today, due to its conflation of 
Jews with Israel and its commission of evil acts in the name of all Jews. As in centuries 
past, the assimilationist assertion is that Jews who want to get rid of antisemitism need 
to disavow Jewish difference and eschew those Jews who refuse to do so. Thus, Jews 
who refuse to reject Zionism should expect, and deserve, antisemitism directed towards 
them. Zack Furness, editor of the online journal Bad Subjects published out of the Uni-
versity of California at Berkeley, complains that the brunt of the resentment against 
Israeli policies will “most likely be shouldered by American Jews.” He laments, “We are 
the ones who will be forced to deal with the backlash of Zionist policies that we are 
encouraged to support.”11 Referring to this antisemitic backlash, he says, “If Jews are 
willing to uncritically take that chance, then they have no right to complain when they 
themselves have collapsed the distinction between Zionism and Judaism.”12 
Then there is Michael Neumann’s disconcerting essay “What Is Anti-Semitism?” in 
which we are informed that, due to the Zionist conflation of Jews and Zionism, since 
anti-Zionism is just and good, antisemitism should also be seen as just and good. He 
argues that if Zionists insist on labelling as antisemitic any opposition against Israel and 
against any Jew who is complicit in Israeli war crimes by refusing to denounce Israel, 
then both anti-Zionism and antisemitism must be, as he puts it, a “moral obligation.”13 
Besides, Neumann continues, antisemitism is not that bad, “simple hostility” towards 
Jews and Jewish culture is “harmless,”14 and, anyway, those Jews who refuse to re-
nounce Zionism and Jewish tribalism – which he characterizes as “racism, pure and 
simple; the valuing of one’s blood over all others”15 – deserve whatever they get. His 
final sentences are especially revealing in their callousness. He says: 
                                                                                                                                                       
10  Butler, supra note 7. 
11  Zack Furness, “Anti-Zionism is NOT Anti-Semitism,” Bad Subjects 77 (2000). 
12  Ibid. 
13  Michael Neumann, “What is Anti-Semitism?” in The Politics of Anti-Semitism, edited by Alex-
ander Cockburn and Jeffrey St. Clair (Petrolia, CA, CounterPunch 2003) p. 3. 
14  Ibid., p. 6. 
15  Ibid., p. 10. 
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The scandal today is not anti-Semitism but the importance it is given. Israel has com-
mitted war crimes. It has implicated Jews generally in these crimes, and Jews general-
ly have hastened to implicate themselves. This has provoked hatred against Jews. 
Why not? Some of this hatred is racist, some isn’t, but who cares? Why should we pay 
any attention to this issue at all?16 
In Neumann’s essay, we can see how the Jewish assimilationist strategy, which seeks to 
deny Jewish difference and allegiance, can and does lead in a reasonable and not unex-
pected way to the phenomenon of some Jews actively promoting antisemitism against 
their fellow Jews. 
3. CONCLUSIONS 
Political apostasy, modernization of religious Judaism, and being on the right side of the 
good Jew/bad Jew dichotomy: this is the internal logic and modus operandi of Jewish 
assimilationism. The pertinent question at this point, particularly given the context of 
these proceedings (a conference on antisemitism) is, of course, is Jewish assimilationism 
antisemitic? This is a complex question, but it would seem that the impulse to eradicate 
Jewish difference, be it from a national or international collective, is qualitatively anti-
Jewish both in intent and effect. If a Jew feels the need to neutralize Jewish difference, he 
or she has already internalized the antisemitic belief that Jewish difference is inherently 
threatening. While universalists like Butler or Deutscher may claim that their location as 
“non-Jewish Jews” is somehow positive and progressively working towards the subver-
sion of hegemonic nationalisms, their logic is inconsistent, since the neutralization or 
eradication of “Jewish Jews” can only serve to reinforce nationalism’s at times genocidal, 
xenophobic tendencies. Of course, there is an important space for dissent and negotia-
tion within the global Jewish community, but if one values Judaism and Jews, one must 
also guard against impulses that are ultimately anti-Jewish. It is crucially important to 
distinguish between those Jewish voices who argue for an expansion of the theoretical 
and practical boundaries of belonging by insisting on their belonging in more than one 
nation – those Jews, for example, who assert their identity as both American and Jewish 
– and those who are working from a point of view which views Jewish difference as a 
problem that can only be overcome with its own erasure. 
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Constellation: Thoughts on Horkheimer, 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Since the works of critical theory on antisemitism and the authoritarian personality in 
the 1940s, the close connection of nationalism to antisemitism has been broadly recog-
nized not only by critical theorists but also by other philosophers, such as Hannah 
Arendt. This close connection has been analyzed in detail with regard to the develop-
ment of the European nation-states in the 19th century (e.g., Massing 1959; Arendt 1951; 
Claussen 1994) as well as the history of the 20th century, where it found its culmination 
in the Shoah (cf. Horkheimer & Adorno 2002; Lepsius 1990). Yet, the end of the Shoah 
and the National Socialist regime marked the end of neither nationalism nor anti-
semitism. The close intertwining of the two phenomena also persisted, for example in 
the manifold strategies of denial of memory and responsibility for the Nazi crimes.1 But 
also today, in times of economic crisis, patterns of antisemitism and nationalism are 
(re)activated and interwoven in simplistic explanations of the world that personalize 
social structures and attribute guilt and responsibility for socially induced problems to 
precast figures. It seems that, especially in post-Holocaust societies, exclusionary nation-
alist identification cannot do without antisemitism, in whatever latent form, as this 
combination seems to meet the need for certainty, stability, and unambiguous belonging 
in crisis-ridden periods (cf. Stoegner, Bischof & Rajal 2011). 
In this paper we would like to highlight how the intertwining of nationalism and anti-
semitism is theorized, especially in critical theory. In doing so, we will briefly refer to 
Habermas’ concept of constitutional patriotism and interpret it as a normative foil for 
what he calls a postnational identity. Against this concept we will contrast Horkheimer’s 
and Adorno’s analysis of nationalism as a founding moment of modern sociation. The 
aim is to tackle the question why nationalism persists in spite of the nation-state’s partial 
loss of its objective function at the political level (e.g., in the European Union) and also in 
the context of an increasingly globalized economy (cf. Sassen 2009; Sklair 2006). How-
ever, we view contemporary nationalism not simply as a reaction to internationalization 
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1 This can be observed, for example, in the debates on nationalism and revisionism concerning 
the public exposure to the Nazi past carried out in the German media in the mid 1980s between 
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and the fragmented modes of contemporary identification, that is to say, not as a mere 
antimodernist and reactionary strain. Instead, this paper focuses on the dialectics of 
social structures, with the aim of showing that they intrinsically provoke nationalism 
and antisemitism. Thus, nationalism belongs to the very form in which society is organ-
ized. With this we come to the related question of antisemitism and how the close 
intertwining of both phenomena depends upon the same basic social structures. Thus, 
neither antisemitism nor nationalism are viewed as a unitary or static phenomenon, but 
rather as being conceived in their continuities and discontinuities. 
2. HABERMAS’ CONCEPT OF CONSTITUTIONAL PATRIOTISM 
Let us start with Habermas’ concept of constitutional patriotism, which he began to 
develop in the course of the Historians’ Debate (Habermas et al. 1987) as a critical and 
cosmopolitical alternative to nationalism (see also Habermas 1987, 1992). With the term 
constitutional patriotism, Habermas tried to theorize the dissolution of the traditional 
close link of republicanism and nationalism (Habermas 1998: 116). The central statement 
suggests that the unquestioned need of belonging on the part of the individuals would 
be met by identifying with universal values rather than a country of origin. The love of 
one’s nation would then be based on the love of freedom and human rights for which 
this nation stood and would no longer recur onto essentialized and ethnicized moments 
(cf. Habermas 1998: 36ff., 1992: 642). 
What is important to note is that constitutional patriotism does not replace national 
identification of the citizens, but rather gives it a reconciled notion (cf. Fine & Smith 2003: 
470). Habermas somehow wants to rescue the possibility and legitimacy of national 
identity for post-Holocaust Germany. Constitutional patriotism means a decoupling of 
national identification and nationalism on the cognitive and emotional level; it stands for a 
national feeling that is ripped of pathological nationalism and instead is founded on a form 
of civic solidarity and citizenship (Habermas 1998: 116). This concept has been widely 
accepted (cf. Delanty 2005; Beck 2003) but also criticized (Fine & Smith 2003; Claussen 
2004). According to Detlev Claussen, Habermas’ argumentation in the course of the 
Historians’ Debate shows that he did not critically supersede the terms and categories of 
the revitalized nation-state with which his revisionist adversaries confronted him. Instead, 
he adopted them himself, though in a different manner. Thus Claussen criticizes that the 
national would also have displaced the social in Habermas. Instead of overcoming the 
principle of national identification in its consequent critique, Habermas would have tried 
to alter national identification and make something republican—a sound patriotic feel-
ing—of it (Claussen 1994: 25ff.). This critique is in line with Adorno’s analysis of national-
ism, which starts from the assumption that, due to a relentless dynamic between the two 
aspects, a clear demarcation of a “sound national feeling” from pathological nationalism is 
impossible. For Adorno the problem in any national feeling is that it is still founded on the 
(often blind) identification with the nation or group, in which the individuals find them-
selves by chance (Adorno 1997b: 589).2 Thus, the very form of identification and collectiv-
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ity formation that is also the basis of a so-called sound national feeling, or patriotism, per se 
bears exclusion of those considered as others. 
While for Habermas the term nationalism seems to be reserved for ethnic national-
ism, his concept of constitutional patriotism very much resembles civic nationalism (cf. 
Fine & Smith 2003: 470). Meanwhile, Rogers Brubaker—like Anthony Smith (1995: 101) 
and Ulrich Beck (2003: 462)—points to the exclusionary force not only of ethnic national-
ism but also of its civic variant. The civic model of nationalism, Brubaker writes (1999: 
64), shows an extraordinary power of exclusion on the global level. While it is undoubt-
edly inclusive in that it includes all citizens regardless of gender, ethnic background, 
religion, class, and the like, all which is not part of the nation is potentially excluded. 
On a global scale, citizenship is an immensely powerful instrument of social clo-
sure…. Access to citizenship is everywhere limited; and even if it is open, in principle, 
to persons regardless of ethnicity, this is small consolation to those excluded from 
citizenship, and even from the possibility of applying for citizenship, by being 
excluded from the territory of the state. (Brubaker 1999: 64) 
But even within the nation-state’s borders, concerning those who are included as citi-
zens, the civic model of nationalism implies the assertion of an internal homogeneity 
and thus the exclusion of the “other,” as Ulrich Beck argues with regard to the contradic-
tion of citizen equality and social inequality in Western welfare states. 
Within the national paradigm, what does this equality rest on in western welfare 
states? It rests on the formal equality of the citizens: income differences between men 
and women, places of residence, etc. do not endorse differentiated citizen status. All 
the individuals of a nation have the same rights and duties; differentiated citizenship 
status is unacceptable. This legally-sanctioned citizen equality corresponds to the 
guiding nation-state principle of cultural homogeneity (language, history, cultural 
traditions). The national principles of inclusion and exclusion thus determine and sta-
bilize the perceptual boundaries of social inequalities. (Beck 2003: 462) 
These methodological and epistemological reflections imply that the concept of constitu-
tional patriotism still relies on the national principle of inclusion and exclusion that it 
simultaneously criticizes. For Beck, this is the result of a conceptual narrowing that he 
calls “methodological nationalism.” He demonstrates how such discourse extraverts 
those exclusionary mechanisms that are only seemingly overcome inwardly. 
Already in the early history of the nation-state, this kind of inward homogeneity was 
demanded. All those who did not conform completely to the given norms were likely to 
be regarded as a “nation within the nation,” and thus as endangering the community. In 
18th century revolutionary France, when Jewish emancipation became popular, Jews 
faced this dialectic of the civic nation, since they were confronted with an unequivocal 
choice between the Jewish community and the national community of the citoyens. It was 
seen as an insurmountable contradiction to belong to both.3 Jews should be included as 
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individuals and not as a community with equal rights. This implies a non-recognition of 
the dialectics of equality and difference, and its abolition in repressive unambiguous-
ness. Later, in 19th century, after assimilation and acculturation had widely diminished 
Jewish difference, the compulsion of unity and unambiguousness resulted in the re-
fabrication of Jewish difference in racist antisemitism. Other than in the period of the 
Enlightenment, when Jews had been deemed capable of being integrated into the nation 
as individuals, they were now seen as mere representatives of a newly constructed 
notion of race, as a biologized total other. This construction was needed as a clear-cut 
opposition to the construct of the nation that had become increasingly völkisch (Braun 
1990; Gilman 1993). Jews were viewed as a non-nation, or even as an anti-nation and a 
rootless anti-people (Postone 1988; Rensmann 2004: 74), and thus served as a projection 
screen for the fears concerning the antisemites’ own fragile identity and unity. What 
seems to flee from and contradict a national description of the world and its constraint 
of unambiguous identification becomes manifest in the image of the Jew as rootless, 
mediating, inorganic, and abstract, viz. the non-nation or non-identity (Horkheimer & 
Adorno 2002: 164ff.; Holz 2001: 108; Rensmann 2004). 
The image of the Jew as the non-identical that contradicts national unity, itself a re-
sult of collective canalization and projection, served as a basis for the murderous project 
of National Socialism, as Horkheimer and Adorno note: 
No matter what the makeup of the Jews may be in reality, their image, that of the 
defeated, has characteristics which must make totalitarian rule their mortal enemy: 
happiness without power, reward without work, a homeland without frontiers, 
religion without myth. These features are outlawed by the ruling powers because 
they are secretly coveted by the ruled. (2002: 164ff.) 
This expresses the dialectic of the nation, for which the ethnic notion of the nation is an 
ideal type, but which, to a certain degree, also concerns the civic notion of the nation. 
The equality of all citizens that the civic model guarantees is maintained only on an 
abstract level. It stands in open contradiction to the concrete inequalities in terms of 
political participation and distribution of the nation’s wealth. In this very gap between 
abstract equality and concrete inequality, Horkheimer and Adorno locate the reason for 
the rage that is discharged on the Jews as a minority. 
Coming back to Habermas, it is important to note that he situates nationalism in the 
framework of economic and social processes of modernization: nationalism therefore 
would be a specifically modern manifestation of collective identity (Habermas 1987: 
165), a modern phenomenon of cultural integration (Habermas 1992: 634). But (and this 
reflection is a prerequisite for his concept of constitutional patriotism) the exaltation of 
pathological nationalism in National Socialist Germany and the associated “shock” 
thereafter would have led to a disruption of the narratively constructed continuity of 
                                                                                                                                                       
recognition from their judges; they should only have our judges. We must refuse legal protection to 
the maintenance of the so-called laws of their Judaic organization; they should not be allowed to 
form in the state either a political body or an order. They must be citizens individually. But, some 
will say to me, they do not want to be citizens. Well then! If they do not want to be citizens, they 
should say so, and then, we should banish them. It is repugnant to have in the state an association 
of non-citizens, and a nation within the nation. … In short, Sirs, the presumed status of every man 
resident in a country is to be a citizen.” (Quoted in Sznaider 2010: 429) 
ANTISEMITISM AND POSTNATIONALISM 123 
Germany’s national history (Habermas 1987: 167); and this disruption would preclude 
recourse to nationalism as means for collective identity formation in Western societies 
today. From this perspective, nationalism today appears as an anachronistic, irrational, 
outdated tradition. 
3.  HORKHEIMER’S AND ADORNO’S VIEWS ON NATIONALISM 
However, the crucial question—why nationalism constantly reappears as an ideological 
pattern of cultural integration and the problem of its persistence and current effective-
ness—is thereby not tackled. Max Horkheimer devoted his attention to exactly this prob-
lem after returning from American exile. His thoughts on nationalism were guided by the 
assumption—based on insights gained in the Studies on the Authoritarian Personality—that 
various ideologies such as nationalism and antisemitism (and also ethnocentrism and 
sexism) belonged to one—antidemocratic—attitudinal syndrome. In this broader ideologi-
cal system, they are not only interrelated but can also avow for and intensify each other. 
Thus, if antisemitism and open racism are tabooed to a certain degree, like in Germany 
and Austria after the collapse of the Nazi regime, a functionally equivalent ideology can 
come to the fore, underneath which the dynamics of the other nonetheless still operate. In 
this specificity, Horkheimer located the topicality of nationalism as a catalyst of an-
tisemitism after 1945, concluding: “Der neue Götze ist das nationale Wir.” (Horkheimer 
1985: 139). This new idol, the “national us,” met the need for collective and exclusionary 
identification that had previously been characteristic of Nazi antisemitism. 
Horkheimer’s and Adorno’s analysis encodes the dialectics of nationalism and 
shows that its undoubted discontinuity after 1945 served to enhanceme of exactly those 
social structures that incite (nationalist) exclusive identification. Horkheimer’s and 
Adorno’s point is that nationalism and the need for it is not to be viewed as a shortcom-
ing of the individuals who cannot cope with modernity. Instead, the very predisposition 
of modern individuals to identify in a nationalist way is intrinsically modern and not an 
antimodernist strain. The more individualization is emphasized in a society that actually 
denigrates the individual, the more the need for collectivity is pronounced on the part of 
the individuals. Thus, modernity itself leads to collectivization. 
Accordingly, Horkheimer’s theory of nationalism is centered on considerations con-
cerning the relationship of the particular and the general, the antagonism of the individual 
and the collective. This contradictory relationship that he recognized as a basis of national-
ism can already be observed in the ambiguous concept of the classic liberal individual, 
which contains aspects of the bourgeois and the citoyen. While “as bourgeois the individual 
needs to think and act selfishly,” as a citoyen or “citizen, the individual has to care for 
society and the nation” (Jikeli 2010: 7). Still, in the progressive phase of bourgeois society, 
particular and general interests were—in spite of the antagonism—mediated to a certain 
degree by the ideas of the Enlightenment, whose aims, while not entirely fulfilled in 
material life, nevertheless also transcended the actual mode of sociation. The aim of a new 
social order, reflecting the principles of freedom, equality, and solidarity, and the corre-
sponding activity of the collective gave sense and purport to the individual’s struggle for 
self-preservation, and in the form of universal rights they served the good of society as a 
whole. In this development, the legitimacy of the bourgeois individual as well as of the 
collectivity can be found. However, this legitimacy intrinsically belonged to liberal capital-
ism. Its abolition in the course of the constitutional centration and centralization of capital, 
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the monopolization of the means of production, and the disappearance of the mediating 
sphere of circulation—in late capitalism circulation is increasingly taken over by monop-
oly—had a deep impact on the bourgeois subject: under late capitalist conditions it lost its 
economic basis. In psychoanalytical terms, the autonomy of the bourgeois subject and its 
conscience, manifest in the conflict of superego and id, have fallen out of use due to the 
changed circumstances. The result was an increasing outer-directedness of the individual 
(Riesman 1989), whose behavior, in contrast to progressive activity in the liberal era, was 
reduced to mere conformism, as noted by Alex Demirovic (1992: 25). The individuals are 
lost in the compulsion of their careers, or they become “national comrades” who enthusi-
astically swear off senseless individuality (Horkheimer 1988a: 171).4 With the decline of its 
objective conditions, the bourgeois subject loses its function, and reason, formerly the 
organ of self-preservation, vanishes. Mere adjustment to blind progress then seems to be 
reasonable, rather than the establishment of the right society. Conformism is the unques-
tioned subordination under the status quo, the assimilation to reality without contradic-
tion. 
Like the bourgeois subject, nationalism might also have had legitimacy in the early 
days of the newly-founded nation-states in the 19th century. It expressed an overall 
progressive orientation, overthrowing the old feudal order. But the antagonism that had 
its basis in the unreconciled contradiction between an abstract demand for liberty, 
equality, and solidarity, on the one hand, and the real competition between the indi-
viduals, on the other, also manifested in nationalism from the very beginning. Further-
more, nationalism was not only a progressive means of social development but to a 
great extent also a reaction to modern secularization processes that performed together 
with the development of the modern nation-state. Nationalism thus served the compen-
satory function of filling the gap that the loss of religion had left. Identity is not formed 
out of itself but via mediation with something else, be it religion or Marxism as its 
“secular form” (Horkheimer 1988a: 428). The irrefutable need to belong to a superordi-
nate concept is explained by the increasing weakening of individuality. And as the 
demand for self-determination and the conscious design of history, as expressed in 
Marxism, are blocked like religion, the individuals seek sanctuary in nationalism. This is 
one reason for the considerable mythologizing tendency in nationalism (Klinger 2008), 
such as the whole idea of the nation resembling an “imagined community” (Anderson 
1991). The idea that the nation’s origins wetre located in immemorial times of human-
kind, as völkisch nationalism suggested, corresponded to the need to give the new 
bourgeois order the veneer of eternity (Benjamin 2003). This already implied a standstill 
in social development. If the bourgeois subject, characterized by autonomy and free will, 
already was in need of reassuring ideologies such as nationalism, then this was even 
more the case after the liberal individual, the bourgeois, had lost its foundation through 
the transition of capitalism from liberalism to monopoly. 
This structurally mediated socio-psychological development is a major basis of the 
manipulative and authoritarian character that Horkheimer already described as the 
mental and spiritual glue of society, the “geistiger Kitt der Gesellschaft,” in his studies 
                                                                                                                                                       
4 “Mit dem Zerfall der Einheit des gesellschaftlichen und des partikularen Interesses … werden 
die Individuen in der bürgerlichen Epoche zu Getriebenen ihrer Laufbahn, oder zu Volksgenossen, 
die der sinnlosen Individualität in heller Begeisterung entsagen….” (Horkheimer 1988a: 171) 
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on authority and the family in 1936 (Horkheimer 1988b: 345). This character formation, 
specific to the years before the Second World War, was marked by an ambivalence 
between subjection and rebellion, as well as by an extreme narcissism that came together 
with a lack of affects. As a result, loyalty to the nation is perverted into “complete and 
unconditional identification of a person with the group to which he happens to belong. 
He is expected to surrender completely to the ‘unit’ and to give up all individual par-
ticularities for the sake of the ‘whole.’” (Adorno 1997a: 491) The reason for this blindness 
and lack of self-inspection with regard to identification is that the antagonism between 
the particular and the general has not been reconciled. The structural antagonism 
corresponds to the two contradictory demands within the individual—to serve a com-
mon goal as well as individual self-preservation. The modern individual is not capable 
of mediating this contradiction. Instead, it has been repressively removed at the struc-
tural level of society, where the general directly usurps the individual (Adorno 1997d: 
380). But here the crucial point is that the general does not serve the “whole” but the 
particular interests of the ruling elites. The general is in fact the particular, while the real 
general interest—in freedom, equality, and solidarity—is eroded. Thus, for Horkheimer, 
nationalism is a tool of manipulation in the interest of the “rackets” (Horkheimer 1988a: 
381), functioning as an integrating ideology, and the nation is the form of organization 
these rackets use to push through their own interests to the disadvantage of society as a 
whole. “That the whole would be the nation is pure ideology,” he writes elsewhere.5 
Due to its own dialectics, the principles of the Enlightenment have been ideologically 
perverted and thus resulted in persisting inequality and oppression (Horkheimer & 
Adorno 2002). In reality, the imagined unitary community is fragmented and the collec-
tive not nearly as homogeneous as imagined in nationalism. 
Still, this society pretends to be purely individualistic, thus confronting the modern 
individual with demands he cannot cope with since he has lost the characteristics of an 
autonomous subject. The fact that the vain individual is hypostatized as an autonomous 
subject in a period when the conditions for autonomy are not sufficient forces individu-
als to stick to forms of collectivization. But collectivization in turn reaffirms their very 
helplessness and powerlessness. Still, collective identification has its specific logic, as the 
individual (unconsciously) experiences that his particular needs are constantly neglected 
in the triumph of the collective. According to Adorno, late capitalist society creates 
circumstances that frustrate individuals’ narcissism so constantly that they seek refuge 
in collective narcissism. By identifying with the collective, the individuals are given back 
a little bit of self-esteem, only to be dispossessed of that self-esteem by the same collec-
tive (cf. Adorno 1997b: 589; cf. Adorno 1997c: 681).6 
                                                                                                                                                       
5 “Daß das Ganze die Nation sei, ist reine Ideologie. Der Nationalismus steht im Gegensatz 
zum Wohl der Gesellschaft, obwohl er das Wohl des Ganzen als seine Parole ausgibt.” (Horkheimer 
1988a: 334) 
6 “Man müsste nur die Normen des bürgerlichen Privatlebens ernst nehmen und zu gesell-
schaftlichen erheben. Aber eine derart gutmütige Empfehlung verkennt die Unmöglichkeit, daß es 
dazu komme unter Bedingungen, die den Einzelnen solche Versagungen auferlegen, ihren indivi-
duellen Narzißmus so konstant enttäuschen, sie real so sehr zur Ohnmacht verdammen, daß sie zu 
kollektivem Narzißmus verurteil sind. Ersatzweise zahlt er ihnen dann gleichsam als Individuen 
etwas von jener Selbstachtung zurück, die ihnen dasselbe Kollektiv entzieht, von dem sie die Rück-
erstattung erhoffen, indem sie wahnhaft mit ihm sich identifizieren.” (Adorno 1997b: 589) 
KARIN STOEGNER AND JOHANNES HOEPOLTSEDER 126 
4.  THE CONNECTION BETWEEN NATIONALISM AND ANTISEMITISM 
Unambiguousness, authenticity, rootedness, unity—these are issues that characterize 
nationalism as well as antisemitism. They are effective devices to cover the actual 
antagonisms along which society is organized. In order to establish unity amidst an-
tagonistic circumstances, a negative foil against which the self can be drawn as unambi-
guous and homogeneous is needed. The predetermined enemy confirms the triumph of 
repressive equality that the concept of the nation stands for. In the history of the Euro-
pean nation-state, the role of the negative foil, the non-identical, was traditionally 
attributed to Jews—they were regarded as a nation within the nation, as not belonging 
to the nation, or even as an anti-nation (Rensmann 2004: 74). This is worked out in detail 
by Paul Massing (1949), but also by Horkheimer and Adorno in the Dialectic of Enlight-
enment. Jean-Paul Sartre (1962) analyzes the history of the European Jewry and the 
development of antisemitism in Europe as processes independent of each other. In this 
view, the antisemitic personality invents the “Jew” according to his psychic economy, 
which, in turn, reflects the specific constellations of society. In contrast Sartre, Hork-
heimer, and Adorno advance a dialectical approach in which they stress the relationship 
between antisemitic imaginary and Jewishness. Still, the relationship is not perceived as 
direct or causal, but as mediated. In 1944, when they wrote the Dialectic of Enlightenment, 
Horkheimer and Adorno described two opposing points of view concerning Jews and 
antisemitism: 
For the fascists the Jews are not a minority but the antirace, the negative principle as 
such; on their extermination the world’s happiness depends. Diametrically opposed 
to this is the thesis that the Jews, free of national or racial features, form a group 
through religious belief and tradition and nothing else. Jewish traits relate to Eastern 
Jews, and only to those not yet assimilated. Both doctrines are true and false at the 
same time. The first is true in the sense that fascism has made it true. The Jews are 
today the group which, in practice and in theory, draws to itself the destructive urge 
which the wrong social order spontaneously produces. … The other, liberal thesis is 
true as an idea. It contains an image of the society in which rage would no longer 
reproduce itself or seek qualities on which to be discharged. (Horkheimer & Adorno 
2002: 137ff.) 
This is reflected in nationalist antisemitism that views the Jews as the anti-nation endan-
gering national unity and identity. In today’s crisis-ridden society, there are also consid-
erable insecurities concerning one’s own national identity and rootedness. The 
individual can barely absorb these insecurities psychically, which is why the feelings of 
discomfort are discharged and projected onto the Jews as an imagined homogeneous 
community. As Klaus Holz (2004: 55) points out, the figure of the anti-national Jew 
contains the fear and—it should be added—the wish that the world could possibly not 
be organized along the national principle anyway. But, in fact, the world is only superfi-
cially organized along the national principle, with the nation leading the individuals to 
believe in a homogeneity and unity that does not exist in reality. If we refer to the nation 
as an imagined community, this means that the world is actually organized according to 
another category—class and its antagonism—that is forcefully blocked out in nationalist 
ideology, where the contradiction between the particular and the general is abolished 
only in order to be confirmed in particularistic unity. 
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Thus, we have to understand both nationalism and antisemitism as intertwining 
ideological patterns based on structural specificities of modern society and not as mere 
prejudices on the part of individuals. This implies that they cannot be opposed by 
alluding to the fact that antisemitic representations do not mirror reality but stem from 
universal delusion. They are furthermore not to be viewed as an outdated attitude of 
some of modernization’s losers but as emanations and expressions of a deeper problem 
that must be the real object of critical analysis: the antagonistic, though forcefully tran-
quilized, relationship of the individual and society, of the particular and the general. 
This antagonism, already evident in the division of the individual into bourgeois or 
citoyen in the liberalist era of capitalist society, is a major source of the need for national 
hold in a purportedly postnational era and the need for collectivization in an era of 
alleged individualization. A critical theory of society has to analyze these needs not 
simply as pathological but as situated within the real living conditions and the form of 
sociation and collectivization. From this perspective, we can find logic in nationalism 
even today. Hence, Horkheimer wrote that, if there were not a portion of truth to na-
tionalism, it would not be so easy to manipulate people against their own interests 
(Horkheimer 1988a: 337).7 Criticizing this ideology means recognizing the “truth” in it 
and changing society in such a way that the need underlying the ideology is satisfied 
without the pathological deformations of nationalism and antisemitism (Horkheimer & 
Adorno 2002: 180). 
So, while Habermas seems to put forward a rather narrow understanding of nation-
alism, reducing it to the ethnic variant, the older critical theory of Adorno and Hork-
heimer develops a broader understanding of nationalism and nationalist exclusion that 
is also useful for an analysis of the continued existence of nationalism and antisemitism, 
namely that it is situated at the very centre of modern identification and the constraint 
on unambiguously identifying with a group one happens to belong to. This includes not 
only the ethnic variant of nationalism but also the civic variant, and thus what Haber-
mas calls the “postnational constellation.” As exclusionary identification is regarded as 
an aspect of modern sociation, the persisting need for nationalist identification despite 
European integration can be explained from a structural point of view without reducing 
it to a mere individual matter. Instead, the European integration process that undoubt-
edly calls nationalist identification into question at the same time dialectically repro-
duces the need for exactly this exclusionary form of identification in that it hypostatizes 
individuality without really providing the conditions for living it. 
What in Habermas’ concept of constitutional patriotism marks the impossibility and 
illegitimacy of ethnic nationalism today—the Shoah—has in reality been taken as a 
starting point for massive nationalist (and also antisemitic) resurrections since 1945. This 
can be plainly observed in the manifestations of secondary antisemitism, as well as in 
the process of the restoration of collectivity that began immediately after the collapse of 
the Nazi regime. The national collective had to be restored, and one major means for this 
was the invention of collective guilt. In this process of collectivizing and thus neutraliz-
ing guilt—because when all Germans are equally guilty nobody is actually responsible—
Horkheimer (1996: 814ff.) located the continuity of the national collective in Germany, 
                                                                                                                                                       
7 “[W]enn im Nationalismus nicht ein Stück Wahrheit steckte, wären die Menschen auch nicht 
durch ihn zu manipulieren.” (Horkheimer 1988a: 337) 
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the satisfaction of the need for national and collective hold. The discontinuity in the 
national narrative that the Shoah has brought about and which Habermas sees as the 
starting point for a new, postnational form of identification, has been bridged success-
fully, and a new national we was created on the very ruins of National Socialism. Like 
secondary antisemitism, nationalism also persisted not only in spite of the Shoah and 
National Socialism but because of it. It is a means to establish continuity by bridging the 
disruption of civilization. It is a means of getting rid of the Nazi past without working 
through it. 
5. CONCLUSION: ANTISEMITISM AND POSTNATIONALISM 
The intersection of antisemitism and nationalism is thus still at work today. What has 
changed is the level at which antisemitic stereotypes are produced in Europe. This no 
longer occurs at a purely national level but increasingly at a supranational, allegedly 
postnational level (cf. Wistrich 2005; Taguieff 2002; Finkielkraut 2004). This goes hand in 
hand with a certain change in antisemitic stereotypes. While in 19th century’s political 
antisemitism the “Jew” was feared within the nation, as an anti-national figure that 
questioned the national principle (cf. Massing 1949; Holz 2001), this is no longer exclu-
sively the case. Since the inauguration of the Israeli nation-state, and more obviously 
since 1967, antisemitic discourses, particularly those of the Left, no longer paint the 
“Jew” as representative of the anti-national. Today the “Jew” functions as a personifica-
tion of the very principle of the national that the postnationalists themselves pretend to 
have overcome. Jewishness is at least as commonly associated with aggressive national-
ism as with cosmopolitanism. This is part of a “new antisemitism” in Europe, “mani-
fested inter alia in the depiction of Israel as a uniquely illegitimate state or people, 
Zionism as a uniquely noxious ideology, supporters of Israel as a uniquely powerful 
lobby and memory of the Holocaust as a uniquely self-serving reference to the past.” 
(Fine 2010: 416) This form of antisemitism (cf. Rabinovici, Speck & Sznaider 2004) singles 
out the Jewish nation-state as anachronistic in an otherwise postnational era. Thus, it 
operates with similar, if not the same, anti-Jewish stereotypes as the nationalist variant. 
In the disguise of anti-Zionism, nationalism and antisemitism can thus be acted out 
without arousing suspicion. The agents of these single-edged discourses can still repre-
sent themselves as anti-nationalists. But negatively it manifests the widespread need for 
national hold in an allegedly postnational era. 
A major problem with the concept of postnational identity is that, even if it is ad-
vanced as part of an emancipatory movement, it still sticks to the principle of identifica-
tion that is at the very heart of nationalism. After the disruption brought about by the 
Shoah, modernity did not reflect upon its intrinsic pathologies as sufficiently as Haber-
mas’ concept seems to suggest. Modernity did not overcome nationalist identification. 
Habermas is undoubtedly looking for a political community that does not incite anti-
semitism and nationalism. Given his vehement opposition to revisionism in the course 
of the Historians’ Debate, we cannot say that for him the problem of antisemitism is a 
problem of the past, as highlighted by Robert Fine: 
What to my mind rescues Habermas from this mode of “historicising” antisemitism, 
that is, locating it in the past, is the active and practical engagement with memory of 
the Holocaust he demands of the new Europe. He was one of those protagonists of 
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the new Europe who in the words of Tony Judt saw it as “bound together by the signs 
and symbols of its terrible past” and as “forever mortgaged to the past.” The com-
mitment Habermas expresses is to teach afresh to each passing generation the story of 
Europe’s murder of its Jews in order to “furnish Europe’s present with admonitory 
meaning and moral purpose” (Judt 2007: 831). (Fine 2010: 413)  
A reductionist view of Habermas’ concept of postnationalism overlooks how much the 
past continues to weigh upon the present and converts it “from a demand for European 
self-reflection on its own murderous past into an uncritical resource by means of which 
we Europeans can again label the Other barbaric and defend ourselves as the civilised 
continent” (Fine 2010: 415). Meanwhile, Habermas’ own concept unwillingly seems to 
invite this reductionist view. 
Habermas insists on the necessity of a postnational society today: anything else 
would be out of date, an anachronism hindering social development. But this perspec-
tive ignores the system-enhancing function of nationalism in an era that is not oriented 
toward real progress in the sense of an emancipated society but is characterized by a 
static if not backward orientation, by what Walter Benjamin (2003), with reference to 
Nietzsche, called the eternal return of the same. 
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Modern Capitalist Society, 
Competing Nation States, Antisemitism 
and Hatred of the Jewish State 
Robin Stoller.* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The fear of losing national identity and the power of nation states has once again become 
popular in Europe in the context of the discourse against so-called globalisation, the 
“unification” process in the European Union and, most recently, the financial crisis. In 
the context of the European Union, some observers have argued that the concept of the 
nation state based on ethnic or religious definitions has transformed into a transnational 
identity. The idea of a post-national era with a common identity and collective memory 
was promoted during the reforms.1 Furthermore, scholars such as Bunzl have argued 
that, in the age of the formation of a European identity, antisemitism would decline and 
Muslims would serve as the new scapegoats in the construction of a common European 
identity.2 But in fact the opposite is true. Rather than disappearing, the nation state as a 
regulator and the concept of the nation as an identity have remained, and the Jews are 
once again serving as scapegoats. Antisemitic statements and attacks have become more 
frequent and aggressive since the Al-Aqsa Intifada of 2000, the anti-American attacks on 
9/11 and well over a hundred terrorist suicide bombings targeting and killing as many 
Jews as possible—mostly in Israel. In Europe, the mass killing of Jews in Israel and 
antisemitic attacks in Europe were partly rejected as antisemitic, but often (at least 
partly) rationalised as a form of resistance against the “Israeli occupation”. Hating the 
Jews has once again become popular in Europe and is partly authorised in the main-
stream media—especially in the guise of Israel bashing. 
Different studies show that classic modern antisemitic perceptions of national and 
international socio-economic processes have once again become prevalent. Over 40 per 
cent of Europeans agree that Jews have too much power in the business world and in 
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Vorurteile und Projektionen in Europa und Nahost (2008) pp. 53-74, esp. pp. 61-74. 
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international financial markets.3 Over 30 per cent blame Jews in the financial industry (at 
least partly) for the economic crisis.4 Almost half of interviewees agree that Jews are 
more loyal to Israel than to the country where they live.5 In a country like Spain, 58 per 
cent of Spaniards agree with statements such as “Jews are very powerful because they 
control the economy and the media”.6 The European unconscious knows about the Jews: 
they are “not true citizens”, they “stick together”, they have built an “artificial state” on 
others peoples’ land and they dishonestly exploit and dominate nations as an alien 
power through the financial markets and the media. What kind of perception of the 
world do these people have and how is it related to the functioning of current society? 
To understand some of these dynamics, this paper analyses some of the connections 
between the system of competing nation states, capitalist society, modern antisemitism 
and hatred of the Jewish state. In order to do so, I will focus on two elements of thought 
in our societies and their connections to antisemitism and anti-Zionism. 
First, I will focus on the role of the system of competing nation states, with their hege-
monic ideological rationales: the republican and the primordial or ethnic nation model. 
Both hegemonic ideological concepts have a specific impact on the perception of “the 
Jews” and Israel. Inclusion and exclusion, citizenship, rights of the individual guaran-
teed by the state and the right of a “nation” to its “own” state depend on the ideological 
rationalisation of these rationales. 
Second, I will touch upon the relation between the largely impersonal processes and 
functioning of modern capitalist societies and modern antisemitism. How do individuals 
perceive structures, processes and exploitation in our society? What kind of connections 
exists between these perceptions and antisemitism? 
Finally, I will argue that a specific connection between both these elements (the na-
tion state concept and the perception of the functioning of society) forms the basis for 
conspiracy theories, which are projected onto Jews. One central problem in attempts to 
combat antisemitism is not only that there are Jewish stereotypes but also that the 
above-mentioned elements, which form the basis of conspiracy theories and eliminatory 
antisemitism, cannot be easily deconstructed in the society we are living in. 
2. ANTISEMITISM AND THE PERCEPTION OF THE WORLD 
In his essay “Portrait de l’antisémite”, Jean Paul Sartre commented that antisemitism is 
not just a matter of taste, a question of whether or not you like “the Jews”.7 Rather, he 
emphasised that antisemitism is a world view that is not limited to being against the 
Jews. He noticed that one cannot be an antisemite without further intellectual principles 
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and described elements of this specific way of interpreting social processes and struc-
tures in modern capitalist societies. In particular, he mentioned specific perceptions not 
only of the nation but also of ownership structures, exploitation, money and so forth. 
Adorno and Horkheimer,8 and later Postone,9 in particular, have examined the rela-
tionship between a specific fetishised perception of modern capitalist society and anti-
semitism. They state that, based on a fetishisation of capitalist structures, antisemites 
relate a negatively perceived, “artificial”, “abstract sphere” (banks, stock markets, 
individuals, intellect, money, etc.) to the Jews, as opposed to a “concrete sphere” (con-
crete work, production, factories, etc.), which is perceived as good and organic and 
related to the nation/people/Volk, that is to say, as being not Jewish. 
In these antisemitic projections, Jews are non-workers, exploiters, intellectuals, bankers 
and stockbrokers, in contrast to the national community, which consists of “real workers” 
and honest, productive industries. In the Nazi ideology, this culminated in the odious sign 
over the gates of the forced labour, concentration and extermination camp Auschwitz, 
“Arbeit macht frei” (literally “Work will make you free” or “Work liberates”). 
3. COMPETING NATION STATES AND ANTISEMITISM 
I want to highlight that the concept of the nation plays a significant role in modern 
antisemitism. Even if traditional and religious elements take part in a transformed form, 
modern antisemitism is related to modernity and the current form of social organisation, 
namely modern capitalist society. We live in a society in which the political regulation of 
the economy.10 and the construction of identity.11 are built up, inter alia, by competing 
states, namely nation states. Even if there are transnational dimensions of political 
regulation of economic processes, the main players are still nation states competing with 
each other. Furthermore, the nation state is the only institution to be addressed by 
political actors and movements, especially in times of crisis. What kind of relation exists 
between the state and the population? 
There are two predominant rationales for the inclusion of individuals in and the ex-
clusion of individuals from nation states. They are those ideological rationales that 
legitimate the rights of citizens, the existence of the state and the extension of state 
territory. First, there is the republican concept based on the rationale that all the indi-
viduals living in a territory are members of the nation and therefore receive citizens’ 
rights. Secondly, there is the primordial concept based on genealogies: either “völkisch”, 
ethnic, cultural or religious.12 It is important to note that under the hegemonic interpre-
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tation you can only be part of one nation: one person—one nation.13 And, in the face of 
competing nation states, you have to serve the interest of “your own” nation only.14 Both 
concepts, the republican and the primordial one, have a specific impact on the percep-
tion of Jews and Israel. 
4. JEWS, CITIZENSHIP AND LOYALTY TO THE NATION 
Consider the republican perspective towards the Jews in the 19th century. Those who 
supported the political emancipation of Jews regardless of their religion and culture 
often did not like the fact that religious Jews still believed in the Jewish religion. Reli-
gious Jews were perceived as “obstinate”. Secularised Jews who held on to Jewish 
heritage and rejected assimilation into secularised Christian culture were perceived as 
“others”. The price or expectation for the right of political emancipation was assimila-
tion into Christian secularised culture, often without naming it as such. If Jews assimi-
lated but still claimed to be Jewish, this contradicted the loyalty of the nation concept: 
one nation for each citizen. 
In the case of the primordial nation concept, three rationales can be distinguished: 
religion, culture and “Volk”. If the rationale of the nation was based on religion, it was 
Christian. If the concept was based on culture, it often (implicitly) signified a secularised 
Christianity, which did not included any explicit Jewish heritage. If the concept was 
based on “Volk” (a German concept), it included a genealogy of blood, and the Jews 
could therefore not be part of the nation. Within the framework of these concepts, 
assimilated Jews, in particular, were suspected of destroying the nation from within. A 
different situation arises when we touch upon the perception of the Jewish state of 
Israel. 
5. THE JEWISH STATE OF ISRAEL, NATION AND TERRITORY 
When one looks at Israel and its perception through the lens of the primordial and 
republican rationales of the nation, one can observe some interesting changes. First of 
all, there is the traditional anti-Jewish concept: the primordial or ethnic one. This concept 
can be found among self-identified right-wingers as well as some left-wingers. From this 
perspective, a nation is established through genealogy: ethnic, cultural, religious or 
other. Some consider the Jews a nation, but most do not because they are perceived as a 
“mixed race” or just as a religion living as “guests” among nations. Their fathers and 
mothers do not have the same blood. But even if the Jews are considered a nation, the 
nation concept connects population and territory in a specific way. Under this concept, a 
nation is constituted through a particular form of genealogy of the population living 
“forever” in a common territory—an “autochthonous” population. From this perspec-
tive, Jews should not be allowed to live in Palestine as a nation, since the so-called 
Palestinian nation (which is perceived as Arab) has lived there forever. The “autochtho-
nous” Palestinians have the right to live in Palestine, while Israel as an “artificial” 
construct has to disappear. This concept goes together with such expressions as “Israel 
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as a cancer”, “colonisers”, “imperialists”, “occupiers of Palestine” and so forth. Under 
this primordial concept, there is no space for the Jews, neither as “guests” among the 
“autochthonous” populations of Europe nor in Palestine.  
This brings us to the liberal or leftist republican concept and its position towards Israel. 
Under the republican concept, a primordial concept is against universalistic principles. 
Different concepts related to Israel can be found, which at the end of the day all serve as 
political ammunition against Israel as a Jewish state. Firstly, there is the concept that every 
nation state has to disappear (the post-national perspective). The focus is mostly on Israel, 
since it is one of the more recent states to be established. From this perspective, the decon-
struction of nation states should therefore start with Israel. But the concept of the one-state 
solution, a common Jewish-Palestinian state, also means the destruction of the Jewish state. 
A two-state solution, with equal rights for Palestinians and Jews in Israel would also cause 
problems given the demographic situation, even without considering the “right of return” 
of the so-called refugees. But what is emphasised most in this perspective is the fact that 
Israel defines itself a Jewish state. Whether it does so ethnically or religiously, either 
definition reminds the European “progressives” of their history.15 Whether it is the reli-
gious definition stemming from feudalism or the ethnic definition prevalent in modern 
capitalist societies, both definitions are seen as having been transcended in Europe and 
should therefore be overcome in general. From this “progressive” perspective, a nation 
state with a definition of citizenship based on ethnic or religious genealogy is perceived as 
racist and something that should be opposed. These universalistic rationales, which 
historically supported the political emancipation of the Jews in Europe regardless of their 
ethnic, religious or cultural genealogies, are now being used by the strongest enemies of 
the Jewish state. Such universalistic perspectives have become a rationale for opposing the 
existence of the Jewish state. The system of competing nation states and their hegemonic 
rationales does not include a Jewish state, which can serve as a state of refuge for all 
persecuted Jews or as a nation state for the Jews. 
6. ISRAEL, JEWS IN THE DIASPORA AND DISLOYALTY 
What kind of situations do Jews who are not living in Israel face in the context of a 
system of competing nation states? From the point of view that every citizen is part of 
one nation and has to serve the interests of their nation state, every Jew is perceived as 
potentially disloyal towards the state where they are living. The traditional general 
suspicion of disloyalty of Jews becomes worse when it comes to Israel. In a society based 
on competing nation states, every Jew is potentially accused of being more loyal towards 
Israel than to their nation state. Furthermore, as Israel is the only nation state in the 
world that threatens to be exterminated along with its population, every Jew speaking 
out against this threat is automatically perceived as a “Zionist” force. In the perception 
of antisemites, every Jew is an Israeli ambassador and is treated as such. 
7. IMPERSONAL RULE, STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES AND ANTISEMITISM 
I want to come back to the second aspect of modern capitalist societies mentioned in the 
introduction, namely the impersonal functioning of such societies and the perception of 
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processes and structures. How is the functioning of capitalist societies perceived and 
how does this relate to antisemitism? 
In contrast to feudalism, exploitation and the production of wealth is not effected 
through immediate personal dominance in capitalist societies. No individual is physi-
cally owned by another. Modern capitalist societies are based on contracts between 
“free” and “equal” legal entities. Every individual has to sell their labour power on the 
market if they do not have property for everyday production. The employer does not 
own the employee. Modern society is based on modern private property and on con-
tracts between “independent” and “equal” individuals. The employer contracts the 
employee. The employee is “free” to choose the employer. The employee produces 
wealth for the employer and the employee is paid for his or her daily production. If the 
employee does not receive enough money for his or her daily production, no one is 
directly responsible. The employee can “choose”. 
Especially during crises, when employees earn less, employers cannot accumulate 
capital and the state can no longer regulate, a responsible party is searched for. In the 
common perception, banks, stocks, shareholders, multinational companies and politi-
cians are held responsible. People search for culprits and personalise the responsibility 
of the impersonal capitalist accumulation processes. This is the point where the system 
of competing nation states is relevant. When the political regulation of the nation state is 
not able to guarantee a minimum amount of wealth for the daily production of its 
population, “foreign forces”, “traitors”, “stockholders”, “banks” and “corrupt politi-
cians” are blamed. The “cosmopolitan” Jews, who are “everywhere”, have no fatherland 
and are not perceived as part of the nation are thus blamed for the misery and the social 
processes that are perceived as being bad. 
This specific connection between the perception of the impersonal functioning of 
capitalism and the system of competing nation states culminates in the Jews being 
blamed for a “global conspiracy”. The Jews are perceived as acting against nations, 
either from within those nations or against the Palestinians, Arabs or Islam. If the Jews 
contradict the existence of the nation state and if they are to blame for the above-
mentioned misery, as they are according to this perception, in the logic of the antisem-
ites there is only one possible way of dealing with them… This perception of the world 






Fighting Antisemitism in 
the Feminist Community 
Nora Gold* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper focuses on my efforts over the past 20 years to fight antisemitism in the 
feminist community. Like my Jewish feminist sisters, I have been deeply disappointed 
and disheartened by this phenomenon. However, I have found various ways to remain 
inside the feminist movement and from there to fight the antisemitism from within. At 
times these efforts have worked to good effect. 
In this paper, I will share some of the strategies I have used. Of course, what I will 
describe here is not intended as any kind of exhaustive list. However, by reviewing 
some of these strategies, perhaps it is possible to articulate some of our best practices 
and how we can be most effective at fighting antisemitism around the world. 
Before discussing the specific strategies I have employed, I will offer a few general 
comments. 
During the years that I have been doing this work, there has been a sea change in the 
nature of antisemitism, and at present the delegitimization of Israel has become so 
widespread on the left that it is virtually normative. There are, therefore, some implica-
tions to this for how we approach fighting antisemitism. 
The first implication is that, while acknowledging the excellent efforts of Jewish 
communities around the world in the fight against antisemitism, we need to try new and 
different strategies. In my view, we need interventions that are innovative, creative, and 
smart, because, unfortunately, our enemies are innovative, creative, and smart, and 
because fighting a norm is different from fighting a group of neo-Nazi skinheads. For 
example, you cannot arrest a norm. 
The second implication, or even premise, for this kind of activism is that, in order to be 
effective, you must be an insider in the group whose norms you are challenging or trying 
to change. Again, this is different from our traditional approaches to fighting antisemitism. 
You did not need to belong to the Aryan Brotherhood to fight them. Here, however, you 
need to share the language and the unique sub-culture, including the particular signs, 
symbols, and at least some of the norms, of this group, if you are to have any effect. 
If all my years of working to fight antisemitism have taught me one thing, it is this: 
the only people who can influence the anti-Israel left are the pro-Israel left. Because, 
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despite the differences between these two groups on the issue of Israel, they have a 
common language. Similarly, within the feminist community, the only people who can 
affect anti-Israel feminists are pro-Israel feminists. In other words, women who strongly 
identify as feminists, and at the same time love Israel and the Jewish people passionately 
enough to go to the mat for them. It is like with a family. It does not matter how nice or 
smart you are; if you are from outside the family, no-one is going to let you change 
something within the family. So, in this kind of work, one must work from within. 
The third and final premise underlying this sort of activism is that, given how large 
and potentially daunting the problem of antisemitism is, one should only target for 
change those whom it is possible to influence. It is a waste of our limited time and 
energy to target hard-core antisemites. We should be directing our energy solely toward 
what I think of as the “well-meaning but ignorant.” Which is how I view many non-
Jews—and many Jews, as well. 
This is also how I view a lot of the feminists I know. For the most part, feminists are 
not a bad or malevolent bunch. They are even idealistic. They have just never thought 
much about the issue of antisemitism before, and no-one has challenged them to. The 
Israel Project has published some interesting research showing that non-Jews who talk 
to a Jew about Israel even once will, in a significant number of cases, come to see Israel 
more positively as a result. However, this research also shows that most Jews rarely 
have these conversations with non-Jews. So the people I target in my efforts are those 
who are open to influence and whose minds can be changed. 
II. STRATEGIES FOR FIGHTING ANTISEMITISM IN THE FEMINIST COMMUNITY 
I will now turn to the strategies that I have used. Of course, much of what I say here 
about fighting antisemitism among feminists can also be generalized to the broader left. 
In approaching my particular corner of the shadow of antisemitism (i.e., the feminist 
community), I have divided my target group into feminists inside academe and those 
outside of it. This is not a perfect distinction, because virtually all feminist scholars (i.e., 
those working in women’s studies programs or in some form of association with them) 
also perceive themselves as part of the larger feminist movement. However, this distinc-
tion is still useful for our purposes, because this academic sub-group was able to be 
influenced by one particular strategy that is nowhere near as useful with feminists 
outside academe. 
1. Feminist academics as a target group 
With this group, I had one powerful tool—I would even say weapon—to work with, and 
this was my research. More specifically, I refer to my two most recent studies, which are 
both feminist in conceptual framework and approach. Both these studies were funded 
by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC), which lent 
them prestige within the academic context. One was a national study of Canadian 
Jewish women and their experiences of antisemitism and sexism, and the other was a 
Toronto study of how Jewish girls aged 10-14 experience and understand antisemitism. 
The context in which I conducted both these studies was the Centre for Women’s 
Studies in Education (CSWE) at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education at the 
University of Toronto, known as OISE/UT. In Canadian Jewish academic circles, OISE 
itself is reputed to be one of the most problematic institutions of higher education in 
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Canada in terms of its radical left-wing orientation and its anti-Israelism and anti-
semitism. This reputation is not without basis. A few years ago, I conducted a research 
study on 80 Canadian Jewish professors from four different Canadian universities, and 
from that research I know that certain parts of OISE are particularly challenging places, 
as are many of the women’s studies programs in Canada and internationally. However, 
the Women’s Centre at OISE/UT, where I have been located for the past decade, is a 
good place where I feel quite comfortable. An important part of this has to do with the 
woman who for many years was the Director there—a non-Jewish Judeophile who 
would never tolerate any form of antisemitism (or racism) at her center. 
I will now discuss these two research studies. The genesis of this research was an en-
counter I had one day with one of my feminist colleagues, who was organizing that 
year’s panel on “Women and Diversity” in honor of International Women’s Day. I 
passed her in the hallway, and asked her if she was planning to include anything on 
Jewish women, and she said that that would not be appropriate, as Jewish women could 
understand oppression because we are white. I told her that this was not correct, and to 
make a long story short, initiated this research on Jewish women so that women like her, 
coming from a left-wing, anti-oppression perspective, could begin to understand the 
parallels between the “dual oppression” of women of color (sexism + racism) and that of 
Jewish women (sexism + antisemitism). In that way I could build some bridges between 
Jewish feminists and other feminists. 
Conceptually, my Jewish women’s study is rooted in Jewish feminist scholarship, 
which is concerned with delineating the specific experience of being Jewish and female, 
and the contributions to this of both antisemitism and sexism (e.g., Beck 1995; Bridges 
1989-2010; Cantor 1995; Gold 2004, 1998, 1997a, 1997b, 1993; Henry & Taitz 1996; Hyman 
2002; Jewish Women’s Archive 2006; Kaye/Kantrowitz & Klepfisz 1986; Medjuck 1993; 
Nashim 2003-2010; Plaskow 1990; Pogrebin 1991; Siegel 1995, 1986; Weidman Schneider 
1984; and Women in Judaism 1997-2010). My Jewish women’s study involved a random 
sample of 365 Jewish women from across Canada and clearly showed the extent of the 
antisemitism and sexism that Canadian Jewish women encounter in their everyday lives 
(Gold 2004, 1998, 1997a, 1997b). It also showed the different mental health implications 
of these two kinds of oppression. The women in the study who reported having had 
many antisemitic experiences in the past also had significantly higher scores on the Beck 
Depression Inventory than the other women in the sample, but no such result was found 
regarding sexism (Gold 2004). 
Another important finding from this research project was that when these women 
were asked where their encounters with antisemitism had taken place, the second most 
frequent response was “at school.” This led me to wonder about the experiences of 
contemporary Canadian Jewish girls, which ultimately resulted in my longitudinal 
study on Toronto Jewish girls (aged 10-14) and their experiences of antisemitism. I 
followed these girls for four years, filming them throughout. This study, like the one on 
Jewish women, revealed disturbingly and unequivocally the reality of antisemitism in 
the lives of the participants and its impact on them. One can glean a small flavor of this 
from the short film (13 minutes long) that I made about the research on these girls, called 
“Jewish Girl Power.”1 
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The Jewish women’s study was the first national study anywhere on women’s ex-
periences of antisemitism and the first to find, within any population, a statistically 
significant relationship between antisemitism and depression. The Jewish girls’ study 
was the first social science research study to examine over time the emotional and 
psychological impact of antisemitism on Jewish girls (or, actually, Jewish children 
altogether). But perhaps the most important contribution of these two studies was the 
opportunity they gave me to lay out before my feminist colleagues, in an irrefutable 
way, the ugly reality of antisemitism. I have presented dozens of times on each of these 
studies to audiences comprised of both Jews and non-Jews (and quite a few of these 
presentations were to feminists), and in each instance I used this talk as an entrée to 
teaching them about anti-Israelism as a form of antisemitism. 
Occasionally I have met with comments that were stupid or hostile, such as, “You 
mean there are some good Jews—I mean Israelis?” However, generally speaking, the 
response from both Jewish and non-Jewish feminists has been positive. I have often been 
told, “I didn’t know about this. I just never thought about any of it before. This is very 
interesting. And important.” 
Consistent with this, a few years ago, I received an extremely gratifying response 
from a feminist colleague I have never met, who at the time was the editor-in-chief of 
Women’s Studies International Forum, a prominent feminist journal based in England. 
Given that the paper I submitted there about my research, entitled “Sexism and Anti-
semitism as Experienced by Canadian Jewish Women: Results of a National Study,” was 
something of a “J’accuse,” I was pleasantly surprised and heartened not only when was 
it accepted unusually quickly and without revisions for publication in this journal, but 
also when the journal’s non-Jewish editor-in-chief wrote me a personal note to say that 
this article was so eye-opening for her, and in her opinion so important for all feminists 
to read, that she was going to jump the queue for it and put it into the very next issue. 
Which she did. 
This incident, and the overall positive reception enjoyed by both of these research 
projects, as well as the film, have helped restore and maintain my faith in at least some 
of my feminist “sisters.” 
Both of these research studies have also been useful weapons in a high profile panel 
discussion I engaged in that included one of the most vociferous anti-Israel feminist 
scholars in Canada. Even though this woman had packed the room with her students 
and acolytes, I won, at least partly because of the power of research, what quickly 
became a debate. My opponent had no research underpinning her comments; she just 
ranted. She was also foolish enough to violate a core aspect of feminist values, culture, 
and etiquette by refusing eye contact with me, and coldly rejecting my friendly, sisterly 
overtures that we work together to build bridges as feminists. Thus she exposed herself 
for what she really was (i.e., full of hate, and therefore not a true “sister” or feminist). 
This helped her to lose this debate. But the solidity of research was definitely a factor. 
Afterwards, this professor’s students (at least half of whom were women of color or 
Muslim) came up to me to thank me and talk to me, and take copies of my paper. These 
young feminists were the perfect example of the “ignorant but well-meaning” people 
who are capable of being influenced that I alluded to earlier. 
So this illustrates how research and scholarship were, and can be, used as weapons 
with which to challenge, confront, and educate a local, or international, community of 
feminist scholars. This is, of course, equally applicable to any other scholarly community 
one wishes to challenge, confront, and/or educate. 
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2. Targeting feminists outside academe 
Obviously, when trying to influence people, different strategies and weapons are re-
quired for different target groups. The women I am thinking of in the larger feminist 
community are involved with feminist bookstores, feminist film festivals, feminist 
poetry readings, feminist journals, and/or in the feminist art world. They also work—for 
pay or as unpaid activists—in the field of violence against women (e.g., in rape crisis 
centers), as well as in the peace movement, or as part of the struggle for women’s rights, 
lesbian rights, reproductive rights, and other general human or civil rights. The most 
influential non-academic feminists I know tend to fall into these two groups (i.e., the arts 
and activism). I therefore designed interventions that target these groups as the main 
tools in my efforts to counteract antisemitism within this population. 
A. The arts 
In addition to my academic career, I am engaged in literary work. I am a fiction writer 
and also the founding editor of a new online literary journal, Jewish Fiction.net. This part 
of my life gives me another route into the feminist world, and another way of influenc-
ing it. 
Regarding Jewish Fiction.net,2 I had several motives for starting this journal, but one 
of them was to counteract the boycott of many Israeli fiction writers. For example, when 
I was recently in Israel, I learned that a prize-winning Israeli author I know was sup-
posed to have her book come out in French, in France, but that it was cancelled at the 
last minute, because the French publisher decided they could not “indirectly support the 
occupation.” I would like, through Jewish Fiction.net, to create a space for Israeli writers 
to showcase their work, where it can receive the international exposure it deserves. I 
have decided to publish at least two Israeli writers per issue. This journal will be widely 
distributed online, including throughout the feminist community. So this is how a 
literary journal can be a weapon. 
In terms of my own fiction writing, my novel, Exile, is in itself a form of activism, a 
tool, and a weapon. Exile is a novel about the anti-Israelism in academe, and what 
happens to a young feminist who comes from Israel to spend a year studying in Canada. 
This novel is as yet unpublished. However, there have already been numerous public 
readings of it at literary conferences, and in public and academic venues (including 
feminist contexts), and very often this novel elicits a strong response from listeners. It 
makes people think. I hope it will have this effect on even more people when excerpts of 
Exile appear on Jewish Fiction.net. 
So these are just a couple of ways that one can harness the deep and latent power of 
literature to help fight antisemitism. Of course, all of the other arts—music, dance, the 
visual arts, theatre, and so forth—can be used in this way as well. The arts speak to 
everyone, and speak to human experience at a concrete and intimate level. So, perhaps 
even more than academic research, which appeals primarily to the intellect, the arts can 
be an effective tool. 
I have seen this, for example, with my short film, “Jewish Girl Power.” Its reach ex-
tends much farther than my research articles. Since it is available online and for free, it 
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has been viewed by over 1,000 people, many of them feminists. But it also reaches 
further because it reaches into the heart, not just the mind. 
A number of Jewish communities, as well as the Israeli government, are now coming 
to recognize that one of the best ways to fight stereotypes about Israel (and hence anti-
Israelism) is through the dissemination of Jewish and Israeli culture and the arts. So the 
arts have great potential as a resource for us in our struggle, and the work I am describ-
ing here, it turns out, is part of a larger trend. 
B. Activism 
In terms of influencing the other influential group of non-academic feminists, the femi-
nist activist community, the obvious tool to use is activism. I therefore recently started a 
new pro-Israel group in Toronto, comprised of Jews who want to fight antisemitism and 
also have ties to a variety of progressive causes and organizations, enabling them to 
infiltrate and influence these places. We have several feminists in our group. We have a 
union member who works for one of Canada’s most anti-Israel unions. We have some-
one formerly employed by the Ontario Human Rights Commission. And so on. So far, 
our group has had two good meetings, and this fall we plan to double in size. 
So these are, in a nutshell, a few strategies that demonstrate some success in the fight 
against antisemitism in the feminist community (and beyond). 
This work is difficult, but what makes it possible is the support I feel from non-
Jewish feminists who are my allies and from other Jewish feminists, whom I experience 
as standing with me as I do this work. This includes some older Jewish feminists who 
have inspired me over the years, like Rachel Josefowitz Siegel, Evelyn Torton Beck, and 
Aviva Cantor. 
I also am able to do this work because I am not naive. I do not expect that sisterhood, 
even at the best of times (and we are not in the best of times) will be simple. Just as I do 
not think family relations of any kind are simple. But whatever the tensions and difficul-
ties, there is a deep connection to build on with one’s sisters. To use perhaps the most 
obvious example of sisterhood, consider the case of Rachel and Leah in the Bible. In 
2010, I published an essay entitled, “Rachel and Leah: A Jewish Model of Sisterhood” in 
Kerem.3 In this piece, I challenge the common misperception of these two women as 
being, above all, competitors for a man. Instead, what my research uncovers is the 
immensely profound and passionate love that Rachel and Leah had for each other, and 
that this love outweighed all the tensions between them. Moreover, according to the 
midrash on Lamentations (Lamentations Rabbah, P’tikhta, 7:49), it was Rachel’s profound 
and passionate love for Leah that led God to deliver us (b’nei Israel) from exile. 
For this reason, among others, I believe profoundly in the capacity of some women 
to truly listen to each other, care for each other, and change. 
III. CONCLUSION 
One persistent, even insistent, question that implicitly haunts any contemporary discus-
sion of antisemitism is the question why the mainstream Jewish community, which has 
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often been successful in dealing with traditional antisemitism coming primarily from the 
right, has until now had limited effectiveness at national and international level in 
dealing with “the new antisemitism” coming from the left. 
I think this is related to the fact that the Jewish community, for the most part, has not 
tended to embrace the left. It does not understand the left, and it cannot really relate to 
it. As a result, it does not have anyone from the left on its team, and so it has no-one who 
can do this work. This, in our current situation, is now a major liability. Particularly 
since, as I have explained, the cleaning-up of the left can only be accomplished by those 
belonging to it. 
However, those who are not feminists and/or on the left still have a crucial role to 
play in this. They can search out, and actively support, those of us on the left (the pro-
Israel left, obviously) who are doing this challenging work. It makes an incalculable 
difference to those of us, for instance in this new group in Toronto, that in certain quar-
ters of the mainstream Jewish community, we are perceived, and supported, as part of 
the international fight against antisemitism. This is far more helpful than the response 
that groups like ours often get: “Oh, you have ties and loyalties to certain causes on the 
left. Feh.” 
As we all know, we are now facing some very difficult times, and it looks like they 
are going to get worse before they get better. We, as an international community of 
scholars, Jewish communal leaders, and activists, simply do not have the luxury of 
playing at internal Jewish politics with each other. In fact, the reality that we here span 
the entire political spectrum is one of our greatest resources, and a source of power. It 
means that we can get to more places where we can fight antisemitism. 
In conclusion, it is my fervent hope that the love that we all feel for Israel and the 
Jewish people (am Yisrael) can—like the love between Rachel and Leah—overpower and 
outweigh the disrespect and divisiveness that sometimes occurs within our community. 
So that we, along with our non-Jewish friends and allies (and we do have non-Jewish 
friends and allies) can work together to defeat our enemies. 
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Campus Antisemitic Speech 
and the First Amendment 
Alexander Tsesis* 
INTRODUCTION 
The recent increased rate of antisemitic incidents at U.S. universities has created a 
quandary for college and university administrators who seek to prevent behavior 
tending to disrupt education without running afoul of the First Amendment. A recent 
United States Supreme Court decision that upheld a state cross burning statute, Virginia 
v. Black,1 may provide guidance for regulating antisemitism in public university spaces. 
This case reconfirms that speech is not an absolute right. Like defamation, antisemitic 
verbal attacks can result in dignitary harms. And like “fighting words” or “true threats,” 
intimidating antisemitism increases the likelihood that hate crimes will be perpetrated 
on campus. Accordingly, intimidating antisemitism is so incompatible with education 
that to prohibit its dissemination on campus would not disrupt the university’s mission 
of intellectual advancement. 
Opponents of university hate speech regulations often rely on the Supreme Court 
reasoning in R.A.V. v. St. Paul, a case in which the majority found a municipal ordinance 
prohibiting cross burning to be unconstitutional.2 Following the Supreme Court’s 
rationale, free speech libertarians and several lower federal courts.3 asserted that univer-
sity administrators lack the authority to regulate the communication of group hatred. 
Eleven years after deciding R.A.V., the Court upheld a more rigorously drafted cross 
burning statute than the one it struck down in R.A.V. The later decision, Virginia v. 
Black,4 defined the scope of legitimate limitations on hate speech in general, and its 
conclusions are applicable to the regulation of antisemitic speech on university cam-
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puses. In this paper, I argue that institutions of higher education can punish persons 
using university property to spread intimidating and defamatory antisemitism. 
I. ANTISEMITISM ON AMERICAN CAMPUSES 
Jewish students at several U.S. universities have recently been the targets of a growing 
number of antisemitic incidents.5 Antisemitic slurs are based on historic stereotypes that 
are derisive to Jews. Virulent antisemitism also aims to create a hostile environment for 
Jewish students and anyone, irrespective of religion, who is associated with Jewish 
causes, like Zionism.6 An Anti-Defamation League audit found that there were 94 
antisemitic incidents on U.S. campuses in 2007, representing about 6 percent of total 
anti-Jewish harassment and vandalism that year.7 A consistent university policy against 
hate speech would demonstrate the gravity of these verbal attacks and could deter 
future antisemitic conduct. In formulating such a policy, it must be borne in mind that 
public university regulations can only withstand judicial scrutiny if they are based on 
judicial precedents concerning free speech. 
The following is a short list of recent events: Jewish students at the University of 
California-Irvine report that antagonism has increased to the point that they must 
circumvent some parts of campus to avoid conflict, are reluctant to engage in activities 
sponsored by Jewish organizations, and have trouble focusing on their studies.8 In one 
of the most extreme examples of new antisemitism, Imam Mohammad al-Asi and Amir 
Abdel Malik Ali delivered speeches at a week-long event at the UC-Irvine that inte-
grated traditional stereotypes with modern events claiming Jews are in control of U.S. 
media and responsible for the terror on September 11, 2001. In one speech Al-Asi as-
serted, “We have a psychosis in the Jewish community that is unable to co-exist equally 
and brotherly with other human beings.”9 In 2010, the Muslim Student Union at UC-
Irvine, which the University subsequently banned from campus, sponsored a speaker 
who “compared Jews to Nazis” and “expressed support for Hamas, Hizbullah and 
Islamic Jihad.”10 At the University of California at Berkeley, swastikas were scrawled on 
a Jewish student organization’s pamphlet.11 In addition, Holocaust denier David Irving 
and Ku Klux Klan supporter Tomislav Sunic appeared at a group event on the Univer-
sity of Oregon campus.12 
Universities and policymakers around the country have drafted a variety of re-
sponses to the uses of hate speech on their campuses. The University of Nevada, Las 
Vegas is evaluating whether to institute a campus hate crime policy that would prohibit 
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expressions motivated by racial, religious, gender, and political bias.13 Such a regulation 
could go further by also prohibiting destructive antisemitic statements. In Spring 2009, 
the Michigan Civil Rights Commission held an open public forum to better understand 
how to balance the testimonies of student victims with free speech concerns.14 At Au-
burn University, the multicultural center suggested sponsoring an event on hate speech 
after a professor received a racist message.15 Derisive, violent statements about Jews 
should be handled with the same gravity as other forms of hate speech. 
Other universities have instituted aspirational civility norms for preventing the use 
of prejudicial slurs.16 The University of Chicago, for instance, requests its academic 
community to foster the marketplace of ideas by preserving the diversity, civility, and 
equality of its campus. St. Scholastica College in Duluth, Minnesota, issued a similar 
statement to students after hate symbols appeared on its campus, as did two other 
colleges in the state.17 
Some of these incidents of hate speech have been isolated occurrences. Others appear 
to be concerted efforts to make Jewish groups, students, and sympathetic faculty mem-
bers feel uncomfortable, threatened, or isolated. The multiple locations where these 
events have taken place, which often occur hundreds or even thousands miles from each 
other, are an indication that the expression of intimidating antisemitism is not localized 
but in fact widespread. 
II. FIRST AMENDMENT STANDARDS 
All public universities must abide by the First Amendment standards established by 
Supreme Court decisions on intimidating speech. In a case decided during World War 
II, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the Supreme Court contrasted constitutionally protected 
expression from violent fighting words, holding that “[t]here are certain well-defined 
and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which has 
never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.”18 The social interest in “order 
and morality” outweighs any cathartic benefit a speaker may derive from statements 
that are likely to provoke a violent response in the average person.19 Fighting words, 
which are likely to draw the average person into a physical altercation, are analogous to 
some forms of antisemitism that tend to provoke violent reactions rather than evoking 
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conversation, discussion, and a search for truth. Just as fighting words are unconnected 
with traditional speech values, antisemitic speech that is likely to incite violence is not 
protected by the First Amendment’s guarantee of self-expression. This dichotomy 
indicates that violently provocative hate symbols or inflammatory antisemitic state-
ments are far from what is acceptable at a public university. 
The verbal barbs of persons who express the desire to harm Jews are not amenable to 
counterarguments. Their veracity cannot be tested in the marketplace of ideas. Verbal 
intimidations also differ from opinion, which is protected against government interfer-
ence. Furthermore, no educational purposes are served by the provocative uses of 
symbols historically linked to violence, such as swastikas and Hamas flags.20 
Under current Supreme Court jurisprudence, antisemitic speech that incites others to 
commit illegal acts or aims to intimidate victims can be regulated on campuses when it 
posses an imminent threat of harm. In a concurrence, Justice Byron R. White of the 
Supreme Court dismissed the notion that hate speech, of which antisemitism is only one 
example, is a legitimate form of political discourse: “Instead, it permits, indeed invites, 
the continuation of expressive conduct that … is evil and worthless in First Amendment 
terms.… Indeed, by characterizing fighting words as a form of ‘debate,’ … legitimates 
hate speech as a form of public discussion.”21 
Not all expressions of hatred and intolerance are advocacy; therefore, some expres-
sions of apathy, disdain, or outright malevolence toward Jews do not fit the paradigm of 
administratively punishable hate speech. This is the case with private antisemitic state-
ments that are not intended to elicit immediate harms. Brandenburg v. Ohio,22 another 
seminal Supreme Court decision, indicates that the First Amendment probably protects 
students who display antisemitic emblems or insignia in private settings, like dormitory 
rooms or personal lockers. Antisemitic slurs are thus only actionable when they are 
made in public locations, such as a student union, classroom, or common area of a 
dormitory. 
In some cases, statements might not be outright threats but defame Jews instead. 
Scurrilous falsehoods about Jews are not mere abstractions but contain content that can 
unjustly harm individuals’ reputations and community standings. Like any other form 
of defamation, the university should be able to provide remedies for students who have 
suffered as a result of stereotyping that demeans them in others’ eyes.23 
A 1992 Supreme Court case, R.A.V. v. St. Paul, raised concerns about the constitu-
tionality of efforts to combat antisemitism and other forms of hate speech on campus.24 
The case arose when juveniles set fire to a cross on a black family’s lawn. They were 
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charged under a St. Paul, Minnesota ordinance against the display of symbols (like Nazi 
swastikas and burning crosses) that purportedly aroused “anger, alarm or resentment … 
on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender.”25 The majority acknowledged that 
the city had a compelling interest to protect the human rights of the “members of groups 
that have historically been subjected to discrimination.”26 However, the Court held the 
ordinance to be an unconstitutional “content discrimination” rather than a blanket 
prohibition on all forms of fighting words.27 
In his concurrence, Justice White argued that the majority had deviated from prece-
dents that had long allowed for content-based regulation of low-level speech. Using 
language reminiscent of the fighting words doctrine in Chaplinsky, White asserted that 
the state can prohibit speech that is “by definition worthless and undeserving of consti-
tutional protection.”28 According to him, the majority substituted its own judgment for 
the City’s assessment that disparagements “based on race, color, creed, religion, [and] 
gender” pose “more pressing public concerns than the harms caused by other fighting 
words.”29 
A more recent opinion, Virginia v. Black, has diminished the significance of R.A.V. in 
the context of hate speech regulations generally and university speech codes specifically. 
Black arose from the prosecution of individuals who had burned a cross in public. The 
statute had been more carefully drafted than the one struck down in R.A.V. Virginia law 
rendered it “unlawful for any person or persons, with the intent of intimidating any 
person or group of persons, to burn, or cause to be burned, a cross on the property of 
another, a highway or other public place.”30 A majority of justices agreed that the state 
did not violate the First Amendment by punishing those who burned crosses with the 
intention of intimidating others. And I believe its reasoning is applicable to specifically 
antisemitic symbols that are meant to intimidate. Mimicking the language in Chaplinsky, 
the Court found that intentionally intimidating cross burning is of “such slight social 
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from [it] is clearly out-
weighed by the social interest in order and morality.”31 The state statute was not a form 
of content discrimination because it prohibited all manner of cross burning, irrespective 
of whether it sought to intimidate others on the bases of race, religion, or other charac-
teristic. The Court explained that Virginia could selectively punish cross burning, even 
though it did not criminalize all other forms of virulent intimidation, “in light of the 
cross burning’s long and pernicious history as a signal of impending violence.”32 This 
reasoning clearly analyzed the content of the communication to determine whether it is 
linked to racism and violent behavior. 
It seems realistic to extrapolate from that judicial statement that college administra-
tors can determine that antisemitic symbols can also intimidate students and visitors on 
college campuses. While it appears clear that intentionally intimidating antisemitic 
                                                                                                                                                       
25  R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 380. 
26  Id. at 395. 
27  Id. at 387, 391. 
28  Id. at 401 (White, J., concurring). 
29  Id. at 407 (White, J., concurring). 
30  Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 348 (2003) (quoting Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-423 (1996)). 
31  Id. at 358-59 (citing Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572). 
32  Id. at 362-63. 
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symbols may be regulated on campuses, what is not certain is whether the fact finder 
can infer the speaker’s mindframe or whether the prosecution must prove it by direct or 
circumstantial evidence. A plurality of the Court found the statute’s prima facie eviden-
tiary presumption to be unconstitutional. This group of four justices argued that, with-
out requiring prosecutors to prove a defendant’s state of mind, juries would lack the 
evidentiary context needed to determine “whether a particular cross burning is intended 
to intimidate” or only to arouse anger.33 The implication for universities seeking to 
prohibit antisemitic intimidation on campus is that a university speech code should at 
least include a negligence element of the offense to avoid offending the First Amend-
ment. 
III. COLLEGE SPEECH CODES PROHIBITING ANTISEMITISM 
The reasoning in Virginia v. Black, which recognized that a state can prohibit intimidating 
cross burning, was closer to international consensus on hate speech than any previous 
Supreme Court decision. The next case to reach the Supreme Court on the subject might 
expressly reflect on the lessons of foreign jurisprudence about how free expression can 
be protected while also prohibiting violent, group-based intimidation. In Black, the 
Supreme Court struck a delicate balance between the right of self-expression and the 
social dangers of true threats. 
Antisemitic intimidation can have a direct and negative impact on Jewish students’ 
academic performance. Maintaining a safe environment is essential to educational and 
extracurricular success. Jewish students who have a reasonable reason to fear for their 
safety are less likely to participate in the classroom and in extracurricular activities. 
Whether the swastika is hung, a cross is burned, a degrading and aggressive speech is 
made in a dormitory corridor, or the Hamas Charter is displayed in a prominent place 
like a classroom or dormitory window, those expression of antisemitic hatred communi-
cate support for or participation in violent conduct. In certain circumstances, expressions 
of hatred are likely to instigate violence, alienate students, or make for a hostile learning 
environment. This is very different than an art or history project incorporating histori-
cally destructive messages but having no advocacy component. Neither would parody 
fall under my definition because it enjoys First Amendment protections.34 
United States’ free speech jurisprudence gives public college officials less latitude to 
pursue charges against antisemitic statements on campus than is available to college 
administrators in some other democracies like Canada, Germany, and England.35 The 
reasoning in Black nevertheless indicates that the U.S. Supreme Court has begun to 
follow some of the same historical findings that foreign and international tribunals have 
been using to punish hateful expressions that threaten public safety. International norms 
and foreign laws on this subject indicate a worldwide consensus that hate speech is 
harmful to individuals as well as groups, especially those who have experienced a 
history of intolerance, discrimination, and oppression. The risk of allowing antisemitism 
                                                                                                                                                       
33  Id. at 362. 
34  See, e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 47-48 (1988) (holding that a parody of Rev-
erend Jerry Falwell is protected under the First Amendment from tort liability). 
35  ALEXANDER TSESIS, DESTRUCTIVE MESSAGES: HOW HATE SPEECH PAVES THE WAY FOR 
HARMFUL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS ch. 12 (2002). 
CAMPUS ANTISEMITIC SPEECH AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 155 
to occur on campuses unchecked is that inaction will leave the targets of violent com-
munications vulnerable to more harassment and even assault. Being uncertain of their 
safety, Jewish students will be more likely to restrict their pursuit of available educa-
tional opportunities in departments where they are threatened. Students who experience 
a sense of impending danger are also likely to restrict their movements in dorms, stu-
dent unions, or other commons areas that they have reason to believe are unsafe. 
Black provides analytical responses to arguments proffered by opponents of hate 
speech regulations. Larry Alexander, for one, argues that hate speech is no more than 
verbal harm, conveying taunting ideas.36 Suzanna Sherry is similarly dismissive of the 
gravity of harms flowing from hate speech. She contends that regulation of it is driven 
by a political agenda that is “designed to improve the virtue of an unvirtuous popula-
tion.”37 She criticizes the use of university hate speech codes for paternalistically enforc-
ing virtuous behavior rather than allowing students to be self-directed.38 John S. 
Greenup takes this argument a step further, arguing that university officials should 
grant organizations like the Ku Klux Klan access to university locations unless their 
activities pose overt threats.39 His perspective recognizes the risk of intimidation but 
fails to make an assessment of whether tolerating an avowed terrorist organization like 
the KKK on campus is threatening, divisive, and disruptive to teaching and learning.40 
The assertions of Nadine Strossen and the ACLU that counterspeech can adequately 
defuse group hatred, promote civil liberties, and even increase tolerance on campus.41 
have been roundly rejected by the international community.42 The United States Su-
preme Court has now endorsed a narrow version of the consensus international perspec-
tive on free speech policy. Just as with sexual harassment in the workplace, 
counterspeech is an inadequate remedy for the intimidating attacks of hate speech.43 
Antisemitism—like ethnocentrism, racism, and xenophobia—is too deeply imbedded in 
culture to be changed overnight through rational discourse. Telling university employ-
ees or students who are the targets of antisemitic attacks to simply respond rationally to 
                                                                                                                                                       
36  Larry Alexander, Banning Hate Speech and the Sticks and Stones Defense, 13 CONST. 
COMMENTARY 71, 91 (1996). 
37  Suzanna Sherry, Speaking of Virtue: A Republican Approach to University Regulation of Hate 
Speech, 75 MINN. L. REV. 933, 936-37 (1991). 
38  Id. at 943-44. 
39  John S. Greenup, The First Amendment and the Right to Hate, 34 J.L. & EDUC. 605, 612 (2005). 
40  Black, 538 U.S. at 389 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“To me, the majority’s brief history of the Ku 
Klux Klan only reinforces this common understanding of the Klan as a terrorist organization, 
which, in its endeavor to intimidate, or even eliminate those it dislikes, uses the most brutal of 
methods.”). 
41  Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?, 1990 DUKE L.J. 484, 
562-64. See also Erwin Chemerinsky, Unpleasant Speech on Campus, Even Hate Speech, Is a First 
Amendment Issue, 17 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 765, 772 (2009). 
42  See TSESIS, supra note 35. 
43  See Jack M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First Amend-
ment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 420-22 (discussing how “to the extent we allow verbal conduct creating a 
hostile working atmosphere, we thereby refuse to protect persons from certain forms of private 
racial and sexual discrimination. Conversely, to the extent that mere words can give rise to liability 
for employment discrimination, intentional infliction of emotional distress, or other causes of 
action, we acknowledge that an employer or co-worker can be punished for making such state-
ments.”). 
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hateful antagonists provides victims with no meaningful, procedural mechanism but 
mere paternalistic platitude. Just as responding genteelly to hostile comments at work 
does not solve the problem of workplace harassment, neither does counterspeech 
decrease the threats posed by antisemitic groups or individuals who carry out campus 
campaigns of intimidation, exclusion, and discrimination. Expecting students to simply 
talk things out and convince those who intimidate them of the fallacy of their threaten-
ing statements fails to provide a procedurally cognizable way of seeking legal redress. 
The mantra that more speech will reduce the risks of antisemitism is based on a liber-
tarian faith in the ability of communications to unmask and delegitimize hatred. The 
effectiveness of Nazi antisemitism in establishing political dictatorship in Germany 
belies the idea that accurate information will inevitably trump stereotype, innuendo, and 
dehumanization.44 It also places harassment and intimidation on a par with dialogue. To 
the contrary, the former are means of disengagement from a hated outgroup, while the 
latter is a form of mutual engagement between the interlocutors. 
I believe that if a litigant were to challenge the constitutionality of a university code 
against antisemitic communications, a judge could uphold it on the basis of the major-
ity’s consensus in Black. Like cross burning, antisemitic symbols that are tied to terror 
organizations or despotic regimes are semantically menacing; they rely on imagery, 
phrases, or slurs that have a social content beyond their immediate use and are meant to 
threaten targeted groups of individuals. Whether those messages are communicated by 
symbols or oral communication is less important than the issue of whether they consti-
tute true threats. Before promulgating such a code of conduct, university administrators 
should assess the historic significance of certain forms of stereotyping, symbolism, and 
threats to determine whether they rise to the level of intimidation analogous to cross 
burning.45 
Jewish students should be provided the opportunity to offer feedback about the code. 
Their sense of safety is important for evaluating the gravity of the circumstances. How an 
objective listener would perceive the message is critical for determining whether a com-
munication constitutes a true threat.46 For liability to attach, the speaker need not intend to 
commit the violence but only to intimidate the listener.47 Accordingly, prohibitions against 
antisemitism on campus need to address the extent to which ordinary Jewish students 
think intimidating statements create a hostile academic environment. 
Allowing students or faculty members to intimidate others through bombast favors 
the liberty of antisemitic speakers’ to advocate discrimination and violence while deny-
ing the victims’ reasonable expectations of security on campus. The constitutional 
importance of the First Amendment to democratic governance and self-assertion does 
not extend to menacing messages that tend to diminish the targeted group’s sense of 
security when traveling through college commons areas and attending university 
                                                                                                                                                       
44  Alexander Tsesis, Empirical Shortcomings of First Amendment Jurisprudence, 40 SANTA CLARA L. 
REV. 729, 740-47 (2000). 
45  Black, 538 U.S. at 354 (identifying Klan violence with burning crosses). 
46  Lovell By and Through Lovell v. Poway Unified School Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 373 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(“While courts may consider the effect on the listener when determining whether a statement 
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47  Black, 538 U.S. at 359-60 (“The speaker need not actually intend to carry out the threat.”). 
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sponsored events. Jewish students and faculty members and their colleagues are more 
likely to think twice before going to hear the college orchestra or heading to the student 
union if it requires walking through an area where a cross has recently been burned, a 
swastika is displayed, or a supremacist rally has taken place. Antisemitic speakers are 
neither inviting intellectual debate and rejoinder nor seeking political dialogue. Theirs is 
a campaign of silencing through intimidation—something that threatens the university’s 
marketplace of ideas and is of no benefit to educational interactions. Academic freedom 
is not a license for harassment. Neither does the hate speech further the pursuit for truth: 
calling Jews vermin, claiming it is they who were responsible for the 9/11 attacks, or 
purporting that the Holocaust is a myth have nothing to do with a university’s mission 
to pursue truth. These derogatory statements are meant to exclude and stamp them with 
labels of outsiders and charlatans. Derisive speech becomes academically punishable 
when it is meant to defame, intimidate, threaten, terrify, or instigate violence. 
While Black provides college administrators with a good starting point for prevent-
ing hate speech on campus, it does not go far enough in identifying expressive harms. 
Justice O’Connor’s view for the plurality, that the First Amendment protects ideologi-
cally driven cross burning not meant to intimidate, fails to fully recognize the symbol’s 
intrinsically social and political connections to the Ku Klux Klan’s history of racial 
violence and white supremacism.48 The supremacist “statement of ideology,” which she 
distinguishes from “intimidation,” relates an organization’s desire and willingness to 
segregate, racially polarize, and perpetrate violence.49 The same is true of other hate, 
exterminationist, or genocidal symbols—such as swastikas or Hamas flags.50—that are 
displayed on campuses to advance menacing ideological agendas. While the burning 
cross expresses a message specifically linked to group violence in the United States, the 
swastika symbolizes the worldwide effort to commit genocide against Jews and to 
subject other non-Aryans to subservience. Its threatening message is unambiguous. 
In formulating a university hate speech code, it is important to distinguish between 
disciplinary measures available to administrators and punishments connected with 
criminal convictions. Educational penalties are designed to negatively impact a student’s 
or a faculty member’s record, while criminal punishment is more onerous because it 
involves the curtailment of liberty and greater social stigma. Educators can assess 
penalties without following the rules of criminal procedure, reducing the burden of 
proof required of university prosecutions. The “beyond a reasonable doubt” evidentiary 
                                                                                                                                                       
48  Id. at 365-66 (O’Connor, J., plurality) (stating that cross burning can both be used to intimi-
date or to elaborate a racist ideology). 
49  I make this inference from the fact that Virginia’s cross burning statute had initially been en-
acted in 1952 to prevent the particularly virulent expression of support for Jim Crow laws. See 
Petitioner’s Brief for Virginia v. Black, 2002 WL 1885898, at *23-24 (2002) (No. 01-1107). 
50  Hamas is a genocidal organization whose charter uses violent antisemitism. The Hamas flag 
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“the Islamic Resistance Movement aspires to bring the promise of Allah to pass, no matter how 
long it takes. As the prophet [Muhammad], may the prayer of Allah and his blessing of peace be 
upon him, said: ‘The time [.Judgment Day] will not come until Muslims fight the Jews and kill them 
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Muslim, oh servant of Allah, there is a Jew hiding [behind me], come and kill him.”’” Id. at art. 7. 
The presence of a Hamas flag signifies support for this genocidal plan. 
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standard used for criminal prosecution is meant to prevent mistaken deprivations of 
liberty, something that is unrelated to college sanctions. 
Recognizing this contrast is important, because the standard of proof for a criminal 
hate speech law, such as one prohibiting cross burning, is significantly more rigorous 
than what would be required for the censure of student hate speech. The O’Connor 
plurality’s mental state requirement in Black applies within the context of criminal 
liability, not civil penalties. 
The most closely analogous standard of civil liability comes from defamation law. In 
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the Court established that a private plaintiff seeking to recover 
damages for defamation about a public matter must prove that the defendant acted 
negligently.51 That is, liability for defamation only attaches in cases of negligent publica-
tion.52 To withstand a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a university code pro-
hibiting antisemitism on campus, the provision should include at least a negligence fault 
component. A no-fault code is far less likely to be found constitutional. To avoid run-
ning afoul of the First Amendment, the campus complainant would need to demonstrate 
the speaker’s negligence by a preponderance of the evidence.53 Such a standard would 
require proof that, under the circumstances, a reasonable speaker should have realized 
hostile expressions based on people’s race, gender, religion, nationality, or sexual 
orientation were likely to intimidate or harm the reputation of a defined group or 
individual students. An additional provision must protect artistic and educational 
references to words and symbols that might otherwise be punishable. 
In conclusion, the social and educational value of regulating intimidating and de-
famatory speech on campus outweighs the minimal burden it places on speakers. 
University hate speech codes raise First Amendment concerns that can best be resolved 
within the framework of Supreme Court jurisprudence on free speech. Public university 
officials aiming to improve campus safety can formulate policies compatible with the 
holding in Virginia v. Black. 
Sanctions that punish the intentional dissemination of intimidating antisemitic mes-
sages on campus do not interfere with constitutionally protected free speech. Like the 
cross burning statute in Black, campus regulations can prohibit the public display of 
historically threatening symbolism. College administrators need not require proof of 
intentional intimidation because the sanctions available to them are far less onerous than 
criminal penalties. Negligently placing others in reasonable apprehension of harm or 
asserting false facts that damage their reputations should be punished by suspension, 
disenrollment, or withdrawal. 
                                                                                                                                                       
51  418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
52  Id. at 347 (setting out the standard for defaming private parties). 
53  Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776-77 (1986). The “substantial truth” 
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Marginalization and Its Discontents: 
American Jews in Multicultural 
and Identity Studies 
Jennifer Roskies* 
The key point about multiculturalism is that there has been almost no place in it for Jews.1 
David A. Hollinger 
1. JEWISH IDENTITY AND MULTICULTURAL DISCOURSE 
“When it’s good for the Jews, it’s bad for Judaism.”2 This saying encapsulates the notion 
that the unprecedented freedom that served Jewish emigrants to the United States and 
their descendants so well has come at a price. Data that point to trends such as popula-
tion decline.3 have prompted numerous responses, including a concerted drive to re-
search the state of Jewish identity. The driving motivation behind much of this research 
is an overriding concern with Jewish survival in the face of, not antisemitism and perse-
cution, but the welcoming environment of pluralistic society in the United States. The 
overall objective of these studies, whether stated or implicit, is to leave no stone un-
turned in search of prescriptions to secure US Jewry’s future “in the struggle to preserve 
Jewish identity” and hence US Jewry itself.4 
Recent decades have also seen a surge of academic inquiry in the fields of identity 
and multicultural theory, which have become among “the most extensively studied 
constructs in the social sciences” and historical research. The research examines issues 
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related to identity in a range of forms—individual, collective, single, multiple, cultural, 
ethnic, gender, occupational, national, narrative, social and more—all in relation to “the 
complex interface of diversity in cultural and ethnic heritage in contemporary globalized 
society.”5 
Considering the imperative nature of these goals for bolstering the future of US 
Jewry as well as for understanding it from within the context of multiculturalism, one 
might think that scholars’ examination of these topics would be exhaustive. Yet notwith-
standing volumes of valuable research that appraise emerging indicators of Jewish 
behaviors, attitudes and affiliations while weighing what they may portend for US 
Jewry’s numbers and resilience, certain areas of omission mar a cohesive overall picture. 
One of these blind spots concerns much of Jewish studies’ overwhelmingly “inward” 
orientation, overlooking what Debra Kaufman referred to as “the subjective by-product 
of social location,”6 namely Jewish identity’s context within the US non-Jewish main-
stream. To David A. Hollinger, this inward perspective typifies what he termed a 
“communalist” perspective, meaning: 
an emphasis on the history of communal Jewry, including the organizations and insti-
tutions that proclaim Jewishness, and the activities of individuals who identify them-
selves as Jewish and/or are so identified by non-Jews with the implication it somehow 
matters.7 
This, as opposed to the “dispersionist” approach he advocated in order to rectify the 
disparity and to understand the “demographic overrepresentations” of Jews in “the US 
worlds of finance, film, science, psychoanalysis, philanthropy, political radicalism, 
modernist movements in the arts and other domains of modernity.” He explains: 
[b]y “dispersionist,” I [refer to] a more expanded compass that takes fuller account of 
the lives in any and all domains of persons with an ancestry in the Jewish diaspora, 
regardless of their degree of involvement with communal Jewry and no matter what 
their extent of declared or described Jewishness.8 … The skills promoted by the condi-
tions of the European Diaspora … surely help explain many kinds of Jewish success.9 
… [A] large swath of American popular and professional discourse … [was] led by … 
people who carried Jewish cultural baggage with them in their creative careers … 
[whether or not they] identif[ied] themselves as Jews.10 
This broadened framework of study is in the interest of understanding both the overrep-
resentation and underrepresentation of different “descent groups,” an approach 
adopted by Yuri Slezkine, for example, who put forward the case that skills honed by 
centuries of life in the European diaspora paved the way for unprecedented Jewish 
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impact over the course of the twentieth century in the United States and elsewhere.11 
The dispersionist perspective, Hollinger claims, rejects the more common course of 
mystification or avoidance due to a perception that this would invite antisemitic infer-
ences. Rather than opening the door to theories of “Jewish domination” or “Jewish 
genius,”12 he says: 
The grounds for this reticence diminish, if not disappear, if these statistics can be ex-
plained by taking full account of the conditions under which the various descent 
groups have been shaped. Avoiding the forthright historical and social-scientific 
study of the question perpetuates the mystification of Jewish history and subtly fuels 
the idea that the answer is really biological and will serve to reinforce invidious dis-
tinctions between descent groups.13 
Turning his attention to multicultural studies, Hollinger points to a vacuum that is a 
mirror image to the communalist-dispersionist dichotomy: 
The key point about multiculturalism is that there has been almost no place in it for 
Jews.… [M]ainstream scholarship has been slow to recognize and appreciate Jewish 
history in relation to the larger prehistory and history of cultural diversity in Ameri-
ca.… One might think that this story [—the impact of groups of Jews on trans-Jewish 
events and discourses—] would attract the attention of mainstream historians inter-
ested in the idea of identity formation and cultural diversity as general phenomena, 
which has been a huge preoccupation of American historians for the last forty years.14 
Instead, due to an “ethnoracial manner of mapping cultural diversity,” which he dated 
back to the late 1970s, Hollinger contends that scholarship in multicultural and identity 
studies has discounted US Jews. 
Jews were ignored [since] the main point of multiculturalism was color, and Jews 
were white, and a second point of multiculturalism was inequality, and Jews were 
doing very well. So, cool it, the collegial message was: let these [multicultural studies 
programs] deal with the needs of Americans color coded … in contrast to the white 
demographic block.15 
It is important to remember at this point that Jews have only recently come to be 
considered white, especially in the United States. Race as a social construct has been a 
remarkably fluid form of categorization over the past centuries.16 As Sander Gilman 
notes: 
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for the eighteenth and nineteenth-century scientist, the “blackness” of the Jew was 
taken as fact and as mark of racial inferiority [in addition to] … an indicator of [his] 
diseased nature. … By the midcentury, being black, being Jewish, being diseased and 
being ‘ugly’ came to be inexorably linked … one bore the signs of one’s diseased sta-
tus on one’s anatomy, and by extension, in one’s psyche.17 
Literature documenting race in the United States dates the designation of Jews as white 
as recently as the 1920s or the period following World War II. With the awareness of 
Nazi Germany’s racial policies and resulting horror, “the 1940s produced a profound 
revision in the taxonomy of the world’s races.”18 This is reflected in examples such as 
Arthur Miller’s 1945 novel Focus or Laura Z. Hobson’s 1947 novel Gentleman’s Agreement, 
later adapted into a film starring Gregory Peck, whose message was not only that Jews 
are difficult to tell apart from non-Jews but that their similarity to “real” Americans 
reflects their essential worthiness of racial equality as well. Expanding the definition of 
“whiteness” brought obvious benefits to Jews in terms of relative power within US 
society. The perceived differentiation from other racial groups coupled with the identifi-
cation with mainstream white America positioned US Jewry to attain greater financial 
security and power during the second half of the twentieth century. 
At the same time, in sources even more recent, Jews are described as “not quite 
white” or as “a different shade of white,” in other words, as not quite blending in. Ruth 
Frankenberg’s 1993 study involving white American women on the subject of their 
white identities noted statements by Jewish participants indicating that 
several points must be made about the intersection of Jewishness and whiteness … 
Ashkenazi Jews for much of this century in the United States and Europe have been 
placed at the borders of whiteness, at times viewed as cultural outsiders, at times as 
racial outsiders, but in any case never as constitutive of the cultural norm.19 
Frankenberg’s study is revealing in other ways as well. In the relatively short section she 
devotes to the Jewish aspect of those women among her participants who were Jews (11 
out of 30), the theme of experiencing antisemitism arose with every single one of them. 
Frankenberg picks up on statements by the Jewish women in her interviews, which 
describe their senses of identity as Jews over different stages in their lives, calling into 
question the “ethnoracial mapping” that excluded the experience of US Jews as a topic 
worthy of attention in its own right within mainstream research. 
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2. JEWISH WOMEN: DOUBLY ECLIPSED 
Consistent with Hollinger’s observations, the intersection of Jewish women’s identities 
goes unnoticed within the general field of identity studies as well. When it comes to 
research examining gender, feminist, or multicultural identity, Jewish women are 
practically absent as case studies.20 Such “multiple exclusions,” as Sara R. Horowitz 
describes them,21 stand in marked contrast to the considerable literature in Black femi-
nist theory.22 and that of other racial and ethnic groups.23 
The omission of Jewish women from general multicultural research appears particu-
larly curious in light of Jewish women’s contributions to the feminist movement in the 
United States,24 both as activists and as leading theorists.25 Hollinger in fact cites the 
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feminist movement as a prime example of the lacunae he observes in multicultural 
research. “Despite the overrepresentation of Jewish women among the ranks of its 
leaders,” he notes, “(by how many thousand percentage points?) … our scholarly and 
popular histories take virtually no notice of this astronomically huge demographic 
fact.”26 Research asking “in what sense is Women’s Liberation … a Jewish story,”27 
Hollinger claims, likening it to the way scholarship has explored the role of Protestant-
ism in the abolitionist and civil rights movements, would help streamline US Jewish 
history’s integration into “mainstream US history.” 
Joyce Antler’s documentation of radical feminism and Jewish women,28 which is 
among rare examples of academic studies to examine the interface of identities for Jews 
within their non-Jewish “social location,” illustrates a redeeming approach. Revealingly, 
the movement leaders she interviewed had disregarded the potential significance of 
being Jewish during the time of their activism during the 1960s and 1970s at the height 
of second wave feminism. Only much more recently and in retrospect had they begun to 
assert its relevance. Dina Pinsky has added dimension to this chapter of history in her 
study interviewing 30 Jews, most of them women, on the subject of their Jewish identi-
ties and their involvement as activists in the women’s movement during the same 
period.29 
When subjects in Debra Kaufman’s expressed sentiments to the effect that their iden-
tity as Jewish women “is grounded in their experience as ‘the Other’ within Judaism,” 
for example, it spoke directly to and in concert with the experience of being a Jewish 
woman vis-à-vis Jewish men, as well as vis-à-vis the greater world’s perception of the 
Jew as Other.30 Nora Gold used both qualitative and quantitative methodology in 
interviewing 364 Jewish women from across Canada regarding their experiences of both 
sexism and antisemitism.31 These five studies—by Frankenberg, Antler, Pinsky, Kauf-
man, and Gold—provide isolated examples that indicate how much may be gleaned in a 
more thorough probing of the intersection of Jewish women’s identities. 
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3. JEWS IN US ACADEMIA: A TACIT FOOTPRINT 
If the rarity of research on Jewish women within mainstream multicultural research on 
the US feminist movement appears paradoxical, US Jewish scholars’ “fail[ure] to get 
Jews on the standardized multicultural map of the United States,”32 despite “the heavy 
demographic overrepresentation of Jews in the cultural industries, including academia,” 
is all the more so. The reason for this lacuna may stem in part from what Alan M. Kraut 
recalls as the “chilling effect” of an US academia still “rife with anti-Semitism” in the 
post-war period, when many of today’s senior scholars were embarking upon their 
academic careers. 
In the aftermath of the war, unabashed Jew-haters in the academy needed to keep 
more of a lid on their attitudes when speaking publicly. However, graduate students 
with professional aspirations still often hesitated … to select a dissertation topic that 
identified them as Jewish.… Wise doctoral mentors took care to counsel against a 
topic that type-cast the young aspiring academic as “too Jewish.”33 
Even those committed to writing history sans Jews had an uphill battle. “Jews special-
izing in American history had a particularly difficult time getting jobs,” observes his-
torian Edward Shapiro. “Historians were reluctant to entrust the teaching of the 
nation’s sacred history to such outsiders.”34 
Examples of this aversion were given voice in a study where US Jewish women—all 
senior members of faculty in the humanities or social sciences—described their choice of 
academic field of research.35 Many upheld the unwritten rule spurning Jewish themes 
within general academic contexts as a given assumption, some stating pointedly that 
choosing such a focus would have been akin to opting for “separatism” as opposed to 
the career they chose in the “mainstream.” A professor of American studies recalled her 
decision to forego a dissertation topic related to Yiddish in favor of “mainstream” career 
prospects: 
If you viewed yourself as someone who wanted to live and work in an integrated envi-
ronment, [it] was not really a viable option. But taking that intellectual drive and chan-
neling it into the secular arena and excelling in … the bastions of American learning, 
that was something we [Jewish graduate students in the ivy league] could handle. 
A professor of English literature and women’s studies articulated this sense of mutual 
exclusivity between Jewish topics and mainstream research when she spoke of course 
syllabi she developed on women, race, and ethnicity in which she did not think to 
include Jewish perspectives: 
I know of no one, certainly no one here at the university, who teaches Jewish women 
writers, or … even Jewish writers, and that may be coincidence…. It may also have to 
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do with a concern about a ghetto-ization. I’m not sure I would want to identify myself 
or be identified as someone circumscribed by a Jewish identification. 
In contrast to the above trend of demarcation between mainstream academia and Jewish 
topics, recent documentation by Lila Corwin Berman .36 traces a very different develop-
ment over the same general period, a phenomenon that functioned indirectly—and 
almost surely inadvertently—in countering marginalization. During the second half of 
the twentieth century, Jews in academia (along with Jewish leaders, rabbis, and intellec-
tuals) “sought to generate a public language … of presenting Jews to the United States” 
as a means of navigating relationships with non-Jews within an open, yet non-Jewish 
society. By creating this “intellectual framework,” Berman noted, Jewish leaders strove 
“to make Jewishness intelligible to the American public.”37 
When properly conceived, a public language of Jewishness, instead of marking Jews 
as outside of or peripheral to American life, enabled Jewish leaders to define Jews as 
indispensable to the United States.38 
Berman describes the intensive involvement of Jews within the academy, particularly 
the social sciences, and their active role in creating both the theories and the very language of 
academic discourse: 
The Jewish attraction to the social sciences [was] a response to the particular circum-
stances of minority and Jewish life…. Sociology offered minority groups an opportunity 
to integrate their experiences into larger national contexts…. Sociological language and 
models became unrivaled sources of authority, sculpting the public language that 
American Jewish leaders used to talk about Jewishness…. The fact that Jews helped 
mold the field of sociology is critical to understanding why sociological language be-
came so useful in Jews’ efforts to explain themselves to the United States.39 
In other words, for Berman, part of what secured US Jews’ entrance and acceptance into 
academic life was the terminology they themselves crafted within emerging academic 
disciplines. 
Again, countering these gains are the gaps to which Hollinger pointed. For when it 
comes to US Jewry as the subject of academic research, the communalist emphasis, on the 
one hand, and the marginalization of Jews from mainstream topics, on the other, “al-
lowed the narratives of American history and American Jewish history to remain mutu-
ally exclusive.”40 Yet what of the parallel effect he describes, the “large swath of 
American popular and professional discourse … led by persons of Jewish ancestry [or] 
people who carried Jewish cultural baggage with them in their creative careers.”41 How 
may this influence have “disseminated into [the] American public sphere” at large?42 An 
excerpt from the interview with one of the scholars quoted above provides an example 
                                                                                                                                                       
36  Berman, Lila Corwin. 2009. Speaking of Jews: Rabbis, Intellectuals and the Creation of an American 
Public Identity. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 
37  Ibid., at p. 6. 
38  Ibid., at pp. 2-3. 
39  Ibid. 
40  Antler, supra note 28. 
41  Hollinger, supra note 1, at p. 12. 
42  Berman, supra note 36, at p. 6. 
JENNIFER ROSKIES 168 
of how her contributions to academic discourse may have incorporated elements of her 
Jewish identity as she construed it. Describing her current academic venture, an interna-
tional journal, she wonders: 
The [journal] has been a really fruitful area that I’ve gone into…. Do I find this congenial 
because being Jewish makes me somehow more cosmopolitan-focused or something? 
and surmises: 
I can’t really say that I have had a sustained commitment to Jewish topics or Jewish 
intellectual concerns in my work, but in a sense … I like to feel that by doing the kind 
of scholarship that I do, and by being kind of both bold and careful and trying to 
move things in fresh directions, I’m somehow carrying on in Jewish intellectual tradi-
tions, even though it’s in the secular realm. I’d like to think that. 
The mid-twentieth century pressures to which Kraut refers, where “wise doctoral 
mentors” curtailed their Jewish protégées’ academic areas of focus to exclude Jewish 
topics, imposed a doctrine of mutual exclusivity. The above excerpts reflect the kind of 
ingrained constraints that have shaped academic careers as well as the fields of multicul-
tural and identity research. Yet the excerpts also suggest the “public language of Jewish-
ness” to which Berman referred. Expressing that their “secular” areas of research may 
“carry on in Jewish intellectual traditions” indicates the degree to which Jewish academ-
ics’ work may implicitly carry blueprints rooted in Jewish experience—elements trace-
able in their scholarship and ultimately in the public sphere beyond. 
4. “AN EMPIRICAL ORPHAN IN THE THEORETICAL STORM” 
The absence of Jews as subjects within mainstream academic research stands in distinct 
contrast to another form of invisibility, namely that of Jewish women within the aca-
demic literature of feminist theory.43 In the former case, the marginalization of Jews 
stemmed from a barely-concealed, often baldly antisemitic aversion communicated to 
researchers setting out on their academic careers. A concurrent development, as we have 
seen, was US Jews’ leading contribution to social science theory and terminology, 
“molding the field,” in Berman’s words, and thus “enable[ing them] to define Jews as 
indispensable to the United States.”44 Perhaps ironically, the very fact of being “defined 
into” the mainstream, coupled with the prescribed “color-coded” cultural typologies,45 
may have swayed US Jewish feminists from developing distinct theoretical models and 
epistemological standpoints, akin to those of Black feminists.46 Any perceived inclina-
tions to do so were whitewashed. 
Yet the absent “feminist Jewish standpoint” has signaled an element of homelessness 
both theoretically and in practice. Unarticulated and unnamed perspectives result in 
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“social, psychological and spiritual malaise,”47 in Paula E. Hyman’s observation, as well 
as vulnerability.48 To borrow Elaine Showalter’s image from her essay “Feminist Criti-
cism in the Wilderness,” without a theoretical basis, Jewish women have remained “an 
empirical orphan in the theoretical storm,”49 rendering US Jewish feminist women’s 
sense of belonging within the mainstream of the movement as ticklish if not tenuous. In 
truth, the experience of feeling like a “cultural outsider” (Frankenberg) and “Other” 
(Kaufman) is far from uncommon.50 Jewish-targeted enmity often takes the form of anti-
Zionism and hostility toward Israel—the interconnected nature of these two bigotries 
has been demonstrated by Kaplan and Small.51 In certain circles, the option of being a 
feminist and a supporter of Israel is rendered mutually incompatible, a contradiction in 
terms. Bereft of theoretical belonging or anchor, not even loyal, committed, and radical 
feminists are exempt from bias, antisemitic slurs, and innuendo. 
5. CONCLUSION: EXPANDING THE STORY 
As we have seen, the “ethnoracial” mapping described by Hollinger that defined US 
Jewry as part of white mainstream culture complemented the Jewish “reticence” he cited 
to call attention to their own “overrepresentation” in so many facets of US life. The 
effective omission of Jews from multicultural and identity research as case studies in 
their own right leaves a gap in our understanding of US modernity. As in the case of 
Jewish women’s absence from feminist theory, it leaves Jews, women and men, ill-
equipped to address the “not quite white” status that remains unexplored and unarticu-
lated. 
If the aim of studying Jewish identity is to channel understanding into securing US 
Jewry’s future; and of multicultural, identity, and feminist research to shed light on how 
individuals of different racial and ethnic groups—including Jewish women and men—
negotiate their respective standpoints, the time for addressing the gaps in academic 
research is long overdue. Heeding Hollinger’s call to decipher matters such as “to what 
degree is Women’s Liberation a Jewish story,” future studies can aim to trace the “Jew-
ish story” within different academic canons and thus shed light on its impact on devel-
opments during the past century both within academia and beyond. By the same token, 
additional study to trace the American, the multicultural, or the feminist “story” within 
the life stories of US Jews would stand to add valuable dimension to what we would 
learn of their Jewish identities, the course of their development, as well as where an-
tisemitism’s impact was salient. Such study will move toward integrating Jewish and 
“mainstream” research, adding dimension with which to understand more fully the 
US—and US Jewish—experience. 
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NGOs and the New Antisemitism 
Anne Herzberg.* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The intensification of the Palestinian terror campaign in the 2000s has been coupled with 
a renewal of attacks on Israel’s legitimacy and Jewish self-determination rights not seen 
since the 1970s during the Cold War.1 These attacks have been particularly severe in the 
United Kingdom, where senior Israeli officials have avoided travel for fear of being 
arrested for alleged “war crimes”2 and anti-Israel boycott campaigns have a strong 
following in the country.3 Violence has also accompanied these initiatives. In one case, 
Israel’s second highest-ranking diplomat in Britain was assaulted by Palestinian protes-
tors after lecturing at Manchester University in May 2010.4 
This demonization is not confined to the United Kingdom, however. In August 2009, 
one of Sweden’s largest circulation dailies, Aftonbladet, revived the medieval blood libel, 
claiming that the Israeli army deliberately killed Palestinians in order to harvest their 
organs for profit.5 “Israel Apartheid Week” originated in Canada, where it continues to 
proliferate.6 The United States has also not been immune. In April 2010, the Israeli 
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ambassador was heckled at the University of California, Irvine; at several other UC 
schools (San Diego, Berkeley), resolutions were introduced calling for divestment from 
companies doing business with Israel.7 
These incidents represent extreme manifestations of a “new antisemitism,” described 
by Canada’s former Justice Minister, Irwin Cotler, as “a new, globalized, virulent anti-
semitism” that “denies the Jewish People the right to live as equal members of the 
Family of Nations.”8 
An often overlooked aspect of this “new antisemitism” is the role played by human 
rights and humanitarian nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in contributing to the 
environment of demonization via politicized campaigns and lobbying. Disturbingly, 
many of these activities are funded by the European Union and European governments; 
large humanitarian Christian organizations that receive substantial government fund-
ing, such as Diakonia (Sweden), Trocaire (Ireland), and Christian Aid (UK); large foun-
dations, such as the Ford Foundation, George Soros’ Open Society Institute, and Oxfam 
NOVIB; and even the progressive Jewish New Israel Fund (NIF).9 
These NGO campaigns can be traced to the NGO Forum at the UN’s 2001 World 
Conference Against Racism in Durban, South Africa, which marked a major increase in 
the re-emergence of antisemitism.10 At the forum, officials from more than 1,500 partici-
pating NGOs, including international NGO superpowers, Human Rights Watch and 
Amnesty International, singled out Israel for condemnation, accusing it of perpetrating 
“holocausts,” “ethnic cleansing,” and “genocide,” and declared Israel to be a “racist, 
apartheid state in which Israels [sic] brand of apartheid” is a “crime against humanity.” 
The Conference revived the hateful 1975 “Zionism is racism” slogan, repealed in 1991 by 
the UN General Assembly, but still promoted by anti-Israel actors. At Durban, anti-
semitic flyers were distributed at official UN events, including one featuring Hitler’s 
visage asking, “What if I had won? The good things: There would be NO Israel and NO 
Palestinian’s [sic] blood shed” (see Appendix, Image 1). Mass demonstrations included 
the chant, “What we have done to apartheid in South Africa, must be done to Zionism in 
Palestine.” In preparatory events held in Tehran and at the conference itself, Jewish and 
Israeli participants were intimidated or excluded from meetings. 
As Professor Gerald Steinberg notes, “the NGO Forum’s Final Declaration estab-
lished the ‘Durban Strategy’—‘a policy of complete and total isolation of Israel as an 
apartheid state,’ and cal[ed] for ‘the imposition of mandatory and comprehensive 
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sanctions and embargoes, the full cessation of all links (diplomatic, economic, social, aid, 
military cooperation, and training) between all states and Israel.’”11 
The “Durban Strategy” has underpinned a decade of anti-Israel efforts by NGOs, in-
cluding the global boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) movement against Israel; 
NGO-initiated lawsuits throughout Europe and North America against Israeli officials 
for “war crimes” (“lawfare”); campaigns in the UN (e.g., the Goldstone mission, Human 
Rights Council) and other international fora such as the European Parliament; and 
“pursuing the parastatal Zionist organizations worldwide” by “dealing with them 
legally as racist, colonial institutions.”12 
NGOs carrying out the Durban Strategy invest millions in publications, public rela-
tions blitzes, and lobbying efforts utilizing the rhetoric of human rights and interna-
tional law to single out Israel as their ultimate violator and abuser.13 By couching 
political attacks in these terms, NGOs seek to create a veneer of credibility and expertise, 
thereby increasing international pressure against Israel. Since the 2001 Durban confer-
ence, this process has played itself out on many occasions—Jenin in 2002, the Interna-
tional Court of Justice’s case against Israel’s “apartheid wall” in 2004, the 2006 Lebanon 
War, the 2008-2009 Gaza War and the Goldstone process, and the May 2010 “Free Gaza” 
flotilla. 
These cases have followed a standard pattern. Israel is faced with a spate of terror 
attacks and responds with counter measures of increasing severity in order to protect its 
population. NGOs immediately issue numerous condemnations, almost all against 
Israel, with accusations of “war crimes,” “crimes against humanity,” and the intentional 
targeting of civilians. These allegations are generally based on speculation with little to 
no hard evidence. The media and the international community adopt these claims at face 
value, rarely conducting independent verification. The UN, particularly the structurally 
biased Human Rights Council,14 engages in further condemnations, calling for interna-
tional investigations and war crimes trials. NGOs are recruited to play an integral role in 
these processes further entrenching their influence and claims. The context of terror is 
completely erased, as are Israel’s rights to self-defense and self-determination. At the 
same time, virulent antisemitism from Iran, Hamas, and Hezbollah is completely ig-
nored.15 
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Significantly, under the Durban Strategy, the concepts of Zionism and a Jewish state 
per se (not specific policies or territorial disputes) are the causes of Israeli “racism,” 
“apartheid,” and “occupation.” As such, NGO campaigns based on the Durban Strategy 
meet the working definition of antisemitism developed by the EU Monitoring Centre on 
Racism and Xenophobia, and recommended for adoption by the United Kingdom’s All-
Party Parliamentary Groups Against Antisemitism. The guidelines note the following as 
forms of contemporary antisemitism: 
– Accusing the Jews as a people, or Israel as a state, of inventing or exaggerating the 
Holocaust. 
– Accusing Jewish citizens of being more loyal to Israel, or to the alleged priorities of 
Jews worldwide, than to the interests of their own nations. 
– Denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e.g., by claiming that the 
existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavor. 
– Applying double standards by requiring of it a behavior not expected or demanded 
of any other democratic nation. 
– Using the symbols and images associated with classic antisemitism (e.g., claims of 
Jews killing Jesus or blood libel) to characterize Israel or Israelis. 
– Drawing comparisons of contemporary Israeli policy to that of the Nazis. 
– Holding Jews collectively responsible for actions of the State of Israel.16 
Harvard Law Professor Alan Dershowitz has also presented criteria that distinguish 
antisemitism from legitimate criticism of Israeli policies or actions. Dershowitz’s criteria 
include: 
– Comparing Israel to the Nazis or its leaders to Hitler, the German army, or the 
Gestapo. Denying, minimizing, or trivializing the Holocaust as part of a campaign 
against Israel. 
– Characterizing Israel as “the worst,” when it is clear that this is not an accurate 
comparative assessment. 
– Singling out only Israel for sanctions for policies that are widespread among other 
nations, or demanding that Jews be better or more moral than others because of their 
history as victims. 
– Blaming Israel for the problems of the world and exaggerating the influence of the 
Jewish state on world affairs.17 
Similarly, British lawyer Anthony Julius has observed that this new antisemitism 
“became hegemonic in the 1990s and 2000s.… It is to be distinguished from the ‘old 
antisemitism’ because it takes Israel and the Zionist project as its collective term for the 
Jews.”18 Nevertheless, it is “continuous with the ‘old antisemitism’ in its principal 
stratagems and tropes, while novel in its specific focus upon the Jewish State—uniquely 
evil and without the right to exist.” He further notes that 
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in its milder form, it seeks to fix the world’s attention on the injustices of the Occupa-
tion … and its one-eyed refusal to find fault with any party other than Israel. In its 
stronger form it recasts the 1948 War as an originary act of persecution.… In both 
forms it tends to seize upon misjudgments and acts of injustice as proof of fundamen-
tal iniquity. 
The following examples reflect several themes adopted by NGOs in carrying out the 
Durban Strategy that manifests this “new antisemitism.” 
2. NAZI-ERA ANTISEMITIC STEREOTYPES 
Several NGOs promote antisemitic stereotypes in their anti-Israel campaigning reminis-
cent of the most virulent images published during the Nazi era. One of the most egre-
gious examples was posted on the website of the Bethlehem-based NGO Badil, which 
advocates for a Palestinian “right of return” to Israel, a policy intended to erase demog-
raphically the Jewish character of the country. A 2010 monetary award winner of its 
annual “Nakba.19 Commemoration” poster contest shows a grotesque caricature of a 
Jewish man, garbed in traditional Hasidic attire with a menacing grin, hooked nose, and 
sidelocks. Surrounded by skulls, he stands on a platform dated “1948,” crushing to 
death an Arab woman and child. He holds a pitch-fork dripping with blood (see Ap-
pendix, Image 2).20 
In addition to its poster contest, Badil is often involved in inflammatory activities 
that antagonize Jews. In 2007, Badil launched “A Call to Action” to mark 60 years of 
“Nakba.” The campaign called upon “global civil society” to take part in “BDS, legal 
actions, media work, and public education and publicity campaigns.” One program 
sought to enlist journalists “to organize a targeted campaign to expose the lies of AIPAC 
and the Anti-Defamation League and to expose the Jewish and Zionist community’s 
double standards regarding Nakba & Occupation.” Several large, European-government 
funded NGOs including Trocaire (Ireland), DanChurchAid (Denmark), and Oxfam 
Solidarity Belgium co-sponsored these activities.21 Badil has also been funded by the 
Norwegian, Swiss, Swedish, and Dutch governments. 
3. THE GLOBAL BDS MOVEMENT: SINGLING ISRAEL OUT FOR CENSURE 
The global anti-Israel boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) movement is another 
manifestation of antisemitism that is spearheaded by NGOs. As noted by Anthony 
Julius, this movement is a way of “segregating Jews” and directed solely at Israel as 
opposed to the dozens of other countries that engage in far worse abuses both quantita-
tively and qualitatively. 
Promoting the “Zionism is racism” slogan is a cornerstone of BDS. For proponents of 
this strategy, the term “occupation” does not refer to an Israeli presence in territories 
acquired in the 1967 war, but rather refers to the establishment of Israel in 1948. In other 
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words, this movement rejects a State of Israel within any boundaries. BDS rallies are 
frequently marred by violence, particularly in the United Kingdom, where patrons of 
Israeli goods are often threatened and intimidated.22 According to the BDS National 
Committee, a coalition of dozens of organizations that includes many EU- and Euro-
pean-funded NGOs: 
The sources of Israel’s regime are found in the racist ideology of late 19th century Euro-
pean colonialism which was adopted by the dominant stream of the Zionist movement 
(World Zionist Organization, Jewish Agency, Jewish National Fund, a.o.) in order to 
justify and recruit political support for its colonial project of an exclusive Jewish state in 
Palestine (i.e. in the area of current Israel and the OPT). Thus, secular political Zionism 
translated ancient religious-spiritual notions of Jews as “a chosen people” and of “Eretz 
Israel” into an aggressive and racist, political colonial program, which—based on the doc-
trine that Jews were a nation in political terms with superior claims to Palestine—called to 
“redeem” Palestine, which was declared to be “a land without people.”23 
BDS campaigns also frequently utilize classic theological antisemitic tropes such as 
the blood libel. In a notorious campaign in 2004, Oxfam Belgium released a poster of a 
Jaffa orange dripping with blood, reading “Israeli fruits have a bitter taste … reject the 
occupation of Palestine, don’t buy Israeli fruits and vegetables” (see Appendix, Image 3). 
In May 2010, representatives from the NIF- and EU-funded Coalition of Women for 
Peace (CWP) and the EU-funded Israel Committee Against House Demolitions 
(ICAHD), participated in an anti-Israel divestment rally in Brussels, targeting Dexia, a 
bank with an Israeli subsidiary. During the event, one rally leader drank “blood” out of 
a wine glass—an apparent reference to the Medieval-era libel of Jews drinking Christian 
blood—supposedly to symbolize Israel’s alleged brutality (see Appendix, Image 4). 
International NGO “superpowers” are active in the BDS movement as well and as 
such contribute to the spread of contemporary antisemitism as defined by the EU and 
others. Human Rights Watch (HRW) is a proponent of the Caterpillar boycott cam-
paign,24 and Oxfam is involved in the boycott effort against Israeli cosmetics manufac-
turer Ahava.25 Amnesty International and Oxfam campaigned for an arms embargo 
against Israel at a March 2009 session of the UK House of Commons.26 Oxfam joined 
NGOs Trocaire, Diakonia, Christian Aid, and others calling for the suspension of the 
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EU-Israel Association Agreement.27 These organizations also engaged in lobbying 
throughout Europe, hoping to block Israel’s entry into the OECD.28 
The BDS National Committee (BNC) not only targets companies doing business with 
Israel, but has waged aggressive attacks against Zionist and Jewish organizations as 
“parastatal agents” of Israel. These attacks involve 
[e]ngaging in judicial and criminal pursuit and accountability against, and applying 
pressure to remove the charity status and tax exemptions from, the Zionist organiza-
tions worldwide, including the World Zionist Organization, the Jewish Agency, and 
the Jewish National Fund, and dealing with them legally as racist, colonial institu-
tions.29 
As noted above, Badil (which is also a BNC leader) organized a “targeted campaign to 
expose the lies of AIPAC and the Anti-Defamation League and to expose the Jewish and 
Zionist community’s double standards regarding Nakba & Occupation.” 
4. APARTHEID RHETORIC 
A key component of the Durban Strategy is to equate Israel with apartheid South Africa, 
despite the manifest differences between the two countries.30 Former South African 
dissident Benjamin Pogrund has remarked that the term “apartheid” is used “because it 
comes easily to hand: it is a lazy label for the complexities of the Middle East conflict.” 
Irwin Cotler notes that “the indictment of Israel as an apartheid state … also involves the 
call for the dismantling of Israel.…” The singling-out of Israel as an “apartheid state,” 
therefore, is a form of incitement and in itself may be an expression of racism. 
NGO campaigns invoking the apartheid canard take several forms, including: (1) 
gratuitous use of apartheid rhetoric; (2) characterizing the Arab-Israeli conflict as moti-
vated by alleged Jewish race-hatred of Arabs, rather than one based on competing 
national and territorial claims; (3) disregarding the role of Arab bigotry; (4) ignoring the 
context of terror; (5) claiming all alleged violations of human rights and humanitarian 
law rise to the level of “apartheid,” albeit only if committed by Israel; (6) hypocritically 
accusing Israel of “apartheid” while actively participating in the political process and 
enjoying the benefits conferred by the state; and (7) ignoring practices in Arab and 
Muslim countries that more closely resemble apartheid South Africa. 
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Despite claims of being founded in principles of universal human rights and interna-
tional law, many of these NGO allegations and legal arguments originate with the PLO’s 
Negotiations Affairs Department and were developed for propaganda purposes. Again, 
European and foundation funding plays a significant role in facilitating these cam-
paigns, including grants from the New Israel Fund. Such funding is clearly inconsistent 
with a March 2010 statement by NIF CEO Daniel Sokatch, claiming that NIF “deeply 
disagree[s] with the use of ‘apartheid’ in the Israeli context. It is a historically inaccurate 
and inflammatory term that serves only to demonize Israel and alienate a majority of 
Jews around the world, including those who care deeply about issues of democracy, 
human rights, social justice and peace.” 
Some notable examples of “apartheid” rhetoric from NGOs include a statement by 
Sarah Leah Whitson, director of HRW’s Mid-East North Africa Division, who claimed 
that Israel has put “a vastly discriminatory system of laws and policies in place that 
create a system of apartheid under any legal definition.” Jessica Montell, Executive 
Director of the NIF- and European-funded B’Tselem, commented that “the word apart-
heid is useful for mobilizing people because of its emotional power. In some cases, the 
situation in the West Bank is worse than apartheid in South Africa.” NIF- and EU-
funded Adalah joined with European-funded Al Haq to issue a 302-page publication 
entitled, “Occupation, Colonialism, Apartheid? A Re-Assessment of Israel’s Practices in 
the Occupied Palestinian Territories under International Law.” The publication declares 
Israel guilty of “colonialism” and “apartheid” and purports to catalogue Israel’s “viola-
tions” including implementing a “Grand Apartheid” policy by placing Palestinians in 
“reserves and ghettoes.” The report concludes by demanding the international commu-
nity “request an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice regarding 
Israel’s practices of apartheid and colonialism.” 
5. “JUDAIZATION” 
Many of the NGOs invoking the Durban Strategy use the terms “Judaization” or “Ju-
daize” in their campaigning. The PLO developed these expressions to erase the Jewish 
historical connection to the region, as well as to suggest that the very presence of Jews is 
alien and unacceptable. The use of the term “Judaize,” therefore, is an articulation of 
anti-Jewish discrimination. 
This terminology bolsters several NGO themes, including that Jews are “foreign, co-
lonial occupiers” in the region; that Jewish self-determination is “racist” and illegitimate, 
as opposed to Palestinian self-determination, which is an international legal obligation; 
and that the Law of Return and symbols such as the Israeli flag or national anthem are 
“racist” even though most European countries and all Islamic countries have official 
state religions and official state religious symbols. The term “Judaize” is not only used 
for East Jerusalem and the West Bank,31 but also to delegitimize Jewish neighborhoods 
in Jaffa, Acre (Akko), and the Negev—or, in other words, challenging the legitimacy of a 
Jewish presence even within the Green Line. While it is perhaps not surprising that the 
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PLO would employ such terminology, it is immoral for human rights organizations to 
use phrases supporting ethnically-based exclusion. 
Ir Amim, an Israeli NGO funded by the EU, NIF, Sweden, Norway, the United 
Kingdom, and the Netherlands, claimed in an October 2009 update that 
[T]his process of accelerated Judaization and Israelization in East Jerusalem, … is part 
of an effort to change the existing discourse … of which the Muslim Quarter becomes 
“the renewed Jewish Quarter,” the Old City and the Holy Basin become “ancient 
Jerusalem.” 
Similarly, in a September 2010 publication on alleged Israeli policy in Jerusalem, enti-
tled Unsafe Space, the Association of Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI) stated the report’s 
purpose was “to bring to light the stories of the Palestinian residents, to reveal the 
experience of life in the neighborhood as others attempt to ‘Judaize’ it.”32 Other NGOs 
that frequently invoke “Judaization” terminology include European-funded NGOs 
Defence for Children International—Palestine Section, the Alternative Information 
Center, and the Palestinian Center for Human Rights. 
6. NAZI/HOLOCAUST COMPARISONS 
As highlighted in the EU working definition, “accusing the Jews as a people, or Israel as a 
state, of inventing or exaggerating the Holocaust” and “drawing comparisons of contem-
porary Israeli policy to that of the Nazis” are forms of antisemitism. Many NGOs engage 
in these accusations and comparisons and use Nazi or Holocaust rhetoric in their cam-
paigns to describe alleged Israeli abuses toward the Palestinians. Terms such as “ghettos,” 
“ethnic cleansing,” “genocide,” and “concentration camps” frequently appear. 
In a June 2007 report, Amnesty International referred to Israel’s security barrier, 
erected to protect against a wave of Palestinian suicide bombings targeting restaurants, 
malls, and buses that had killed hundreds and wounded thousands, as “the Wall of 
Death.”33 This phrase mirrored an appellation used to describe the notorious site near 
Block 11 at Auschwitz where thousands of prisoners were summarily executed. 
Many NGOs exploited the Gaza War and the Goldstone process to engage in this 
form of demonization. For instance, Michael Warschawski of the European-funded 
Alternative Information Center.34 issued highly inflammatory remarks during the war, 
offensively stating: 
Ehud Barak, Tzipi Livni, Gabi Ashkenazi and Ehud Olmert don’t you dare show your 
faces at any memorial ceremony for the heroes of the Warsaw Ghetto, Lublin, Vilna or 
Kishinev.… You are not representing any continuity with the Warsaw Ghetto, be-
cause today the Warsaw Ghetto is right in front of you, targeted by your own tanks 
and artillery, and its name is Gaza.…35 
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Al Mezan, a Gaza-based NGO that receives substantial funding from the EU, Switzer-
land, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Ireland accused Israeli officials of “incit-
ing a ‘holocaust’ (genocide).” 
In its submission to the Goldstone panel, a group of NIF- and EU-funded NGOs.36 
(Gisha, ACRI, Adalah, Yesh Din, HaMoked, Physicians for Human Rights-Israel, and the 
Public Committee Against Torture in Israel) claimed that “a shocking picture emerges of 
harsh, inhuman and degrading conditions … [m]any prisoners … were held in pits in 
the ground, 1-3 meters deep, apparently dug by the army,” harkening to the execution 
and cremation pits used by the Nazis to exterminate Jews. 
During the public hearings of the Goldstone mission, member Desmond Travers 
asked pre-vetted.37 representatives of the Gaza-based NGO Gaza Community Mental 
Health Project (funded by the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Torino) a 
question laced with antisemitic undertones and which elicited a comparison of Israelis to 
Nazis: 
We have heard testimony of great, uh, violence, seemingly un-militarily, unnecessary 
violence inflicted particularly on children. There have been instances of the shooting of 
children in front of their parents. As an ex-soldier I find that kind of action to be very, 
very strange and very unique. I would like to ask you if you have any professional in-
sights as to what mindset or what conditioning or what training could bring around a state of 
behavior that would cause a soldier, a fellow human being to shoot children in front of their 
parents. Do you have any professional insights into that kind of behavior? [emphasis 
added]  
In response, the representatives stated that: 
With time the Israeli soldier has the image of absolute superiority.… There we see the 
arrogance of power and he uses it without thinking of humanity at all … inside Israel 
there is an identification with the aggressor, the Nazis. 
Imagery associated with the Holocaust such as emaciated prisoners caged behind 
barbed wire or children holding up their hands while being threatened at gunpoint by 
soldiers is also commonly used by NGOs (see Appendix, Images 5 and 6). Other NGOs, 
like NIF-funded and EU-funded Mada al-Carmel and Adalah, accuse Israel and Jews of 
“exploiting” the Holocaust at the expense of Palestinian self determination: 
We believe that exploiting [the Holocaust] and its consequences in order to legitimize 
the right of the Jews to establish a state at the expense of the Palestinian people serves 
to belittle the universal, human, and moral lessons to be learned from this cata-
strophic event, which concerns the whole of humanity.38 
                                                                                                                                                       
36  Adalah, “Submission of Human Rights Organizations based in Israel to the Goldstone In-
quiry Delegation,” June 2009, available at: <http://www.adalah.org/newsletter/eng/jun09/goldstone 
%20report_and_appendix[1].pdf>. 
37  Witnesses chosen by the Goldstone mission to appear at the public hearings were extensively 
interviewed prior to their “testimony.” 
38  Haifa Declaration, May 15, 2007, available at: <http://www.mada-research.org/UserFiles/file/ 
haifaenglish.pdf>. 
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7. CHRISTIAN ANTISEMITISM, SUPERSESSIONISM 
Classic Christian antisemitism accuses Jews of deicide, the blood libel, and the libel of 
“poisoning wells” and advances supersessionism (replacement theology). Many NGOs 
have adopted these themes, substituting Palestinians as the new victims of these alleged 
Jewish crimes. These campaigns are highly offensive and reflect a gross insensitivity to 
interfaith relationships. 
Sabeel Ecumenical Liberation Theology Center, a Jerusalem-based NGO, is a leader in 
the anti-Israel church divestment movement and frequently campaigns against a two-state 
solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Palestinian Anglican, Naim Ateek, heads the organiza-
tion and frequently employs antisemitic theological themes and imagery in his speeches 
and publications. His 2001 Easter message stated that “it seems to many of us that Jesus is 
on the cross again with thousands of crucified Palestinians around him. … The Israeli 
government crucifixion system is operating daily.” In a February 2001 sermon, Ateek 
intimated that Israel was responsible for the death of Jesus (the Palestinians): “Israel has 
placed a large boulder, a big stone that has metaphorically shut off the Palestinians in a 
tomb. It is similar to the stone placed on the entrance of Jesus’ tomb.…” Sabeel is funded 
by the Swedish government via Diakonia, a Christian humanitarian aid organization.39 
Other NGOs exploit Christian holidays to issue condemnations of the Jewish state 
that invoke these classical antisemitic theological themes. In 2006, British NGO War on 
Want issued a Christmas card entitled, “Mary and Joseph being frisked on their way to 
find an inn for the night,” showing a pregnant Mary and Joseph being searched by IDF 
officers at the security barrier in Bethlehem (see Appendix, Image 7). Similarly, Amos 
Trust sells a “wall nativity” scene where a model of the security barrier runs through a 
traditional nativity setting (see Appendix, Image 8). Christian Aid promoted a Christ-
mas appeal, entitled “Child of Bethlehem,” featuring the story of “Jessica,” a seven-year-
old Palestinian girl allegedly injured by Israeli soldiers (see Appendix, Image 9) Chris-
tian Aid was heavily criticized by both Jewish and Christian groups for exploiting 
Christmas for its anti-Israel advocacy. 
These anti-Israel theological campaigns are not only confined to Christian NGOs but 
are also promoted by NGO “superpowers.” During the 2006 Lebanon War, Human 
Rights Watch’s executive director, Ken Roth issued a supersessionist anti-Jewish slur 
that denigrated the Old Testament, claiming that Israel’s actions were motivated by “an 
eye for an eye—or more accurately in this case twenty eyes for an eye” which “may have 
been the morality of a more primitive moment.” 
Modern-day expressions of these Medieval libels frequently reoccur in NGO cam-
paigning. These include accusations of Israel uniquely imposing “collective punish-
ment” on the population of Gaza and claims of a systematic Israeli policy to deliberately 
target Palestinian and Lebanese civilians in counter-terror operations.40 The context of 
Hamas and Hezbollah attacks against Israeli citizens are minimized or even erased. 
                                                                                                                                                       
39  For more on Sabeel’s activities, see NGO Monitor, “Sabeel Conferences: Fuelling the Arab-
Israeli Conflict,” October 8, 2007, available at: <http://www.ngo-monitor.org/data/images/File/ 
sabeel_conference_101107.pdf>. 
40  For examples of these campaigns, see NGO Monitor’s monograph, “The NGO Front in the 
Gaza War: the Durban Strategy Continues (February 2009),” available at: <http://www.ngo-
monitor.org/data/images/File/NGO_Front_Gaza.pdf>. 
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During the Gaza War these types of accusations were particularly pronounced and 
also underlay the conclusions of the Goldstone report. Diakonia, for instance, declared 
that “[Israel’s] policy amounts to the collective punishment of the entire Gaza popula-
tion.…” Oxfam charged that Israel engaged in “… massive and disproportionate vio-
lence against Gazan civilians in violation of international law.” A joint submission to 
Goldstone by ACRI, Gisha, Adalah, PHR-I, HaMoked, PCATI, and Yesh Din claimed 
Israel “deliberately and knowingly shelled civilian institutions.…” PCHR joined the 
chorus by alleging that Israel perpetrated “indiscriminate killing and continued system-
atic destruction of all the Palestinian institutions and civilian facilities in the Gaza Strip.” 
Ken Roth also played a highly public role in promoting these charges. In December 
2009, Roth wrote, “[t]oday, the prevailing U.S. doctrine—most notably in Afghanistan—
stresses the importance of protecting civilians.…41 Israel’s view [is] that one prevails in 
asymmetric warfare by pummeling rather than protecting civilians.…”42 To support his 
claim, Roth misrepresented remarks of former Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni: 
there is strong evidence that Israel wanted Gazan civilians to pay the price for 
Hamas’s abuses … as … Tzipi Livni, said…: ‘I heard that Hamas declared the man 
killed by a rocket in Ashkelon “one of the Zionists” despite being an Israeli Arab. 
They don’t make a distinction, and neither should we.’ 
Roth used this quote as proof that the IDF was ordered by the highest levels of the 
Israeli government to indiscriminately kill Palestinians in Gaza. In fact, Livni was 
actually rebuking Israeli Knesset Member Ahmed Tibi for his remarks exacerbating 
racial divisions between Israeli Jews and Arabs and was encouraging Israelis to embrace 
a common identity in the face of rocket attacks from Gaza. Roth omitted this context 
entirely from his article, including Tibi’s remarks, in order to bolster his anti-Israel 
slander.43 
Several Christian NGOs, including Christian Peacemaker Teams and other groups 
active in the BDS movement, accuse Israel of poisoning the Palestinian water supply. 
Amnesty International has also aided these claims. In October 2009, Amnesty released a 
112-page report, entitled “Troubled Waters—Palestinians Denied Fair Access to Water,” 
claiming that Israel enacts “water policies and practices” in order to “discriminate 
against the Palestinian population of the OPT.” However, the report ignored evidence 
not only that Israel provides West Bank Palestinians with more water than required 
                                                                                                                                                       
41  Roth repeatedly advances this claim even though the empirical evidence does not support 
his charges. In fact, the United States and NATO have a much higher ratio of civilian casualties to 
combatants than Israel. For instance, in the November-December 2004 Battle of Fallujah in Iraq, US 
and British troops were alleged to have killed several thousand civilians. A forthcoming study 
examining the effectiveness of US targeted killings in Afghanistan and Pakistan have found that an 
average of nine civilians are killed for every combatant. The rate for Israeli operations was found to 
be two civilians for every combatant. 
42  Ken Roth, “Geneva Conventions Still Hold Up,” Foreign Policy in Focus, December 30, 2009, 
available at: <http://www.fpif.org/articles/geneva_conventions_still_hold_up>. 
43  When NGO Monitor pointed out that Roth had distorted Livni’s remarks, HRW posted an 
“explanation” on its web page reprinting the op-ed, claiming the statement was “ambiguous” (even 
though it was not). No correction, however, was posted on the Foreign Policy in Focus site where the 
original piece is still available, nor did HRW amend its earlier reports that had made this same 
claim. 
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under the Oslo framework but also that in some areas Palestinian water thieves were 
responsible for stealing up to 50% of supplies. Amnesty also claimed that Palestinian 
water consumption (60-70 liters per person per day), is “the lowest in the region” even 
though this level is similar, if not better, than that of comparable cities like Amman, 
Tunis, and Algiers. Notably, the report was issued to coincide with a November 2009 
speaking tour in the United States organized by the Palestinian Cultural Academic 
Boycott of Israel (PCABI) movement, entitled “Israel’s Control of Water as a Tool of 
Apartheid and Means of Ethnic Cleansing.” 
Similarly, Amnesty International was also responsible for originating a claim during 
the Gaza War that Israel had “wantonly” destroyed Gaza’s only flour mill in order to 
hamper the Palestinian food supply.44 It further claimed that the mill’s “owners are 
adamant that the site was neither a launch pad for rockets nor a weapons cache, and the 
Israeli army has provided no evidence to the contrary.”45 Documentary evidence re-
leased by the UN (UNITAR)46 and the IDF refuted Amnesty’s version of events, clearly 
showing that the mill was damaged by artillery during a firefight with Hamas combat-
ants. 
8. CONCLUSION 
Given the tens of millions of dollars funneled each year by European governments and 
prominent foundations to NGOs that are used to promote themes that fall under the 
EU’s own definition of antisemitism, it is important to highlight these examples and 
bring them to the attention of those underwriting such NGO activities. These funding 
agencies must recognize their role in spreading antisemitism by financing organizations 
that engage in these highly offensive and inflammatory activities. It is critical that 
funders adopt guidelines to prevent further abuse of taxpayer largesse and generous 
donations. It is also essential that such funding is regularly monitored and independent 
evaluations are conducted with mechanisms put in place for oversight. At present, little 
to no substantive evaluation of NGO activities is conducted by the European Union, 
governments or foundation funders. 
Peace between Israelis and Palestinians is one of the most complex political issues of 
our time. Solutions cannot be found, however, when problems are solely viewed 
through a narrow ideological lens and morality and universal principles are exploited to 
promote bias and racism. Palestinian self-determination cannot be considered a just 
cause if it is obtained by propagating antisemitism—the “oldest hatred”—or by deni-
grating and seeking to exterminate Jewish self-determination rights. Hopefully, the 
critical questions raised in this paper will inform the debate and lead to the necessary 
reforms. Without such changes, peace and co-existence will be farther away than ever. 
                                                                                                                                                       
44  Amnesty International, “22 Days of Death and Destruction,” July 2009, at 71. 
45  Id. 
46  UNITAR, “Satellite Image Analysis in Support to the United Nations Fact Finding Mission to 
the Gaza Conflict”, July 31, 2009, at 33, available at: <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hr 
council/specialsession/9/docs/UNITAR_UNOSAT_FFMGC_31July2009.pdf>. The UNITAR report 
notes that most of the damage found at the mill appeared to have occurred on January 16-18, 2009 
(not January 10 as claimed by Amnesty) and was the result of “ground fire,” not an airstrike. 
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Image 4: Anti-Israel divestment rally 






Image 5: “Civilians Under Siege” 
 
Source: B’Tselem, The Gaza Strip: One Big Prison (2007) 
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The Image of Israel and Israelis in 
the French, British, and Italian Press 
During the 1982 Lebanon War 
Marianna Scherini* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The current debate on “new antisemitism” often identifies the media as one of the main 
sources of today’s antisemitism in European societies due to its representation of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. In fact, a majority of observers highlight the media’s liability for 
depicting the State of Israel as a “collective Jew,” thus providing a convenient channel 
for the outpouring of prejudice and—sometimes—hatred against Jews in general. In 
2005, for example, Robert Wistrich, highlighted that 
The problem in Europe today comes primarily from civil society—especially from the 
educated elites and the media, whose barely disguised hostility to Israel has created a 
new climate of suspicion toward Jews. This atmosphere is in many ways more remi-
niscent of fin-de-siècle Europe during the Dreyfus Affair than the 1930s. Then, as now, 
with Israel, the Jew in the collective sense was stigmatized as a pariah in European 
society.1 
Yet, the issue is controversial. Opinions, as formulated during the a decade of debate, 
diverge on the main question of whether and, if so, when anti-Zionist statements and 
criticism of Israel turn into antisemitic discourse.2 
Among those who criticize the notion of what Wistrich refers to as “antisemitic anti-
Zionism,”3 the philosopher Brian Klug argues that “the depth and bitterness of [the 
Arab-Israeli] conflict is sufficient to explain, for the most part, the strength and intensity 
of the polemic against the state.”4 In Klug’s view, most anti-Israeli opinions, especially 
                                                                                                                                                       
* Ph.D. History, Anthropology, and Theory of Culture, University of Sienna. 
1 Robert S. Wistrich, Antisemitism in Western Europe at the Turn of the 21st Century, Institute of 
the World Jewish Congress, Jerusalem, 2005, p. 6. For more on the identification of Israel as “the 
collective Jew,” see Jonathan Sacks, “The hatred that won’t die,” The Guardian, February 28, 2002; 
and Irwin Cotler, “Making the World ‘Judenstaatrein,’” The Jerusalem Post, February 22, 2009. 
2 For an excellent critical analysis of the debate on the relationship between antisemitism and 
anti-Zionism, see David Hirsh, Anti-Zionism and Antisemitism Cosmopolitan Reflections, The Yale 
Initiative for the Interdisciplinary Study of Antisemitism, New Haven, 2007. 
3 Wistrich, Antisemitism in Western Europe, p. 5. 
4 Brian Klug, “The collective Jew: Israel and the new antisemitism,” Patterns of Prejudice, Vol. 
37, No. 2 (2003), p. 133. 
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those expressed in Muslim and left-wing or liberal environments, originate from “mere” 
anti-Western or anti-imperialist rather than anti-Jewish feelings. Klug does not rule out 
that criticism of Israeli politics could sometimes hide antisemitic contents, but he consid-
ers that only those cases that present classic anti-Jewish stereotypes (either in the text or 
subtext) can be addressed as antisemitic without fear of emphasizing the phenomenon 
of the new antisemitism.5 
This ultimately reduces the question where to draw the line between legitimate and 
antisemitic criticism of Israel to a matter of interpretation. Most authors in fact identify 
the same stereotypes whose antisemitic contents Klug denies as the latest form of classic 
antisemitic representations, analyzing how the same “patterns of anti-Jewish prejudice” 
have adapted to the new reality in which the State of Israel exists. The main tendency 
when analyzing the media discourse on Israel is therefore to trace back and expose the 
common roots of past antisemitic stereotypes and today’s representations of Israel.6 
The present article contributes to this debate from a historical perspective. It aims to 
assess how the media representation of Israel was conveyed at a critical moment and 
turning point in Israel’s history: the events in Lebanon of September 1982.7 
This article argues that although it encompassed extremely negative features, the image 
of Israel and “the Israelis” painted during this time was not part of the classic antisemitic 
discourse. Although not (entirely) disconnected from past antisemitic representations, 
these features instead generated an image specifically describing the Israelis, conveying 
a “new” set of stereotypes about them. At the same time, by conveying a new perception 
of the role of Jewish communities in the Diaspora vis-à-vis Israel, the press indeed 
represented Israel as “the collective Jew.” However, the Diaspora Jews were compared 
to the image of Israelis. In other words, they were observed through the lens of the 
“new” representation of Israel rather than vice versa. 
This article also addresses a second issue that emerges from the current debate. Most 
scholars and commentators indicate the key role played by the left-wing media in 
relation to today’s antisemitism in Europe. This article argues that, although they were 
                                                                                                                                                       
5 Ibid., p. 131. In Klug’s view, the phenomenon of the “new antisemitism” in European socie-
ties is greatly exaggerated by scholars and commentators because of “a certain outlook or mental-
ity: a way of viewing the world such that a person is disposed to overstate hostility towards Israel 
and Jews, or to assume that this hostility is antisemitic, or both.” Brian Klug, “Is Europe a lost 
cause? The European debate on antisemitism and the Middle East conflict,” Patterns of Prejudice, 
Vol. 39, No. 1 (2005), p. 47. 
6 See Manfred Gerstenfeld, “Anti-Israelism and Anti-Semitism: Common Characteristics and 
Motifs,” Jewish Political Studies Review, Vol. 19, Nos. 1-2 (Spring 2007). Gerstenfeld examines the 
“common characteristics and motifs” between anti-Israelism and antisemitism, highlighting for 
instance how the widespread representation of the Israelis as Nazis is clearly a new form of the past 
antisemitic core theme that identified the Jews with absolute evil. For an analysis of anti-Zionist 
contents underlying antisemitism focused on the British context, see Winston Pickett, “Nasty or 
Nazi? The Use of Antisemitic Topoi by the Left-Liberal Media,” in Paul Iganski and Barry Kosmin, 
eds., A New Antisemitism? Debating Judeophobia in 21st Century Britain, Profile Book/Institute for 
Jewish Policy Research, London, 2003, pp. 149-166. 
7 As stressed by the literature on new antisemitism, the media representation of Israel that de-
veloped during the period following these events contributed significantly to shaping images of 
“the Israelis” that are still vivid today. See, for instance, Pierre André Taguieff, La nouvelle propa-
gande antijuive, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 2010, p. 145; cf. Gerstenfeld, “Anti-Israelism 
and Anti-Semitism,” p. 85. 
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more prominent in the left-wing press, the stereotypes concerning Israel were not 
confined to this perspective but were shared by the press in general. 
The article analyzes the coverage of the events in five major mainstream newspapers 
from three European countries. These include the conservative Corriere della Sera and the 
left-wing La Repubblica for Italy, the conservative The Times and the left-wing The Guard-
ian for the United Kingdom, and the left-wing Le Monde for France. The analysis is based 
primarily on news articles and aims to examine the features of “the Israelis” conveyed 
by the press in its daily reporting of events. Attention is also given to leading articles and 
commentaries, which expressed the newspapers political line throughout this period.8 
The article is organized around the chronologic sequence of events, with a view to un-
derlining significant evolutions in the discourse. It concentrates on two events that imme-
diately followed the assassination of Lebanese President-elect Bashir Gemayel on 
September 14, 1982, namely the Israeli military intervention in West Beirut and the massa-
cre of Palestinian refugees in the camps of Sabra and Shatila on September 16-18, 1982. 
2. THE PRESS COVERAGE OF THE ASSASSINATION OF BASHIR GEMAYEL AND THE 
ISRAELI MILITARY OPERATION IN WEST BEIRUT 
At the beginning of September 1982, the Lebanon war, which had broken out in June of the 
same year, seemed to be headed toward a solution. Furthermore, a new diplomatic era 
likely to usher in a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict seemed within reach. 
These developments benefited from a series of events that occurred during the preceding 
month, including the election of Maronite leader Bashir Gemayel as president of Lebanon 
and the evacuation of the PLO’s political and military leadership from Beirut. 
However, on September 14, hopes for a peaceful resolution of the Middle East con-
flict were shattered when President-elect Gemayel was assassinated in a bombing in 
Beirut and Israeli forces moved in toward the western (Muslim) areas of the Lebanese 
capital a few hours later. 
These events, which thrust the Middle East back into the limelight, received great 
attention in the press. In the following days, all the opening headlines focused on the 
Lebanese news, although coverage of similar events varied significantly among news-
papers. This aspect attests to the variety of approaches taken when dealing with Middle 
East issues and particularly Israel. 
While news articles described the destruction caused by the explosion and reported 
in detail the relief work at the scene of the attack, the press simultaneously devoted 
prominent attention to the portrait of the assassinated president. 
In the British newspapers, Gemayel was depicted as a controversial figure. Both The 
Times and The Guardian reported on the violence that had marked his past deeds as the 
leader of the Maronite Phalangist militia. They minutely described some of his cruelest 
actions against Maronite opponents in the struggle for the group’s leadership as well as 
against the Palestinians during Lebanon’s civil war.9 On the other hand, both newspa-
                                                                                                                                                       
8 The analysis does not take into consideration those opinions that are detached from the main 
newspapers’ vision, which were sometimes presented but ultimately became collateral or isolated. 
9 See, for instance, “Death in Lebanon,” The Times, September 16, 1982; “Obituary: Bashir Ge-
mayel,” The Times, September 16, 1982; “Gemayel ‘aimed to heal the wounds of conflict,’” The 
Guardian, September 16, 1982; “A bomb to blast away brief hope,” The Guardian, September 16, 1982. 
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pers praised Gemayel for his conversion from a military to a political approach after his 
election to the Lebanese presidency and for his call for reconciliation between Christians 
and Muslims.10 Gemayel was the only Lebanese leader with enough support among 
different communities to be able to restore the country’s sovereignty. He was also the 
closest ally Israel had in Lebanese politics. For these reasons, the two British newspapers 
concluded that his death had led to a political void, which in turn could lead to the 
destabilization of the whole region. The newspapers thus assessed the importance and 
implications of this event mainly from the point of view of international relations. 
A completely different interpretation of the attack appeared in Le Monde. The French 
newspaper chose to report on this event from the point of view of Lebanese society or at 
least one of its political factions. Both through the coverage of the news by Beirut corre-
spondent Lucien George, a left-wing Lebanese national, and the numerous commentar-
ies and editorials written by some of the newspaper’s most prominent columnists,11 Le 
Monde drew an hagiographic portrait of Gemayel. While completely omitting the violent 
aspects of his past, it described Gemayel as a charismatic and “romantic” leader, driven 
by “an almost insane passion for his country” and “a destiny to save Lebanon.”12 More-
over, the newspaper emphasized the consensus Gemayel enjoyed, which went beyond 
the ethnic and political boundaries of his own group, representing Lebanese society as 
unanimously animated by a determination to regain political unity after years of civil 
war.13 By doing so, it clearly ignored the conflicts that were still affecting Lebanon at the 
time, given that its recent past was marked by a bloody civil war. 
The same perspective appeared in Italy’s La Repubblica, which was completely sub-
ordinate to Le Monde in this respect. In fact, its coverage and interpretation of events 
were supplied exclusively by Le Monde’s Beirut correspondent, Lucien George, who also 
acted as a correspondent for the Italian newspaper and whose articles were translated 
into Italian and published in La Repubblica either on the same day or the day after ap-
pearing in Le Monde.14 
Finally, another interpretation of this event appeared in the Corriere della Sera. In pre-
senting Gemayel’s biography, the Italian daily emphasized the most brutal aspects of his 
past and explaining them by reference to the alleged “essence” of Lebanese politics and 
society, which it described—using an Orientalist paradigm—as being based on “feuds” 
and “feudal systems,” “principles unaccounted for in Western democracies.”15 The 
newspaper did not show further interest in the complex reality of Lebanon, thus failing 
                                                                                                                                                       
10  Ibid. Cf. “Street fighter turn into political conciliator,” The Times, 15 September 1982. 
11  Among others, the newspaper’s editor André Fontaine and the newspaper’s Cairo corre-
spondent Jean-Pierre Péroncel-Hugoz. 
12  J.-P. Péroncel-Hugoz, “Une passion presque insensée,” Le Monde, September 16, 1982; cf. 
André Fontaine, “Défense d’espérer!,” Le Monde, September 16, 1982. 
13  See, for instance, Lucien George, “La solidarité nationale retrouvée,” Le Monde, September 
17, 1982. 
14  Lucien George, “Bechir non ha avuto il tempo di pacificare il Libano,” La Repubblica, Septem-
ber 16, 1982; cf. Lucien George, “Trois semaines pour prouver que la solution passait par lui,” Le 
Monde, September 16, 1982; Lucien George, “Anche l’Islam libanese voterà per Amin Gemayel,” La 
Repubblica, September 18, 1982; cf. Lucien George, “La solidarité nationale retrouvée,” Le Monde, 
September 17, 1982. 
15  M. Ch., “Chi è Amin Gemayel,” Corriere della Sera, September 18, 1982. See also Maurizio 
Chierici, “Gemayel, una breve vita tra sanguinose faide,” Corriere della Sera, September 16, 1982. 
ISRAEL’S IMAGE IN THE PRESS DURING THE 1982 LEBANON WAR 191 
to transmit a realistic frame of reference for comprehending the attack and its implica-
tions for Lebanese politics and the situation in the Middle East. 
From the beginning, the press also covered another issue relating to the attack. Ignor-
ing who the attackers might have been (only later historiography would point to Syrian 
responsibility), reports, comments, and leading articles speculated about possible 
instigators and compiled lists of past and present enemies of Gemayel.16 Attention 
focused on the Palestinians, the Syrians, and the Maronite Franjieh and Chamoun 
families, but without any further analysis of these groups’ conflicts with Gemayel or 
their political views. 
While the issue was abandoned by the British press, presumably due to lack of in-
formation, the Italian newspapers and Le Monde continued to speculate in the following 
days. In these newspapers, the hypothesis that the attack might have been committed by 
the Israelis—which had first been formulated in the Lebanese left-wing press and had 
been explicitly dismissed as irrelevant by The Guardian—was closely examined and 
received more and more credit. In news articles and comments, both La Repubblica and 
Corriere della Sera devoted increasing attention to the “advantages”17 that Israel might 
have gained from Gemayel’s death, while in Le Monde this issue appeared, albeit mar-
ginally, in George’s articles. 
Concerning the reasons why the Israelis might have wanted Gemayel’s death, these 
newspapers supported the hypothesis that the Israelis wanted to get rid of Gemayel to 
prevent the stabilization of Lebanon, in order to forestall a potential withdrawal from 
the occupied territories of Gaza and the West Bank. Moreover, by highlighting the recent 
tensions between the Israeli government and Gemayel, because of the latter’s refusal to 
sign a peace treaty with Israel, the Italian newspapers regarded the Israeli leaders’ desire 
to take revenge on an ex-ally who had become recalcitrant as a second motive. For 
example, the Corriere della Sera supported the opinion of unspecified Lebanese Muslim 
leaders who stated that “the Israelis have killed Gemayel because he was adopting a 
hard line against them … they do not forgive whoever hampers their plans and they 
would do anything to boycott any attempts to bring peace to the region.”18 Because of 
the attention and interest it received, the hypothesis regarding Israeli involvement in the 
attack eventually gained prominence and legitimacy, despite the fact that it was not 
presented as a certainty. 
From the outset, the news of the bombing against Gemayel was connected to the en-
try of Israeli troops into West Beirut. This was not only because of the sequence of events 
(articles reporting the attack appeared side-by-side with those reporting the military 
events), but also because the press, with the exception of The Guardian, interpreted 
Gemayel’s death as providing Israel with a “pretext” or “excuse”19 to launch a new 
military operation. 
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The Guardian was the only newspaper that, in accordance with the official declara-
tions of the Israeli authorities, described the operation as a search for hidden arms 
depots and the Palestinian militiamen who had remained in Beirut following the PLO 
evacuation, who were said to number between 2,000 and 4,000. The newspaper therefore 
interpreted Israel’s motive as preventing the military reorganization of the PLO and its 
allies in the political void caused by the assassination of Gemayel.20 
This interpretation also appeared in The Times, which announced the news of the 
military operation on its front page, stating that Begin had acted to preserve gains, i.e. to 
prevent the redeployment of PLO military groups in West Beirut.21 However, The Times 
also presented a second reading, which explicitly denied the officially Israeli position. 
Indeed, on the same front page, a report by Beirut correspondent Robert Fisk focused on 
the invalidation of the official Israeli declarations by reporting the words of the Lebanese 
Prime Minister Chaffiq Wazzan and the opinion of a young member of the Communist 
Party, who both referred to these declarations as “an excuse.”22 In another report on the 
same day, Robert Fisk reaffirmed this interpretation by linking the military action to the 
fact that “there was a favorite saying among Israeli officers in Beirut during the past four 
months: nature, they would say, abhors a vacuum.” In the correspondent’s words, “this 
anodyne phrase accompanied each tiny shift forward”23 that the Israelis had made in 
Lebanon. 
Thus, although The Times, like The Guardian, gave a “rational” explanation for the Is-
raeli intervention, the newspaper also ascribed it to an almost anthropologic factor: the 
fact that the Israelis liked to play the lord and master. 
Conversely, the Italian press and Le Monde concentrated exclusively on the interpre-
tation that denied any tactical or strategic purpose to Israel. Accordingly, the military 
intervention was explained by the emotions driving the Israeli leadership, particularly 
Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, speaking of their 
“dreams,” “desires,” and “ambition.” Le Monde, for instance, stated that the Defense 
Minister “has decided to take advantage of the attack against Bashir Gemayel to fulfill 
the occupation he has dreamt about since the beginning of the war.”24 Similarly, in the 
Corriere della Sera, the Israeli intervention was judged as being “from the beginning 
Sharon’s objective,” who “having gotten rid of the PLO, was waiting for the occasion to 
‘complete the work’ and get rid of every terrorist, every PLO supporter, even the Pales-
tinian refugees themselves.”25 
The interpretation of the operation as originating in irrational impulses was bol-
stered by the approach the newspapers adopted toward the military news, i.e. the way 
in which they reported the unfolding events. Alongside opinions and commentaries 
devoted to the examination of Israel’s possible motives behind the intervention, news 
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articles described the events in extremely general terms, often using highly metaphorical 
language. All of this without any indication about the sequence of events, the quality of 
the troops and military means involved, or information about tactical and strategic 
decisions. News articles generically reported “gunfire and shooting,” “tanks progressing 
with confident slowness,” “combat aircraft flying low over the city,” and “forces tighten-
ing their grip” against residential areas of West Beirut.26 Moreover, the newspapers’ 
correspondents and special envoys contested the Israeli estimate that more than 1,000 
militiamen remained in West Beirut.27 They further repeatedly reported that the Israeli 
targets (imaginary PLO and left-wing militias) only had at their disposal automatic 
machineguns, thereby suggesting there was an imbalance between the forces while also 
suggesting that the action was directed against civilians. For instance, Le Monde pub-
lished a general report by its special envoy in Beirut as follows: 
The kfir [missiles] awaken the city, and soon they throw people into shelters. The grip 
tightens on all sides and, just before eight, the assault is launched. Tanks and com-
mandos come up from the sea…. Panic. Cars rush to a safe shelter. Women run, ba-
bies in their arms, toward the nearest shelter. Men follow them, carrying bread and 
water.28 
In this respect, The Guardian also gave a different account. It was the only newspaper to 
report a sequence of events, as well as the way the attack was conducted, together with 
an indication that the operation had taken place in an area that was the stronghold of 
Palestinian militias.29 The newspaper’s account therefore proves that information about 
what was going on was in fact available and that, using this information, events could be 
accounted for in a more comprehensive way. 
3. THE SABRA AND SHATILA MASSACRES 
The alarming Lebanese situation set in motion by Gemayel’s death suddenly took a 
dramatic turn with the massacres in the Palestinian refugees camps of Sabra and Shatila, 
in which, depending on the estimates, between 700 and 2,000 people were killed, most of 
whom were civilians. From September 19 onwards, news of the massacres made the 
front page headlines in all newspapers and news relating to these events monopolized 
the front pages during the following week. 
Due to an initial lack of information about the exact nature of the massacres, the first 
reports described what had happened mainly through “television-style” descriptions of 
the destruction and the unburied corpses in the camps, as witnessed by the international 
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journalists in Beirut who first entered the area after the killers had left. At the same time, 
these first accounts focused on Israel’s role in the massacres, which was also highlighted 
in headlines and leading articles.30 In fact, whilst rapidly reporting that the actual 
perpetrators of the massacres were confusedly identified by survivors as belonging 
either to the Phalangist militias or the Christian militia commanded by Major Saad 
Haddad (a military renegade who was Israel’s closest ally in Southern Lebanon), all 
reports mainly explored the Israeli leaders’ and soldiers’ responsibilities, either based on 
available information or in a hypothetical way. In fact, from the beginning and during 
the following days, this issue constituted the main focus of the majority of the commen-
taries and editorials. 
Various newspapers blamed Israel with different degrees of responsibility. Le Monde 
and La Repubblica ascribed to Israel a direct involvement in the massacres. For instance, Le 
Monde’s first leading article commenting on the massacres asserted that with this episode 
Israel has reached the limits of the crazy logic that belongs to Begin, a paranoiac folly 
that identifies every Palestinian as a terrorist—and therefore each Palestinian is be-
lieved to be one, the absolute evil to exterminate.31 
Similarly, La Repubblica’s leader explicitly identified Begin and Sharon as “the architects 
of the massacre,” adding that “we would never have imagined that the Israeli govern-
ment could organize this latest manhunt (and womanhunt and childhunt) in the Pales-
tinian camps in Beirut.”32 
During the following days Le Monde on three occasions devoted its second page en-
tirely to opinions focused on Israel, discussing its involvement and role in the massacres, 
as well as the implications for the country at a political and moral level. Although 
various points of view were featured, those accusing Israel for the massacres were 
preponderant.33 Moreover, because Le Monde exclusively explored Israel’s involvement, 
its reading of the massacres clearly assigned more than a marginal or indirect role to 
Israel in the events, and instead portrayed it as the main character. 
The Corriere della Sera ambiguously suggested there had been indirect Israeli in-
volvement. Most of the news articles referred to the fact that Israeli soldiers were (only) 
indirectly involved for having failed to stop the killers in spite of their position around 
the camps’ perimeter. Nevertheless, the newspaper’s special envoy in Beirut, describing 
his conversation with a mother from Shatila whose family had been killed, declared that 
“we would like to suggest to the woman to put her four dead children, father, and 
husband on Begin’s desk.”34 Moreover, the newspaper’s leading article assigned major 
responsibility to the Israeli government, although it did not accuse the Israeli leaders of 
planning the massacres.35 
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Similarly, in leading articles and opinion pieces, the British newspapers endorsed the 
theory of Israel’s indirect responsibility for having failed to stop the massacres and for 
being somewhat involved with the alleged killers at the military and political level.36 
Two in-depth documentary reports, which appeared in the newspapers when more 
information had been gathered, provided a chronology of the massacres starting from 
the Israeli operation in West Beirut, thereby directly linking what had happened to 
Israel. Moreover, both reports—The Guardian’s suggestively entitled “Complicity in a 
massacre”—focused on Israel’s role and aimed to establish what the position and the 
involvement of the troops had been, as well as the degree of government’s responsibility 
that could be inferred from available information and official declarations.37 
While reports from Beirut continued to analyze Israel’s role in depth, in the follow-
ing days all newspapers prominently featured reports from Israel that conveyed new 
information, mostly revealed by Israeli military correspondents in Beirut, about the 
government’s and the soldiers’ awareness that massacres were being perpetrated against 
civilians in the camps. The official version given by Defense Minister Sharon in the 
Knesset also received prominence. Sharon stated that, in agreement with top Phalangist 
leaders, Israel had indeed planned a military operation, which, according to those plans, 
should have been confined to action against armed militiamen still hiding in the camps, 
with Phalangists guaranteeing that no civilians would be harmed. 
The press reported on this declaration as “evidence” of Israel’s responsibility, in 
some cases depicting it as an open “confession” by the defense minister. Sharon’s 
specific allegation that Phalangist militias had carried out the massacre, which was 
corroborated by evidence gathered by Israeli journalists in Lebanon at the same time, 
was either completely ignored or explicitly denied as fraudulent by the press. 
Articles used the word “Phalangists” more frequently than the expression 
“Haddad’s forces” to refer to the killers, although correspondents continued to mention 
both armies, sometimes in the same story. Even more often, newspapers wrote about the 
perpetrators of the massacres while underlining their connection to Israel or, alterna-
tively, their subordinate role vis-à-vis Israel. For instance, Robert Fisk, who often re-
ferred to the killers as “Christian militias” or “Israel’s Lebanese auxiliaries and allies,” 
wrote a report in The Times dealing primarily with the connection between the two 
groups and Israel rather than the two Lebanese armies.38 
The Guardian was the only newspaper that pointed to militia chief Elias Khobeika as 
the author of the massacres, as indicated by Sharon, and was also the only newspaper 
that explored the consequences this entailed for Lebanon.39 As evidence of Maronite 
involvement increasingly mounted, no other newspaper contemplated the political 
implications for Lebanon of the Phalangist militias’ responsibility, even when Bashir 
Gemayel’s brother, Amin, was elected to the Lebanese presidency. 
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The press also failed to investigate the motives behind the militias’ action. The first re-
ports in the Corriere della Sera and The Guardian about the massacres raised this issue, but 
only marginally. In practice, both newspapers simply attributed the massacres to “en-
demic” Lebanese violence and the “atavistic hatred” nurtured by Christian groups against 
Muslims and Palestinians.40 La Repubblica and Le Monde never contemplated and even 
explicitly denied the possibility that the Phalangists were animated by revenge because of 
the assassination of their leader Gemayel. The newspapers’ idyllic representation of the 
national unity fostered by Bashir clearly collided with the reality of the massacres. Both 
newspapers instead interpreted Sharon’s allegations as another Israeli attempt to destabi-
lize Lebanon. This view was also shared by The Times, mainly through Fisk’s reports.41 
In contrast, the Israeli “motives” for organizing or allowing the massacres were ana-
lyzed in depth by the press, both in news reports and in leading articles and comments. 
All newspapers considered that one of the reasons behind the massacres was, as La 
Repubblica put it, “the intention of the Israelis to disperse the refugees in order to prevent 
national and cultural unity, which could favor the formation of armed groups.”42 This 
comment clearly assumes a political and strategic—and brutal—motive behind Israel’s 
involvement in the massacres. It was the only version presented by The Guardian, which, 
for instance, talked about a “strong suspicion that Mr. Begin, Mr. Sharon and a few more 
are intent on prolonging the [Lebanese] crisis to extract everything they can from it, 
including an atmosphere of terror among the Palestinians.”43 However, this interpreta-
tion was marginal and the massacres were more often interpreted as deriving from 
Israeli leaders’ willingness to annihilate Palestinians, a “desire” belonging to the irra-
tional sphere, beyond any political or military rationale. 
For instance, the Corriere della Sera stated that the massacres were “absurd and found 
no justification in the logic of war.” It assigned their responsibility to Israel and sug-
gested, using a comparison to World War II, that the Israelis were in fact animated by a 
desire of extermination similar to the one once suffered by the Jews during that period: 
“the Israelis have committed a historic crime. Indeed a people who came out of the lager 
could not and should not have committed the massacre of the Palestinians who stayed 
in the lager after the evacuation of the guerrilla.”44 
La Repubblica conveyed a similar view. It held that the Jewish people had undergone 
a process of “mutation” in Israel by introducing the idea of an “Israeli disease” as the 
key to interpret events. The newspaper found the origin of the disease, characterized as 
the “emergence of a systematic and uncontrollable violence both at the level of the 
leadership and amongst the entire society,”45 in the Jewish character of the state. In the 
editor’s words: 
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[the origin of the disease] is primarily psychological. Israel has introjected part of the 
violence it has suffered from over centuries and now that it can, it gives it back furi-
ously. From sacrificial victim, it has become executioner; from defenseless people, it 
has become a conqueror State.46 
Much like the Italian newspapers, Le Monde considered that the Israeli leaders’ “folie 
exterminatrice” was one of the primary motives of the massacres. It featured several 
comments that assigned this irrational feeling to a “mutation” the Jews had undergone 
in Israel. 
Finally, The Times did not focus on the reasons behind the massacres. Nevertheless, a 
comment by Fisk conveyed the idea that the massacres were to be understood as an 
Israeli “obsession” vis-à-vis terrorism, thus once again placing the Israeli motivation 
primarily in the irrational sphere.47 
4. “ANOTHER ISRAEL”: THE REACTIONS TO THE MASSACRES IN ISRAEL AND 
AMONG DIASPORA JEWS 
Another issue emerges from the analysis of the press during this period. The image of 
Israel described so far concentrates mainly on the representation of the government and 
the military. Following the massacres, newspapers also conveyed the image of what they 
described as “another Israel,” which referred not only to what was, in the newspapers’ 
judgment, “the finest part” of the Israeli public but also to Jews in the Diaspora. 
From the beginning, the reactions of Israeli civil society to the massacres received 
attention in the press. News articles and reports from Israel described Israeli citizens as 
“anguished” and “distraught,” as well as “ashamed,” because of what had happened in 
the refugees camps.48 However, these feelings were never further explored. The news 
from Israel instead dealt with the political struggle that was raging in parliament be-
tween the government and the Labor opposition party, due to the refusal of the former 
to set up an impartial commission of inquiry into the involvement of the army and 
politicians in the events. 
In addition to political coverage, correspondents reported on the protests that were 
taking place in the country. On September 25, the front page headlines of all newspapers 
were devoted to the news of a demonstration that the opposition and peace movements 
had organized the day before in Tel Aviv. 
Although the news emphasized that this had been the biggest demonstration ever 
held in Israel since the foundation of the state, all newspapers also pointed out that only 
a minority of the population opposed the government. Moreover, no newspaper exam-
ined Israeli pacifism in and of itself. The demands of the pacifist movement therefore 
appeared to be directly related to the massacres and the opposition’s demands for a 
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commission of inquiry and the resignation of the government. The peace movement, as 
represented in the press, ultimately coincided with the parliamentary opposition. 
The press’s analysis of Israeli society was thus limited to an investigation of political 
parties and political events, and the newspapers were unable to echo the various points 
of view circulating in Israeli social and political life. 
Furthermore, from the start, the newspapers drew parallels between the Israeli reac-
tion and the reaction of Jewish communities in the Diaspora. Both issues appeared in 
articles that were placed side-by-side on front and inside pages. 
Several articles reported on the official declarations of the international Jewish com-
munity concerning the massacres and covered large and small initiatives promoted by 
Jewish institutions and groups. A protest organized by a few dozen Jews in Rome was 
thus compared to the 400,000-strong demonstration in Tel Aviv. 
While the views of individual Israelis were either marginalized or ignored, on sev-
eral occasions news articles conveyed the opinions of individual non-Israelis explicitly 
identified as Jews and gave prominence to interviews with intellectuals and community 
leaders.49 
These “Jewish opinions” often unanimously condemned the Israeli deeds in Leba-
non. As a consequence, newspapers represented Diaspora Jews as the true holders of the 
“original values of Judaism,”50 as opposed to the transgression of those values perpe-
trated by Israeli politicians. 
The fact that, in the press’s view, the massacres concerned Diaspora Jews as well as Is-
raelis can be clearly seen, for instance, in the following comment in the Corriere della Sera: 
What is going on in the heart, in the mind, in the feelings of those who are called Levi 
or Segre, of those who have the name of a city and are linked, heart and soul, to the 
people of the “Exodus”? We asked intellectuals, writers … common people who are 
experiencing, once again, the nightmare of the uncertainty and of the Biblical curse, 
because of a now generalized condemnation.51 
Clearly, the quality of the articles conveying the reaction of the Diaspora Jews was 
superior to that of the articles concerning the Israelis’ reaction. In addition, the repetition 
of these articles gave the impression that the members of the “other Israel” whom the 
newspapers talked about were first and foremost Diaspora Jews, whose image conflicted 
greatly with the negative image of the Israelis as presented in the news. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
From this analysis of the newspapers’ coverage of the events in Lebanon of September 
1982, three key issues emerge about the image of Israel and the Israelis as conveyed by 
the press during this period. 
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First of all, all newspapers tended to detach Israel from the surrounding historical 
and political context, which was merely presented as a “stage” on which the Israelis 
operated. In other words, the actions of the Israelis received prominent or exclusive 
attention, as clearly suggested in the analysis of the coverage of Gemayel’s assassination. 
Both the Orientalist representation of Lebanese society adopted by the Corriere della Sera 
and the approach of the British newspapers, which focused on the international conse-
quences of Gemayel’s death, ignored Lebanon’s multifaceted ethnic and political reality. 
Le Monde and La Repubblica, on the other hand, chose to depict an idyllic image of Leba-
nese society that equally deprived the readers of the possibility to fully comprehend the 
complexity of the events. 
When mentioned in the press, the various Lebanese groups were simply “labeled” 
under general political or ethnic terms (the left-wing, the Muslims, the Maronites, etc.) 
without any information on their political positions or ambitions. 
The press adopted a similar aphasic representation of the Palestinians. In the ac-
counts of the military operation in West Beirut, they emerged in an abstract manner as 
potential targets of the Israelis. Conversely, in reports about the massacres at Sabra and 
Shatila, they appeared either as unburied corpses or small groups of survivors (most 
often women) mourning what had happened. On this occasion, the press did not show 
any interest in their emotional individuality nor, as was the case for other Lebanese 
factions, in their political specificity. Instead, they were represented as symbolic victims 
of Israeli (mis)deeds. 
Secondly, concerning the way the press portrayed the Israelis, the analysis reveals 
that their image was often based on prejudices toward Israeli leaders’ actions and 
motives rather than on an examination of the available data and information. This can 
clearly be inferred from the attitude of the press toward information from Israeli 
sources, which the press relied on only when it corroborated already established opin-
ions, as happened with evidence gathered by Israeli journalists about Israel’s military 
and political involvement in the massacres. In contrast, information coming from the 
Israeli government was either ignored or denied regardless of its validity when it did 
not match “expectations,” as happened in the case of official declarations making allega-
tions against the Phalangist militias. Although the Italian newspapers and Le Monde 
used this approach more often, it was sometimes also adopted by The Times. Certainly, 
the greater the amount of available information and the deeper the elaboration of the 
facts, like in The Guardian, the more balanced the ideas conveyed about the facts them-
selves and about the main characters involved in the events. 
Nevertheless, the image of Israel and the Israelis painted by the press was mislead-
ing and almost exclusively represented the actions and opinions of the army and the 
government. Leaders were portrayed in very negative terms in all newspapers and were 
mostly described as being driven by a conquering will and irrational (negative) im-
pulses, such as vengeance and a desire for annihilation. The image of the Israeli army 
that appeared in the news consisted mainly of military means (aircraft and tanks), 
conveying the idea of devastating force and the disproportionate (and indiscriminate) 
use of those means. These reports converged in validating the expression “Israeli war 
machine,” which was used by journalists and commentators in all newspapers as a 
synonym for the Israeli army, together with the use of phrases like “Sharon’s army” or 
“Begin’s troops,” which explicitly identified the army with the government. 
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Moreover, by referring to World War II when describing the massacres in Sabra and 
Shatila, the press implicitly drew a parallel between the Nazis and the Israelis, who were 
referred to as the executioners of today’s victims (the Palestinians). The Israelis were 
thus depicted in terms of absolute evil, and the interpretation of their actions, deprived 
of any political or sociological analysis, resorted to psychological categories. “Insane 
passion,” “folly,” and “mental disease” were all identified as belonging specifically to 
the Israelis. 
Discussing the press coverage of the events in Lebanon of 1982 in his latest work La 
nouvelle propaganda antijuive, the French sociologist Pierré-André Taguieff argues that 
The criminalization of Israel based on the accusation of the Sabra and Shatila massa-
cres derives from a campaign of disinformation that has all in all succeeded. But this 
campaign was successful because it offered a confirmation of what the audience al-
ready believed it knew. Something like an illustration considered as evidence of what 
Israel was expected to do.52 
From the analysis of the press, it is not a conscious campaign of disinformation that 
emerges but rather a “set of prejudices” about Israel that informed the work of the 
journalists, affecting their coverage of events, and was presumably shared by the audi-
ence the newspapers addressed. Moreover, these prejudices, although more prominent 
in the left-wing Le Monde and La Repubblica, were by no means exclusive to this side of 
the political spectrum. In practice, they were shared by the conservative Corriere della 
Sera and The Times. In the left-wing The Guardian, however, these prejudices were miti-
gated by the more comprehensive information provided by the newspaper. 
Finally, the emerging image of “another Israel” was awarded a positive connotation 
through an ambiguous parallelism between a segment of the Israeli public and Jews in 
the Diaspora. Without any elaboration on the reality and the complexity of the relation-
ship between Diaspora Jews and the State of Israel, the former were regarded as primary 
interpreters of Israeli actions and were treated almost as full characters taking part in the 
events. 
The press presented Israel as the lens through which Diaspora Jews were observed, 
thus portraying it as the “collective Jew.” 
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The Transformation of Antisemitism 
in a Cosmopolitanizing Environment 
Elisabeth Kuebler.* and Matthias Falter.** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this paper is to discuss antisemitism .1 in the cosmopolitanizing envi-
ronment of the UN Durban Review Conference (henceforth, Durban II), which took 
place in Geneva in 2009. Based on our definition of antisemitism, we will map the 
transformations and continuities of antisemitism at Durban II as compared to traditional 
antisemitism. Instead of a mere description of the events, we seek to capture Durban II, 
the preparatory process, and the surrounding debates as a cosmopolitanizing environ-
ment. As shall be explained later, such an environment is a fairly institutionalized 
setting that is located between the nation-state and (the so far non-existent) world 
society. This more abstract conceptualization of Durban II allows for an evidence-based 
investigation of the degree to which antisemitic practices .2 were modified at Durban II. 
By way of conclusion, we suggest that, on the surface, antisemitic speech has been 
adapted to the new cosmopolitanizing environment of Durban II. A more thorough 
inspection reveals that the most remarkable turning point in modern antisemitism 
remains the Shoah and the subsequent establishment of the State of Israel. In other 
words, the patterns of resentment unfolding at Durban II are to be understood as anti-
semitism coming after the Nazi annihilation of European Jews and in light of the contin-
ued threat to the existence of a Jewish and democratic sovereign state. 
The 2001 World Conference Against Racism (WCAR) in Durban and its 2009 follow-
up, both organized by the UN, garnered wide media attention due to the antisemitic acts 
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1 Throughout this text, the spelling antisemitism is preferred. In contrast to the hyphenated ver-
sion, it visualizes that antisemitism is an ideology directed against Jews or people perceived as such 
and that it bears no relation to opposition against Semitism, which outside the field of linguistics is a 
largely meaningless concept. 
2 In an earlier article (Falter & Kuebler 2010), based on a comprehensive analysis of all docu-
ments pertinent to Durban II, we identified the obsession with Israel as the sole bearer of blame for 
the Middle East conflict, the delegitimation of Jewish statehood, the equation of Israel with Nazi 
Germany, the Jewish world conspiracy myth, and the hijacking of Jewish Holocaust remembrance 
as the core antisemitic moments at Durban II. 
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of various conference participants and accredited NGO representatives, the almost 
obsessive concentration on Israel’s role in the Middle East conflict, and the correspond-
ing protest, which included the withdrawal of several country delegations.3 Even com-
mentators who are rather critical of Israel, such as Banton, argue that a unique 
opportunity to address racism, colonialism, and slavery at global level was thereby 
missed (Banton 2002: 359). In September 2011, Durban III took place in New York to 
mark one decade of what could be called the Durban process of UN anti-racism events 
and related preparatory processes.4  
The UN-Israel relationship has been tense since its inception. The UN’s dispropor-
tionate focus on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is characterized by an anti-Israel bias (cf. 
Mréjen 1998). Resolution 3379, branding Zionism as a form of racism, which was passed 
in 1975 and revoked in 1991, represents the pre-Durban nadir of this relationship. At the 
same time, the UN refers to the end of World War II as its founding moment, following 
the failure of the League of Nations, and has been active in Holocaust remembrance and 
genocide prevention since the turn of the millennium. 
Before analyzing antisemitism and Durban II, our normative point of departure 
should be clarified. We advocate the viewpoint that international and regional organiza-
tions are shaped by power relations and unequal access. They accordingly constitute 
venues of politics, i.e. the ideologically grounded contestation of interests and prefer-
ences, and are clearly not a-political regulators. These international and regional actors 
by no means render the nation-state obsolete, but rather supplement it in terms of 
moderating member-state positions and re-importing adapted or novel policies to the 
domestic level. Conceding to Dahl’s skepticism (Dahl 2010), this does not automatically 
imply that international or regional organizations promote or at least partially function 
according to Western liberal democratic principles. This is especially true of intergov-
ernmental organizations, whose actors are delegated or appointed by nation-state 
governments and cannot be elected into office or forced to resign by the people. Dahl’s 
critique of unrealistic expectations regarding global democracy can be expanded to the 
realm of transnational civil society. Yet ideology and interest-based politics do not 
necessarily need a full-blown democratic framework to materialize. Moreover, it is 
important to emphasize the significance of the UN’s legitimacy, which is due to its 
foundation as an immediate response to the crimes against humanity and atrocities of 
World War II and the inclusion of practically all sovereign nation-states. Antisemitic 
agitation in such an environment does not only bestow acceptability on this ideology but 
can also have a very tangible impact on concrete geo-political decisions. 
                                                                                                                                                       
3 Israel and the United States withdrew their delegations from the WCAR. Australia, Canada, 
Germany, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, and the United States refused to 
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process. The United Kingdom and 22 other European countries boycotted President Ahmadinejad’s 
speech. The Czech Republic, which held the rotating European Council presidency at the time, 
recalled its delegation shortly after Ahmadinejad’s antisemitic tirade. 
4 Due to time constraints, Durban III is not covered in this analysis. It can only be assumed that 
our theoretical argument will be at least partially applicable to the decennial conference. As of the 
beginning of September 2011, Australia, Austria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Germany, Israel, 
Italy, the Netherlands and the United States had announced their intention to boycott the event. 
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II. ANTISEMITISM AFTER THE SHOAH AND IN LIGHT OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL 
We regard antisemitism as ideologically shaped hostility toward people who define 
themselves or are defined by others as being Jewish. Antisemitism is a complex of 
resentments against Jews as well as an ideological explanation of the world and society 
(Rensmann & Schoeps 2011: 21; Salzborn 2010b: 91). Antisemitic prejudices are anti-
pluralistic, since they reject the idea of a diverse society. Antisemites pursue the idea of a 
harmonious community devoid of conflict and difference in standpoints. Contrary to 
racism, modern antisemitism conveys a Manichean dimension by imagining a “counter-
race,” which according to antisemites ought to be annihilated (Horkheimer & Adorno 
2001: 177). In this ideological assumption, Jews embody by their very existence the 
“principle of evil,” which clashes with other peoples’ welfare and interests (Sartre 1994: 
28). Jews are blamed for social and political conflicts as well as economic crises, and they 
are regarded as a powerful clique that affects various social structures and phenomena. 
Antisemitism can therefore be regarded as a distorted perception and explanation of 
reality. 
Being a hermetic worldview, antisemitism tends to resist all empirical evidence 
countering its ideological suppositions (Arendt 2001: 763; Salzborn 2010a: 331). Howev-
er, antisemitic resentments do not remain completely steady, and their frames of ideo-
logical argumentation have transformed throughout history due to changing political, 
economic, and social circumstances (Laqueur 2006; Maccoby 2006; Wistrich 2010: 34). 
Since the Holocaust, overt antisemitic attacks against Jews have been gradually replaced 
with a coded political language that produces and reproduces antisemitic resentments 
less blatantly, especially within Western democratic nation-states and/or international 
and regional organizations shaped by the West (Rensmann & Schoeps 2011: 18). In 
addition, Holocaust denial, the fight against remembrance of the Shoah, and rejection of 
the State of Israel have been incorporated into the complex of antisemitic ideology. 
Though already an expression of antisemitic resentment before the establishment of 
Israel, in its aftermath anti-Zionism has increasingly become a focal point of antisemitic 
ideology (Wistrich 2010: 62). Displaying most features common to an ethnically defined 
nation-state, contemporary Israel’s self-characterization as a Jewish state.5 is used as an 
accusation against it, turning it into a “Jew among the nations” in a seemingly post-
national world. In this context, criticism of Israel serves as a smokescreen for less ac-
ceptable overt antisemitic attacks. 
III. HALF-WAY TO A GLOBAL COSMOPOLITAN DEMOCRACY 
By analyzing antisemitic contributions to Durban II, we highlight current changes and 
continuities in antisemitism in a cosmopolitanizing environment. Fine’s useful distinc-
tion between the “cosmopolitan outlook” and the “cosmopolitan condition” (Fine 2007: 
134) describes the tension between the ideal of a cosmopolitan world, as envisioned by 
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ethnic, and republican statehood and citizenship (cf. Shafir & Peled 2002). The ethnic component is 
stressed here, as Israel’s immigration and naturalization laws are predominantly defined by criteria 
of ethnicity. 
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the Stoics in antiquity, Kant, and contemporary thinkers such as Held, and present-day 
globalized society with its existing—albeit isolated—actualizations of cosmopolitanism. 
In order to make sense of this non-linear process toward a (currently utopian) world 
society, the term cosmopolitanizing environment is introduced. This describes a partially 
institutionalized setting (more concretely UN bodies or regular meetings and large-scale 
conferences) that clearly transcends the boundaries of the sovereign nation-state or mere 
intergovernmental cooperation, is inclusive toward non-state actors, and realizes core 
elements of cosmopolitanism. 
Such programmatic political cosmopolitanism in its idealized form has been cogently 
described by Archibugi (2010) and Held (2010). A future cosmopolitan democracy 
would be anchored in a UN-based world parliament, representing governments and 
individuals, with the important qualification that decisions should be taken most closely 
to the citizens affected. Issues that transcend the limits of subsidiarity and make it on to 
the agenda of the world parliament are thus understood to be of global significance. 
Archibugi (2010: 321) explains one of the key features of his and Held’s vision: “Admis-
sion to intergovernmental organizations is regulated by the principle of effective control 
over a given territory, excluding only governments that violate fundamental human 
rights (for instance, genocide and apartheid).” A watershed controversy within the 
discussion of political cosmopolitanism concerns the question of basic constitutional 
rules, most probably of Western liberal democratic design (a viewpoint advocated by 
Habermas), and Mouffe’s call for ongoing contestation that transforms antagonism into 
agonism (cf. Tambakaki 2009). 
The case of Durban II is conceptually challenging, because it merges the existing 
cosmopolitan condition (as expressed in low thresholds to participation, (temporary) 
recognition irrespective of concrete form of government, and the cherished principle of 
dialogue) with the ideal of a global community stripped of racism, the negative legacy of 
slavery, and (neo-)colonialism. Certainly, the cosmopolitanizing environment that 
emerged during the Durban process is host to fundamental arguments concerning the 
potential membership of world society. Although this is a rather illusionary goal, dis-
putes in this regard are fought out with the means provided by the existing cosmopoli-
tan condition. Furthermore, Durban II was clearly informed by the framing of the issue 
of racism and the purported domination of the world by the West, the United States and, 
most ridiculously, Israel as a joint predicament. According to Beck (2010), affectedness 
shared by all or at least large segments of humanity provokes the search for cosmopoli-
tan answers. Drawing on Pogge (2010), the principle of sovereignty is entirely abolished, 
but political units are reshaped in order to adequately respond to threats that cut across 
nation-state borders. Finally, the cosmopolitanizing environment of Durban II promi-
nently features more or less explicit references to (real or perceived) crimes against 
humanity. This mirrors and possibly also perverts the basic cosmopolitan principle of 
the human rights of the individual superseding the power of sovereign states (as ex-
pressed in the juridification of the issue at the Nuremberg, Rwanda, and Bosnia tribu-
nals and the ICC) (cf. Benhabib 2006; Hayden 2005). As explained in the seminal study 
by Levy and Sznaider (2005) on the globalization and universalization of Holocaust 
remembrance, the Holocaust serves as a blueprint for the global recognition of victim-
hood in a cosmopolitanizing environment. 
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IV. JEWS AND ISRAEL: A STUMBLING BLOCK ON THE ROAD TO A HARMONIOUS 
WORLD SOCIETY? 
At Durban II, the struggle over inclusion in and exclusion from an ideal cosmopolitan 
world society culminated in an effort by Arab and Muslim countries and similarly 
aligned NGOs to exclude Israel from a future world society. Not surprisingly, this 
received a rather lukewarm reaction from UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon (4) and 
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navanethem Pillay (5), who vacillated 
between their outrage at Ahmadinejad’s antisemitism and their desire to keep the 
conference as inclusive and dialogue-based as possible. According to the conceptualiza-
tion of antisemitism as outlined above, the singling-out of Israel from the apparently 
harmonious global community revolves around five dimensions, which include both 
changes and continuities in traditional antisemitic resentments. These dimensions are: 
the construction of a harmonious global community;6 exclusion from such a community; 
the deflation and reversal of guilt; falling victim to imagined Jewish domination and 
conspiracies; and the rejection of nationhood and nation-states. 
Although 20th century antisemitism has always had an international dimension (Ar-
endt 1948), it tended to be framed by national semantics (Holz 2001). Ironically, Jews 
were considered to be a cosmopolitan threat to the nation-state by undermining the 
national community through modern capitalism and international conspiracies 
(Rensmann & Schoeps 2011: 23). The notion of a homogenous collective is a key aspect 
of antisemitic ideology, but in the cosmopolitanizing environment the point of reference 
is gradually shifting to the idea of a harmonious world community devoid of conflict. 
Whereas in the national context Jews were depicted as an anti-national or cosmopolitan 
menace to the nation concerned, in a cosmopolitanizing environment that promotes the 
notion of global dialogue antisemites accuse Israel and Zionists of being a nationalist, 
racist, and particularist remnant in an imagined universalist surrounding. In both cases, 
Jews are perceived as the cause for international conflicts, economic crises, and human 
suffering. Due to the politically correct speech adopted after the Shoah, antisemitic 
speech rarely refers to the Jews but rather to the Jewish national movement, i.e. Zionism. 
The overarching theme of the antisemitic speech acts at Durban II was the attempt to 
ostracize Israel and by extension, perhaps, the Jewish people from the desired harmony 
of the global community. The cosmopolitanization of international politics contributes to 
the globalization of the discourses of inclusion and exclusion beyond the nation-state. A 
Janus-faced process of othering can be discerned. On the one hand, the Other can be a 
respected part of humankind, whose diversity has to be accommodated by means of 
deliberation. On the other hand, a different Other is completely shunned from the 
imagined global community, as its very existence is regarded as a threat to the former. 
The discursive and practical exclusion of Jews and Jewish collectives from various types 
of community is a core device of antisemitic ideology. Whereas in Medieval Europe Jews 
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the first is indicative of an idealized cosmopolitan future, in which people associate with and 
assume responsibility for each other by dint of their belonging to humankind, the latter contains the 
notion of a more closely knit collective, which excludes people on the ground of certain criteria of 
belonging. One such criterion could be compliance with cosmopolitan ideals as defined by the 
insiders or potential insiders of the global community. 
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were expelled from towns and boroughs, in more modern times they have been regard-
ed as a menace to gentile communities. Antisemitic outbursts in a cosmopolitanizing 
environment clearly include a disproportionate focus on the Middle East conflict. Under 
this distorted perception, the Palestinian side is made out to be the victim while the 
Israeli state is demonized. For example, the statement by the head of the Sudanese 
delegation at Durban II singled out the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and referred to “hei-
nous crimes committed against the Palestinian people by the Israeli occupation” (10). 
Moreover he stated that “Israel continues to act against humanity,” thereby excluding it 
from the imagined community concerned with the protection of humanity. Two months 
prior to Durban II, the Iranian minister of foreign affairs accused Israel of “committing 
multiple crimes against humanity and war crimes.” Israel would not “pay the faintest 
respect to humanity and human rights” and would ignore “the values of the interna-
tional community and the civilized world” (11). By demonizing Israel, antisemitic actors 
attempt to build the discursive foundations for its exclusion from a cosmopolitanizing 
global community. 
The term Holocaust has been universalized to characterize other (real or perceived) 
crimes against humanity and the subsequent legitimate recognition of victimhood. This 
is part of a tendency to hijack and delegitimize this specific Jewish memory. A wealth of 
contributions at Durban II attempted to claim victimhood of a Holocaust-like crime in 
order to delegitimize the status of the State of Israel, which is an historical consequence 
of Nazis’ mass extermination of the Jews. This link is increasingly and awkwardly used 
by Holocaust deniers, who trivialize or reject the Shoah but also compare contemporary 
Israeli policies and military action to that of Nazi Germany in order to justify their 
hatred of the State of Israel. A consortium of several NGOs contributed a statement at 
Durban II accusing Israel of “implementing a policy of slow ‘ethnic cleansing’” (1). 
Another attempt to claim victimhood was displayed in a statement by Algeria during a 
session of the Preparatory Committee in which it claimed that Arabs were also “Se-
mites” and hence that they were affected by the exclusionary practices of European 
societies in a similar fashion to Jews (12). Others did not adopt the term of antisemitism 
for their own cause but, like the Secretary General of the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference (OIC), rejected any discussion on antisemitism. At Durban II, he remarked 
that the Review Process should not be “an anti-Semitism exercise” and in so doing 
repudiated any engagement with charges of antisemitism. Furthermore, he proposed 
that the participants should “address the real and serious challenges of racism, racial 
discrimination, xenophobia and islamophobia” (8, emphasis added). It was frequently 
suggested that the concept of Islamophobia was the exact equivalent of antisemitism 
and an even more pressing and ardent issue. In the most extreme cases, Israeli policies 
toward the Palestinians were equated with Nazi crimes. For example, the Iranian Neda 
Institute for Scientific and Political Research accused Israel of “intentionally and indis-
criminately” targeting civilians in the Palestinian territories, arguing that “[t]his can only 
be explained by incessant indoctrinations of racial superiority….” It went on to state that 
a “genuine opposition to Nazism can only be achieved by fighting the concepts of racial 
superiority” (3). This statement thus links (alleged) Israeli policies to the Nazi concept of 
racial superiority and is tantamount to a reversal of guilt. 
In a fiercely criticized speech at Durban II, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmad-
inejad incorporated key elements of several classic antisemitic conspiracies by suggest-
ing to the assembly that “you are all aware of the conspiracies of some powers and 
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Zionist circles against the goals and objectives of this conference” (7). Shortly thereafter, 
he stated that the “making of a global society is in fact the accomplishment of a noble 
goal held in the establishment of a common global system”. In antisemitic ideology, the 
successful construction of a homogeneous world community is inextricably bound up 
with the projection of all real-life contradictions and cleavages onto an allegedly power-
ful clique of people (i.e. the Jews) who are perceived as inhibiting the progress and well-
being of all other nations. Put succinctly, antisemites tend to regard themselves and/or 
their allies as victims of alleged Jewish domination. The perception of victimhood 
requires an easily identifiable perpetrator. By reducing complex phenomena and rela-
tions to the form of a single clique, this Manichean and distorted worldview is able to 
gain momentum. Antisemitic conspiracy theories have always transcended national 
boundaries, but in a cosmopolitanizing environment and given the universalization of 
Holocaust remembrance the presumed moral surplus of victimhood is outweighed by 
antisemitic fear of Jewish domination. Even the Western media’s criticism of antisemitic 
and anti-Zionist tendencies within the Durban process was linked to conspiracy theo-
ries. For example, an NGO named Europe-Third World Centre (CETIM) ascribed the 
“disinformation” to the influence of “financial oligarchies” (2). 
The challenge posed by the imposition of globalization on a world still structured 
according to nation-state divisions and the uncertainties arising from that situation are 
projected onto Israel, which in the eyes of its enemies is an example of outdated and 
ultimately illegitimate nationalism. The nationalist agendas of other sovereign states 
were simply ignored at Durban II and were even defended against foreign interference. 
A collective of NGOs against racism against Arabs, Africans, and Muslims issued a 
statement singling out the Middle East conflict as the only evil in the region, while 
simultaneously protesting against the charges brought by the International Criminal 
Court against the Sudanese president (6). At the closing session of Durban II, the Paki-
stani representative of the OIC emphasized the “positive role played by the delegations 
of Palestine, Syria and Iran” and protested against the occupation of “Muslim lands” (9).  
This examination of the contributions to the debate on Israel within the Durban pro-
cess demonstrates that the concept of the nation-state as such had not been abandoned, 
but rather that a distinction had been created between legitimate and illegitimate state-
hood. In this vein, the branding of Israel as racist and nationalist must be deemed 
antisemitic, since almost every other country, as well as the general nexus of ethnically 
defined nationalism and racism, was not branded in this manner. 
V. CONCLUSION: OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLES 
Antisemitism is changing its appearance in response to changing social circumstances, 
while simultaneously preserving some of its core features. This statement holds true for 
the entire history of antisemitism and is also applicable, as argued here, in the case of 
Durban II. We have grouped the antisemitic practices at Durban II into five dimen-
sions—the construction of a harmonious global community; exclusion from such a 
community; the deflation and reversal of guilt; falling victim to imagined Jewish domi-
nation and conspiracies; and the rejection of nationhood and nation-states—and but-
tressed our argument with particularly telling quotes from various Durban II 
documents. All of these dimensions contain specific elements of antisemitism in a 
cosmopolitanizing environment, such as the desire to overcome a nation-state-centered 
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world, the drafting of membership criteria that pretend to be inclusive to all but exclude 
some by delegitimizing them, and the reference to the international rejection of and 
jurisdiction over crimes against humanity. Comparable, if not identical, mechanisms of 
ostracism and dehumanization were employed against Jewish individuals and collec-
tives throughout history. The deflation of guilt and the accusation of outdated nation-
hood clearly relate to post-Holocaust antisemitism and the establishment of a sovereign 
Jewish and democratic state. While one can discern changes in the antisemitic resent-
ment expressed at Durban II and, more generally speaking, in a cosmopolitanizing 
environment, caution must be exercised in deciding whether there is anything really 
new here. We challenge the proposition of novelty and conclude that the antisemitism 
displayed at Durban II continues to draw on the post-1945 (defeat of Nazi Germany) and 
post-1948 (foundation of the State of Israel) features of antisemitism. This does not 
preclude that more substantial transformations could materialize on the path to further 
cosmopolitanization. For the time being, research on antisemitism should focus on the 
necessary criticism of the social conditions that produce and reproduce antisemitism. 
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Antisemitism and Anti-Zionism 
in the “New” South Africa: 
Observations and Reflections 
Milton Shain* 
Almost two years ago, I was struck by two virtually concurrent news headlines: the 
weekly South African Jewish Report led with the headline “Low anti-Semitism in SA – but 
don’t be complacent” and a week later I received a piece from the South African Zionist 
Federation in Israel entitled “South Africa almost tops anti-Semitism charts”. The South 
African Jewish Report article was based on a talk by a senior researcher at the South 
African Jewish Board of Deputies, David Saks, who reported that South Africa had a 
relatively low rate of antisemitism: it was 10 times higher in the UK, France and Argen-
tina, 15 times higher in Australia and 20 times higher in Canada and Germany. 
The figures had been calibrated in terms of antisemitic incidents. The low number 
was attributed to dormant far-right white organizations, coupled with an anti-racist 
ethos in post-apartheid South Africa and buttressed by South Africa’s so-called chapter 
nine institutions, such as the Human Rights Commission, and the values embedded in 
the Constitution.1 On the other hand, the South African Zionist Federation based their 
claim that “South Africa almost tops anti-Semitism charts” on a “Pew Global Attitudes 
Survey of 2008”, which found that South Africans, along with Spaniards, Mexicans and 
Brazilians, held some of the most negative views of Jews outside of the Muslim world. 
According to the survey, 46 percent of South Africans harboured unfavourable views of 
Jews and of those 46 percent two-thirds disliked Jews in the extreme. A much lower 
figure of 11 percent was recorded in Australia – which had more incidents.2 
What one has here are measures by incidents on the one hand and measures by atti-
tudes on the other. What should we make of the differences? Certainly we should not 
discount the role of ideas, especially in specific political contexts. In South Africa, for 
example, a serious “Jewish Question” was experienced in the 1930s and 1940s when – at 
a time of heightened Afrikaner ethno-nationalism – hostile ideas about the Jews were 
transformed by the radical Afrikaner white right into programmatic antisemitism.3 
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Today, this radical white right – with its conspiratorial views of Jewish wealth, 
power and influence – has effectively disappeared. In its heyday in the 1930s and early 
1940s, movements such as the Greyshirts, the Ossewa Brandwag and the New Order – all 
clearly inspired by Nazism – were a serious menace. But these ideas eroded rapidly after 
the Second World War. Classic Jew baiting was restricted to a fringe ultra-right element, 
although the apartheid government did question Jewish loyalty in the early 1960s when 
Israel supported the African bloc in the United Nations, and it did, from time to time, 
remind Jews of their disproportionate involvement in anti-apartheid activities.4 In the 
“new” democratic South Africa, however, the white right is of marginal concern. On the 
other hand, the “black” or African majority has shown some proclivity towards anti-
Jewish prejudices. While historically these victims of apartheid struggled to overthrow 
white minority rule and certainly never focused specifically on Jews when articulating 
grievances and aspirations, studies from the early 1970s show that the black population 
is not immune to anti-Jewish prejudice.5 
In recent times, industrial protests have occasionally identified specifically “Jewish 
capitalists” and antisemitic placards have been displayed at a number of strikes around 
the country. In the wake of the 2009 Gaza War, anti-Zionist protests led by the labour 
union federation COSATU raised the possibility of targeting specifically Jewish busi-
nesses. In some circles, Jewish loyalty to South Africa is questioned. But on the whole 
the black African population cannot be accused of widespread antisemitism. When it 
comes to the Muslim population – less than 2 percent of the total population but rela-
tively influential – things are different. Many in this community share conspiratorial 
ideas of the old far-right white, manifested in the letter columns of the daily press and 
articulated in radio talk shows. Although the focus of their rhetoric is Zionism, their 
language often reveals classic anti-Jewish motifs and tropes. For some critics, at least, 
Jews or Zionists have become diabolically evil.6 This was best captured in the comments 
made by South Africa’s deputy foreign minister, Fatima Hajaig, at an anti-Zionist rally 
in January 2009:  
They [Jews] control [America], no matter which government comes into power, 
whether Republican or Democratic, whether Barack Obama or George Bush… Their 
control of America, just like the control of most Western countries, is in the hands of 
Jewish money and if Jewish money controls their country then you cannot expect any-
thing.7 
Holocaust denial has also crept into Muslim anger. In 1996, Radio 786, a Muslim radio 
station, had to apologize for airing an interview with Dr Ahmed Huber, who spoke of 
the “Holocaust swindle”, and in May 1998 the same radio station interviewed Dr Yaqub 
Zaki who, besides claiming that the “million plus” Jews who died in the Second World 
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War had died of infectious diseases, spent much of his time engaged with elaborate 
Jewish conspiracies. Shortly after the Cape Town Holocaust Centre was established in 
1998, a leading Muslim newspaper recommended readers acquaint themselves with the 
work of Arthur Butz and other “denialists”.8 It was thus no surprise that the Protocols of 
the Elders of Zion went on sale at the World Conference Against Racism in Durban in 
2001. 
Yet despite these developments, one cannot talk of classic antisemitism having seri-
ous traction in South Africa today. The public discourse is inclusive and non-racial, as 
opposed to exclusivist, as it was in the 1930s when the country had – as mentioned 
above – a serious “Jewish Question”. Pluralism, multiculturalism, religious tolerance 
and “rainbowism” – the very antithesis of ethno-nationalism – is celebrated in South 
Africa. Cultural rights and religious freedom are enshrined in the new South African 
Constitution. This has the potential to take the sharpness out of ethnic conflict while 
militating against antisemitism. Of course, in some countries, multiculturalism has led to 
a dangerous identity politics, especially on the part of Muslims. So far this has not been 
the case in South Africa. Muslims were a part of “the struggle” for generations and 
appreciate the new constitutional order. One also needs to note the condemnation of 
antisemitism by political leaders in recent years. An apology from the deputy foreign 
minister, Fatima Hajaig, following her tirade is not without significance. She was not 
reappointed in Jacob Zuma’s cabinet when he took office in 2009. 
Certainly, the climate for opposing classical antisemitism in South Africa today – 
built upon the ANC’s historic opposition to racism – is more favourable than it has been 
in the past. When it comes to anti-Zionism, however, things are markedly different. In 
particular, it is noteworthy that hostility penetrates into the highest echelons of govern-
ment. For many, the very notion of an allegedly exclusivist and colonialist “Jewish state” 
is anathema. This worldview has a long history, deeply embedded in “the struggle”. As 
far back as 1955, the ANC’s Freedom Charter stressed the unity of South Africa and 
opposed the politics of ethnicity or “tribalism”. Intellectually, liberation was under-
pinned by a critique of the dangers of ethnic mobilization as evident in the Afrikaner 
national movement. 
These ideas were further reinforced from the 1960s by Marxian currents within the 
academy, both in South Africa and abroad. Scholars deconstructed ethnicity – neither 
“natural or immutable” in the words of Shula Marks and Stanley Trapido – while 
demonstrating how it was being manipulated and used in South Africa as a means to 
divide and rule, palpable in the apartheid project with its proposed puppet ethnic 
“homelands”.9 A broadly “third worldist” and anti-colonial Weltanschauung evolved 
among exiled and domestic activists. They took a decidedly dyspeptic view of the West, 
its support for the apartheid state and the Pretoria-Jerusalem axis that evolved from the 
early 1970s, a relationship recently explored by Sasha Polakow-Suransky in his book The 
Unspoken Alliance.10 
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These ideas were fed by a growing anti-Zionist literature that demonized the Jewish 
state. In particular, Muslims acquainted themselves with this literature. Pained at the 
outcome of the Six Day War, buoyed by the “Zionism equals Racism” resolution of 1975 
at the United Nations and radicalized by the Soweto uprising of 1976, a younger genera-
tion of Muslims were increasingly radicalized. They were further encouraged by the 
overthrow of the Shah in Iran in 1979 and the success of Khomeinism. 
Although the Muslim voice carried little weight with most whites in apartheid South 
Africa, it is arguable that they added muster and substance to the broad left’s position, 
including “white” progressives who began to voice their support for what they saw as 
the legitimate anti-colonial struggle of the Palestinian people. By the late 1980s, an 
increasingly radicalized “left” criticized Israel as an exclusivist apartheid state. At the 
United Nations, Dr Neo Mnumzama, the Chief Representative of ANC – still in exile at 
the time – put it bluntly: “The South African people have never approved of Zionism. 
They see parallels of apartheid in Zionism and therefore their struggle against apartheid 
automatically has overtones of anti-Zionism which is not the same thing as being anti-
Jewish”.11 
These views were shared by Aubrey Mokoena, a senior member of the United De-
mocratic Front, an internal wing of the ANC. Zionism, he maintained, was simply 
racism, “because Zionism says we close our ranks on an ethnic basis. We take care of the 
Jewish interests. If you are Jewish it’s okay, if you are not Jewish, out.”12 A former 
president of the “Africanist” Azanian Political Organization (Azapo), Ishmael Mkhabela, 
took a similar view, claiming that Zionism was a form of religious discrimination that 
was, in his view, the same as the racial discrimination faced by blacks in South Africa.13 
This alleged exclusivity ran counter to the non-racial and inclusive outlook of the libera-
tion movement, both exiled and domestic. With it went a sense of unease with a Jewish 
state and, as the Rev Frank Chikane, Secretary General of the South African Council of 
Churches, put it, “an easy sympathy” for the PLO.14 There is no doubt, said one promi-
nent Soweto civic leader, Dr Nthato Motlana, in the 1980s, “that Black Africans tend to 
identify with the PLO… Let’s be clear about this, there is a perception of the Israeli-Arab 
conflict as one of almost colonialism of a white race coming out of Europe.”15 
Such ideas have survived and are now a staple of trade union and progressive activ-
ism. In addition, the English-language media – largely owned since 1994 by the Irishman 
Tony O’Reilly’s Independent Group – reinforced these positions. Columnists like Robert 
Fisk and John Pilger regularly poison a hostile anti-Zionist atmosphere. 
When Yasser Arafat spoke in South Africa’s parliament in 1998, he was applauded 
when he referred to Zionism as racism, despite the notion running counter to the ANC’s 
stated position on the Arab-Israeli conflict, namely accepting a Jewish state alongside a 
Palestinian state.16 Even 9/11 did not temper hostility. On 23 October 2001, the minister 
of water affairs, Ronnie Kasrils, a communist Jew, a member of the ANC underground 
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for 30 years and a senior commander of its military wing, Umkhonto We Sizwe, read a 
statement on the Middle East in the National Assembly during a special Middle East 
debate that discussed the report of a fact-finding committee that had visited the Middle 
East.17 
Kasrils and his ANC colleague Max Ozinsky, a member of the Western Cape provin-
cial legislature, then circulated the statement – slightly amended – with a view to getting 
as many Jewish signatories as possible. The final declaration was launched on 7 Decem-
ber 2001 under the banner “Not in My Name”. It was signed by only 284 Jews but had 
widespread support beyond the Jewish community, including the ANC and the media. 
Kasrils has compared the discourse of “chosenness” in Zionism with “the way the 
Afrikaner trekkers also used it, the way many historical movements have done to 
advance the cause of a particular people. It’s an exclusivity which gives rise to racism 
and all sorts of negative things.”18 This notion of exclusivity – manifest in the ethno-
national state – has always raised problems for the radical left. It challenges a deep 
seated universalism. But, in addition, the apparent success of South Africa’s so-called 
“miracle” further undermines the Zionist idea. That is to say, commentators increasingly 
ask why Israelis and Palestinians cannot follow the South African example and establish 
a single constitutional state, which includes Jews and Palestinians. They compare Zion-
ists with apartheid ideologues of old and see Hamas and Islamic Jihad as demonized in 
much the same way as the apartheid government had demonized the ANC in exile. 
They argue that Israel – like the apartheid government – wants to cut a deal only with 
moderates like Mahmoud Abbas.19 
In this context, support for a two-state solution is rapidly eroding. One well-known 
former liberal newspaper editor, Allister Sparks, repeatedly contends that such a solu-
tion is untenable. Israel’s lack of will to remove the settlements coupled with demo-
graphic realities, he argues, has precluded this option. “Like South Africa’s bantustan 
policy it was a nice idea in theory: to separate rival groups living in one country so that 
each can have its own national homeland sounds like a moral solution – provided the 
separation is fair and the homelands are viable.” 
In building his case, Sparks recalls how the apartheid planners had also denied 
demographic realities in their dream of a “white” South Africa. But eventually, he 
reminds us, they had to face the truth. Sparks’ great source is the book One State Solution 
by Virginia Tilley, an American academic now resident in South Africa. “Would a 
negotiated settlement for a one-party state,” ask Sparks, “not defuse the destructive 
antagonisms between Israelis and Palestinians as it has done in South Africa, and in 
doing so make Israel a much safer homeland for Jews than it is now?”20 
Sparks continues to draw parallels between Israel and South Africa and sees the Is-
raeli-Palestinian conflict through a South African prism. The fact remains, he argues,  
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that many ethno-nationalisms grapple with the problem of other ethnic groups in 
their midst… The new South Africa has not required the forfeiture of the “Afrikaner 
homeland”. I well remember the dark warnings, uttered from pulpit and platform, 
over more than half my working life, that “one man one vote” would mean the “na-
tional suicide” of the Afrikaner volk and that they would never, ever contemplate it.21 
Sparks’s views have wide resonance and reflect attitudes among the chattering class, 
particularly within a government that is informed by a mantra of non-racism, opposition 
to ethnic politics, a powerful anti-colonialism, support for the underdog and a particular 
understanding of South Africa’s so-called “miracle”, built upon respect for cultural and 
religious diversity. 
Put simply, there is a general antipathy towards ethnic concerns. South African poli-
tics, notes Hermann Giliomee, a leading South African historian, is informed by “a 
dogmatic or intransigent universalism.” “Its point of departure,” he explains,  
is that race or ethnicity as a principle of social organization is essentially irrational 
and ephemeral and that there is no need to make any concessions to it. What this boils 
down to is the unshakeable conviction that there is not much more to racial or ethnic 
identification than the legacy of apartheid classification.22 
With this mindset, the Palestinian struggle is seen as a classic anti-colonial struggle. And 
the parallels with black resistance in South Africa are taken even further. Many believe 
that the Palestinians were offered “bantustans” at Camp David in 2000, akin to what the 
“homeland” leaders were offered under apartheid. This, they maintain, will replicate the 
historic migrant labour system so powerful in South African consciousness. 
To use the late Tony Judt’s term, for many South African elites, including radical 
Jews, Israel is an anachronistic ethnic state.23 Zionism as a Jewish liberation movement 
has receded into the mists of time; the term has become associated with exclusivism and 
expansionism. “It’s a policy that to me looks like it has very many parallels with ra-
cism,” explains Nobel Laureate Archbishop Emeritus Desmond Tutu.24 Tutu is widely 
supported in the electronic and print media. The late Anthony Holiday, a philosopher at 
the University of the Western Cape, went so far as to advocate outlawing the South 
African Zionist Federation.25 
Such views have been maturing for decades and are inextricably linked to a specific 
South African past. While the ANC’s commitment to multilateralism and the United 
Nations ensures support for a two-state settlement – for the time being at least – it seems 
to me that elites, driven and informed by activists, many of them Muslim, will continue 
to push for ties between Pretoria and Jerusalem to be cut. 
Yet it needs to be noted that a Pew Global Project Attitudes Survey conducted in ur-
ban areas in South Africa in 2007 reported greater sympathy for Israel than for the 
Palestinians. The survey indicated that 28 percent of South Africans sided with Israel in 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as opposed to 19 percent with the Palestinians. Nineteen 
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percent sympathized with both the Israelis and the Palestinians.26 Perhaps this is be-
cause the majority of South African blacks are Christian, with a deep attachment to the 
so-called “Holy Land”. It also needs to be said that the Muslim community is not mono-
lithic. Many Muslims are progressive, emphasizing Islamic humanism and universalism; 
others, of course, are conservative or Islamist, at odds with religious pluralism and 
ecumenism. 
But there is a broad anti-Zionism, shared, as noted above, by many in the highest 
echelons of government. There are repeated calls – especially from activist groups such 
as the Palestine Solidarity Committee and the Trade Union Federation – to break diplo-
matic and trade relations ties with Israel. Hamas is popular among many Muslims. In 
July 2010, a former minister of education, Professor Kadar Asmal, called on the world to 
deny legitimacy to Israel. “It is time to delegitimize this entity”, he wrote, in the weekly 
Mail & Guardian while reflecting on the Goldstone Report and the Gaza Flotilla.27 The 
Thinker, an intellectual monthly founded by Mbeki’s right-hand man, former minister in 
the presidency Essop Pahad, included vitriolic anti-Israel comment in its latest issue.28 
Memories are short. The drama of the Jewish suffering in the diaspora and the re-
birth of the Jewish state have receded into the distant past. Regular television footage of 
Israeli forces in the territories, interminable talk shows dominated by anti-Zionists and 
an outpouring of literature comparing apartheid South Africa to Israel, continue to 
undermine the idea of the Jewish state. For many elites in South Africa, Zionism is a 19th 
century ethno-national movement caught off-side in the 21st century. 
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The Politics of Paranoia: 
How—and Why—the European Radical Right 
Mobilizes Antisemitism, Xenophobia, 
and Counter-Cosmopolitanism 
Lars Rensmann* 
1. THE RADICAL RIGHT AND ANTISEMITISM: IRRELEVANT AT THE MARGINS? 
The radical right’s anti-immigrant resentments, and especially its anti-Muslim cam-
paigns, have come under public and scientific scrutiny in recent years (Mammone 2011). 
Yet antisemitism as an ideological factor in mobilizing radical right voters has neither 
been systematically examined in scholarly research, nor has it received much media 
attention—in spite of some heated scholarly meta-controversies about the “new anti-
semitism,” that is, the partial or full convergence of radical right, radical left and Islamist 
antisemitism in the form of hatred of Israel and the chimera of “world Zionism.” In fact, 
while there are some notable exceptions—studies that explore the radical right and 
antisemitism (e.g. Weitzman 2010; Rensmann 2011)—public and scholarly debates often 
a priori presuppose that antisemitism is an ideology that is past its expiration date and 
thus also without significance in the radical right’s political and ideological mobiliza-
tions. Indeed, it is a widely shared belief in contemporary European publics that anti-
semitism has largely dissipated and generally become socially and politically irrele-
vant—even though such claims are difficult to substantiate and contradict social re-
search findings. If antisemitism surfaces as a problem today, it is frequently suggested 
that it is instrumentalized and overused, presumably constituting an ubiquitous political 
charge allegedly employed by Jewish and Israeli lobbies in order to suppress dissent and 
fence off criticism of Israel in Europe and the United States (see, for instance, Mear-
sheimer & Walt 2009; for a scholarly critique of these claims, see Lieberman 2009a; 
2009b). In a similar vein, some scholars and political pundits have suggested that the 
European radical right, with its anti-Muslim vigor, has turned “pro-Israel” and “pro-
Jewish” (Bunzl 2007). Moreover, it has become popular to view Muslims as “the Jews of 
today,” a trope insinuating that Muslims are the subject of forms of systematic persecu-
tion in Europe similar to those faced by Jews in European history and that Islamophobia 
has generally replaced—not just complemented—antisemitism in 21st century Europe, 
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or, in other words, that Islamophobia has become the “new antisemitism” (Guarnieri 
2010). 
Looking at contemporary radical right ideology and its political context, this article 
challenges the aforementioned propositions. It claims that, while racialized hostility 
against Muslims plays an important role in many radical right mobilizations alongside 
general anti-immigrant resentment, antisemitism remains an integral—indeed in many 
cases reinforced—element of new radical right ideology. For much of the European 
radical right, antisemitism continues to function as a constitutive, prevalent conspiracy 
ideology to explain the modern world and its crises. New radical right parties tend to 
modernize their ideology in order to increase their appeal, although overtly racialized 
stereotypes of Jews, ethnic minorities, and immigrants—as well as Holocaust revision-
ism—continue to surface in political campaigns. For instance, the alleged powerful 
conspirators of world Jewry are today often called “world Zionists.” 
In general, the word “Zionists” is increasingly used as a synonym for “Jews” to make 
antisemitic attacks on world Jewry sound respectable. Among the radical right and 
beyond, the phrase the Zionists has generally become the main code for the Jews in 
antisemitic discourse. It blurs the boundaries between legitimate political critique, 
innuendo, and overt antisemitism, while mobilizing anti-Jewish resentments, and also 
helps avoid potential legal prosecution. In this ideological construct, the Jews and the 
Zionists seek to dominate the world, control Zionist-occupied governments (ZOGs) 
behind the scenes, and personify globalism and global modernity, including American 
and Zionist imperialism, the global financial system, and global capitalism. 
Furthermore, the radical right’s political antisemitism does not harm their political 
mobilizations but, on the contrary, feeds into an increased public legitimacy of hostility 
against Jews, which is fueled by perceptions of the Middle East conflict and widespread 
hatred of Israel in society, as well as the recent globalization crises. Such resentment 
marches in step with, and complements, anti-immigrant resentments and prejudices 
against ethnic minorities. 
The following sections summarize the findings of several qualitative content analy-
ses of radical right party manifestos and public campaigns in order to establish the 
constitutive features of the European radical right’s contemporary ideology. It then 
examines the demand side, the general political context, and favorable conditions for 
radical right mobilizations of resentment, focusing in particular on the neglected resur-
gence of political antisemitism and its origins and causal mechanisms. 
2. ANTISEMITISM, XENOPHOBIA, AND COUNTER-COSMOPOLITANISM IN 
CONTEMPORARY RADICAL RIGHT PARTIES IN EUROPE: THE CASE OF HUNGARY 
In this section, I examine a country where the radical right has been most successful 
electorally: Hungary. The study focuses on the platforms and manifestos of the relevant 
radical right parties but also covers public statements by party leaders, party websites, and 
political campaigns as components shaping the political ideology of the European radical 
right.1 Special attention is paid to the modernization of radical right party ideology. 
                                                                                                                                                       
1 We classify parties as relevant that have shown at least some level of electoral success, scoring 
at least 3 percent or more in regional or national elections. 
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MIÉP (Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja—Hungarian Party for Justice and Life) has been 
the most successful radical right party in post-Communist Hungary in electoral terms 
but has faded in relevance in recent years. Under the authoritarian leadership of István 
Csurka, the party promotes exclusivist nationalism and expansionist ambitions, espe-
cially with regard to the Hungarian ethnic minority under foreign rule.2 The 2002 
national electoral campaign focused on an interrelated set of anti-globalization, anti-
semitic, anti-Communist, and anti-Israel issues. Regarding any cooperation with the 
West as part of a US-Zionist plan, MIÉP continues to oppose EU membership and 
promotes a distinctly anti-Jewish, anti-globalization ideology. For instance, bankers are 
portrayed as a bunch of Jews sucking the money of average people. Viewing cosmopolitan 
Judeo-Bolshevik plutocrats and cosmopolitanism and globalization as the main enemy, the 
party has explained the electoral successes of the left and the alleged ongoing Commu-
nist rule in Hungary by referring to Jewish-Zionist activity (Stephen Roth Institute 2002). 
According to Csurka, Hungarians are being exploited and oppressed by Jews who 
dominate the economy and literature. He also fears a Jewish conspiracy, whose perpetrators 
are sitting in New York and Tel Aviv (cited in Bos 2011). Antisemitism and hatred of 
Israel are the core elements of this extreme ethno-nationalist party, while resentment 
against minorities (or Muslims) is also part of the party’s ideology but less central to its 
identity. 
However, the party has continuously lost ground since it won 5.5 percent of the vote 
in 1998. In 2004, electoral support for the MIÉP was down to 4.4 percent. By 2006, sup-
port for the party had fallen to 2.2 percent and it virtually dissolved, in spite of the fact 
that it had formed an electoral alliance with the initially even more radical Jobbik Mag-
yarországért Mozgalom (Movement for a Better Hungary). Jobbik has since taken MIÉP’s 
place as the most significant political and electoral extreme right force in Hungary. By 
2008, the now independent Jobbik was already at 7 percent in national polls, and the 
party initially received a stunning 14.77 percent of the vote in the 2009 European elec-
tions. This turned Jobbik into the third strongest Hungarian party in the European 
Parliament. It consolidated this position in the Hungarian party system by mobilizing an 
average of 16.67 percent of the vote in the two rounds of the 2010 national elections. 
Without being less radical in its ethnic nationalism, xenophobia, and, especially, anti-
semitism, Jobbik has managed to gain wider electoral appeal after its separation from 
MIÉP. Although the party’s current chairman is the young historian Gábor Vona, the 
modern face of the party and its best-known and most popular politician is the human 
rights lawyer and law professor Krisztina Morvai. Morvai is the head of the party’s EP 
delegation and has worked as a women’s rights advocate at the United Nations but also 
has a strong record of anti-Israel advocacy. Her leadership role in this radical right, 
extremely nationalistic party took many by surprise and instantly helped Jobbik to gain 
broader legitimacy in spite of its radical platform and catering to militant fascists. 
Jobbik’s campaign platform for the 2010 elections declared the reunification of the 
Hungarian nation, the rebuilding of pre-1919 Greater Hungary, and (thus) the redraw-
ing of Hungary’s borders to be its first priority and most important political goal—a 
radical right, nationalist, and expansionist claim that could ultimately give rise to a war 
with its European neighbors. It shows very little political constraint and fosters a radical 
                                                                                                                                                       
2  See: <http://www.miep.hu>. 
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political orientation and rhetoric that openly attacks gypsies and Jewish capital. Its 
propaganda, along with its use of certain political symbols, is clearly reminiscent of 
Nyilaskeresztes Párt (NYKP), Hungary’s ruling Nazi party between 1944 and 1945, which 
established a ruthless terror regime that collaborated in the Holocaust (Maegerle 2009). 
Its slightly more strategic mobilization focus is nostalgic Hungarian nationalism and 
opposition to globalism in its economic, political and cultural dimensions. Along with 
the leadership role of a feminist human rights lawyer, its fashionable opposition to 
globalism, the European Union, and foreign investment is turning the party into the 
prototype of a counter-cosmopolitan, modernized radical right party that seeks to 
mobilize both its core constituency of nationalist, radical right voters and a broader 
spectrum of globalization losers. While all the indicators of its counter-cosmopolitan 
ideological transformation are prevalent and highly salient, the party has not sacrificed 
its traditional fascist ideology and self-declared radicalism or its militancy, neither of 
which, incidentally, seem to alienate voters anyway.3 In 2007, Jobbik created the Magyar 
Gárda Kulturális Egyesület (Cultural Association of the Hungarian Guard). The Hungar-
ian Guard is a paramilitary organization with sworn-in members designed “to awaken 
the active self-consciousness of the nation.” In 2009, the organization was prohibited, 
and this ruling was later confirmed by the courts. Jobbik has not shied away from racist 
and antisemitic rhetoric. Party-affiliated publications employ inflammatory rhetoric 
against Jews, Roma, and homosexuals. Party members are linked to anti-Roma and 
antisemitic violence (Freeman 2009). 
The party also proposes the creation of a special national police unit to deal with 
gypsy delinquency. While the party is open to militant Christian Hungarian nationalism 
and radicalism displayed by subgroups of the party and segments of the party elite, 
Jobbik has broadened its appeal and transformed its party ideology and identity. First 
and foremost, this includes a major focus on opposition to globalization and Europeani-
zation. Reaching out to various disenfranchised segments of the Hungarian electorate, 
the modernized party platform is still dedicated to a combination of anti-globalization 
views and coded popular antisemitism, alongside its previous support of Christian 
values, Hungarian nationalism, and attacks on Roma and other ethnic minorities. 
Serving both radical nationalists and disillusioned voters, its economic policies are 
primarily directed against “the neoliberal ideology dominated policies during these 
years under the name of privatization, liberalization and deregulation,”4 while it also 
rejects the Lisbon Treaty and European integration. Jobbik thus capitalizes on increasing 
joblessness, corruption crises, and social unrest caused by the global economic crisis. In 
light of widespread economic and cultural fears, the party mobilizes political and 
cultural resentments against pro-European and pro-cosmopolitan elites and minorities, 
as well as against multinational corporations, America, and Israel (i.e. globalism, impe-
rialism, and international institutions). 
The rise of Jobbik indicates that there is considerable legitimate political space for 
such counter-cosmopolitan, nationalistic, and antisemitic views in Hungarian politics. In 
fact, the party’s success is accompanied by a broader right-wing, nationalistic trend in 
Hungarian politics. Challenging conventional wisdom about electorates and their spatial 
                                                                                                                                                       
3  See: <http://www.jobbik.com>. 
4  Ibid. 
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representation in the party system, there seems to be no trade-off between party con-
stituencies supporting xenophobia and nationalistic claims. On the one hand, due to 
various factors—including major corruption cases—the left-of-center Magyar Szocialista 
Párt (MSZP), which was the major governing party for most of the post-Communist 
period, collapsed at the 2010 national elections, receiving only 19.3 percent of the vote. 
Severely weakened, MSZP is now barely the biggest opposition party. On the other 
hand, the national-populist Fidesz—Magyar Polgári Szövetség (Fidesz—Hungarian Civic 
Union) gained 52.73 percent of the vote in 2010. It thus achieved an absolute majority 
that equipped the party with a two-thirds majority in the national parliament and the 
power to make sweeping changes to the legal system. 
The national-populist Fidesz, led since its inception by the populist prime minister 
Viktor Orbán, campaigns against anti-national elements. While Fidesz is less radical than 
Jobbik and combines various political constituencies in its policies, it also provides a 
government that is apparently sympathetic to radical nationalism and antisemitic 
resentment. For instance, without being penalized by the party, Fidesz member of par-
liament Oszkár Molnár stated: “I love Hungary, I love Hungarians, and I prefer Hungar-
ian interests to global financial capital, or Jewish capital, if you like, which wants to 
devour the whole world, but especially Hungary.” He also suggested that there was an 
Israeli conspiracy to colonize Hungary. Molnár found widespread support, even though 
the Fidesz government ratified an authoritarian media law that severely restricts freedom 
of speech on the pretense of fighting hate speech. 
Hungary’s restrictive media laws, poor civil rights record, and discriminatory poli-
cies have come under increasing scrutiny from the European Union. However, it is also 
a sign of the times and of the new assertiveness of the populist and radical right in 
Hungary and across Europe with regard to xenophobia and antisemitism that Jobbik can 
flourish and that even politicians of the ruling party can mobilize resentments against 
Jews and gypsies without facing effective political opposition. The Cultural Institute of 
the Republic of Hungary, operating under the auspices of the Fidesz government, initi-
ates discussions about what it calls the Jewish problem and how to deal with it. It is even 
doing so in Germany, as part of transnational Hungarian cultural policy (Balassi Insti-
tute 2011). 
Another sign of public collaboration with the radical right and the legitimacy of eth-
nic nationalism and antisemitism in Hungary is the fact that the mayor of Budapest, 
István Tarlós, recently appointed István Csurka, the leader of MIÉP, and the nationalist 
György Dörner as new directors of the Hungarian capital’s prestigious New Theater, 
despite the concerns of Jewish groups and international condemnation. The new direc-
tors want to rename the theater and act against what they call “the degenerate sick 
liberal hegemony.” They have demanded that only Hungarian drama be performed and 
want to stop what they refer to as “foreign garbage,” which is regarded as a code word 
for Jewish and other non-Hungarian productions (Bos 2011). 
3. EUROPE’S RADICAL RIGHT AND THE MOBILIZATION OF RESENTMENT: 
COMPARATIVE FINDINGS 
If we look beyond Hungary, a comparative analysis of party ideologies and mobiliza-
tions in a study of 11 countries in Western and Eastern Europe reveals a partly hetero-
geneous picture. Political contexts and context-dependent variables play a significant 
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role, and campaigns are rarely conducted transnationally. In part, they respond to 
specific national issues and electoral demands. However, even though ideological 
priorities and mobilizations vary, there are some prevalent ideological features that 
generally characterize the contemporary European radical right. 
Firstly, all radical right parties share a high level of xenophobia and anti-immigrant 
resentment. Immigrants are blamed for all kinds of economic and social woes, as well as 
for the loss of cultural identity. At present, this resentment is often—though by no 
means exclusively—directed against Muslim immigrants and, depending on the coun-
try, specific ethnic minorities. This expresses an ethnic nationalism and collective self-
understanding that remains a core feature of the European radical right. It is intimately 
related to opposition to cosmopolitan diversity. However, there are exceptions to the 
rule. In Eastern Europe, anti-Muslim prejudice plays only a marginal role, if any, in the 
public mobilization of the radical right. Jobbik, the most successful radical right party in 
Europe, is predominantly antisemitic and also discriminates against Roma. In contrast, 
Muslims are largely irrelevant in campaigns. 
Secondly, while retaining an ethnic-nationalist ideological profile, several relevant 
European radical right parties, have also become partly transnational in outlook. They 
claim to defend a Europe of nations against cosmopolitan influences and immigration, 
multi-national corporations, and global political norms and institutions, including EU 
governance. Some parties have developed a highly modernized, radically counter-
cosmopolitan, anti-globalization identity (Mudde 2007) that reflects widespread senti-
ments in the electorate. The “counter-cosmopolitan” defense of cultural particularism 
includes, but is not limited to, national particularism. 
Thirdly, and closely related to the second feature, antisemitism remains a core ele-
ment of radical right ideology, old and new. In several cases, there is even a noticeable 
resurgence of antisemitism, at times coded in radical anti-Israel resentments, de-
nouncements of “world Zionism” or “foreign influence,” and conspiracy theories.5 Such 
antisemitic mobilizations are often directly linked to the anti-globalization discourse, in 
which Jews are identified as the key agents of cosmopolitan cultural change, global 
power, and the global financial and economic system. Once again, Jews serve as a 
personified, reified explanation for the world’s ills. To be sure, the demonstrable rele-
vance and revival of antisemitism in radical right ideology is at odds with popular 
perceptions of the radical right. Moreover, some premature scholarly claims that an-
tisemitism has virtually disappeared as a mobilizing resource for the new radical right 
due to its allegedly bygone appeal run counter to our findings. 
Rather, we are witnessing the emergence of a new ideology that combines domestic 
resentment against Muslims with hatred of Jews and opposition to cosmopolitan norms 
and cosmopolitanization processes. In several cases, Israel, world Zionism, and Israel 
lobbies have become the primary target in the radical right’s approach to foreign affairs, 
which fosters support for radical Islamist terror against Jews and Israel, even though 
Muslim immigrants are not accepted as equal members of society. 
                                                                                                                                                       
5 This should not be misunderstood as any kind of lexical ordering. 
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4. THE RESURGENCE OF COUNTER-COSMOPOLITANISM, XENOPHOBIA, AND 
ANTISEMITISM IN EUROPE 
Before exploring several hypotheses to explain why such an ideological combination, 
and the resurgence of antisemitism in particular, may be an effective mobilizing tool in 
party systems in contemporary Europe, this section takes a close look at the changing 
political climate and the increased popular demand for counter-cosmopolitan, xenopho-
bic, and antisemitic politics. This demand finds expression in (i) widespread, increasing 
resentments against Jews, Muslims, and immigrants; and (ii) the increased public and 
political salience of these subjects and related issues. In addition, (iii) economic and 
socio-cultural globalization crises tend to embolden and intensify previously existing 
antisemitic undercurrents, including reified perceptions of globalization and the cos-
mopolitanization of societies as “Jewish machinations.” 
A. Increasing resentment of Jews and Muslims 
PEW data indicate a strong relationship between anti-Jewish and anti-Muslim senti-
ments. Indeed, in the six European countries included in the PEW survey, the correla-
tion between unfavorable opinions of Jews and unfavorable opinions of Muslims is 
remarkably high (neg .80; PEW 2008). Overall, negative views of Muslims have in-
creased over in recent years. Exceptions are Spain and Germany, where negative views 
of Muslims are nevertheless still high (52 percent and 50 percent respectively). More-
over, there has been considerable progress in the cosmopolitanization of European socie-
ties (i.e. the diversification of European societies and the recognition of cosmopolitan 
diversity and norms). Yet there is still a considerable segment of the electorate that is 
hostile to immigrants and the socio-cultural change they represent. Largely overlooked 
in public debates, antisemitism has surged and resurged in Europe since the turn of the 
century. Antisemitism is a far cry from being merely an historical legacy. Instead, 
empirical data show that antisemitic attitudes remain an undercurrent—even if varying 
in scope and intensity—within European societies. Not only that: surveys indicate that 
such resentments are now more prevalent than in previous decades and that they matter 
more to certain segments of voters. Antisemitism, like xenophobia, is no marginal 
minority opinion at the fringe of society. 
On average, antisemitic attitudes have been on the rise in Europe since 2000, al-
though there are fluctuations and considerable cross-national variations. Moreover, 
hatred of Israel and “Zionists” has become a medium to express hatred of Jews. Forms 
of radical anti-Zionism, wishing for the destruction of the Jewish state and the de-
Zionization of the world, may also be motivated by secondary antisemitism (Rensmann 
1998): the desire to morally demonize Jews because they are living reminders of the 
German and European atrocities committed against them during the Nazi era. Equating 
the Zionists with Nazis is a way to project guilt and settle an old score. According to a 
seven-country survey including the most populous EU member states, almost every 
second European (45.7 percent) uses Nazi associations and comparisons when thinking 
of Israel. This means that they somewhat or strongly agree that “Israel is conducting a 
war of extermination against the Palestinians,” while 37.4 percent agree with the state-
ment that “considering Israel’s policy I can understand why people do not like Jews” 
(Zick 2009: 13). 
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B. Increased public and political salience 
Antisemitism and hostility against Muslims have become more salient issues in public, 
political, and media spheres. Anti-Muslim hostility seems to benefit from media debates 
about mosques and the alleged introduction of Sharia law. In recent years, the political 
and public discourse in Europe is also characterized by a high level of awareness and 
alertness in the face of anti-Muslim campaigns or statements. For instance, a popular 
bestselling book by former German politician Thilo Sarrazin, which includes blatantly 
xenophobic, racialized anti-Muslim claims, was subjected to scathing criticism by the 
German public and its political class. After the terrorist acts of Anders Behring Breivik in 
Norway in 2011, the public debate about anti-Muslim hostility reached a new peak, and 
anti-Muslim radical right groups such as Stop the Islamisation of Norway (SIAN) have 
come under renewed public scrutiny. Anti-Muslim resentments are becoming increas-
ingly unacceptable to European publics, and parties associated with anti-immigrant or 
anti-Muslim resentments have recently lost electoral support. For instance, the national 
populist Progress Party of Norway suffered significant losses in local elections in the 
aftermath of Breivik’s terror acts. 
However, while the public focus has shifted to anti-Muslim prejudices, which remain a 
controversial issue from which the radical right might still draw long-term gains, radical 
right parties also benefit from an increasingly legitimate public discourse that is hostile to 
Jews. This aspect has been neglected in recent research. There is an expanding zone of 
acquiescence in relation to antisemitism, which also finds reflection in the radical right, 
that has so far hardly been recognized in research on the subject. This increased legitimacy, 
or public tolerance, of anti-Jewish resentment is characterized by shifting boundaries in 
what is considered respectable discourse about Jews and Zionists. It also finds expression in 
the rise of conspiracy theories, which often lead directly to a reservoir of antisemitic 
images of Jews allegedly pulling the strings and controlling the world. Furthermore, 
antisemitism is also nurtured by a popular Manichean world view that is not necessarily 
antisemitic in itself but helps create a climate of anti-Jewish hostility and is increasingly 
gaining traction in European publics. It portrays the two countries in which most of the 
world’s Jews live, namely the United States and Israel, as the main—if not the only—
villains in world politics and the global economy, while letting brutal dictatorships and 
repressive regimes across the world off the hook. Anti-Israel sentiments and anti-Zionism 
that go far beyond criticism of the Israeli government and its policies are in most cases no 
longer discredited as illegitimate resentments against another group or country but have 
become a badge of honor even among public figures and politicians on the left, who 
otherwise tend to support anti-discrimination policies and universal human rights (Hirsh 
2007; Markovits 2011; Rensmann & Schoeps 2011; Wistrich 2010). 
In its radical version, this Manichean world view manifests itself in publicly articu-
lated stereotypes about war-mongering Zionists and a globally powerful Israel lobby 
that dominates governments and stifles free debate about Israel’s atrocities against 
innocent Palestinians. Such claims go hand in hand with a widespread immunization 
strategy in the form of antisemitism denial that reaches deep into the public and the 
political left. According to this view, antisemitism today is a priori relevant only insofar 
as it is seen as a spurious charge that the Zionists or the pro-Israel lobby would throw at 
critics of Israel (Hirsh 2007: 73). Flanked by the claim that criticism of Israel cannot be 
antisemitic (cited in Hirsh 2007) and the belief that, if there is any antisemitism, Israel is 
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to blame for its emergence, highly emotionalized boycott campaigns directed exclusively 
against the Jewish state are taking place across Europe. They are emboldened by the 
widely popular charge that Israel is an apartheid regime that deserves to be dismantled. 
Singling out Israel as a pariah among the nations, the aggressive demonization of the 
Jewish state far beyond any rational criticism, and the simultaneous denial of the prob-
lem of antisemitism are not limited to the radical right. They resonate in segments of the 
public across the political spectrum as well as in civil society, including left-wing stu-
dent and teacher unions and the media. More often than not, such aggressive anti-
Zionism slips into overt antisemitic stereotypes and resentment. For instance, the left-
leaning British newspaper The Guardian recently published an article in which journalist 
Deborah Orr claimed that the Israel-Hamas prisoner swap—Hamas released the cap-
tured soldier Gilad Shalit in exchange for the release of 1,000 Palestinians responsible for 
the death of 600 Israelis, most of the victims women and children—proved that Israel 
nurtures a supremacist Jewish self-understanding of being a “chosen” people whose 
lives are worth a thousand times the lives of others (Orr 2011). 
There is, at any rate, a noticeable erosion of the discursive boundaries that evolved in 
postwar Europe—about what is tolerated as part of public discourse and what is classi-
fied or scandalized as hate speech—with regard to Jews and Zionists. The most recent 
indicator of antisemitism’s renewed public toleration, if not legitimacy, is the fact that 
the extreme nationalist, radical right LAOS party, along with its chairman Georgios 
Karatzaferis, is part of the new Greek coalition government that was established in 
response to the European debt crisis. The LAOS party, claiming to represent true Greeks 
instead of Jews, homosexuals and Communists, campaigns against Jews and Israel in 
particular. The party received 7 percent of the vote in the last national election. Karatzaf-
eris is a self-professed Holocaust denier who hates Israel and is known for his openly 
antisemitic statements. After the 9/11 attacks in New York, he repeated the myth that all 
the Jews were warned not to come to work that day before the Greek parliament. He has 
also questioned historical accounts of Auschwitz and Dachau. During Israel’s Operation 
Cast Lead in 2008, Karatzaferis said that the Israel Defense Forces were acting “with 
savage brutality only seen in Hitler’s time towards helpless people” (Uni 2011). 
C. Impact of global economic and socio-cultural crises 
Finally, global crises and crises relating to globalization have provided a fertile climate 
for the mobilization of resentments against immigrants and Jews on the grounds that 
they are responsible for these problems. By personifying the origins of theses crises in 
immigrants, foreign capital, and the Jews, in particular, the radical right can tap into—
and strengthen the link between—existing social resentments and current multi-faceted 
crises of global modernity. In particular, the identification of Jews with globalism and 
cosmopolitan political, economic, and socio-cultural transformations corresponds to 
what we call counter-cosmopolitanism, that is, the generalized, particularistic opposition to 
the combined set of political, cultural, and economic transformations associated with 
globalization and cosmopolitan value change (Rensmann 2011; Rensmann & Miller 2010; 
Markovits & Rensmann 2010).6 
                                                                                                                                                       
6 This rejection is part and parcel of, but not limited to, nationalistic attitudes; it can also entail 
religiously or culturally grounded motivations, and it can be expressed transnationally in its own 
organizational outreach or political alliance-building. 
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Counter-cosmopolitanism—the unqualified rejection of all forms of socio-cultural, 
economic, and political globalization, as well as cosmopolitan norms and diversity—is 
likely to become more prevalent during global crises. Counter-cosmopolitan parties, 
which generally oppose globalization and the cosmopolitanization of society (Beck & 
Grande 2007), seek to strategically mobilize those citizens who identify with the national 
community, citizens from economic strata that have traditionally been protected by the 
nation state and now find themselves increasingly exposed to foreign competition, and 
those who lack the cultural competence to meet the economic and cultural challenge of a 
globalizing world (Kriesi et al. 2008). 
While counter-cosmopolitanism bolsters hostility against immigrants and cultural 
change, it particularly encourages hostility against Jews. As a form of reified critique of 
globalization, such generalized counter-cosmopolitanism is highly susceptible to con-
spiracy theories that invoke the old social image of the cosmopolitan wandering Jew. In 
antisemitic narratives, Jews have traditionally been identified with modernity, cos-
mopolitanism, and globalism. Jews or Zionists are now often charged with cosmopolitan 
social change, global wars and global domination, cultural diffusion, the global erosion 
of the nation state, “dual loyalties,” and capitalist crises. It is, after all, one of modern 
antisemitism’s distinct feature to function as an objectified explanation of the modern 
world. In this ideology, Jews are seen as the embodiment of these cultural and economic 
modernizations processes (including immigration) and as the agents that orchestrate 
them. In a world of abstract domination governed by complex, abstract, and anonymous 
social relations, the antisemites disclose the world’s problems as a Zionist scheme. The 
widespread uneasiness that is felt in the changing, postmodern world is thus projected 
onto the image of the Jew. If this projection is not framed as a global Jewish conspiracy, 
the problems in question are often blamed squarely on the Zionists and the allegedly 
disproportionate Jewish influence on politics and the media at national and global level 
through the powerful, secret Israel lobby and the Holocaust industry. 
5. CONCLUSION 
There is continuity and change in the political ideology of the radical right parties in 
Europe. A focus on anti-immigration issues and anti-Muslim resentment is accompanied 
by virulent antisemitism. Contrary to common perceptions, the latter remains an inte-
gral part of the radical right’s political identity and mobilization. While anti-Muslim 
resentments often matter, the claim that antisemitism has been “replaced” by other 
resentments cannot be substantiated; it is equally untrue that the European radical right 
has largely turned “pro-Israel” (Bunzl 2007). Instead, most of the radical right promi-
nently features modernized, “anti-globalist,” and “anti-Zionist” antisemitism. Cross-
national variations notwithstanding, antisemitism has gained in importance. This is 
especially true for the most successful radical right parties in Eastern and Western 
Europe, such as Jobbik (Hungary), LAOS (Greece), and FPÖ (Austria). In many instances, 
radical right parties cater to broader counter-cosmopolitan constituencies. This emerging 
modernized ideological profile combines xenophobic resentment against immigrants 
and European Muslims with a counter-cosmopolitan agenda, domestic antisemitism, 
and modernized anti-Zionist antisemitism in foreign affairs. Even though Muslim 
immigrants are rejected domestically, radical Islamists still gain the sympathy of the 
radical right for their struggle against world Zionism. 
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These mobilizations and transformations on the radical right supply side are sup-
ported by a set of favorable conditions. Radical right parties articulate an evident elec-
toral demand by catering to significant counter-cosmopolitan constituencies that harbor 
resentments against social and cultural change in general and immigrants and Jews in 
particular. Moreover, they benefit from a broader European political climate in which 
certain anti-immigrant resentments have resurfaced and in which forms of modernized 
antisemitism (Rensmann & Schoeps 2011) are becoming increasingly respectable and 
tolerated. Finally, the radical right is one of several agents that seeks to exploit current 
European and globalization crises affecting European citizens, such as the European 
financial debt crisis, and feeds into persisting anti-Jewish undercurrents and conspiracy 
theories. These crises can also be seen as crises of cosmopolitanism that help foster 
counter-cosmopolitan responses, including hostility against immigrants and Jews. 
The radical right’s resurgent and reloaded politics of paranoia in Europe find a spe-
cial target in Jews and Zionists. The new and modernized radical right, emulating the 
old, thus plays its part in the emergence of a new international antisemitism. The oft-
neglected, and at times denied, revival of antisemitism in radical right party ideology 
and beyond epitomizes what could happen, both on the political demand side and on 
the political supply side, in the event of a deeper political crisis in Europe. The broader 
resurgence of antisemitism can be theorized as an anti-modern, counter-cosmopolitan 
response to rapid economic and cultural change and current crises in the 21st century. 
Part and parcel of, but far from limited to, the radical right, there are indicators that this 
reaction has begun to move from the fringes to the center. 
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Penalizing Holocaust Denial: 
A View from Europe 
Aleksandra Gliszczyńska-Grabias* 
The visual evidence and the verbal testimony of starvation, cruelty and bestiality 
were so overpowering as to leave me a bit sick. In one room, where [there] were piled 
up twenty or thirty naked men, killed by starvation, George Patton would not even 
enter. He said that he would get sick if he did so. I made the visit deliberately, in or-
der to be in a position to give first-hand evidence of these things if ever, in the future, 
there develops a tendency to charge these allegations merely to “propaganda.” 
General Dwight D. Eisenhower.1 
The alleged Hitlerian gas chambers and the alleged genocide of the Jews form one 
and the same historical lie, which permitted a gigantic financial swindle whose chief 
beneficiaries have been the State of Israel and international Zionism, and whose main 
victims have been the German people and the Palestinian people as a whole. 
Robert Faurisson.2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Incorporating Holocaust denial into the catalogue of issues governed by legal provi-
sions, and in particular by the provisions of criminal law, raises a number of under-
standable doubts. Aside from the controversies related to the indisputable interference 
with freedom of speech, there are problems concerning the form of legal provisions that 
would ban the dissemination of the negationists’ theories, as well as difficulties in 
guaranteeing the effectiveness and consistency of their proper enforcement.3 
                                                                                                                                                       
* Research Assistant, Poznań Human Rights Centre, Institute of Legal Studies of the Polish 
Academy of Sciences; Graduate Fellow, Yale Initiative for the Interdisciplinary Study of Anti-
semitism (YIISA), Yale University. 
1 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Dear General: Eisenhower’s Wartime Letters To Marshall (1999), p. 223. 
2 Robert Faurisson, as quoted by the Guardian Weekly, Apr. 7, 1991. 
3 The term negationism in relation to Holocaust denial seems to be more appropriate than the 
frequently applied term revisionism. The school of revisionism may be associated with historical 
research, whereas Holocaust denial has nothing in common with any academic conduct. Negation-
ism comprises multiple forms of denying historical truth. Most frequently however, it is used to 
describe various forms of Holocaust denial. See, e.g., Deborah Lipstadt, Denying the Holocaust: The 
Growing Assault on Truth and Memory (1994); Michael Shermer and Alex Grobman, Denying History: 
Who Says the Holocaust Never Happened and Why Do They Say It? (2000). 
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In the United States, the essential differences between the European and the Ameri-
can understanding of the free speech doctrine lead to distrust of and even objections to 
every single court trial or a custodial sentence for a Holocaust denier in Europe.4 More-
over, the question whether—and if so how—to punish someone for Holocaust denial, 
but also more broadly for hate speech dissemination, poses a challenge, especially for 
those European enthusiasts of the greatest possible freedom of speech. This is because 
they simultaneously and (apparently) contradictorily acknowledge the need to resort to 
legal instruments that restrict this freedom, in order to protect different values and the 
rights of other individuals. 
The US “First Amendment ethos” makes it almost impossible to accept the restrictive 
way of dealing with negationists that we see in so many European legal orders.5 Con-
versely, most Europeans find the US legal doctrine of the unlimited freedom of speech, 
including Holocaust denial, disturbing. One of the primary reasons for such a discrep-
ancy in legal attitudes is the estimated risk of the danger that negationists are likely to 
cause. As Professor Wojciech Sadurski puts it: 
In the United States, the groups which feed on the literature such as “historical revi-
sionism” are part of the political folklore, just as are flat-Earthers and Montana sepa-
ratists: probably irritating and deeply offensive to many, but very unlikely to reach a 
capacity to challenge the democratic system to its core.6 
However, there are numerous other complex and persuasive factors that are crucial to 
the establishment of a legal ban on Holocaust denial in Europe. This article introduces 
the most fundamental arguments raised in the European discourse in favor of penalizing 
Holocaust denial. 
II. HOLOCAUST DENIAL—DEFINITIONAL CONTROVERSIES 
The basic difficulty that occurs while discussing the idea of penalizing Holocaust denial 
concerns the attempt to define the concept in legal terms. Due to the lack of a coherent, 
internationally recognized definition of the crime of negationism as a whole and Holo-
caust denial in particular, the scope of the penalization may differ considerably.7 At the 
                                                                                                                                                       
4 The differences between the European and American perceptions of the conflict between free 
speech and hate speech cover many more issues than only Holocaust denial. A compelling descrip-
tion of the American understanding of the civil liberties doctrine in the context of hate speech can 
be found in a book by Aryeh Neier, former leader of the American Civil Liberties Union. See Aryeh 
Neier, Taking Liberties. Four Decades in the Struggle for Rights (2003), pp. 113-33. 
5 The European states that penalize Holocaust denial are: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, 
France, Germany, Lichtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovakia, and Switzerland. After the entry into force of EU Council Framework Decision 
2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008 on combating certain forms and expressions of racism and 
xenophobia by means of criminal law, all EU member states are legally obliged to penalize certain 
forms of negationism. 
6 Wojciech Sadurski, “‘It All Depends’: The Universal and the Contingent in Human Rights,” 
European University Institute Working Paper LAW No. 2002/7 (2002), p. 28. 
7 The UN General Assembly has stated that it condemns without any reservation any denial of 
the Holocaust. See G.A. Res. 61/251, UN Doc. A/RES/61/255, Mar. 22, 2007. See also Jonathan 
Cooper and Adrian Marshall Williams, Hate Speech, Holocaust Denial and International Human Rights 
Law, 6 European Human Rights Law Review (1999), p. 593. 
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same time, such divergence in definitions allows for a more flexible approach, in which 
the newly generated forms of Holocaust denial can also be considered as legally forbid-
den negationism. 
A. Domestic law in European states 
We observe different approaches to negationism in the legal provisions of European 
states that penalize the public dissemination of Holocaust denial. It speaks for itself that 
historical factors play a major role in defining the crime of negationism, as well as the 
political intention to shape and influence the memory of the nation. 
Under Polish law, it is legally forbidden to deny, publicly and contrary to the facts, 
Nazi crimes, communist crimes, and other crimes constituting crimes against peace, 
crimes against humanity, or war crimes perpetrated against persons of Polish nationality 
and Polish citizens of other ethnicity or nationality in the period between September 1, 
1939 and July 31, 1990. Such denial is subject to a fine or a custodial penalty of up to 
three years, and the judgment is to be made public.8 The objective scope of the provision 
is not limited to negationism concerning crimes committed by Nazi Germany; it also 
covers denial of the Katyn massacre.9 
The French Gayssot Act, named after its initiator, Jean-Claude Gayssot (a socialist 
deputy in the French parliament), imposes a punishment of one month to one year of 
imprisonment or a fine for individuals who publicly question the existence of one or 
more crimes against humanity. These are crimes that have been defined in the statute of 
the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, included in the London Agreement of 
8 August 1945 and carried out either by members of an organization declared criminal 
pursuant to Article 9 of the aforementioned statute or by a person found guilty of such 
crimes under French or international jurisdiction.10 
German law regulates the issue of penalizing Holocaust denial in a more complex 
way. There are several provisions that may be invoked against Holocaust deniers. One 
of the provisions allows for penalizing anyone who publicly approves of, denies, or 
belittles an act committed under the rule of National Socialism in a manner capable of 
disturbing the public peace. Such a person shall be punished with imprisonment of up 
to five years or a fine.11 
The Austrian solution for penalizing Holocaust denial was introduced in 1992 in the 
form of an amendment to the Prohibition Act of 1947, a special bill that banned the Nazi 
Party and provided the legal framework for the process of removing all possible conse-
quences of Nazism from Austria. It was designed to suppress any potential future 
revival of the murderous Nazi regime.12 However, the foremost reason for introducing 
the legal ban on Holocaust denial in Austria was a number of court proceedings in 
                                                                                                                                                       
8 Polish Official Journal, No. 155, Item 1016, Dec. 18, 1998, available at: <http://isap.sejm.gov.pl>. 
9 In the spring of 1940, the Soviets murdered almost 20,000 Polish prisoners of war—military 
officers, policemen, and intellectuals—in the forest of Katyn. 
10  French Official Journal, No. 162, July 13, 1990, available at: <http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/ 
affichTexte.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006076185&dateTexte=vig>. 
11  German Official Journal, Nov. 13, 1998, available at: <http://bundesrecht.juris.de/stgb/__130. 
html>. 
12  Austrian Official Journal, No. 148/1992, Mar. 19, 1992, available at: <http://www.nachkriegs 
justiz.at/service/gesetze/BGBl_148_1992.gif>. 
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which Holocaust deniers were acquitted due to an ineffective basis for accusation. 
Austrian judges regarded the legal ban on incitement to racial hatred as inapplicable to 
the negation of the Holocaust.13 As a result, a new provision was introduced. It stipu-
lates that whoever denies, grossly plays down, approves of, or tries to excuse the Na-
tional Socialist genocide or other National Socialist crimes against humanity in a printed 
publication, in a broadcast, or in any other media shall be punished with imprisonment 
for one to ten years and, in cases of particularly dangerous suspects or activity, up to 
twenty years. The court may also decide in favor of the forfeiture of property, which 
usually relates to the entire print run of the publication containing the negationists’ 
theories. 
Liechtenstein.14 and Romania.15 explicitly mention the Holocaust in their negationism 
penalization laws. Liechtenstein law penalizes anyone who through speech, pictures, 
writing, or electronic media denies, crudely deprecates, or tries to justify the Holocaust 
or other crimes against humanity with imprisonment for up to two years. Romanian 
law, on the other hand, punishes public negation of the Holocaust or its effects with 
imprisonment for six months to five years. It is also prohibited to erect or maintain in a 
public space statues, statuary groups, or commemorative plaques celebrating persons 
guilty of committing crimes against peace or humanity, or to name streets, boulevards, 
squares, parks, or other public spaces after such persons.16 
If one agrees that penalizing this form of negationism is legitimate and relevant, it 
should be stated that, in order to make the penal method effective, the legal definition of 
Holocaust denial must be sufficiently broad and encompass not only the negation of the 
Holocaust but also, inter alia, its trivialization and justification. However, accepting such 
an extensive definition obviously implies a higher risk of excessive interference in the 
sphere of free speech and freedom of scientific research. It is also bound up with doubts 
concerning the legal interpretation of such legally imprecise concepts as trivialization or 
justification. Nevertheless, the Europeans remain firmly convinced that the interpretative 
difficulties do not prevail over the need to legally regulate the dissemination of Holo-
caust denial. This is because the boundary between legal and illegal behavior in this area 
is very fine, making it highly inadvisable to leave such behavior without clarification 
and an appropriate legal response. 
B. The Council of Europe 
The creation of the Council of Europe is inextricably linked to the horrors of World War 
II and the Holocaust. Accordingly, all member states of the Council of Europe unani-
mously recognize any manifestation of antisemitism as a human rights violation and 
regard the obligation to fight it as an integral part of counteracting racism in Europe. 
                                                                                                                                                       
13  See Stephen J. Roth, Denial of the Holocaust. An Issue of Law (1994), pp. 221-22. 
14  Lichtenstein’s Official Journal, Article 283, June 24, 1987, available at: <http://www.gesetze.li/ 
Seite1.jsp?LGBlm=1988037>. 
15  Emergency Ordinance 31/2002 of the Penal Code, Monitorul official al Romaniei, Mar. 28, 
2003, cited in Final Report of the International Commission on the Holocaust in Romania, presented to 
President Ion Iliescu, Bucharest, Nov. 11, 2004, p. 36. 
16  See databases of the EU Fundamental Rights Agency, available at: <http://fra.europa.eu/fra 
Website/products/products_en.htm>. 
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This position of the Council of Europe has been confirmed repeatedly.17 The need to 
engage in an active and effective fight against antisemitism, together with the willing-
ness to do so, was also one of the motivations behind the establishment of the Council of 
Europe’s European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), which occurred 
during the First Vienna Summit Conference of Heads of State and Government of the 
member states of the Council of Europe in 1993.18 In the “Vienna Declaration” adopted 
at that time, a common policy for counteracting racism, xenophobia, antisemitism, and 
intolerance was agreed upon. In this declaration, the member states of the Council of 
Europe declared that they would combat all ideologies, policies, and practices constitut-
ing incitement of racial hatred, violence, and discrimination, as well as any action or 
language likely to strengthen fears and tensions between groups of different racial, 
ethnic, national, religious, or social background. 
In 1997, the executive body of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe 
issued a recommendation that deals exclusively with the phenomenon of hate speech.19 
In the appendix to that recommendation, hate speech was defined as speech covering all 
forms of expression that spread, incite, promote, or justify racial hatred, xenophobia, 
antisemitism, or other forms of hatred based on intolerance, including: intolerance 
expressed by aggressive nationalism and ethnocentrism, and discrimination and hostil-
ity against minorities, migrants and people of immigrant origin. It is important that the 
concept of Holocaust denial was included in the category of speech that disseminates 
and propagates antisemitism. 
In light of the growing wave of antisemitic attitudes in the member states of the Coun-
cil of Europe, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted Resolution 
No. 1563, entitled “Combating anti-Semitism in Europe.”20 The Assembly emphasized the 
immense danger of antisemitism and called on all member states of the Council of Europe 
to vigorously and systematically enforce legislation criminalizing antisemitic and other 
hate speech, in particular any incitement to violence. In addition, it called on all member 
states to make public denial, as well as trivialization, justification, or praise, with racist 
intentions, of crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes, a criminal 
offense. The resolution also includes a call to actively and strongly condemn all states 
sponsoring antisemitism, Holocaust denial, and incitement to genocide. 
                                                                                                                                                       
17  See, e.g., Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Recommendations: No. 1222 (1993) on 
the fight against racism, xenophobia and intolerance; No. 1275 (1995) on the fight against racism, 
xenophobia, anti-Semitism and intolerance; No. 1438 (2000) on the threat posed to democracy by 
extremist parties and movements in Europe; and No. 1543 (2001) on racism and xenophobia in 
cyberspace. See also Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Resolutions: No. 1308 (2002) on 
restrictions on political parties in the Council of Europe member states; and No. 1345 (2003) on 
racist, xenophobic and intolerant discourse in politics. All available at: <http://assembly.coe.int/ 
ASP/Doc/ATListing_E.asp>. 
18  The compilation of the Council of Europe documents, available at: <http://www.coe.int/t/dcr/ 
summit/decl_vienne_pl.asp>. 
19  Council of Europe Committee of Ministers Recommendation No. R (97) 20 on hate speech, 
available at: <https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet 
&InstranetImage=568168&SecMode=1&DocId=582600&Usage=2>. 
20  Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Resolution No. 1563 (2007) on combating anti-
Semitism in Europe, available at: <http://assembly.coe.int/main.asp?Link=/documents/adoptedtext/ 
ta07/eres1563.htm>. 
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Moreover, the Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on Cyber-
crime, concerning the criminalisation of acts of a racist and xenophobic nature commit-
ted through computer systems, deals with the issue of Holocaust denial in its Article 6, 
which stipulates that the each state party to the protocol:  
shall adopt such legislative measures as may be necessary to establish the following 
conduct as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally 
and without right: distributing or otherwise making available, through a computer 
system to the public, material which denies, grossly minimizes, approves or justifies 
acts constituting genocide or crimes against humanity….21 
A direct reference to the need to penalize Holocaust denial may also be found in 
ECRI General Policy Recommendation No. 9: “The fight against anti-Semitism.”22 The 
most important aspect of the this recommendation concerns the form of legal provisions 
in the Council of Europe member states and their effective implementation. States 
should ensure that for all criminal offenses, antisemitic motivation will be regarded as 
an aggravating circumstance. The ECRI mentions the following actions, which, if com-
mitted intentionally, should be penalized: the public denial, trivialization, justification, 
or condoning of the Holocaust and the public denial, trivialization, justification, or 
condoning, with an antisemitic aim, of crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, or 
war crimes committed against persons on the grounds of their Jewish identity or origin. 
Moreover, the ECRI recommendation indicates the need to punish by legal means the 
public dissemination or public distribution, or the production or storage aimed at public 
dissemination or public distribution, of antisemitic written, pictorial, or other material 
containing, inter alia, Holocaust denial.23 The need to implement an effective legal ban 
on disseminating Holocaust denial is thus emphasized here in the most explicit way. 
C. European Union 
The record of the debates, which took place over many years, on the shape of the com-
mon Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008 on combating 
certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law 
indicate that those who supported the introduction of an obligation to penalize Holo-
caust denial by the EU member states followed the European rationale for such penaliza-
tion.24 It should be emphasized that these provisions were the object of serious and 
turbulent disagreement, which obviously stemmed from the different approaches of 
individual EU member states to the general problem of penalizing speech. 
Article 1(1)(d) of the Framework Decision obliges the EU member states to take the 
necessary measures to ensure that the following intentional conduct is punishable:  
                                                                                                                                                       
21  Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, concerning the criminalisation of acts 
of a racist and xenophobic nature committed through computer systems, available at: <http:// 
conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/189.htm>. The Additional Protocol entered into force 
on March 1, 2006 and has been by now ratified by 19 European states. 
22  ECRI General Policy Recommendation No. 9 on the fight against anti-Semitism, CRI (2004) 
37, available at: <http://www.legislationline.org/documents/action/popup/id/7388>. 
23  Id. 
24  Council of the European Union Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008 on 
combating certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law, OJ L 
328/55, Dec. 6, 2008. 
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publicly condoning, denying or grossly trivialising the crimes defined in Article 6 of 
the Charter of the International Military Tribunal appended to the London Agreement 
of 8 August 1945,25 directed against a group of persons or a member of such a group 
defined by reference to race, colour, religion, descent or national or ethnic origin 
when the conduct is carried out in a manner likely to incite to violence or hatred 
against such a group or a member of such a group. 
Article 1 also introduces a similar ban with respect to genocide, crimes against human-
ity, and war crimes as defined by the Statute of the International Crime Court.26 Not-
                                                                                                                                                       
25  Article 6 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal—Annex to the Agreement for 
the prosecution and punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis (“London 
Agreement”) stipulates: 
The Tribunal established by the Agreement referred to in article 1 hereof for the trial and 
punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis countries shall have the 
power to try and punish persons who, acting in the interests of the European Axis coun-
tries, whether as individuals or as members of organizations, committed any of the follow-
ing crimes. 
The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within the jurisdiction of the Tri-
bunal for which there shall be individual responsibility: 
(a) Crimes against peace: namely, planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of 
aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or par-
ticipation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing; 
(b) War crimes: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall 
include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to Wave labour or for 
any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment 
of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private 
property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by 
military necessity; 
(c) Crimes against humanity: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deporta-
tion, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during 
the war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in con-
nection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation 
of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated. 
Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation or 
execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are re-
sponsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution of such plan. 
See Appendix II of The Charter and Judgment of the Nürnberg Tribunal: History and Analysis, United 
Nations General Assembly/International Law Commission, New York, 1949, Doc. A/CN.4/5, 
available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain>. 
26  Article 6 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court defines the crime of geno-
cide as: 
… any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a na-
tional, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: 
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Doc. A/CONF.183/9, available at: <http:// 
www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Legal+Texts+and+Tools>. 
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withstanding these provisions, the final content of the Framework Decision was disap-
pointing to its supporters.27 Rapporteur Martine Roure of the EU Committee on Civil 
Liberties, Justice, and Home Affairs stated in her report on the proposal for a Council 
Framework Decision, she “regrets the failure of the Council’s text to move strongly 
forward and rise to the political challenge posed by the fight against racism and xeno-
phobia.” She vociferously opposed the limits placed on the scope of the Framework 
Decision concerning the penalization of negationism in domestic law, according to 
which member states are free to chose to punish only such behavior that is likely to 
incite to violence or hatred. Martine Roure rightly claimed that: “Trivialisation of the 
crime of genocide is a form of racism, and Member States should be able to punish it 
even where incitement to hatred or violence is not involved.” 
The Framework Decision indeed makes it possible to significantly limit the obliga-
tions imposed on member states. In addition to the remarks quoted above, member 
states may also declare that denying or grossly trivializing the crimes listed in the 
Framework Decision shall be penalized only if these crimes have been established by a 
final decision of a national court of a particular member state and/or an international 
court or by final decision of an international court only.28 
The Framework Decision came into force in December 2008, but the substance of the 
decision required a prolonged period of transposition in the EU member states.29 The 
states were obliged to take the necessary measures to comply with the provisions of this 
Framework Decision by November 28, 2010. By the same date, they were required to 
transmit to the General Secretariat of the Council and to the Commission the text of the 
provisions transposing the Framework Decision into their domestic legal orders. By 
November 28, 2013, the Council will assess the extent to which member states have 
complied with the provisions of the Framework Decision and review the Framework 
Decision. It seems highly likely that those member states that had not penalized any 
form of negationism before the entry into force of the Framework Decision will find it 
very difficult to comply with this part of the Decision. It remains an open question 
whether, or to what extent, the 2013 review process will indicate the need to exclude the 
ban on negationism from the scope of the Framework Decision. 
It was claimed, in light of the significant differences in the legislation of the EU 
member states in the areas covered by the framework decision, as well as their different 
political and social traditions, that the compromise achieved was the only possible 
solution at this stage of the negotiations. However, although the Framework Decision 
contains several important and necessary elements, the document as a whole appears to 
be rather limited in scope. Nevertheless, the efforts to harmonize legislation at the EU 
level and the establishment of a consolidated catalogue of sanctions to be imposed 
against hate crimes and hate speech (including the public dissemination of negationism) 
is an important step in combating all forms of racism and intolerance. 
                                                                                                                                                       
27  See, e.g., Report on the proposal for a Council framework decision on combating certain 
forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law, Nov. 14, 2007, pre-
sented by Martine Roure MEP. The description of the entire tumultuous negotiation process related 
to the adoption of the Framework Decision is available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/prelex/detail_ 
dossier_real.cfm?CL=en&DosId=169885>. 
28  Article 1(4) of the Framework Decision. 
29  Article 10 of the Framework Decision. 
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III. FUNDAMENTAL PREREQUISITES FOR HOLOCAUST DENIAL PENALIZATION IN 
EUROPE 
As discussed above, the issue of Holocaust denial and its penalization is of a profound 
significance for Europe. In order to carefully identify the reasons that justify restricting 
the freedom of speech of Holocaust deniers, it is essential to explain the essence of this 
phenomenon beyond its legal definition. 
In layman’s terms, Holocaust denial is a form of negationism that refers mainly to 
the act of denying, trivializing, or justifying the crimes committed by Nazi Germany 
against the Jews during World War II, although it should be clear that denying these 
crimes affects all victims and not only the Jewish ones. In practice, however, Holocaust 
denial is carried out almost exclusively in relation to Jews, and this is how it is being 
popularized throughout the world. Professor Wojciech Sadurski rightly describes this 
phenomenon as “a part of a larger package of an ideology which maintains that Jews 
cannot be trusted on anything, even on their own past.”30 
In 1984, during a seminar held at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Professor Yis-
rael Gutman posed the question whether Holocaust denial was simply a short-lived 
phenomenon, or whether it had a future and would have to be dealt with.31 Today, 
when the theories spread by negationists have supporters all around the world, and the 
president of Iran openly claims that Holocaust is a fiction made up by Jews, raising 
Holocaust denial to the rank of a state doctrine, the answer to Professor Gutman’s 
question is, unfortunately, straightforward. 
The circle that has gathered around the idea of Holocaust denial has always con-
sisted of people from many different milieus, representing a wide spectrum of personal 
backgrounds and political ideals, even though the representatives of the post-war neo-
Nazi movement in Germany, France, and the United Kingdom initially prevailed.32 
Currently, the circle of Holocaust deniers around the world is much wider and has 
strengthened enormously, also in a financial sense, due to the support it obtains from 
many Arab states.33 
As time has passed, the range of statements described as Holocaust denial has also 
changed. The opinion of researchers dealing with the issue was initially that Holocaust 
denial was meant to clear the blame for the ideas of National Socialism and Hitler.34 
Since then, the claims of Holocaust deniers have become more nuanced. They argue, 
inter alia, that even if Holocaust really took place, the number of victims was signifi-
                                                                                                                                                       
30  Sadurski, supra note 6, p. 27. 
31  See Yisrael Gutman, Denying the Holocaust (1985), pp. 20-25. 
32  See, e.g., Shermer and Grobman, supra note 3; Walter Laqueur, The Changing Face of Anti-
Semitism: From Ancient Times to the Present Day (2006), pp. 135-39. 
33  The most well-known examples are nowadays the statements of Iranian President Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad, who repeatedly claims that the Holocaust was nothing but a “Jewish swindle.” For 
coverage, see, e.g., Anne Appelbaum, “Teheran’s Holocaust Lesson,” The Washington Post online, 
Dec. 12, 2006, available at: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/11/AR 
2006121101163.html>. 
34  Deborah E. Lipstadt calls this kind of Holocaust denial hard core Holocaust denial, distin-
guishing it from soft core Holocaust denial, which includes, for example, describing military inter-
ventions of the Israeli army as the “Palestinian Holocaust.” See Deborah E. Lipstadt’s blog at: 
<http://lipstadt.blogspot.com>. 
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cantly lower than what the official statistics indicate; that it is true that many Jews 
perished during the war, but most of them were victims of contagious diseases and hard 
living conditions; that Hitler had never signed any written order to murder the whole 
Jewish population in Europe, so the Holocaust could not be described as a complex, 
precise plan; that Auschwitz was not a concentration camp but only a labor camp, 
equipped with such facilities as a swimming pool or a dance hall; that Zyklon B was 
only used for disinfection purposes; that gas chambers were first built after the war; that 
the testimonies of the former prisoners of the camps are not veracious, as they were 
given only to gain undue financial benefits; and that the evidence given by the former 
camp guards and Nazis was elicited by means of torture. 
The threat stemming from the dissemination of Holocaust denial becomes even more 
apparent when one considers that general knowledge about World War II and the 
Holocaust in Europe. The level of historical awareness in society has always been the 
best guarantor of preserving historical memory. However, as indicated by a poll con-
ducted in Great Britain in 2004, over 60 percent of the British population under the age 
of 35 have not heard of the “Final Solution,” and 30 percent of students surveyed in high 
schools in Brussels in 2005 were convinced that Oskar Schindler was one of Hitler’s 
advisers. It is thus clear how much opportunity has arisen for those who wish to distort 
and misrepresent historical truth.35 It should also be emphasized that, in the age of the 
Internet, the possibilities for disseminating negationist theories are almost limitless. This 
is proven by thousands of websites that furnish information about the “great Jewish lie” 
in a way that makes them appear to be based on reliable, scientifically-proven facts.36 
It is clear that the low level knowledge in society about the Holocaust and the lack of 
an appropriate response to its negation or trivialization are not in themselves a sufficient 
justification for penalizing Holocaust denial. Also, penalization should not stem solely 
from the fact that the claims of negationists are outrageous and evoke moral objections. 
If so, what are the reasons for recognizing the legitimacy of punishing words in the case 
of Holocaust denial? The most fundamental grounds for such legitimacy, identified in 
the European discourse, are the following: 
– the necessity to turn the memory and honor of the victims of the Holocaust into a 
legally protected value; 
– the conviction that restricting the negationists’ freedom of speech is acceptable in 
order to protect the very fundamental element of the history and national identity of 
certain European states and the heritage of European civilization as a whole; and 
– the recognition of Holocaust denial as one of the modern forms of antisemitism and 
a form of hate speech directed at Jews that may lead not only to a rise in antisemitic 
moods and attitudes but also to a rise in hate crimes committed on this basis. 
                                                                                                                                                       
35  The data cited are sourced from a survey commissioned by the BBC in December 2004 and 
from an opinion poll conducted by Res Publica, a Belgian political quarterly, in January 2005. 
Quoted from the Znak website, available at: <http://www.forumznak.org.pl/?lang1=pl&page1=news 
&subpage1=news00&infopassid1=2432&scrt1=sn> (in Polish). 
36  The significance of the problem of the dissemination of hate speech and Holocaust denial via 
the internet was explicitly acknowledged in the above-mentioned Additional Protocol to the 
Convention on Cybercrime, concerning the criminalization of acts of a racist and xenophobic nature 
committed through computer systems. 
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Such universal and axiological reasons (which are to be distinguished from the for-
mal prerequisites that must be fulfilled in order to use a specific legal provision limiting 
the freedom of speech of the individual) should be seen as an attempt to formulate a 
justification for introducing a legal ban on disseminating Holocaust denial, in the sense 
that they indicate the European legislators’ rationale for using penal sanctions against 
negationists. 
A. Memory and honor of the victims 
The memory and honor of the victims has been strongly emphasized in Germany, where the 
dissemination of Holocaust denial is punishable on the basis of regulations that prohibit 
insulting and humiliating the dead, among other legal methods.37 However, this ap-
proach to penalization carries with it the risk of the negative effects of trials involving 
Holocaust deniers, which often turn into bizarre shows during which negationists get a 
chance to present their theories to a wider audience. This, in turn, may be perceived as 
an additional insult to the memory of the dead. 
However, the consequence of trying to avoid such situations would be that no per-
son who is willing to defend the legitimacy of his or her actions in court would be 
punished, on the grounds that it might encourage others to take similar actions or insult 
the feelings of individuals who suffered as victims of such actions. Moreover, the public 
spectacle of David Irving, the notorious Holocaust denier, denouncing his theories in 
front of an Austrian judge and loudly admitting that the Holocaust was indeed a crime 
perpetrated by Nazi Germany and that gas chambers were indeed used to kill the Jewish 
people ridicules the whole negationist movement and illustrates the weakness of this 
ideology. Thus, the existing negative aspects of the judicial consideration of Holocaust 
deniers’ guilt should not be seen as a sufficient argument against punishing Holocaust 
denial by means of legal instruments. 
B. Historical truth and identity 
The essence of the second reason for penalizing Holocaust denial, which is related to the 
preservation of historical heritage, is well captured in the words of Marek Safjan, a 
Polish judge of the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg. In the context of the 
discussion on the penalization of Holocaust denial in Poland, Professor Safjan has noted: 
“Human memory is short and deceptive, while the trivialization of lies and hatred 
disseminated in public space may have shocking and destructive effects, particularly for 
the young generation of Europeans.”38 In other words, punishing negationists is also 
aimed at halting the process of the gradual fading of the memory of the Holocaust and 
the crimes of totalitarian regimes, which are still not yet a thing of the past. 
This argument also emphasizes the educational role of the state, which by introduc-
ing a legally protected taboo affirms certain values, such as a commitment to non-
discrimination on the grounds of national, racial, or ethnic grounds. However, this 
                                                                                                                                                       
37  German Official Journal, Nov. 13, 1998, available at: <http://bundesrecht.juris.de/stgb/__189. 
html>. 
38  Marek Safjan, Wolność słowa w debacie europejskiej, Otwarta Rzeczpospolita Stowarzyszenie 
przeciwko Antysemityzmowi i Ksenofobii, available at: <http://www.otwarta.org/marek-safjan-
wolnosc-slowa-w-debacie-europejskiej,400.html> (in Polish). 
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approach also carries a certain risk, namely that regulations that are only of a symbolic 
character will not be strictly executed. As a result of their controversial nature or vague 
wording, such provisions can thus be a risky method of assuring justice. Yet in the case 
of Holocaust denial, the significance of such provisions is deemed to prevail over any 
doubts. Moreover, from a European perspective, a proper legal response is an explicit 
form of warning against totalitarian regimes, which are always capable of resurgence. 
C. Hate speech and hate crime 
With regard to the third reason for penalizing Holocaust denial, which concerns the 
correlation between hate speech and hate crimes, it is important to remember that while 
most statements denying the Holocaust do not contain openly hostile or hateful antisemitic 
messages, the antisemitic motives for disseminating such statements are obvious to any-
body who analyzes them in a broader context. For example, denying the Holocaust has 
been described as a manifestation of antisemitism in ECRI Recommendation No. 9 and in 
the working definition of antisemitism prepared by the European Monitoring Center on 
Racism and Xenophobia (which became the European Union Agency for Fundamental 
Rights in 2007), as well as in resolutions of the European Parliament.39 
Therefore, if we assume that Holocaust denial is a form or at least a manifestation of 
antisemitism, the legal regulations that would ban its dissemination must be regarded as 
part of a broader state strategy that aims to fight all forms of racial, national, or religious 
hatred and intolerance. The European states have undertaken international obligations 
in this respect, also in the legal sphere, by becoming parties to a number of international 
human rights treaties.40 
                                                                                                                                                       
39  See, e.g., European Parliament resolution on remembrance of the Holocaust, anti-Semitism 
and racism, P6_TA (2005) 0018, available at: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type 
=TA&reference=P6-TA-2005-0018&language=EN>. 
40  See, e.g., Article 4 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, which stipulates that: 
States Parties condemn all propaganda and all organizations which are based on ideas or 
theories of superiority of one race or group of persons of one colour or ethnic origin, or 
which attempt to justify or promote racial hatred and discrimination in any form, and un-
dertake to adopt immediate and positive measures designed to eradicate all incitement to, 
or acts of, such discrimination and, to this end, with due regard to the principles embodied 
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the rights expressly set forth in article 5 
of this Convention, inter alia: 
(a) Shall declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on racial 
superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of violence 
or incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons of another colour or 
ethnic origin, and also the provision of any assistance to racist activities, including the 
financing thereof; 
(b) Shall declare illegal and prohibit organizations, and also organized and all other 
propaganda activities, which promote and incite racial discrimination, and shall recog-
nize participation in such organizations or activities as an offence punishable by law; 
(c) Shall not permit public authorities or public institutions, national or local, to promote 
or incite racial discrimination. 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, adopted 
and opened for signature and ratification by General Assembly resolution 2106 (XX), available at: 
<http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cerd.htm#4>. 
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It is possible that Holocaust denial does not translate into sudden, intense explosions 
of antisemitic sentiment or lead directly to acts of violence against Jews. However, a 
strong correlation between words and actions is indisputable, although it is difficult to 
determine when the critical transition takes place. Various forms of antagonism may lie 
dormant for long periods of time only to suddenly escalate, reaching the proportions of 
a mass psychosis. The history of the Third Reich’s hate propaganda leaves no room for 
doubt regarding the influence that words may have on deeds. 
One recent, dramatic example of this correlation is the radio broadcasts aired on a 
Rwandan radio stations at the time of the genocide. Due to high rates of illiteracy in 
Rwanda, radio served as a powerful and effective way of inciting hate and violence 
against the inyenzi (cockroaches), a derogatory term used to describe the Tutsis.41 One of 
the key figures engaged in using words as a tool of genocide was Georges Ruggiu, a 
Belgian journalist who was found guilty of public incitement to commit genocide and 
crimes against humanity by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.42 As the 
Tribunal stated in its judgment: 
The media, particularly RTLM radio, was a key tool used by extremists within the po-
litical parties to mobilize and incite the population to commit the massacres. RTLM 
had a large audience in Rwanda and became an effective propaganda instrument. The 
accused, who was a journalist and broadcaster with the RTLM, played a crucial role 
in the incitement of ethnic hatred and violence, which RTLM vigorously pursued. … 
His broadcasts incited massacres of the Tutsi population.43 
In this context, attention should also be drawn to the annual reports of the European 
Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and the Council of Europe’s European Commis-
sion Against Racism and Intolerance, which point not only to an apparent increase in 
racist, xenophobic, and antisemitic attitudes in most European countries but also to the 
growing number of assaults, beatings, and other acts of violence committed on the same 
grounds.44 
IV. THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
The essence of each of the above-mentioned reasons for penalizing Holocaust denial is 
clearly mirrored in the case law of the Strasbourg-based European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR), the supervisory body of the European system of human rights protec-
                                                                                                                                                       
41  Report by the International Development Research Centre, “Hate media in Rwanda,” avail-
able at: <http://www.idrc.ca/rwandagenocide/ev-108178-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html>. 
42  The Prosecutor v. Georges Ruggiu, Judgment and Sentence, ICTR-97-32-I, International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for Rwanda, June 1, 2000. 
43  Id. 
44  See, e.g., the following reports of the Fundamental Rights Agency: “Anti-Semitism: Sum-
mary overview of the situation in the European Union 2001-2009”; “Anti-Semitism: Summary 
overview of the situation in the European Union 2001-2008 (updated version February 2009)”; 
“Annual report 2007: Report on Racism and Xenophobia in the Member States of the EU”; and 
“Racist Violence in 15 EU Member States Based on RAXEN information,” all available at: <http:// 
www.fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/research/research_en.htm>. See also the reports of the European 
Commission against Racism and Intolerance in which it examines the situation concerning manifes-
tations of racism and intolerance in each of the Council of Europe member states, all available at: 
<http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/activities/countrybycountry_en.asp>. 
ALEKSANDRA GLISZCZYŃSKA-GRABIAS 250 
tion.45 The Court (and previously also the European Commission of Human Rights, 
which served as a part of the Strasbourg system until 1998) has repeatedly been faced 
with the problem of evaluating the methods by which the member states of the Council 
of Europe limit the freedom of speech of Holocaust deniers by means of their domestic 
legislation. It is significant that up until now the ECtHR has consistently and unambigu-
ously refused to grant protection to Holocaust deniers, ruling that their complaints 
concerning the limitation of free speech were inadmissible.46 
However, the ECtHR’s position in regard to Holocaust denial has never been based 
on one consistent way of reasoning. The Strasbourg Court has used various techniques 
to establish the inadmissibility of negationists’ attempts to defend their views under 
Article 10 (freedom of speech) of the European Convention on Human Rights.47 In 
several cases, it has ruled that the legal limitations imposed on Holocaust deniers’ free 
speech by the member states were necessary for the protection of the rights of others, the 
public security, or public morals in a democratic society. At other times, the ECtHR has 
invoked Article 17 of the Convention, which stipulates that: “Nothing in this Convention 
may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any 
activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set 
forth herein….” As a result, every attempt by negationists to rely on Article 10 is re-
garded as an abuse of the rights guaranteed in this international human rights treaty. 
                                                                                                                                                       
45  The European Court of Human Rights is an international court set up in 1959. It rules on in-
dividual or state applications alleging violations of the civil and political rights set out in the 
European Convention on Human Rights. Since 1998 it has sat as a full-time court and individuals 
can apply to it directly. The Court’s case law makes the Convention a powerful living instrument 
for meeting new challenges and consolidating the rule of law and democracy in Europe. On the 
case law of the Strasbourg Court regarding hate speech and Holocaust denial, see, e.g., Uladzislau 
Belavusau, “A Dernier Cri from Strasbourg: An Ever Formidable Challenge of Hate Speech,” 
European Public Law, Vol. 16(3) (2010), pp. 373-89; Ivan Hare, “Extreme Speech under International 
and Regional Human Rights Standards,” in Ivan Hare and James Weinstein (eds.), Extreme Speech 
and Democracy (2009); M.G. Schmidt and R.L. Vojtovic, “Holocaust Denial and Freedom of Expres-
sion,” in T.S. Orlin and M. Scheinin, The Jurisprudence of the Human Rights Law: A Comparative 
Interpretive Approach (2000). 
46  Complaints by Holocaust deniers were found inadmissible in numerous cases, including: T. 
v. Belgium, App. No. 9777/82 (1983); F.P. v. Germany, App. No. 19459/92 (1993); Honsik v. Austria, 
App. No. 25062/94 (1995); Remer v. Germany, App. No. 25096/94 (1995). Nachtmann v. Austria, App. 
No. 36773/97 (1998); and Witzsch v. Germany, App. No. 41448/98 (1999). 
47  Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights stipulates: 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to 
hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by 
public authority and regardless of frontiers. This article shall not prevent States from 
requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be 
subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law 
and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial 
integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of 
health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing 
the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority 
and impartiality of the judiciary. 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, CETS No. 5, 
available at: <http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=005&CL=ENG>. 
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X. v. Germany is one of the earliest cases concerning Holocaust denial that were ex-
amined by the Strasbourg Court.48 The author of the complaint had displayed pamphlets 
that described the Holocaust as an “unacceptable lie” and a “Zionist swindle” on a 
notice board located on the fence of his property. A neighbor of Jewish descent whose 
grandfather had been murdered in Auschwitz filed a civil lawsuit against him. The 
Court of First Instance ruled that despite the fact that the pamphlets did not directly 
address the neighbor or his grandfather, they must be considered offensive to all Jewish 
victims of National Socialism and their surviving relatives. The court instructed Mr. X. 
to refrain from expressing his beliefs publicly. However, the Court of Appeal ruled that 
contents of the pamphlets, which denied the facts of the Holocaust, did not insult people 
of Jewish origin as a whole but only individuals who expressed certain opinions on the 
extermination of Jews during the Third Reich, opinions which, according to Mr. X., were 
untrue. The Federal Court of Justice issued a decision reiterating its previous rulings on 
this issue, according to which in Germany, because of its history, every individual of 
Jewish descent may feel insulted by attacks on Jews as a group or as a community, 
regardless of his or her personal experiences during the time of the Nazi regime, and 
even regardless of whether the person was alive at the time. The Court emphasized that 
Holocaust denial is not covered by the freedom of speech enshrined in the German 
Constitution. 
The complaint filed by Mr. X. before the Strasbourg Court referred specifically to an 
alleged violation of Article 10 (freedom of speech) of the Convention, which in his 
opinion had taken place as a result of the distortion of historical truth by the German 
nation for political reasons. He also claimed a violation of Article 6 (right to a fair trial) 
of the Convention, due to the German court’s refusal to order a review of popular 
Holocaust denial publications and views, which were supposed to serve as evidence in 
the civil suit. 
Concerning the alleged violation of Article 10, the European Commission of Human 
Rights (which at that time decided on the admissibility of applications) delivered a very 
significant judgment, finding that: 
it was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable to consider the pamphlets displayed by the 
applicant as a defamatory attack against the Jewish community and against each in-
dividual member of this community. By describing the historical fact of the assassina-
tion of millions of Jews, a fact which was even admitted by the applicant himself, as a 
lie and a Zionistic swindle, the pamphlets in question not only gave a distorted pic-
ture of the relevant historical facts but also contained an attack on the reputation of all 
those who were described as liars or swindlers, or at least as persons profiting from or 
interested in such lies or swindles. The Commission considers that the courts rightly 
identified this as the underlying tendency of the pamphlets in question. Their re-
striction was therefore not only covered by a legitimate purpose recognised by the 
Convention (namely the protection of the reputation of others), but could also be con-
sidered as necessary in a democratic society. Such a society rests on the principles of 
tolerance and broadmindedness which the pamphlets in question clearly failed to ob-
serve. The protection of these principles may be especially indicated vis-à-vis groups 
which have historically suffered from discrimination. The fact that collective protec-
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tion against defamation is limited to certain specific groups including Jews is based 
on objective considerations and does not involve any element of, discrimination con-
trary to Article 14 of the Convention. 
Furthermore, in response to the accusation that, by not admitting the negationist ma-
terials as evidence, the German courts had violated Article 6 of the Convention, the 
Commission reiterated that the crime of the Holocaust was a historical fact that was 
proven beyond any reasonable doubt and did not need to be proven in the courtroom 
again. The German courts were not required to rule on whether or not the contents of 
the pamphlets were true but to consider the question concerning their insulting nature. 
In conclusion, the European Commission stated that the entire complaint of Mr. X. was 
manifestly ill-founded. 
The Strasbourg Court also considered the penalization of Holocaust denial in an-
other interesting context. This complaint concerned the imposition by the authorities of 
the city of Munich of various duties on the far-right National Democratic Party of 
Germany (NDP) relating to the organization of a conference, entitled “Germany’s future 
in the shade of political extortion?,” where David Irving, a well-known antisemite and 
Holocaust denier, was to deliver a key lecture.49 The NDP was obliged to ensure that the 
crime of the Holocaust would not be denied during the course of the entire conference 
and to inform participants of the sanctions resulting from incitement to hatred and 
insulting the memory of the dead. If statements denying the Holocaust were made, the 
organizers of the conference were obliged to block them or even to discontinue the 
conference immediately. Because of David Irving’s participation in the conference, the 
risk that statements negating the Holocaust would be made during the course of the 
conference was regarded as very high. The NDP’s complaint regarding the decision of 
the Munich authorities was rejected in subsequent court proceedings. Ultimately, the 
German Federal Constitutional Court ruled yet again that Holocaust denial did not fall 
under the constitutional protection of freedom of speech. 
The authors of the application submitted to the Strasbourg Court claimed in particu-
lar that: 
statements denying the persecution of Jews under the Nazi regime, in particular the 
denial of the existence of gas chambers were protected by the Convention as state-
ments or opinions relating to contemporary history. In this respect, the applicant or-
ganisation maintains that, according to scientific research, the gas chambers in 
Auschwitz were not authentic. 
In the NDP’s opinion, the scheduled conference was only meant to discuss the concept 
of anti-German atrocity propaganda. 
The European Commission of Human Rights held that the application was clearly 
inadmissible and that the intervention of the German authorities had been justified and 
proportionate. According to the Commission, David Irving’s presence had rightly been 
regarded as a factor that made it highly probable that statements denying the Holocaust 
would be made and that public order disturbances would occur. The German authorities 
had been thus right to take steps to prevent this from happening. Referring to Article 17 
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of the Convention, the Commission ruled that statements negating the persecution of 
millions of Jews by the Nationalist Socialist regime made in the context of a discussion 
about “anti-German atrocity propaganda,” were contrary to the essential values under-
lying the entire Convention. 
Among the numerous complaints submitted to the ECtHR by Holocaust deniers is 
the one of Roger Garaudy, one of the key leaders of the European negationist move-
ment, who had been fined by the French courts for denying the Holocaust.50 In the 
process of considering the legitimacy of said complaint, the Court unambiguously 
articulated its standpoint regarding attempts to use the Convention by persons who 
disseminate Holocaust denial. In its decision, the Court firmly asserted that Holocaust 
denial is: 
one of the most serious forms of racial defamation of Jews and of incitement to hatred 
of them. The denial or rewriting of this type of historical fact undermines the values 
on which the fight against racism and anti-Semitism are based…. Such acts are in-
compatible with democracy and human rights because they infringe the rights of oth-
ers. 
As a result, the complaint was found inadmissible on the basis of Article 17 of the 
Convention. 
The fact that the ECtHR relies on Article 17 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights in its case law concerning the public dissemination of Holocaust denial is very 
significant. However, it simultaneously raises several doubts arising from the excep-
tional character of this provision. According to the case law of the Strasbourg Court, as 
well as the ideas underlying the Convention itself, Article 17 was designed to serve as a 
“last resort” in cases where the limitation clauses appended to those provisions of the 
Convention that grant specific rights and freedoms could no longer be applied or might 
be deemed insufficient. The essence of the meaning of Article 17 was expressed during 
the consideration of the complaint in De Becker v. Belgium,51 where the ECtHR empha-
sized that Article 17 was applicable only to those individuals who posed a threat to the 
democratic order of the states parties to the Convention. 
The fact that the ECtHR regards Holocaust deniers as individuals who pose this kind 
of threat is a clear sign that the Strasbourg Court understands and is ready to fight the 
dangers resulting from Holocaust denial in Europe. However, a question arises as to the 
scope and wording of negationists’ statements that are covered by Article 17. Would a 
similar line of argument apply to the efforts to negate the genocide that took place in 
Bosnia during the Balkan wars? The fact that the crime of genocide was committed in 
Bosnia at that time has also been proven beyond all reasonable doubt.52 Moreover, new 
provisions penalizing the negation of other genocides are being implemented by indi-
vidual European states, as was the case with the French law prohibiting the negation of 
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the genocide committed by the Turks against the Armenian people.53 Until now, the 
ECtHR has not been required to respond to this question, but it is most likely that it will 
soon face such challenges. Only then will it be possible to assert with certainty that the 
antisemitic character of Holocaust denial is a decisive factor on which the invocation of 
Article 17 of the Convention relies in the context of negationism. 
V. UN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE AND HOLOCAUST DENIAL IN THE EUROPEAN 
CONTEXT 
The question of the freedom of speech of Holocaust deniers in the European context was 
also examined by an international, quasi-judicial body in the universal human rights 
protection system, namely the UN Human Rights Committee, after Robert Faurisson, 
another prominent representative of the European negationist movement, submitted a 
complaint to the Committee.54 Shortly after the so-called Gayssot Act, which penalizes 
Holocaust denial0, had been adopted in France, Faurisson gave a press interview in which 
he stated, inter alia, that he did not believe in the existence of a “policy of extermination of 
Jews” and “magical gas chambers.” Eventually, a French court fined Faurisson. 
During the proceedings before of the UN Committee, where Faurisson submitted his 
complaint, France raised the issue of the admissibility of the communication, arguing that 
it should be dismissed as inconsistent ratione materiae with the provisions of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.55 It invoked Article 5 of the Covenant, which 
is similar in character and effect to Article 17 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights and stipulates that: “Nothing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as imply-
ing for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act 
aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms recognized herein….” It was 
emphasized that Faurisson’s complaint should be treated in the same manner as similar 
complaints submitted to the Strasbourg Court and found inadmissible. Article 20 of the 
Covenant was also invoked. This provision explicitly imposes an obligation on all states 
parties to prohibit by law any war propaganda, as well as any advocacy of national, racial, 
or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility, or violence. 
However, the UN Human Rights Committee did not share the position of the French 
government and found the complaint admissible as regards the alleged violation of 
Faurisson’s freedom of speech, guaranteed by Article 19 of the Covenant. 
When considering the merits of the communication, the Committee stated that, in 
certain circumstances, the Gayssot Act might lead to a breach of the Covenant, as it 
limits freedom of speech too extensively. However, it also emphasized that, in the case 
of Roger Faurisson, the French courts had managed to eliminate such a risk by carefully 
analyzing all circumstances of the case. Furthermore, the Committee referred to its 
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General Comment No. 10, which explicitly states that restrictions on the freedom of 
speech may be necessary in order to protect and ensure the interests of other persons 
and specific groups as a whole.56 Restricting the free speech of a Holocaust denier thus 
served to protect the right of the Jewish community in France to live a life free of fear 
and antisemitism. The statements made by Faurisson, interpreted in their wider context, 
stirred antisemitic feelings. As a result, the Committee decided that France did not 
violate any provisions of the Covenant. However, the Committee’s decision was accom-
panied by a number of individual opinions of the Committee’s members, who empha-
sized their concerns regarding the overly restrictive nature of French legal provisions 
penalizing Holocaust denial. Although they all agreed with the final conclusion of the 
Committee, they perceived the Gayssot Act as a potential threat to freedom of speech if 
used in a context other than the penalization of antisemitism. 
One of the most striking elements of the Committee’s decision in Faurisson’s case was 
a statement by Professor Thomas Buergenthal, who is currently a judge of the International 
Court of Justice in the Hague: “As a survivor of the concentration camps of Auschwitz and 
Sachsenhausen whose father, maternal grandparents and many other family members 
were killed in the Nazi Holocaust, I have no choice but to recluse myself from participating 
in the decision of this case.” This powerful confession of a Holocaust survivor, forced by 
the Holocaust denier’s demand for protection of his antisemitic views in front of a UN 
human rights protection body, is indeed a symbolic one. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
The question of the legitimacy of penalizing Holocaust denial is part of a broader doc-
trinal dispute in which the views of those who advocate the unrestricted freedom of 
speech of the negationists clash with the views of those who see the need to use a spe-
cific legal barrier in cases of drastic abuse of this freedom. This question is also con-
stantly present within European states. In 2007, the Constitutional Court of Spain found 
a legal provision penalizing Holocaust denial unconstitutional.57 It stated that the 
danger of restricting free public debate within the democratic society of Spain overrides 
the need to counteract dissemination of Holocaust denial. 
Beyond such free speech violation controversies, the fact that European legislators 
and judges are having serious doubts about this issue is also caused by another disturb-
ing phenomenon, namely the multiplication of so-called “memory laws” in many 
European states. In recent times, an increasing number of legal provisions penalizing 
various “historical lies” have been adopted, some of which are far from rational.58 For 
example, as already noted above, under the Turkish Penal Code it is forbidden to pub-
licly claim that the Armenian genocide ever took place. In 2005, a world-famous Turkish 
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writer and Noble Prize winner, Orhan Pamuk, was accused of publicly insulting Turk-
ishness after stating in an interview that the murder of Armenians by the Turks was 
nothing short of genocide.59 Grotesque as it may seem, at the same time France and 
Switzerland decided to penalize public denial of the Armenian genocide. The Russian 
parliament, on the other hand, has recently started drafting a law that could result in 
penalizing any critique of the actions of the Soviets in World War II—an unprecedented 
abuse of the truth from the Polish perspective.60 Which historical claims deserves legal 
protection? When does justified action against the abuse of historical truth turn into 
state-sponsored decreeing of an official version of history? These questions remain open, 
as the answers depend to a large extent on the specific historical context and the indi-
vidual “memory law.” 
And yet, in the case of Holocaust denial, it is not enough to speak of falsifying facts 
and historical events. It is an unprecedented phenomenon that has spread all over the 
world for a very specific reason: to incite hatred of one particular nation—the Jewish 
people. The fact that Holocaust denial is currently part of official state doctrine in Iran is 
terrifying. This makes it all the more problematic that a fellow at one of America’s most 
prestigious universities organized a meeting for students with the president of Iran, the 
very same person who has been saying for years that the Jews invented Holocaust and 
that Israel should be wiped off the world map.61  
The antisemitic motivation for spreading Holocaust denial is the most convincing 
reason for the need to punish negationists for their words. What is debatable is whether 
or not they should be punished by imprisonment. It is possible that establishing very 
high financial penalties for denying the Holocaust, combined with an obligation to 
publicize and publicly announce the judicial ruling in question, could also produce the 
desired effect. At the same time, we should be wary of the idea that it is only necessary 
to penalize Holocaust denial. Even though Germany has a special responsibility in this 
area, denying the murder of millions of Jews has the same objective and the same 
harrowing effects all over the world. 
It is clear that the problem of penalizing Holocaust denial does not merely come 
down to making arguments for or against such penalization. The very shape of the 
particular legal provision, including the form and scope of the penal sanction and the 
manner in which national courts and law enforcement agencies use the available legal 
instruments, is equally important and controversial. These are the elements that most 
often determine whether or not the boundary between justified restriction of freedom of 
speech and excessive penal repression has been crossed. 
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The Judeo-Masonic Enemy in 
Francoist Propaganda (1936-1945) 
Javier Domínguez Arribas* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Between the beginning of the Spanish Civil War and the end of the Second World War, 
Francoist propaganda depicted Jews and Freemasons as two closely linked forces that 
conspired tirelessly against Spain. They were considered responsible for all the evils that 
afflicted the country, together with the leftists. While the “Reds” were an obvious and 
significant enemy for the nationalist forces, there were no more than about 5,000 Spanish 
Freemasons in 1936, and their influence in Spanish public affairs was limited, at least as 
an organization (although the individual influence of some Freemasons is another 
issue). However, their fate was the same as that of the “Communists”: relentless repres-
sion.1 The case of the Jews is even more surprising. The antisemitic propaganda of the 
early days of the Franco regime took place in a country where almost no Jews had lived 
since their expulsion by the Catholic monarchs in 1492. Furthermore, most members of 
the tiny Jewish community in the Iberian Peninsula in 1936 had arrived just a short time 
previously, coming mostly from Hitler’s Germany. Their number, although impossible 
to establish precisely, has been estimated at close to 6,000.2 In spite of the violent rhetoric 
against Jews, the regime did not systematically implement discriminatory policies 
against them. Above all, the Franco government did not facilitate Nazi antisemitic 
persecution during the Second World War, while some Spanish diplomats in fact pro-
tected Jews in danger.3 Why, then, were two groups that were so small, so different, and 
so differently treated by the regime, presented together by official propaganda as the 
powerful Judeo-Masonic enemy to be fought? This, among other aspects, is the focus of 
the research presented in this paper.4 
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This research is devoted to antisemitic and anti-Masonic propaganda during the first 
period of the Franco regime (1936-1945). In order to respect the internal logic of Fran-
coist discourse, it has been necessary to make a joint analysis of the representations of 
Jews and Freemasons, because antisemitic and anti-Masonic references were very often 
intertwined in the regime’s propaganda. Taking this as my starting point, my research 
has been essentially based on a cross-analysis of two kinds of primary sources: first, the 
printed sources that made the dissemination of antisemitic and anti-Masonic propagan-
da possible, in particular the press and books that denounced the intrigues of Jews and 
Freemasons; and, second, several archival sources that reveal the precise nature of the 
links between the organization of Francoist propaganda and the creation of an anti-
Judeo-Masonic discourse.5 
The resultant research work, published in Spanish under the title of El enemigo judeo-
masónico en la propaganda franquista (1936-1945),6 is divided in four parts, each consisting 
of two chapters. The first part studies two preliminary issues essential for a thorough 
understanding of the topic: the antisemitic and anti-Masonic tradition that later inspired 
Franco’s propaganda (Chapter I) and Franco’s personal attitudes toward Jews and 
Masons (Chapter II). 
The second and the third parts follow a chronological pattern, focusing on the Span-
ish Civil War and the Second World War respectively. The situation of the Jews and the 
Freemasons is briefly presented at the beginning of each part, which share a common 
structure based on the propaganda means under analysis. Thus, in each of these two 
parts, one chapter focuses on the role of the press in the transmission of antisemitic and 
anti-Masonic ideas (Chapters III and V), while the other focuses on the most important 
official and unofficial publishing houses involved in disseminating these ideas in books 
and pamphlets in each period (Chapters IV and VI). 
Finally, the fourth and final part moves beyond the chronological pattern to apply an 
interpretative scheme based on the following questions: what was the purpose of Fran-
co’s propaganda about Jews and Masons, and what were its functions? Two of the 
functions of antisemitic and anti-Masonic propaganda are analyzed in detail: first, the 
use of anti-Masonic discourse within the Francoist coalition as a political weapon (Chap-
ter VII); and, second, the invocation of a common Judeo-Masonic enemy as a means of 
cohesion, uniting the different factions of the coalition (Chapter VIII). 
2. THE JUDEO-MASONIC ENEMY 
Among other results of this research, it appears that the new Francoist regime led an 
unprecedented propaganda effort to present the imaginary Judeo-Masonic consortium as 
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one of the major enemies of the regime and, by extension, Spain. But the antisemitic and 
anti-Masonic themes were not new at all. In some cases, they came from a centuries-old 
tradition, although the modern configuration of the Judeo-Masonic myth mainly emerged 
in the second half of the 19th century, due principally to a small group of French Catholic 
authors who acquired a strong influence in Spain. During the Second Spanish Republic 
(1931-1936), the anti-liberal radicalization of the right wing reinforced this myth.7 One of 
the few new aspects of Francoism regarding the transmission of anti-Judeo-Masonic 
theories is the fact that they were disseminated by the authorities for the first time. 
It has also been demonstrated that the Judeo-Masonic enemy proved especially use-
ful as a “substitute enemy” in cases where anti-Communist propaganda may have been 
counterproductive. This refers in particular to leaflets dropped behind the Republican 
lines during the Civil War, a means of persuasion in which anti-Communist arguments 
were useless, as well as to the context of the German-Soviet Pact (from August 1939 to 
June 1941), when Francoist propaganda had to tone down its anti-Bolshevik attacks.8 
3. INFLUENCES 
Several influences of a very different nature made their mark on Franco’s propagandists. 
First of all, they were the heirs of the long reactionary tradition that had given rise to the 
Judeo-Masonic myth. Coming from this ideological background, the Protocols of the 
Elders of Zion exerted a decisive influence in Spain, as did the work of French Catholic 
authors Ernest Jouin and Léon de Poncins.9 
Nazi Germany’s influence is also apparent in the antisemitic propaganda produced 
in Spain. The Third Reich bribed journalists and financed the publication of works of 
propaganda during both the Spanish Civil War and the Second World War.10 However, 
the significance of Nazi influence should not be exaggerated, as has often been the case, 
in particular in discussions that hold it to be the sole form of antisemitic (and even anti-
Masonic) propaganda spread in Spain, especially through the Falange, the Spanish 
fascist party. An analysis of Francoist propaganda regarding Jews and Freemasons 
shows that the anti-Judeo-Masonism of the early years of the regime did not emerge ex 
novo and that the Falangists were not its sole distributors, as has sometimes been sug-
gested. It is true that Nazi antisemitic propaganda was available in Spain (sometimes 
transmitted through the Falange), but it came into a field that was already fertile. In fact, 
external factors did have some influence on the varying pace of anti-Judeo-Masonic 
propaganda prior to 1945, but they did not determine it. 
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9 One of the latter’s books was particularly influential: Léon de Poncins, Las fuerzas secretas de la 
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Among the Francoist political factions engaged in spreading anti-Judeo-Masonic 
theories, the Falangists were the most active. This is due to the control they exerted over 
official propaganda between 1938 and 1945 rather than to any specific obsession with 
antisemitic issues, even less so anti-Masonic ones. In fact, these themes did not occupy a 
central position in the original thinking of the Falangists (with the sole exception of 
Onésimo Redondo).11 When they did use it for propaganda purposes after 1936, they 
essentially returned to the religious arguments that the most traditional forms of Cathol-
icism, in particular Integrists and Carlists, had been espousing for several decades. Even 
then, their arguments sometimes lacked conviction. The predominant accusations 
against the Judeo-Masonic enemy, including those of the Falangists, did not have the 
modern nature claimed by fascism. 
In sum, although the Falangists played a main role in the transmission of anti-Judeo-
Masonic ideas, the data tends to underline the significance of another ideological current 
whose influence on Francoist discourse has often been underestimated: traditionalist 
thought. The cultural and ideological origins of the Judeo-Masonic myth, as used in the 
early years of the regime, were not fascist; rather, they lay in the reactionary ideas of 
national Catholicism.12 
4. FRANCO’S POSITION 
The dictator’s personal position should not be overlooked when it comes to explaining 
the use of the Judeo-Masonic enemy in the regime’s propaganda, although his attitudes 
toward Jews and Freemasons were relatively independent from the ideas transmitted by 
his propagandists. In particular, Franco does not seem to have given much credit to the 
theory that linked Jews and Masons; he had very different points of view regarding each 
group (which has often masked the fact that the regime’s propaganda did link them). 
The Jews never occupied an important place in his thought and he even showed some 
understanding of the Sephardim, although this was because of their Spanish roots rather 
than their Jewishness.13 However, this did not prevent him from using antisemitic 
themes for propaganda purposes, as he did in various speeches, especially between 1939 
and 1943, several of the articles he wrote for the newspaper Arriba in 1949 and 1950, and 
even in instructions given to the press during the Civil War that have only recently come 
to light.14 
Franco considered Freemasonry his worst enemy, even worse than Communism, 
and the dictator’s ideas about Freemasonry are essential in explaining the virulence of 
the propaganda against the organization, in which he personally took part. Franco wrote 
numerous anti-Masonic texts, beginning at the time of the Civil War, for use as the basis 
                                                                                                                                                       
11  See Álvarez Chillida, op. cit., at pp. 340-343. 
12  National Catholicism is the ideology that considers Catholicism as the essence of the Spanish 
nation. 
13  See especially Francisco Franco Bahamonde, Papeles de la guerra de Marruecos. Diario de una 
bandera. La hora de Xauen. Diario de Alhucemas, Madrid, Fundación Nacional Francisco Franco, 1986, 
pp. 191-192. 
14  The articles were published under a pseudonym and then compiled in J. Boor, Masonería, 
Madrid, Gráficas Valera, 1952. Some of the instructions for the press can be seen in AGM, CGG, 
5/284 (20). 
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for leaflets and instructions to the press. He later decided to publish his own anti-
Masonic articles in Arriba.15 One of the most significant results of this work was the 
detailed analysis of a previously unknown element that played a decisive role in shap-
ing Franco’s thoughts and acts on Freemasonry, beginning in the early 1940s. This was 
the spy network known as APIS, which transmitted dozens of fake Masonic documents 
to the dictator over a period of more than 20 years, with the partisan aim of influencing 
him in an anti-Falangist and anti-Juanist direction.16 
5. PROPAGANDA MEANS 
Several means were used to transmit anti-Judeo-Masonic theories between 1936 and 
1945. Visual media such as posters or films do not seem to have played a significant role, 
with rare exceptions, while oral forms of propaganda, such as lectures, talks, and 
speeches, were used to disseminate these theories among very different audiences. 
Speeches and lectures about the misdeeds of the Jewish and Masonic enemy were 
sometimes broadcast on radio, particularly during the Civil War, considerably extending 
their audience and even reaching the Republican side.17 Leaflets were also distributed in 
enemy areas during the conflict to encourage the desertion of militiamen; some con-
tained invectives against Jews and Masons, who were accused of dominating Republi-
can Spain. Further leaflets attacking the Judeo-Masonic enemy were distributed later on, 
for instance during a propaganda campaign for unity between the army and the Falange 
in the winter of 1941-1942.18 
The use of antisemitic and anti-Masonic discourse by the Franco regime is particular-
ly evident when we examine newspapers and, above all, the consignas (instructions) sent 
to them by the official press and propaganda machine, during both the Spanish Civil 
War and the Second World War. During the first period, antisemitic and anti-Masonic 
themes appeared in the press on an almost daily basis, especially in 1937, due to the 
constant intervention of the new Francoist regime. The instructions were a way of 
launching very different campaigns with different goals. One of them, for instance, was 
to discredit initiatives at mediation in the eyes of public opinion, while another was to 
avoid any dissidence, warning Spaniards against the enemy’s infiltration of the new 
regime.19 During the Second World War, attacks against Jews and Masons followed ever 
more divergent paths in the Francoist press; although still abundant, they were no 
longer published on a daily basis and tailed off considerably toward the end of the 
conflict. The Franco regime’s use of such themes, especially antisemitic ones, was then 
increasingly shaped by developments in the international context, a trend already begun 
at the end of the Civil War.20 
                                                                                                                                                       
15  Some of these texts and instructions can be seen in AGM, CGG, 5/283 (10) and 5/284 (27). 
16  The juanistas were the supporters of Juan de Borbón, son of Alphonse XIII and pretender to 
the Spanish throne. On the APIS network, see CDMH, Presidencia, 91; AFF, 965, 1061, 1244, 1246, 
5071, 5072, 5073, 9459, 11389, etc. 
17  An example of a broadcast of an anti-Masonic lecture can be found in AGM, CGG, 2986 (1). 
18  AGA, Cultura, 21/119. 
19  There were press campaigns against mediation in the springs of 1937 and 1938 and October 
1938. Anti-Judeo-Masonic arguments played an important role in all three cases. 
20  See Domínguez Arribas, op. cit., at ch. V. 
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In parallel with this press activity, two publishing houses at the service of the Franco 
regime played a major role in disseminating anti-Judeo-Masonic theories: Ediciones 
Antisectarias (1936-1939) and Ediciones Toledo (1941-1943). The former’s links to the 
regime were unofficial, unlike the latter, which concealed its origins to increase its 
persuasive power. At Ediciones Antisectarias, the ideological positions of traditionalism 
and Catholic integrism prevailed (despite the support that this collection received from 
the pro-Falangist minister Serrano Suñer), while Ediciones Toledo was controlled by the 
Falangists, although they were watered down and submissive to Franco. Therefore, each 
series of works distinguished itself by an orientation that was primarily Catholic in the 
case of Antisectarias and Falangist in the case of Toledo. However, with regard to Jews 
and Freemasons, the contents were not very different between the two publishing 
houses, being mainly characterized by anti-Judeo-Masonism with Christian roots. 
The leading authors of the two publishing houses had very different careers, but 
they did have some points in common. Juan Tusquets, a priest, managed Ediciones 
Antisectarias and wrote the most important volumes in the collection, while Francisco 
Ferrari Billoch, himself a former Mason, was an anti-Judeo-Masonic expert for Ediciones 
Toledo, among other contributors. He wrote a single pamphlet under his own name for 
Toledo, but a number of anonymous brochures must also be attributed to him. Both 
Tusquets and Ferrari had begun their anti-Masonic (and antisemitic) careers prior to the 
uprising of July 1936, inspired by a rigid view of Catholicism.21 
If we consider propaganda means as a whole, it is apparent that the Falangists’ 
gradual take-over of the propaganda department during the war and, particularly, in its 
aftermath did not imply a significant change in the antisemitic and anti-Masonic themes 
that appeared in Francoist discourse. Contrary to what one might expect, the period 
characterized by the highest “anti-Judeo-Masonic inflation” is that prior to the Falange’s 
control of the propaganda machine, that is, during the first half of the Civil War. 
6. THE FUNCTIONS OF ANTI-JUDEO-MASONIC PROPAGANDA 
If the regime did spread violent discourse against Freemasons and Jews in its early 
years, it was because it stood to gain many advantages thereby. “Everything can be used 
from the enemy,” says a fictional Franco in a story by a well-known Spanish writer.22 
This assertion can be applied to the Judeo-Masonic enemy, which could even be used to 
achieve goals that were unattainable through the mere invocation of the Communist 
enemy, as we have seen. 
Among the functions of antisemitic and anti-Masonic propaganda, those addressed 
to the Spanish population as a whole must be considered first. The explanatory function 
is maybe the most evident of all. Since it first emerged in the 19th century, the Judeo-
                                                                                                                                                       
21  Ibid., at chs. IV and VI. A preliminary version of these chapters may be consulted in Javier 
Domínguez Arribas, “Juan Tusquets y sus Ediciones Antisectarias (1936-1939),” in J.A. Ferrer 
Benimeli (ed.), La masonería española en la época de Sagasta, Zaragoza, Gobierno de Aragón, 2007, vol. 
II, pp. 1157-1196; and Javier Domínguez Arribas, “La propaganda anti-judeo-masónica durante el 
primer franquismo: el caso de Ediciones Toledo (1941-1943),” in J.A. Ferrer Benimeli (ed.), La 
masonería en Madrid y en España del siglo XVIII al XXI, Zaragoza, Gobierno de Aragón, 2004, vol. II, 
pp. 1165-1194. 
22  Francisco Umbral, Leyenda del César Visionario, Barcelona, Bibliotex, 2001, p. 70 (1st ed., 1991). 
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Masonic myth provided simple and comprehensive explanations for extremely complex 
situations, and this fundamental use continued in Franco’s Spain after 1936. These 
supposed Judeo-Masonic plots were a way of explaining the unexplainable, from the 
criticism against Nationalists by some foreign Catholics during the Civil War, which was 
considered incomprehensible, to the black market, corruption, and hunger in the post-
war period.23 
The legitimating function, equally obvious, was particularly necessary in the context 
of a state under construction that was imposing its rule through civil war. Alleged 
Judeo-Masonic control over Republican Spain legitimated the war effort and the estab-
lishment of a new regime, as well as the specific measures adopted by it, especially in 
terms of repression. The analysis of Ediciones Toledo has shown that some brochures 
justified specific repressive measures.24 
The central role of the repressive function in anti-Judeo-Masonic propaganda must 
likewise be emphasized. Countless examples prove the existence of close links between 
propaganda and repression, although the former directed its invectives against both 
Jews and Masons and the second affected only the latter. The lists of Freemasons pub-
lished by the Nationalist press at the beginning of the Civil War may be included in the 
“thread that leads from propaganda to repression,” to quote Dominique Rossignol, and 
the same is true of the works of Tusquets and Ferrari Billoch, which were used by the 
courts as evidence to prosecute Freemasons.25 Another fact is even more significant: both 
authors actively participated in the repression of the “sect” during the Civil War, along 
with other anti-Judeo-Masonic propagandists. Tusquets simultaneously managed the 
anti-Masonic section of Franco’s military intelligence and the collection that actually 
became its propaganda organ, Ediciones Antisectarias.26 
Other functions were specific to the factions that were part of the authoritarian coali-
tion. Within this coalition, propaganda against Jews and Freemasons principally served 
two contradictory functions. On the one hand, the Judeo-Masonic common enemy was 
invoked to unite the different factions that supported Franco. In critical periods, those in 
charge of propaganda, and particularly the Falangists loyal to Franco who took over in 
1941, aimed to ease tensions and to strengthen the regime’s stability by joining forces 
against this mythical figure. Both Ediciones Antisectarias and Ediciones Toledo, just like 
newspapers and other means of propaganda, published this kind of call for unity, meant 
particularly to neutralize existing conflicts between the military and the Falangists, as 
well as between the latter and all the other “families” in the nationalist coalition. 
The principal function of anti-Judeo-Masonic propaganda within the Francoist coali-
tion, however, was completely different from, and even contrary to, the aforementioned 
function. Its antisemitic and especially anti-Masonic discourse was not only directed 
against the various enemies of the New Spain (from Republican leaders to liberal Catho-
                                                                                                                                                       
23  See, for instance, Juan Tusquets, Masones y pacifistas, Burgos, Ediciones Antisectarias, 1939; 
and La garra del capitalismo judío. Sus procedimientos y efectos en el momento actual, Madrid, Ediciones 
Toledo, 1943. 
24  For example, La masonería en acción, Madrid, Ediciones Toledo, 1941. 
25  Dominique Rossignol, Histoire de la propagande en France de 1940 à 1944. L’utopie Pétain, Paris, 
Presses Universitaires de France, 1991, p. 254. 
26  On the role of Tusquets in the anti-Masonic section of the Military Information Service (SIM), 
see AGM, CGG, 2986 and 2964 (2). 
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lics). In fact, this kind of argument was also used by several factions of the authoritarian 
coalition as a powerful weapon to launch a more or less subtle attack on the opposing 
factions of the same coalition. This internal use can be seen in the press from the Civil 
War on, when Falangist newspapers presented anti-Judeo-Masonic arguments to criti-
cize the former members of the CEDA (a rightist Catholic party), and vice versa. Edi-
ciones Antisectarias did the same with the Falange and with one of its foreign models, 
Nazism. However, it was in the period of the Second World War that accusations of 
links with Freemasonry (Judaism being progressively left aside) became especially 
frequent within the Francoist conglomerate. Reading between the lines, it is possible to 
find this kind of insinuation in La masonería en acción (Freemasonry in action) (1941), one of 
Ediciones Toledo’s brochures, as well as in newspapers, sometimes due to instructions 
from the Falangists that controlled the press and propaganda offices. Everybody accused 
everybody else, although Falangists and Don Juan’s supporters seem to have been the 
main victims of these attacks, which in some cases even took the form of specific repres-
sive action. 
7. CONCLUSION 
In sum, the Judeo-Masonic enemy, as it appeared in early Francoist propaganda, worked 
within the authoritarian coalition as a mechanism to regulate tensions and control 
internal dissidence. Sometimes, its invocation as a common enemy was able to reduce 
conflict; at other times, anti-Judeo-Masonic rhetoric acted as a safety valve, allowing 
tensions to be expressed (and maybe even resolved) through accusations of Freema-
sonry such as those directed against Pedro Sainz Rodríguez or Gerardo Salvador Me-
rino, two high officials of the regime. After this kind of accusation, it was time to expect 
a possible intervention in favor of one faction or another by the supreme arbitrator—the 
Caudillo, whose anti-Masonic obsession was familiar to all. Francoism clearly emerges 
from this research as an extremely conflictive and non-uniform reality. This, in my 
opinion, is not to downplay its dictatorial and repressive nature at all. 
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“Artisans … for Antichrist”: 
Jews, Radical Catholic Traditionalists, 
and the Extreme Right 
Mark Weitzman* 
The Israeli historian, Israel J. Yuval, recently wrote: 
The Christian-Jewish debate that started nineteen hundred years ago, in our day came 
to a conciliatory close. … In one fell swoop, the anti-Jewish position of Christianity 
became reprehensible and illegitimate. … Ours is thus the first generation of scholars 
that can and may discuss the Christian-Jewish debate from a certain remove … a post-
polemical age.1 
This appraisal helped spur Yuval to write his recent controversial book Two Nations in 
Your Womb: Perceptions of Jews and Christians in late Antiquity and the Middle Ages. Yuval 
based his optimistic assessment on the strength of the reforms in Catholicism that 
stemmed from the adoption by the Second Vatican Council in 1965 of the document 
known as Nostra Aetate. Nostra Aetate in Michael Phayer’s words, was the “revolution-
ary” document that signified “the Catholic church’s reversal of its 2,000 year tradition of 
antisemitism.”2 
Yet recent events in the relationship between Catholics and Jews could well cause 
one to wonder about the optimism inherent in Yuval’s pronouncement. For, while the 
established Catholic Church is still officially committed to the teachings of Nostra Aetate, 
the opponents of that document and of “modernity” in general have continued their 
fight and appear to have gained, if not a foothold, at least a hearing in the Vatican today. 
And, since in the view of these radical Catholic traditionalists “[i]nternational Judaism 
wants to radically defeat Christianity and to be its substitute” using tools like the Free-
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masons, it is in their views on Jews and Judaism that we can find the most profound 
expression of their radical rejection of Nostra Aetate, Vatican II, and the modern virtues 
of democracy and tolerance.3 
Although the firestorm of publicity aroused in recent years by the actor Mel Gibson’s 
film “The Passion of the Christ” and the more recent Holocaust denial remarks of Bishop 
Richard Williamson have died down, they serve to remind us that for some Catholics 
the subsequent statements and reforms by the Church in regard to the Jewish people, 
such as Nostra Aetate and its successor documents, are still unacceptable, and the earlier 
tradition of “the teachings of contempt”4 still retain their validity. 
An even more basic question is, of course, that of definition. Following the sociologist 
Michael Cuneo, I begin with the loose definition of those who have rejected the reforms of 
Vatican II and “entered into schism from the institutional church.” However, I should 
stress that the focus of this article will be on only examining the attitudes of those extreme 
traditionalists toward Jews, Judaism, and the related area of religious freedom.5 
The Society of Saint Pius X (SSPX) has become the locus of the extreme Catholic tra-
ditionalist world. It was created in 1970 by Archbishop Marcel Lefebvre, who first came 
to attention when he refused to sign the Vatican II statement on Religious Liberty and 
the Church in the Modern World.6 As a result, in 1970, he created a traditionalist semi-
nary in Econe, Switzerland, and in the same year he founded the Society of Saint Pius X. 
In 1973 and 1974, the SSPX came to the United States, with chapels being established in 
California, Texas, and New York. Lefebvre continued to publicly criticize the reforms of 
Vatican II, including the liturgical changes, and came into more and more overt conflict 
with Rome. He was ordered to close down his Swiss seminary in 1974 by Pope Paul VI 
but refused, and as a result his priestly functions were suspended in 1976. This did not 
stop Lefebvre, who upped the ante in 1983 by threatening to consecrate a successor. 
Trying a different response, a year later Pope John Paul II reintroduced, under some 
conditions, the Tridentine (Latin) Mass, which was a gesture of conciliation to the 
traditionalists. Lefebvre and the traditionalists were not reconciled however, and three 
years later Lefebvre again threatened to consecrate a successor. This time the Vatican 
responded by entering into negotiations with the group, and indeed, on May 5, 1988, 
Lefebvre signed an agreement that required him to acknowledge his loyalty to the 
Vatican and to accept the new Mass as legitimate. In return, the SSPX was to be recog-
nized and allowed to continue to use the Tridentine Mass in its services. The very next 
day, Lefebvre repudiated the agreement, and on June 30, 1988 he consecrated four 
bishops, in defiance of Rome’s authority. This time, the Vatican responded forcefully, 
excommunicating Lefebvre and his priests and putting the SSPX into a state of schism.7 
Lefebvre died in 1991, but by then the SSPX had become established and was able to 
withstand the loss of its founder. Bishop Bernard Fellay (Swiss) was elected as Superior 
General in 1994 and was re-elected in 2006. 
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The most recent firestorm erupted when Bishop Richard Williamson of the SSPX 
questioned the reality of the Holocaust. Williamson was one of the four bishops conse-
crated by Lefebvre in 1988. In January of 2009, Pope Benedict XVI lifted the excommuni-
cations; however, on that same day an interview with Williamson aired on Swedish TV 
in which he said: “I believe that the historical evidence is strongly against, is hugely 
against six million Jews having been deliberately gassed in gas chambers as a deliberate 
policy of Adolf Hitler,”8 and “I think that 200,000 to 300,000 Jews perished in Nazi 
concentration camps, but none of them in gas chambers.”9 
The reaction from outraged Jews and others was immediate and grew upon expo-
sure of Williamson’s history of antisemitic comments, which included a belief in the 
accuracy of the notorious forgery The Protocols of the Elders of Zion.10 The resulting storm 
of criticism caused the Vatican to insist upon Williamson’s renunciation of his Holocaust 
denial, which he has refused to do. However, in a letter in February 2009, he did say that 
“[o]bserving these consequences I can truthfully say that I regret having made such 
remarks,” but he never indicated a recantation of his views.11 The negative import of 
Williamson’s comments, coming amidst the ongoing reconciliation discussions with the 
Vatican, was also not lost on the SSPX leadership. Fellay weighed in on the matter by 
issuing a statement that said: 
It’s clear that a Catholic bishop cannot speak with ecclesiastical authority except on 
questions that regard faith and morals. Our Fraternity does not claim any authority 
on other matters. Its mission is the propagation and restoration of authentic Catholic 
doctrine, expressed in the dogmas of the faith. It’s for this reason that we are known, 
accepted and respected in the entire world. The affirmations of Bishop Williamson do 
not reflect in any sense the position of our Fraternity. For this reason I have prohibited 
him, pending any new orders, from taking any public positions on political or histori-
cal questions.12 
Yet Williamson’s antisemitism was not new, or hidden. In a letter that was posted on the 
SSPX’ seminary website, dated February 1, 1991, Williamsons reflected on the (first) Gulf 
War. First he pontificated that the war was instigated by Russia in an attempt to “kill 
with one stone … obstacles to the advance of International Socialism,” that would then 
allow “Russia to march through the now unguarded gateway to Europe.” But hidden 
behind the Russian advance, according to Williamson, was another, even more sinister 
cause. “However, behind the Gulf War, and even behind Russia, may one not, thirdly, 
fear the looming figure of the Anti-Christ?” The war was a creation of “the many friends 
of Israel in the USA … whooping for the United States to break the Arab strong man.” 
Finally, Williamson puts these comments into a clear theological perspective: 
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Until [the Jews] recover their true messianic vocation [by accepting the Church] they 
may be expected to continue fanatically agitating, in accordance with their false mes-
sianic vocation of Jewish world domination. … So we may fear their continuing to 
play their major part in the agitation of the East and the corruption of the West.13 
In another letter to his supporters, written on the letterhead of the SSPX’s St. Thomas 
Aquinas Seminary in Winona, Minnesota just a few months later, while discussing the 
media’s debilitating influence on society (referring specifically to the confirmation 
hearings of Clarence Thomas for the Supreme Court), Williamson quoted the notorious 
Protocols of the Elders of Zion approvingly: 
… it is indispensable to stir up the people’s relations with their governments in all 
countries so as to utterly to exhaust humanity with dissension, hatred, struggle, envy 
… so that the goyim see no other course open to them than to take refuge in our com-
plete sovereignty in money and all else.14 
Later in the same letter Williamson also cited Protocol 14 (“in countries known as 
progressive and enlightened, we have created a senseless, filthy, abominable literature”), 
referring to the “alternative life-style,” which in Williamson’s view is “so horrible as to 
cry to heaven for vengeance.” Williamson’s belief in the Protocols has remained consis-
tent. A decade later, in a letter of May 1, 2009, Williamson wrote: “God puts in men’s 
hands the ‘Protocols of the Sages of Sion’ … if men want to know the truth, but few 
do.”15 
Interestingly enough, Williamson’s letters demonstrate not only his antisemitism but 
also overt racism and sexism. In an even more recent letter, he explains the 2005 unrest 
in France by writing: “So when white men give up on saving Jews, looking after other 
races and leading their womenfolk, it is altogether normal for them to be punished 
respectively by the domination of Jewish finance, by the refusal to follow of the non-
white races and by rampant feminism.”16 Finally, in the above-mentioned letter of 
February 1991, Williamson even combined two of those themes, noting criticism of his 
September letter in which he condemned women for wearing pants and jocularly com-
pared it to criticism of his Holocaust denial, beginning the letter as follows: 
Few of you will be surprised to learn that the September letter appealing to the wom-
en not to wear trousers caused a strong reaction, comparable only to the reaction of 
the Seminary letter which referred to scientific evidence that certain famous “holo-
caust gas-chambers” in Poland cannot have served as gas-chambers at all.17 
While Fellay issued his statement in 2009, it is clear that Williamson’s antisemitism was 
evident and publicly disseminated to the membership of the SSPX at least for the 18 
years prior to Fellay’s public statement. Furthermore, barring any evidence of prior 
repudiation or discipline of Williamson for his antisemitism, it is clear that Fellay was 
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being disingenuous at best when he claimed that “[t]he affirmations of Bishop William-
son do not reflect in any sense the position of our Fraternity.” In fact, the SSPX and the 
extremist Catholic traditionalist movement in general are shot through with anti-
semitism to such an extent that I believe it is possible to consider antisemitism as one of 
the foundational doctrines of the movement. 
If we return to Lefebvre, we see that his record on Jews and Judaism was also highly 
questionable. In an August 31, 1985 letter to Pope John Paul II, he was quoted as having 
spoken approvingly of “both the World War II-era Vichy Regime in France and the far-
right National Front” and identified the contemporary enemies of the faith as “Jews, 
Communists and Freemasons.” In that letter, Lefebvre also criticized “all the reforms 
carried out over 20 years within the church to please heretics, schismatics, false religions 
and declared enemies of the church, such as the Jews, the Communists and the Freema-
sons.”18 
According to the same account, Lefebvre also gave an interview to the journal of the 
National Front in France, suggesting that Catholic opposition to a residence of Carmelite 
nuns at the site of the Auschwitz concentration camp was instigated by Jews.19 
Lefebvre’s followers often share this outlook. One of the four bishops ordained by 
him in 1988, Bernard Tissier de Mallerais, said in 1997, 
The church for its part has at all times forbidden and condemned the killing of Jews, 
even when “their grave defects rendered them odious to the nations among which 
they were established.” … All this makes us think that the Jews are the most active 
artisans for the coming of Antichrist.20 
Bishop de Mallerais, who is the authorized SSPX biographer of Lefebvre, in an interview 
after the Williamson controversy erupted, responded as follows to a direct question 
about Williamson’s remarks: “I have no opinion about this. … I think that this question 
does not concern me, and I have no opinion on this question.”21 
Nor has their record been confined simply to making statements. In 1989, Paul Tou-
vier, a fugitive charged with ordering the execution of seven Jews in 1944 as a Nazi 
collaborator, was arrested in a priory of the Fraternity of St. Pius X in Nice, France. The 
fraternity stated at the time that Touvier had been granted asylum as “an act of charity 
to a homeless man.” When Touvier died in 1996, a parish church operated by the frater-
nity offered a Requiem Mass in his honor.”22 
When the controversy over Williamson exploded, I immediately went to the SSPX 
website and captured some documents that were removed shortly afterwards. They 
included two postings that reflected and summed up the SSPX’s position on Jews and 
Judaism. 
In one essay, the Vatican II teaching that “the Jews should not be spoken of as re-
jected or accursed as if this followed from Holy Scripture” is described as “outra-
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geous.”23 The other essay claims that “Judaism is inimical to all nations in general, and 
in a special manner to Christian nations” and that “the unrepentant Jewish people are 
disposed by God to be a theological enemy, the status of this opposition must be univer-
sal, inevitable, and terrible.” There are claims that “the Talmud, which governs Jews, 
orders enmity with Christians” and that the “Jewish people persecute Christendom,” 
“conspire against the Christian State,” commit “usury,” and even “are known to kill 
Christians”! Thus, the essay defends the notion that Jews should not be “given equality 
of rights” but rather should be forced into ghettos (“isolated into its own neighbor-
hoods”).24 
In their recent exposé of the SSPX and the Catholic traditionalist movement, the 
Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) cited a 1959 letter from Lefebvre’s close ally, 
Bishop Gerald Sigaud, stating: “Money, the media, and international politics are for a 
large part in the hands of Jews.” Bishop Sigaud also wrote: “Those who have revealed 
the atomic secrets of the USA were … all Jews. The founders of communism were Jew 
[sic].” This letter was also posted on the SSPX website.25 
Heidi Beirich, the SPLC’s lead researcher on this story, noted: “And as of early Feb-
ruary [2009], the SPLC reported that the Canadian SSPX website still hosted an archive 
of Williamson’s anti-Semitic letters, one of which complains that ‘Jews have come closer 
and closer to fulfilling their … drive toward world domination.’” Other SSPX officials 
sound similar. After the Williamson controversy broke out, Fr. Floriano Abrahamowicz, 
a pastor and spokesperson for the SSPX in Northern Italy, defended Williamson and 
said he, too, was unsure if gas chambers were used for anything but disinfection or 
whether six million Jews were really murdered. He called the Jews a “people of deicide.” 
Abrahamowicz was later expelled from the Society. 
Meanwhile Rev. Arnaud Sélégny, the general secretary of the SSPX international 
headquarters in Menzingen, Switzerland, is on record saying that Williamson would 
certainly be included in any reconciliation between SSPX and the Vatican because 
“everybody is allowed to have his opinion in the Society.”26 
These positions are not original to the SSPX, nor are they a theological innovation to 
current Catholic traditionalists; indeed, they bear a striking similarity to the writings of 
an otherwise obscure Irish priest named Father Denis Fahey, whose work is one of the 
most—if not the most—frequently cited by the members of the SSPX and similar believ-
ers. Mary Christine Athans, in her important book, The Coughlin-Fahey Connection: Father 
Charles E. Coughlin, Father Denis Fahey, C.S. Sp., and Religious Anti-Semitism in the United 
States, 1938-1954, thoroughly explored Fahey’s life and thought and how his theology of 
antisemitism made its way from Ireland to the United States.27 
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Fahey was born on July 2, 1883 in Kilmore, Golden, County Tipperary, Ireland. In 1900, 
he was a novice of the Holy Ghost Congregation in France, which was still dealing with 
the impact of the Dreyfus Affair and the French government’s anti-clerical actions, particu-
larly the Associations Laws of 1905 that required religious congregations to be recognized 
by the government. At that time, France was an incubator of ecclesiastical antisemitism. As 
David Kertzer wrote: “In the cauldron of Catholic resentment toward the republican state 
in the 1880s, the Jews, visible in national politics, in the civil service and in the economy, 
served as a lightning rod, all that was wrong with modern French society.”28 This was a 
struggle that began, according to those Catholics, with the French Revolution, which one 
such writer described as “[t]he greatest event of history for over 1800 years.”29 
In 1908, Fahey went to Rome, where he obtained two doctorates (philosophy and 
theology) and lived at the Collège Français (Pontifical French Seminary).30 Ordained in 
1911, Fahey returned to Dublin in 1912, where he stayed (except for 1916-1920, when he 
was in Switzerland for health reasons) as professor at the Holy Ghost Seminary until 
death on January 24, 1954. Fahey was fairly prominent in Ireland, maintaining a high 
profile as a public intellectual, as evidenced by the fact that, upon his death, Irish Prime 
Minister Eamon de Valera attended his evening funeral Mass.31 Mervyn O’Donnell, in 
his research on Jewish immigration to Ireland in 1933-1939, has pointed out that during 
this period “[m]any Irish civil servants betrayed negative preconceived notions about 
the Jews.”32 While de Valera was generally seen as being relatively moderate toward 
Jews at that time, and thus his attendance at the Mass might have been a matter of 
protocol, it certainly reflected on Fahey’s stature at the time of his death. 
While in Rome, Fahey was heavily influenced by Father Henri Le Floch, who was the 
Superior of the Collège Français. Athans described Le Floch 
as an exponent of conservative right-wing French and Italian Catholic thought in 
those anti-Modernist years … Le Floch had substantial influence on Fahey. … He was 
later removed from his position as Rector because of his relationship to the controver-
sial and anti-Semitic Action Française movement which was finally condemned by 
Pius XI in 1926.33 
Le Floch was also a revered mentor to Lefebvre. Athans, who interviewed a number of 
Fahey’s students and younger colleagues in Ireland, wrote that “[s]ome [priests] believe 
that Le Floch’s influence can also be traced to Archbishop Marcel Lefebvre … founder of 
the dissident traditionalist movement … known as the Fraternity of SPX.”34 Another 
resident of the French Seminary was the future Archbishop of Dublin and Primate of 
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Ireland John Charles McQuaid, who studied under Fahey. McQuaid’s biographer, John 
Cooney, has asserted that Le Floch’s “combination of theological rigidity and political 
conservatism rubbed off on the seminarians, among them … Marcel Lefebvre.”35 Having 
been nurtured in the same intellectual milieu, it is no surprise that Fahey and Lefebvre 
shared much of the same weltanschauung. 
Among other sources, Fahey also drew on the Revue International des Sociétés Se-
crètes.36 This journal was founded in 1912 by Father Ernest Jouin, who was described by 
Kertzer as “[t]he main champion of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, and the best 
known exponent of Catholic antisemitism in the 1920s” in France.37 Jouin and his work 
were not isolated on the fringes of Catholic life. Pope Benedict XV gave Jouin the title of 
“Prelate of His Holiness’, which he used to add papal authority to his works, and he 
received further blessings from Vatican Secretary of State Gasparri in 1919 and later 
from Pope Pius XI as well. Jouin even claimed credit for originating the term “Judeoma-
sonic” in 1920 and claimed to have been told by Pius XI to “[c]ontinue your Review … for 
you are combating our mortal enemy.”38 Fahey was not the only one influenced by 
Jouin; the influential Italian fascist Roberto Farinacci in 1939 repeated some of these 
familiar themes in urging harsher anti-Jewish measures in Italy, claiming that the French 
Revolution had created a great wrong by proclaiming rights of men that grew into rights 
of Jews and that this situation required remedying by following the paths laid out by the 
Jesuits over the years in La Civilta Cattolica and by Jouin with his papal approved Review 
and publication of the Protocols.39 
Fahey was a prolific writer, publishing a series of books and pamphlets, many with 
repetitive titles and similar themes, including: 
– The Mystical Body of Christ in the Modern World (Dublin: Browne and Nolan, 1935). 
– The Mystical Body of Christ and the Reorganization of Society (Waterford, Ireland: 
Browne and Nolan, 1939). 
– The Rulers of Russia, 3d American edition, revised and enlarged (Detroit: Condon 
Print. Co., 1940). 
– The Kingdom of Christ and Organized Naturalism (Wexford, Ireland: Forum Press, 1943). 
– Grand Orient Freemasonry Unmasked as the Secret Power Behind Communism (1950, 
(republication of George F. Dillon’s work with a foreword by Fahey). 
– Humanum Genus: Encyclical Letter of His Holiness Pope Leo XIII on Freemasonry (Lon-
don: Britons Publishing Society, 1953). 
– The Kingship of Christ and the Conversion of the Jewish Nation (Dublin: Holy Ghost 
Missionary College, 1953). 
For Fahey, the world was a very simple but dangerous place. In his Manichaean per-
spective, he believed that God was only accessible through the Catholic Church, which 
in turn was “supra-national and supernatural.” However, God was locked in a cosmic 
struggle with Satan, who was, for Fahey, a very real antagonist. Although Judaism was 
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the chief antagonist, Satan’s agents in this world included “Bolshevism, as the most 
recent development in the age-long struggle waged by the Jewish nation against the 
Supernational Messias, our Lord Jesus Christ, and his Mystical Body, the Catholic 
Church.” Fahey followed that depiction with a comparison of Catholicism and Judaism 
that was totally to the detriment of the latter. According to his theology, by its rejection 
of Jesus as Christ, Judaism attempts to “recast [the world] in the mould of Jewish na-
tional life.” Fahey concluded by asserting that this rejection “cannot but mean the 
complete undoing of the Catholic organization of society,” which was, in Fahey’s view, 
the appropriate order of things.40 
As mentioned above, Fahey regarded Communism as just a tool used by the Jews. 
“The real forces behind Bolshevism in Russia are Jewish forces, and that Bolshevism is 
really an instrument in the hands of the Jews for the establishment of their future Messi-
anic kingdom.”41 
Fahey’s contrast between Judaism and Catholicism had different implications, some 
of which transcended pure theological concerns. For example, in his above-mentioned 
tract The Rulers of Russia, Fahey spells out the differences between Jews and Catholics 
regarding what he terms “citizenship”: 
Here it will be well … to contrast the Jewish idea of citizenship with the Catholic idea. 
… As members of their own “messianic” nation, they must strive for the domination 
of their nation over others, as thus they alone, they hold, justice and peace can be 
achieved on earth. The Jew would fail in his duty to the Messias to come if he did not 
subordinate the interests of other nations to is own. … But the Catholic Church, being 
supra-national and supernatural, does not aim at the obliteration of national charac-
teristics and qualities by the imposition of a national form, but at their harmonious 
development by the elimination of the defects due to original sin.42 
This reading of theological history viewed Judaism as a religion committed to ruling 
over the other nations and its adherents as not possessing the qualities of eligibility for 
equal citizenship, while Catholicism by its nature (and despite the historical evidence to 
the contrary) is seen as less restrictive and the proper dominant authority in society. 
Fahey further believed that the world had reached its peak in the 13th century, when 
the Church was its essential ruler (at least in Europe, which appeared to be all that 
mattered for Fahey). However, that state did not last long. For Fahey, there was no 
concept of religious liberty; in fact, it was a tool of the devil that was used to take the 
state and society away from the true worship of the Church. An echo of this belief can 
also be found in Williamson’s thought. In comments on Pope Benedict’s Address to the 
Curia of December 2005, Williamson stated: 
What is wrong with freeing States from any obligation to Christ the King is that implicit-
ly you are denying that Jesus Christ is God. … Religious liberty means in effect, a declara-
tion of independence from God, which is directly opposed to the first Commandment. 
… However, where Catholics are in a sufficient majority, the State may physically pre-
vent the public practice of false religion while tolerating their practice in private.43 
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This was a fundamental tenet of Lefebvre’s belief as well. In his biography by de Malle-
rais, he is quoted as saying that the acceptance of the doctrine of religious liberty is “a 
scandal to Catholic souls (that) cannot be measured. The Church is shaken to its very 
foundation.”44 
In January 2008, a SSPX theologian repeated this theme in a Catechism of the Crisis of 
the Church addressed to the Church membership. After posing the question “Is there, 
then, no right to the free exercise of religion?” he offered the following answer: 
The true religion possesses the absolute right to develop and to be practiced freely, for 
no one can be impeded from serving God in the way He Himself has prescribed. It is 
an exigency of the natural law. The false religions, to the contrary, have no real right 
to be practiced precisely because they are false and erroneous. Error can never have 
any right; only the truth has rights.45 
The same Catechism succinctly summed up the SSPX’s stance on tolerance; tolerance, it 
claimed, was simply “the patient endurance of an evil.”46 
For Fahey and similar thinkers, political freedom, not only religious freedom, can 
only be found in, and thus only given by, the Church, and so the right order is one in 
which the Church reigns supreme and delegates those freedoms as it desires and for its 
benefit only. Outside of the Church, there are no rights and no freedom, and all in 
opposition or in non-belief are agents of Satan. 
Fahey’s traced it all back to the original fall of humanity in the Garden of Eden, 
which was then followed by more recent tragic historical events, such as the Reforma-
tion and the French Revolution, with equally disastrous results. As he wrote, 
[the] Protestant Reformation … broke the unity of European subjection to the supra-
national, supernatural Church of Christ. … It did not however install a naturalistic 
international organization. … That was reserved for the French Revolution [which 
began] the domination of the world by Masonic Naturalism. … Behind Masonry, 
however, [was] the other naturalistic force of the once chosen people. … The Jews 
everywhere made use of Freemasonry to secure the rights of becoming citizens of the 
once Christian states.47 
Even the horrors of the Holocaust did not shatter Fahey’s deep-rooted antisemitism. He 
did find it necessary after the Holocaust to attempt to draw a distinction between 
unacceptable antisemitism, which was defined as “hatred of the Jewish nation” and 
“opposition to the Jewish and Masonic naturalism,” which he endorsed as a vital aspect 
of Catholicism.48 For Fahey, naturalism was a source of evil precisely because it inevita-
bly led to rejection of belief in God or any other form of supernaturalism. The revulsion 
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felt by the world to the horrors of the Holocaust created the necessity for Fahey to try 
and distinguish his brand of antisemitism from that of the Third Reich. In the foreword 
to his 1953 book The Kingship of Christ and the Conversion of the Jewish Nation (the body of 
the book was written before the war but published afterwards) he wrote of 
… the confusion created in minds owing to the use of the term “Anti-Semitism.” The 
Hitlerite naturalistic or anti-supernatural regime in Germany gave to the world the 
odious spectacle of a display of Anti-Semitism, that is hatred of the Jewish Nation. Yet 
all the propaganda about that display of Anti-Semitism should not have made Catho-
lics forget the existence of age-long Jewish Naturalism and Anti-Supernaturalism. 
Forgetfulness of the disorder of Jewish naturalistic opposition to Christ the King is 
keeping Catholics blind to the danger that is arising from the clever extension of the 
term “Anti-Semitism” with all its war connotation to the mind of the unthinking.49 
In the body of this book, Fahey went so far as to justify the Nazi actions against the Jews 
on theological grounds and to imply that the Catholic Church was even more of a 
victim. In Fahey’s words: 
One can readily conclude that the National-Socialist reaction against the corroding 
influence of Jewish Naturalism on German national life leads not only to measures of 
repression against the Jews but to a dire persecution of the Catholic Church. The dei-
fied German race has attacked the rival natural deity, the Jewish race, directly, and 
has proceeded systematically to get rid of it as corrupting the very fount of deity, 
German blood.50 
In other words, the Nazis were only reacting to the Jewish threat, and their major fault 
was not in the reaction, but rather the form it took. In the same work, Fahey spelled this 
out in even greater detail: “We have seen that the Nazi movement in Germany is one of 
a number of national reactions against the naturalistic Internationalism of the Jewish 
Nation and of Freemasonry.”51 Thus, in Fahey’s vision of the Third Reich, the innate 
Jewish “naturalism” was something that was recognized by many as a danger that 
would naturally lead to defensive reactions, but it was the Church that was the ultimate 
opponent and the ultimate victim of the Nazis.52 
Fahey, like most conspiratorial antisemites, relied uncritically on highly questionable 
sources for his information. He used the most rabid of antisemites as reliable sources, for 
example citing Arnold Leese (in The Fascist, May 1939): “Jews are the chief owners of 
urban real estate in Poland.”53 Leese was one of the most well-known and radical anti-
semitic figures in England during that period. Among his writings was a work that 
claimed that the blood libel was real. He also served a number of prison sentences 
connected to his activities, which included aiding Waffen-SS POWs in escaping from 
England. Fahey also drew upon the classic antisemitic work The Protocols of the Elders of 
Zion. Athans has compared Fahey’s attitude to the Protocols to that of Henry Ford, 
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Charles Coughlin, and Nesta Webster (all antisemitic figures who Fahey admired), who 
“all admitted that [while] they could not prove the veracity of the Protocols … what was 
described in the Protocols was what was going on in the world.” Increasingly Fahey 
relied on the Protocols in his own work.54 
And again, like many other conspiratorial antisemites, Fahey was prone to seeing 
conspiracies of Jews everywhere. In one of his books, he even claimed that Jews were 
attempting to eliminate from the celebration of Christmas any the religious meaning. 
The proof for this insidious plot was: 
Christmas cards that show a row of dogs and a few birds have nothing to remind the 
recipient of what the rejoicing is for. … In this process of eliminating the supernatural 
Messias from the celebration of the anniversary of his birth, the largest firm of 
Christmas card manufacturers, have certainly played a great part. … All three direc-
tors appear in the communal Directory of the Jewish Year Book (and other Jewish 
communal activities).55 
Thus, the Jews, through the ownership of a greeting card company by three Jews, were 
intent on stripping Christmas of its sacral meaning! 
In other works, he published lists of Jews in the Russian/Communist leadership, as 
well as a list of “Members of the Jewish Nations in the United Nations Organization. … 
As of last year [1951] this tiny but powerful group of Zionist nationalists hold the fol-
lowing key posts.” This list comprised 86 names, spread over five pages.56 A forerunner 
of many extremists today, Fahey wrote that “[t]he real purpose of the UN is to pave the 
way for a ‘World Government’ to which all nations surrender their sovereignty and 
independence.”57 
For Fahey, this threat from Jews meant that the Church had to fight back by all avail-
able means, including depriving Jews of their civil rights, thus denying them the latitude 
and freedom they were using to undermine society. He believed that 
[a] step to be taken to undo the naturalism of the French Revolution and, at the same 
time, prevent onslaughts on the Jews, is to withdraw citizenship of other States from 
all of them, and limit them to citizenship of some other State, their own. That State 
must not be Palestine, for the Jewish claim to Palestine is implicitly a denial that they 
have disobeyed God and missed their vocation by the rejection of the True Super-
natural Messias.58 
Finally, after the Holocaust, he was worried that Catholic sympathy for Jews because of 
their terrible suffering would create a lessening of Catholic anti-Jewish vigilance. And, 
despite the growing awareness of the Nazi Holocaust, those crimes did not begin to 
compare to the ancient Jewish crime of deicide, which should have ordained history and 
the structure of society ever since: “Some Catholics seem to forget that the Jews who, in 
their terrible opposition to God … were intent on the most awful crime ever committed, 
the crime of deicide.”59 
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Mark Lilla has described how “[t]he Catholic Church in particular cast itself as 
spokesman for reaction throughout much of the [19th] century.”60 Fahey’s theology was 
clearly formed in and reflective of that Church. However, his teachings might well have 
faded into obscurity, but for the fact that he found a powerful ally in the United States in 
the person of Father Charles Coughlin who brought Fahey to the attention of a receptive 
audience across the Atlantic. 
In her book on The Coughlin-Fahey Connection and in other writings, Athans has dem-
onstrated how “the ‘theologian’ Coughlin quoted most frequently was an Irish priest, 
Father Denis Fahey.”61 Coughlin did not just quote Fahey or even base his thought on 
the Irish priest’s writings but took an even more active role, especially by reprinting and 
distributing Fahey’s tract The Rulers of Russia through his Social Justice Publishing 
Company in 1940, when Coughlin was at the height of his powers. This distribution 
ensured Fahey’s introduction to a mass American audience. 
Coughlin was easily the most prominent Catholic and antisemite in the United States 
at that time. As one of his biographers wrote: “Coughlin … dominated among anti-
semitic public figures in these years.”62 His domination was reflected in his reach. “Not 
only did he reach millions with his weekly radio broadcasts, but he also disseminated 
his extremist messages through his widely read magazine Social Justice, which claimed 
200,000 subscribers.”63 The result was that he popularized an antisemitism that had a 
significant impact on US popular discourse and even translated into the spurring of 
antisemitic acts that were often led by his followers and threatened public safety.64 
As Athans has clearly demonstrated, by bringing Fahey’s writings to an American 
audience, Coughlin allowed Fahey to become a bridge between the French and papal 
reactionary Catholic antisemitism of the early 20th century and extreme right-wing 
groups and figures in America.65 
Another scholar described it as translating “the struggles of the Christ and Antichrist 
into contemporary terms, in which Christianity and America represented Christ, and 
Communists and bankers represented the Antichrist. And conveniently, the two evils 
were linked together in the Jewish race.” And, while a number of the hierarchy were 
displeased with Coughlin’s ravings, he nevertheless found a receptive and supportive 
audience in the diocesan press. One of his key supporters in the eastern United States 
was the Brooklyn Tablet. In a typical defense of Coughlin’s antisemitism, the editor 
(Patrick Scanlon) remarked: 
Fr. Coughlin has fearlessly and courageously discussed the Jewish problem that oth-
ers would pass by in cowardly silence…. [No Catholic can honestly criticize] Fr. 
Coughlin’s very temperate reference to the part that a Jewish Weltanschauung contrib-
uted to the untoward world conditions.66 
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What Scanlon called a “temperate reference” was translated by some of Coughlin’s 
followers into the formation of a radical group called the Christian Front, whose mem-
bers were implicated in a series of disruptive and violent antisemitic acts that in the late 
1930s and early 1940s disturbed the peace and threatened the security of Jews in cities 
with a large Irish Catholic presence such as Boston and New York. In both cities, the 
wave of antisemitism was often ignored by sympathetic Catholic police and eventually 
had to be countered through official action by Massachusetts Governor Leverett Salton-
stall and New York Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia.67 
Even before the wave of antisemitism became overt, the antisemitic discourse had 
become sufficiently heated and the issue sufficiently politically sensitive that it even 
reached the White House. In a 1941 memorandum to Myron Taylor, his personal repre-
sentative to the Vatican, President Franklin D. Roosevelt wrote: 
I forgot to mention that when you get the chance, you might express the thought that 
there is a great deal of anti-Jewish feeling in the dioceses of Brooklyn, Baltimore and 
Detroit and this feeling is said to be encouraged by the church. The point to make is 
that if anti-Jewish feeling is stirred up, it automatically stirs up anti-Catholic feeling 
and that makes a general mess.68 
Taylor did raised the issue but found the Vatican essentially non-responsive. It was the 
Vatican’s resident American expert, Father Joseph Patrick Hurley, who himself was a 
virulent antisemite and who advised the Vatican to ignore Coughlin’s antisemitism.69 
While the Coughlin-Fahey correspondence continued in the same vein even after 
Coughlin’s official silencing, the loss of Coughlin’s public platform certainly contributed 
to the lowering of Fahey’s profile in the United States.70 
However, the damage had been done, and Fahey’s influence had become entrenched 
in certain circles. While for the most part scholars have traced Fahey’s influence in the 
extremist Catholic circles that they have been examining, it is entirely possible that his 
connection with Coughlin allowed his influence to spread even wider. Among 
Coughlin’s associates and allies were Gerald Winrod and Gerald L.K. Smith, who were 
foundational figures in American right-wing extremism. Smith was also in direct contact 
with Fahey, exchanging letters in late 1940s and early 1950s. Fahey wrote in at letter to 
Irish follower that 
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the programme of Gerald L.K. Smith as taken from his paper The Cross and the Flag … 
declares unflinchingly and unequivocally for the Rights of Christ the King. Are his 
detractors and smearers for Christ the King or against Him? The Judaeo-Communists 
tried to brand every man who stood for American nationalism and against Com-
munism during the war as pro-Nazis.71 
Another such figure, Francis Parker Yockey, published an article in Coughlin’s Social 
Justice magazine in 1938. The Catholic born Yockey was a fervent admirer of Adolf 
Hitler, who attempted, especially in his almost incomprehensible book Imperium, to find 
a way to adapt Nazism to the post-World War II world. In his early Social Justice article, 
Yockey lamented that an “alien” control of the media resulted in the spiritual enslave-
ment of American youth.72 The historian George Michael has also noted Coughlin’s 
influence on Willis Carto, arguably the most important figure on the American far right 
in the last half-century. Carto has founded and financed a number of major far-right 
initiatives over the last 50 years, including the Liberty Lobby and its newspaper Spot-
light, the Institute for Historical Review (the center for Holocaust denial), The Barnes 
Review, and the Populist Party (which ran the notorious neo-Nazi David Duke as its 1988 
presidential candidate). Carto recalls Coughlin as a seminal figure from his childhood.73 
As a youth Carto claims to have never heard of right-wing extremists, “with the ex-
ception of Father Coughlin, to whose broadcasts he would listen with the whole fam-
ily.”74 Carto “recalled listening to Coughlin’s broadcasts with his family and described 
him as a spellbinding orator.”75 He also characterized “Coughlin as a genuine populist” 
and cited “opposition from Jewish organizations … as evidence of Coughlin’s bona fides 
as a true American hero.”76 
Carto was also influenced by Yockey, whom he visited in jail just before Yockey’s 
suicide. As Michael writes: “Yockey left quite an impression on Carto; as he once re-
marked, ‘I knew I was in the presence of a great force.’”77 
This nexus between the extremist traditionalist Catholics and the far right has con-
tinued to the present. Richard Williamson has also found himself taken up by a various 
aspects of the movement. Among those who have adopted the bishop are the notorious 
neo-Nazi and professional Holocaust denier Mark Weber, the director of the Institute for 
Historical Review, who in a March 2009 article entitled “Bishop Williamson and ‘Holo-
caust Denial’: Why the Uproar?” concluded that “[t]he Williamson affair underscores a 
well entrenched Jewish-Zionist bias in the cultural life of modern Western society, and 
reminds us, once again, of the power behind that bias.”78 
Robert Faurisson, the French academic Holocaust denier, who is currently in the 
middle of a squabble with Weber over the future of Holocaust denial, also sprang to 
Williamson’s defense. According to a posting on his blog: 
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The height of his enemies’ misfortune, and for the traditionalist Catholic he is … if he 
ever did fall to his knees before the new Inquisition he would immediately remind 
everyone of Galileo, the man whom science and history ended up acknowledging to 
be right despite his abjuration. Even if he wound up losing, Richard Williamson 
would thus have won.79 
The links between the Holocaust deniers and Catholic extremists are not limited to 
Williamson. In 1993, the Journal of Historical Review, the house organ of the Institute of 
Historical Review, the central organization of Holocaust deniers in the United States, 
published in its September/October issue three short entries under the title “The Holo-
caust Issue: Three Christian Views.” Two were by traditionalist Catholics (including the 
late Joseph Sobran, fired by William Buckley from his journal National Review for an-
tisemitism) and the other was by Bishop Louis Vezelis, described as the “editor of The 
Seraph, a traditionalist Catholic monthly.” According to Vezelis, “the preponderance of 
objective and factual evidence shows the promoters of the Holocaust story to be libelous 
frauds.”80 Sobran was defended by the Institute of Historical Review as far back as 1987 
and later spoke at its 2002 conference.81 
Despite the denunciations of Williamson’s Holocaust denial, and even some pro 
forma condemnations of antisemitism from the SSPX, there can be no question, based on 
their own writings, that the antisemitic teachings espoused by Fahey and repeated by 
Williamson still permeate the heart of the theology of the SSPX and many similar Catho-
lic traditionalists. 
For example, still available on the Asia SSPX’s website is an article from March-April 
2000 by Bishop Salvador L. Lazo, entitled: “My Return of the Traditional Latin Mass: 
Autobiography of a Traditional Catholic Bishop.” In this article, Lazo lists some of the 
books that inspired him on his spiritual journey. They include Fahey’s The Kingship of 
Christ and The Conversion of the Jewish Nation, as well as others about the dangers of 
Freemasonry. Lazo was very open about their impact on his thought, writing that 
Reading these books gave me a better idea of the crisis and confusion in the Church 
today. It became clear to me who are the real enemies of the Catholic Church. Father 
Denis Fahey pinpointed them when he wrote: “The enemies of the Catholic Church 
are three. One invisible, Satan, and two visible: a) Talmudic Judaism, and b) Freema-
sonry.” … That Judaism is the visible chief enemy of the Catholic Church, is evident 
from the Church history, from words and deeds of individuals, and groups and the 
teachings of the Talmud of which the Kabbalah constitute the basis of Judaism.82 
Williamson has openly held up Fahey as an authority to be relied upon. On the website 
of the SSPX’s US seminary (based in Winona, Minnesota), I recently found a letter 
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written by Williamson in 1983, before he was even ordained as a bishop, in which, in 
relation to a book written by a Protestant author, he advised his readers that “Catholics 
should be very wary of this kind of book. Let them keep to sound doctrine and proven 
authors, for instance the excellent Fr. Denis Fahey.”83 
Finally, it must be recognized that Fahey’s baleful influence is alive today not only in 
the SSPX but also in similar-minded groups, as reflected in the following quote. It is 
from John Sharpe, the former Naval Academy graduate and officer and rabid tradition-
alist Catholic. Sharpe sued a local paper that had publicized his antisemitic beliefs for 
libel. In the decision against him, the judge wrote: “No reasonable person can read 
Sharpe’s individual writings and conclude that he espouses anything other than a deep, 
abiding and pervasive suspicion of and hostility toward Jews, whether considered as a 
collective people, religion, nation or ethnic group.”84 
Sharpe, who has his own traditionalist distribution house, concluded a 2003 article 
that he published in the SSPX’s magazine The Angelus criticizing the 2001 Vatican docu-
ment The Jewish People and Their Sacred Scriptures in the Christian Bible with a quote from 
Fahey’s Mystical Body of Christ and the Reorganization of Society, in which he hoped that 
“we all then have the courage to respond with the words of Fr. Fahey: ‘In that sense, 
every sane thinker must be an anti-Semite.’”85 
The SSPX has been quite open about its goals. Speaking about the current efforts by 
Rome to bring the group back into the Church, Bishop Tissier de Mallerais was blunt, 
saying that “we do not change our positions, but we have the intention of converting 
Rome, that is to lead Rome towards our positions.”86 
Any attempt by the Vatican to bring these groups out of schism and into the Church 
must honestly confront these issues and not ignore or hide them. If baptism was once, 
for Jews, the ticket to admission to Western society, then acceptance of Vatican II, 
including the rejection of Catholic antisemitism and the acceptance of religious liberty, 
must be the price of admission for these groups into today’s Church. Pope Benedict has 
spoken movingly and powerfully about his feelings about antisemitism, the Holocaust, 
Jews, and Judaism. Yet unless the Church’s current deeds match its words, Jewish-
Catholic relations will continue their downward trajectory of recent years. 
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Germany’s Foreign Policy Toward Egypt 
Ulricke Becker* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
After 1948, every country that was diplomatically involved in the Middle East conflict 
was confronted with Arab hostility toward Israel and was therefore challenged with the 
task of reacting to such animosity. A new antisemitism emerged that was directed 
against the very existence of a Jewish state. This gives rise to several important ques-
tions. How did diplomats react to Arab animosity toward Israel? Did Arab antisemitism 
play a role in the conceptions of foreign policy? If so, was this topic actually brought up 
with Arab states? Did diplomats do anything to confront this problem?1 
While these questions emerged for all diplomats, German diplomats had to address 
more specific concerns. Especially in Egypt, they were confronted with the ramifications 
of German antisemitic propaganda and politics, which many of them had personally 
designed and promoted only a few years earlier. The Middle East policy of the Nazis 
had been anti-British in design and antisemitic in essence. Especially during the second 
half of World War II, Germany had employed considerable efforts to incite Arabs to 
fight against Germany’s enemies via radio propaganda with a distinctly antisemitic, 
anti-British, and anti-American character, as Jeffrey Herf convincingly describes in his 
illuminating book on this subject.2 The Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin el-Husseini, was a 
close ally of the Nazis and had played a major role in programming propaganda broad-
casts into the Arab World.3 In the post-war years, the Mufti—although he had been 
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involved in war crimes—was a figure of considerable political influence in Egypt, and 
his Nazi-like antisemitism affected the Palestinian national movement and the Muslim 
brotherhood in Egypt. Then there was the circle of young officers including Abdel 
Nasser and Anwar as-Sadat. In July 1952, they seized power in Egypt in a military coup 
d’état. During World War II, both of them had collaborated with the Germans as guerril-
la fighters.4 As politicians, Nasser and Sadat both recommended the “Protocols of the 
Elders of Zion” as an important source of information on the nature of Israel and the 
Jewish people. Nasser’s brother Sauqi Abdannasir personally edited an Arabic transla-
tion of the “Protocols,” and under Nasser’s presidency in the 1950s one of the most 
radical antisemitic publicists of the Third Reich, Johann von Leers, who had been an 
open advocate of Jewish genocide, was employed in the Egyptian propaganda ministry. 
He was in charge of propaganda against Israel and organized lectures for Egyptian 
officials.5 Bernard Lewis is one of many historians who have pointed out how German 
National Socialism was openly praised in post-war Egypt. This was the political climate 
faced by German diplomats in Egypt at the beginning of the 1950s.6 
In this article, I will focus on two questions. The first question concerns whether 
German foreign policy sent signals to the Arab world that were understood as support 
for Arab hostility toward Israel. The most important examples of this are Germany’s 
refusal to establish diplomatic relations with Israel until 1965 and the support provided 
to Egypt’s military and arms industry by German experts. The second question concerns 
whether there was a transfer of ideas from the Nazi era to the post-war period. In this 
context, I will examine perceptions of Zionism and how decisions that helped to delegit-
imize the Jewish state were connected to the Nazi heritage. My research therefore also 
touches on the issue of the German political elite’s relationship with its Nazi past. 
2. THE IMPACT OF GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY ON ARAB HOSTILITY TOWARD 
ISRAEL 
Usually, the historiography of German-Arab relations begins in 1952. In October of that 
year, Günther Pawelke, the first West German ambassador, arrived in Cairo. But his 
arrival was not the first chapter in German-Egyptian relations after World War II. 
Another group of Germans had arrived two years earlier, led by Dr. Wilhelm Voss, a 
former high-ranking SS officer (SS-Standartenführer). Voss had been one of Nazi Germa-
ny’s leading managers. In 1937, he was appointed general manager of the Reichswerke 
Hermann Göring. During World War II he also headed several large armament conglom-
erates, mainly in German-occupied Czechoslovakia. Czech companies and trusts were 
bought or dispossessed and integrated into Nazi conglomerates, two of which were led 
by Voss (Skoda and Brünner Waffenfabrik). The Göring-Werke employed more than 1.8 
million forced laborers, POWs, and concentration camp prisoners. In Voss’ area of 
operations, at least 18,000 people died of brutal abuse, a consequence of the murderous 
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violence of the SS police state that was imported into the war economy and the concept 
of “annihilation through work,” which was first implemented at the Reichswerke.7 Voss 
was also a member of the so-called “circle of friends of Heinrich Himmler” (until 1935 
the “circle of friends of the Reichsführer SS”), a group of about 40 leading SS officers, 
Nazis, and German industrialists who advised the Nazi Party on economic matters and 
supported the party financially. Voss thus belonged to the elite circles of the Nazi 
regime.8 
Voss arrived in Egypt at the end of 1950, after spending time in an American deten-
tion camp and under house arrest in Germany for about five years. He was stationed in 
the Ministry of War, where he laid the foundations for the Egyptian arms industry. He 
also brought several former generals and officers of the German armed forces to Egypt. 
This group of advisers, who served from 1951 to 1958, was comprised of up to 60 Ger-
man officers. Wilhelm Fahrmbacher, a former general, headed the subgroup that was 
located within the Egyptian army.9 Fahrmbacher’s office was next to the office of the 
Egyptian Chief of Staff, and they worked closely together.10 Although the advisers 
stressed that their job was purely of a consultative nature and that they did not hold 
command positions, they were clearly involved in military preparations. Beyond docu-
ments concerning consultation on operative, strategic, and tactical questions, I have also 
found plans for military operations against Israel in Fahrmbacher’s papers.11 The group 
came to Egypt when King Farouk was still in power. However, Voss and Fahrmbacher 
kept their positions after the coup against Farouk in July 1952. According to CIA 
sources, Fahrmbacher helped the “free officers,” the circle around Nasser and Naguib, to 
prepare a plan for the army’s internal control in Cairo in case there would be a revolu-
tion.12 
Voss accompanied Egyptian officials on their trips to Germany and served as an in-
termediary to German industrial circles. He also maintained contacts with West German 
officials in the Foreign Office, the Trade Ministry, the Chancellery, and the Ministry of 
Defense, which was then in the process of being set up. Some observers considered his 
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influence in Cairo and Germany to be higher than that of Germany’s official ambassa-
dor, Günther Pawelke, and rumor spread in intelligence circles that Voss would soon 
become an official West German representative.13 
The position of Günther Pawelke, the first official German ambassador to Egypt, was 
therefore not easy. The Foreign Ministry expected him to cooperate with Voss, and while 
the two got along well in the beginning conflicts began to emerge in April 1953, when 
Pawelke was concerned that Voss was acting against German interests.14 One claim was 
that he was cooperating with Communists, another that he maintained close contacts 
with the Arab and German circles around Mufti Amin el-Husseini and German busi-
nessman Joachim Hertslet, a committed and high-ranking Nazi who had worked for the 
Reich Ministry of Economic Affairs. Hertslet was the leading force behind a campaign in 
the Arab states against the German compensation payments to Israel. (The Federal 
Republic committed itself to supply goods in the amount of DM 3.45 billion to Israel and 
to pay DM 450 million to the Jewish Claims Conference.) 
In the end, it was Pawelke who decided to resign and leave Egypt in 1954 after he 
refused to cooperate with Voss, while the former SS man remained in his position. But 
Voss’ influence also faded, particularly after British Prime Minister Winston Churchill 
publicly criticized the activities of the ex-Nazis working as military advisers in May 1953 
and accused them of training Egyptian guerrilla units that attacked British troops 
stationed in the Suez Canal zone. The German government then sent an official to Cairo 
who met with the advisers and gave them strict guidelines. The group was separated 
into two different units and lost a great deal of its influence with the Egyptian govern-
ment around 1954. In spite of the British criticism, the above-mentioned German official 
highly valued the work of the Germans in Egypt, which he described as a “positive 
political fact” for Germany. He recommended exerting influence on the group and 
giving them a “feeling of official comradely support.”15 
I believe that, in utilizing these contacts, the German government also sent a political 
message to the Egyptian government, signaling that former SS men were accepted 
mediators and negotiators, not to mention the fact that their function was to assist Egypt 
in its war against Israel. 
3. THE TRANSFER OF IDEAS FROM THE NAZI ERA TO THE POST-WAR PERIOD 
This brings me to my second point, the question whether there was a transfer of ideas 
from the Nazi era to the post-war period. I want to illustrate this question by focusing on 
the case of one diplomat. Wilhelm Melchers was employed in the German Foreign Office 
from 1925. He was appointed director of the Near East department in December 1939 
and held this position until the end of the war.16 Jeffrey Herf describes how he was 
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involved in developing antisemitic propaganda for the Arab world.17 After the war, 
from 1951 to 1953, Melchers once again headed the Near East department. He thus 
wielded considerable influence over Germany’s Near East policy and the re-
establishment of West Germany’s relations with Arab countries. From 1953 until 1957, 
Melchers was the head of the German embassy in Baghdad. During this time, he was 
also in charge of the legation in Jordan and for reports on Israel. 
The way in which an antisemitic conception of Zionism influenced Melchers’ as-
sessment of the Near East conflict after the war is evident from some of his reports. In 
1955, he sent a report from Baghdad analyzing Israel’s policies, in which he described 
the Jewish state as being of an “expansionist nature.” Israel in its present form, he 
argued, would establish a “bridgehead” providing the basis for future “generous expan-
sion.” An “uncompromising attitude” on the Arab side was therefore understandable, 
and a peaceful solution to the conflict impossible. The Arabs would “feel safe only after 
the last Jew had left Palestine.”18 
This report reveals how deeply Melchers’ thoughts were still influenced by Nazi 
conceptions. The idea that the Jews were intending to combine Palestine with Syria and 
Transjordan in a “huge Jewish home” had been among the core ideas of Nazi propagan-
da for the Arab world, as well as predictions concerning the murderous policies of the 
Jews toward the Arabs in Palestine and elsewhere.19 Melchers’ conclusion that it was 
impossible for Arab countries to tolerate even a small Jewish minority on Palestinian soil 
reveals his anti-Jewish worldview. 
In what way did this worldview affect West Germany’s foreign policy? The most 
controversial issues in German post-war Middle East policy concerned the character of 
German relations with Israel. After the debate on compensation payments in 1952, the 
main question was whether Germany should establish diplomatic relations with the 
Jewish state. The debate cannot be explored in detail here; however, the result was that 
Germany refused to establish diplomatic ties with Israel until 1965.20 The decision in 
favor of this policy was made in 1956, when a secret conference of German ambassadors 
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(ed.), Zwischen Moral und Realpolitik. Deutsch-israelische Beziehungen 1945-1965. Eine Dokumenten-
sammlung, Gerlingen, 1997, p. 44ff; Niels Hansen, Aus dem Schatten der Katastrophe: die deutsch-
israelischen Beziehungen in der Ära Konrad Adenauer und David Ben Gurion. Ein dokumentierter Bericht, 
Düsseldorf, 2002. 
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who represented Germany in Middle Eastern states took place in Istanbul. The German 
ambassadors attending the conference unanimously opposed the establishment of 
diplomatic relations with Israel, fearing protests from Arab countries and—as a conse-
quence—Arab diplomatic recognition of the German Democratic Republic (GDR). They 
even voted against the establishment of a trade mission, which was subsequently can-
celled despite prior promises.21 
Wilhelm Melchers was one of the first and most outspoken advocates in this debate. 
His reasons are expressed in a letter that he sent to the German Foreign Office in July 
1955. In this letter, he painted a grim picture of what would happen should Germany 
establish diplomatic relations with Israel:  
The establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel would cause a storm of outrage 
in Arab countries and would inflict serious damage to our political, economic, and 
cultural interests. … It would definitely unsettle the German-Arab friendship and—
due to the Arab mentality—would turn friendship into hate, because the Arab coun-
tries would not forgive the betrayal of a good friend.22  
Melchers here refers to a crucial point. Arab diplomats were convinced that Germany 
had acted under foreign pressure when it signed the Luxembourg Treaty, which regu-
lated the compensation payments to Israel, in 1952. After Germany regained its sover-
eignty in 1955, the Arab world expected the German government to refrain from any 
step in favor of Israel. It is clear that Melchers was well aware of the anti-Israel compo-
nent of the so-called German-Arab friendship. Moreover, he was clearly unwilling to 
give up the advantages he expected to obtain from Germany’s Nazi legacy. 
The idea that Germany had been forced to sign the Luxembourg Treaty was indeed 
very widespread in the Arab world. Although this was not true, it is correct that the 
compensation payments were not very popular in Germany or among German politi-
cians. Inside the Foreign Office in West Germany, however, overt Nazi-like anti-
semitism and anti-Zionism was taboo. Germany’s main aim in foreign policy was to be 
integrated economically and strategically in the Western alliance. It was crucial to 
establish a new image of a democratic society and to demonstrate a new beginning. As 
the U.S. High Commissioner John McCloy observed, Adenauer understood that “the 
way Germany acts toward the Jews in the future will be the acid test of German democ-
racy.”23 Consequently, Adenauer often stressed that the compensation payments to 
Israel that he announced in September 1951 were a “necessity” to regain credibility in 
the Western world, in order to obtain credit and business contracts. In retrospect, the 
moral side of the question was not sufficiently emphasized. Historian Wageh Atek 
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quotes Egyptian sources revealing that Adenauer personally stated in front of an Arab 
delegation that the issue of reparations to Israel had been regulated in accordance with 
the wishes of the United States.24 Under-Secretary of State Hallstein reportedly said to 
the Egyptian Consul General in Frankfurt: “It is not possible not to sign the agreement. 
Israel through the Jewish magnifying glass in America and England is stronger than one 
assumes. It is impossible for the federal government to take counter-action.”25 In those 
statements, the antisemitic stereotype of Jewish power was given a new lease of life. It is 
therefore not surprising that many Arab politicians and journalists were under the 
impression that antisemitic and anti-Israeli views still prevailed in Germany and that the 
German government would have supported the Arab side in the conflict if it had been 
completely sovereign. 
The above statement is not documented in German protocols of meetings between 
Hallstein and Egyptian representatives. According to German sources, Hallstein ex-
plained, on the one hand, that the decision to sign the Luxemburg Treaty originated 
from the desire of the German people to “wipe away” the “blemish” on the German 
honor resulting from the crimes against the Jews. On the other hand, he emphasized that 
Germany was not able not to ratify the agreement, as this would be “suicide.”26 
Melchers made a similar argument in a meeting with the King of Jordan. He wired to 
Bonn that he had informed King Hussein that “the Arabs could not expect Germany to 
commit suicide, only to save their Arab friends from harm….”27 Moreover, Chancellor 
Adenauer argued that the “power of the Jews, particularly in America” was one of the 
most important reasons for him to seek reconciliation with the Jewish people.28 
4. CONCLUSION 
In these and similar statements, German politicians and diplomats highlighted that they 
had not been completely free in their decisions. It is therefore not surprising that Ger-
man diplomats failed to convey the message of a new, non-antisemitic Germany to the 
Arab states until 1965. This failure became obvious in a report sent to Bonn from the 
German embassy in Cairo in the summer of 1964. This report stated that the Egyptian 
government was convinced of the “existence of another, real, national Germany” that 
was hiding behind the official one. Nasser perceived the official Germany to be under 
pressure from Zionist circles and tried to encourage the “hidden Germany” to emerge 
for closer cooperation with Egypt.29 This analysis was made after President Nasser gave 
an exclusive interview to the Deutsche National- und Soldatenzeitung, a radical right-wing 
                                                                                                                                                       
24  Wageh Atek, “Der Standpunkt Ägyptens zur westdeutschen Wiedergutmachung an Israel,” 
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27  Melchers to Foreign Office in Bonn, December 28, 1953, in B11, Bd. 1389. 
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German journal circulating in Nazi circles, in May 1964. In this interview, Nasser de-
scribed the Holocaust as a “myth” and announced that Egypt would crush Israel.30 
During the 1950s and early 1960s, German diplomats in Arab countries were aware 
of the fact that they enjoyed considerable advantages in Arab countries compared to 
other Western states because of their refusal to establish diplomatic relations with Israel. 
In the words of von Waldow, a legation councillor at the German embassy in Baghdad:  
There has been a strong argument in favor of the Federal Republic: the fact that Ger-
many, in contrast to other Western democracies, has no diplomatic relations with the 
State of Israel. If we lose this argument in the future, the only defensive weapon we 
possess will be beaten out of our hands.31 
Voices like these dominated the debate in the Foreign Office at that time. Anti-
semitism in the Arab states was not criticized by German diplomats, nor was Holocaust-
denial. Former high-ranking German Nazis were accepted as interlocutors in Egypt. A 
highly ambivalent policy toward Israel added to the deligitimization of the Jewish state. 
The episodes described in this article show how strongly antisemitism and complicity 
with Arab hostility toward Israel informed Germany’s foreign policy in the post-war 
years. 
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Great Expectations: Antisemitism and the Politics 
of Free-Speech Jurisprudence 
Stephen M. Feldman* 
This essay addresses two related questions. First, is anti-Zionist expression a type of hate 
speech (specifically, antisemitic hate speech)? Second, from the standpoint of American 
constitutional law, is (antisemitic) hate speech constitutionally protected under the first 
amendment? My thesis is that both questions are inherently political, and, as such, they 
cannot be answered definitively. To say that these questions (or answers to the ques-
tions) are political does not mean that we cannot rationally discuss or debate answers to 
the questions, but rather that we can never arrive at a non-controversial conclusion. 
One’s answers will necessarily reflect or manifest one’s interests and values, including 
religious and other cultural values.1 
I will initially address the second question—the question of first-amendment protec-
tions—and, in fact, the bulk of this essay focuses on this question. Toward the end of the 
essay, I will return to the first question and explain its relationship to the first-
amendment issue.2 
I. POLITICS AND FREE-SPEECH JURISPRUDENCE 
Although many constitutional scholars deem free expression to be a constitutional 
lodestar,3 the United States Supreme Court has rarely resolved free-expression issues 
contrary to mainstream interests or values. The corollary to this point is that political 
and cultural outsiders or minorities often suffer at the hands of the Court, including in 
cases that appear to be great victories for free expression. Many cases that have upheld 
first-amendment rights involved situations where the protected expression attacked or 
injured outsiders or minorities. 
                                                                                                                                                       
* Jerry W. Housel/Carl F. Arnold Distinguished Professor of Law and Adjunct Professor of Po-
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1 I discuss the politics of free expression more extensively in STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, FREE 
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2 I have discussed the relationship between antisemitism and the first-amendment issue of the 
separation of church and state in STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, PLEASE DON’T WISH ME A MERRY 
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© Stephen M. Feldman, 2013 | doi 10.1163/9789004265561_027 
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC 4.0 license.
STEPHEN M. FELDMAN 292 
Two cases involving free speech in a hostile audience situation are illustrative. A 
hostile audience case arises when a speaker addresses a large group of people who begin 
to get upset and threaten possible violence. The speaker is humming along, “Blah, blah, 
blah,” but people in the crowd start to complain, “Murmur, murmur, murmur.” Per-
haps, a couple of people in the crowd start pushing or shoving. Someone might yell, 
“You better shut up!” In these situations, the police have sometimes arrested the speaker 
for a crime such as breach of the peace or disorderly conduct. Hence, the Court has 
needed to address the constitutional question: does the first amendment protect the 
speaker’s expression even though it might generate violence (albeit violence against the 
speaker)? 
In Terminiello v. Chicago, a hostile audience case decided in 1949, the Supreme Court 
concluded that the defendant’s conviction under a disorderly conduct ordinance was 
unconstitutional. The speaker was a Roman Catholic priest, so in the context of the 
United States in the 1940s, one could possibly maintain that the Court protected the 
speech of a religious outsider. But the priest’s speech was an antisemitic diatribe. He 
condemned “atheistic, communistic Jewish or Zionist Jews.” He claimed that Jewish 
doctors had performed atrocities on Germans, and he asked, “Do you wonder [that] they 
were persecuted in other countries?” Then he proclaimed that “we want them to go back 
where they came from.”4 The American Jewish Congress filed an amicus curiae brief 
that emphasized the frightening threat posed to Jews by such antisemitic hate speech, 
especially coming so soon after the Nazi Holocaust.5 Nonetheless, the justices held that 
the first amendment protected the speech. 
Two years later, in 1951, the Court decided another hostile audience case, Feiner v. 
New York, but this time, the Court held the speech unprotected. The defendant, Feiner, 
was a college student who had spoken to a racially mixed crowd of seventy-five to 
eighty whites and blacks gathered together on a sidewalk in Syracuse, New York. He 
had encouraged the audience to attend a meeting of the Young Progressives of America, 
protested the city’s cancellation of a permit for an earlier Young Progressives meeting, 
and made derogatory remarks about “President Truman, the American Legion, the 
Mayor of Syracuse, and other local political officials.” The Court held that the first 
amendment did not protect this speech because, according to the Court, the speech 
created a clear and present danger, even though the evidence suggested otherwise. The 
justices seemed especially worried that Feiner had urged African Americans to “rise up 
in arms and fight for equal rights.” Yet, witnesses had sworn that Feiner had instead 
encouraged his listeners to “rise up and fight for their rights by going arm in arm to the 
[Young Progressives meeting], black and white alike.”6 
If we compare these two hostile audience cases, in the first, Terminiello, the Court 
protected inflammatory antisemitic speech, while in the second, Feiner, the Court al-
lowed the punishment of speech largely criticizing public officials and encouraging 
African Americans to take political action. What is my point here? I am not arguing that 
the justices purposefully discriminated against outsiders or minorities (or peripheral 
groups), but rather that the convergence or lack of convergence of interests between 
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outsiders and the mainstream can influence the Court’s decisions. Derrick Bell has 
labeled this phenomenon the interest convergence thesis.7 
Pursuant to the interest convergence thesis, the results in Terminiello and Feiner sug-
gest that the Court is most likely to emphasize the principled protection of free expres-
sion when the speech or writing attacks or harms outsiders or minorities rather than the 
American mainstream or elites. Thus, in Terminiello, the Court found antisemitic hate 
speech to be constitutionally protected, while in Feiner, the Court found speech threaten-
ing the mainstream and elites to be unprotected. 
A landmark free speech case, Brandenburg v. Ohio, decided in 1969, further illustrates 
this point. In Brandenburg, the Court articulated its most speech-protective standard ever 
for determining when subversive advocacy or, more generally, speech inciting unlawful 
conduct, would be outside of first-amendment protections and therefore punishable. 
Yet, one should not overlook that the defendant was a Ku Klux Klan leader who spouted 
typical hate speech, repeatedly denouncing blacks and Jews and warning that “if our 
President, our Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to suppress the white, Caucasian 
race, it’s possible that there might have to be some revengeance taken.”8 
Another landmark free speech case, New York Times v. Sullivan, decided in 1964, un-
derscores how the Court tends to protect the expression of outsiders when doing so 
converges or corresponds with predominant interests, values, or practices. The Times 
had published a full-page advertisement soliciting support for the civil rights move-
ment. The advertisement contained several minor factual errors. For instance, it stated 
that students in Montgomery, Alabama, had sung “‘My Country, ‘Tis of Thee’ on the 
State Capitol steps,” but they had, in fact, sung the national anthem. Because the adver-
tisement also criticized police reactions to civil rights protests, the police commissioner, 
Sullivan, brought a civil action in the state courts for defamation against the Times and 
four civil rights leaders (whose signatures had appeared at the bottom of the advertise-
ment). Sullivan won in the state courts; in fact, the state’s highest court upheld a jury 
award for $500,000.9 
A unanimous United States Supreme Court reversed and issued one of its most vig-
orous defenses of free expression. The Court articulated the highly speech-protective 
actual-malice standard for determining when a public official could recover damages in 
a civil suit against the press. A “public official” can recover “damages for a defamatory 
falsehood relating to his official conduct” only if “he proves that the statement was 
made with ‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless 
disregard of whether it was false or not.”10 
New York Times enunciated a strong conception of a free press, and, of course, the 
press celebrated the decision. But as the legal historian Lucas A. Powe emphasized, New 
York Times was “a race case first and foremost.”11 It not only protected the expression of 
black civil rights leaders but also assured that news media, like the Times, could continue 
to report the atrocities inflicted on civil rights activists in the South. The Court’s protec-
                                                                                                                                                       
7 Derrick A. Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. 
REV. 518 (1980). 
8 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 444-47 (1969). 
9 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256-59 (1964). 
10  376 U.S. at 279-80. 
11  LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 309 (2000). 
STEPHEN M. FELDMAN 294 
tion of the civil rights leaders and the press went hand-in-hand; news reporting, particu-
larly on television, had helped nurture a national political coalition pushing for civil 
rights reform. This coalition had begun developing in the 1950s and reached its apex of 
power in the mid-1960s, as demonstrated by the congressional passage of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Thus, New York Times did not show 
the Court baldly and boldly protecting a minority group’s constitutional rights regard-
less of the political fallout. To the contrary, the decision manifested the Court’s compli-
ance with a dominant national political coalition that was at its maximum power.12 
Taken together, these four cases—Terminiello, Feiner, Brandenburg, and New York 
Times—demonstrate a crucial point: the judicial determination of the scope of first-
amendment protections is integrally political. The justices decide cases in accordance 
with the interests and values at stake. To be clear, I am not suggesting that the political 
nature of these cases manifests a corruption of the adjudicative process. Rather, politics 
is inherent to constitutional interpretation and adjudication, when accurately de-
scribed.13 
Thus, the constitutional protection of hate speech qua hate speech, including anti-
semitic hate speech, is necessarily a political issue. The Court has decided several cases 
involving hate speech, but the Court has not yet explicitly held whether hate speech is or 
is not a low-value type of expression outside of first-amendment protection. With that 
said, though, the justices seem to be leaning strongly toward the conclusion that hate 
speech is constitutionally protected. If so, then the government, of course, would be 
precluded from criminally punishing such speech.14 Yet, to underscore the basic point, 
the judicial determination of whether hate speech is constitutionally protected in any 
particular case will be largely influenced by the interests and values at stake. 
II. IS ANTI-ZIONISM HATE SPEECH? 
Now, I can return to my first question: is anti-Zionist expression a type of hate speech 
(specifically, antisemitic hate speech)? Most commentators agree that one can criticize 
Israel without being antisemitic. For example, one might argue that Israel’s policy on 
new settlements is incorrect; such an argument is not necessarily antisemitic. It might 
merely be an argument about the justice and politics of settlements.15 
Simultaneously, many commentators agree that many anti-Israel arguments are bla-
tantly antisemitic. For an example, I draw on the writings of Ken Marcus, who has 
described a situation that arose at the University of California at Irvine. 
At [UC Irvine], pro-Israel Jewish students have been subject to stalking, rock throw-
ing, and various forms of intimidation, and a Holocaust memorial was damaged or 
destroyed. Signs have been posted on campus showing a Star of David dripping with 
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blood. Speakers at campus events have chastised Jews for arrogance and have spoken 
of the distinction between the “good Jews” and the “bad Jews.”16 
Yet, as Professor Marcus points out, some people would deny that even these statements 
and actions are antisemitic. 
In any event, I would add a broader point: arguments criticizing Israel fall along a 
continuum, ranging from the “overtly antisemitic” to the “non-antisemitic.” Many 
arguments might fall somewhere on the continuum other than at the two extreme ends. 
For instance, when debating the appropriateness of new Jewish settlements, if a discuss-
ant focuses on the consequences of settlements for the long-term peace process, then the 
argument would probably not be antisemitic. But if the discussant adds that Israelis are 
the new Nazis, then the argument has shifted to the antisemitic side of the continuum. 
So, how does this question—whether anti-Zionist expression is a type of (antisemitic) 
hate speech—relate to the question of first-amendment protections, including the first-
amendment protection of hate speech? Well, if even the legal question of whether par-
ticular expression is protected under the first amendment is necessarily political, then 
the specification of anti-Zionist speech as being either antisemitic or not will also neces-
sarily be political. In other words, the question whether somebody who criticizes Israel 
is simultaneously condemning Jews as a race or religion is an inherently political prob-
lem: one’s interests and values vis-à-vis Israel and Judaism will strongly influence the 
answer that one gives to this question. 
Thus, when critics of Israel insist that their arguments are merely political and not anti-
semitic, they often are begging the question because whether anti-Zionism is political or 
antisemitic is itself a political question. This key point is something of a logical conun-
drum and therefore bears some clarification. Many commentators see a dichotomy, an 
either/or: criticisms of Israel are deemed either political—and, consequently, legitimate—
or antisemitic—and, consequently, illegitimate. But this dichotomy, this distinction 
between political anti-Zionist arguments, on the one hand, and antisemitic (or hate-
speech) anti-Zionist arguments, on the other hand, is too slippery to resolve these 
disputes definitively. It is too slippery because the distinction itself is political: we 
cannot determine whether anti-Zionism is merely political or is instead hate speech 
without accounting for our political interests and values, particularly vis-à-vis Israel 
itself. 
III. CONCLUSION: EXCESSIVE EXPECTATIONS? 
If both questions raised at the outset—first, is anti-Zionist expression a type of hate 
speech, and second, is (antisemitic) hate speech constitutionally protected under the first 
amendment—lead to inherently political answers, then what follows? First, we must 
guard against having expectations for law that are too great. The law, or legal doctrine, 
cannot eliminate antisemitism. It cannot prevent people from sometimes making anti-
Zionist arguments that are antisemitic because, in part, the law itself cannot be separated 
from the underlying political battles regarding Israel and Zionism. If antisemitism 
spreads through society, we should not expect the law to save us. 
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Nonetheless, and this is a second conclusion, I do not mean to suggest that we 
should therefore disregard the law. The law, or the interpretation of law, is inherently 
political, but the law can simultaneously influence politics. While I have focused on 
American constitutional law, we should not forget the importance of statutory law. 
Legislatures might enact statutes that encourage positive results or developments, such 
as the reduction of antisemitism in society or the control of the detrimental effects of 
antisemitism (though, of course, legislatures must act within constitutional restraints). 
And even within the realm of constitutional law, important distinctions must be kept at 
the forefront. Constitutional restraints or limits generally apply only to governmental 
actors and not to non-governmental or private actors. Thus, for instance, a private 
university might be able to punish the dissemination of antisemitic hate speech, while a 
public university might be unable to do so (depending on the judicial interpretation of 
the first amendment). 
Ultimately, we obviously need to find ways to stop the spread of antisemitism. Law 
might play a role here, but we need to think about other means as well. 
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A Brief History of Iberian Antisemitism 
Lina Gorenstein* 
1. BACKGROUND 
In 1449, a discriminatory, racist, and antisemitic set of laws was passed in Toledo. It 
prohibited any Jew who converted to Christianity, or conversos, from participating in a 
professional corporation or being admitted to any honorific office of the state or the 
Church. 
Known as the “Purity of Blood Statutes,” this legislation discriminated against indi-
viduals on the basis of their ethnic origin and was aimed exclusively at Jewish converts 
to Christianity and their descendants. 
Since 1391, the number of converted Jews in Spain had been increasing. This was the 
year of the “Seville massacres” and the beginning of the conversion movement ordered 
by Friar Vicente Ferrer. 
Traditionally, Jews in the Iberian Peninsula were subject to their own legislation, 
which was becoming increasingly restrictive. As conversos, they were in the same posi-
tion as the Christians and could compete with them in every field. 
In the realms of Christianity, the specific rights of Jewish communities were dis-
played in the foros that had been promulgated since the 11th century.1 These provisions 
regarding the Jews were rarely incorporated into the municipal charters of the various 
localities. The Jewish community constituted a separate political body, with its own 
justice and laws, directed by Jewish law or the Torah and the decisions of the Talmudic 
authorities.2 The taxes that the Jewish communities had to pay directly to the King were 
laid down in those charters and represented an important contribution to the royal 
treasury. The autonomy of the judarias.3 was reinforced, and laws were issued reaffirm-
ing the autonomy of the Jews and assuring the safety of their property, regulated by the 
charters and submitted to the King. 
From the 14th century, canonical legislation became more prevalent in the realms of 
Iberian Christianity. Legislation concerning Jews had already been applied across the 
rest of Europe. This was restrictive legislation,4 aimed at prohibiting familiarity between 
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Jews and Christians. It had already been introduced by the Lateran Council in 1215 but 
was only enforced in the Iberian Peninsula in the 14th century. 
The tolerance and familiarity that ruled the relationship between Christians and Jews 
were slowly deteriorating. Since the middle of the 13th century—the end of the Christian 
Reconquista—the normalization of life in Christian society offered a fertile soil for anti-
semitism and traditional negative attitudes toward the Jews. 
In the 14th century, the popular belief that Jews were poisoners and a destructive 
element within Christianity was spread throughout Europe, and they were blamed for 
the plague that devastated Europe in 1348. 
Anti-Jewish feeling was growing, and the Jews were expelled from England, France, 
and some German cities. It is this environment that provides the context for the “Seville 
massacres” of 1391 in Castela.5 
The situation was different now, and the Old Christians reacted to this freedom by 
attempting to use legislation to limit competition from the converted Jews. In Toledo in 
1449, a rebellion against the conversos—accusing them of being responsible for the rise in 
taxes—resulted in the promulgation of the Sentencia-Estatuto, known as the “Purity of 
Blood Statutes.”6 
The Sentencia-Estatuto was both a judgment and a legislative act against the conversos. 
In reality, it was a measure based on economic motives, but those responsible for this 
discriminating legislation used religious pretexts. They accused all the conversos of being 
secret Jews and, therefore, of being bad Christians. It did not matter what the conversos 
did: Judaism was in their blood, and they drank it in with their mother’s milk.7 
This was the first racial institutional legislation since the canonical laws. Conversos—
or New Christians—were not equal to the Old Christians and would never be, since they 
carried in their blood the seeds of “impurity,” the seeds of Judaism. 
This racist politics against the conversos accused them all of being false Christians. It 
reflected a conflict between the Old and the New Christian bourgeoisie—a competition 
for the work and trade markets. 
This anti-Jewish politics reached its peak in 1492, when the kings of Spain presented 
the Jews with a choice between conversion or leaving the kingdom. The Edict of Expul-
sion was published on March 31, 1492 and gave the Jews until August to leave Spain. 
These statutes were social and urban phenomena, with the purpose of stopping the 
converted middle class from competing in professional corporations and public office 
and blocking their social ascent. The statutes lasted for almost three centuries in the 
Iberian countries and its dominions, always favoring the Old Christian upper classes. 
                                                                                                                                                       
5 Poliakov, supra n. 2, at p. 130. 
6 The Sentencia-Estatuto has been studied by many historians, who devoted themselves to dis-
cussing the reasons that led to this state of affairs. See, among many others, A. Sicroff, Los Estatutos 
de Limpieza de Sangre, trad. M. Arminõ (Madrid, Taurus 1958); Benzion Netanyahu, The Origins of 
Inquisition in Fifteenth Century Spain (New York, Random House 1995); Jaime Contreras, “Limpieza 
de sangre, cambio social y manipulacion de la memoria,” in Inquisicion y conversos—III Curso de 
cultura hispano-judia y sefardi (Toledo, Associacion de amigos del museo sefardi/caja de Castilla la-
Mancha 1993) pp. 81-102; Christiane Stallaert, Ni una gota de sangre impura (Barcelona, Circulo de 
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7 IAN/TT/IL (Institutos dos Arquivos Nacionais, Torre do Tombo, Inquisição de Lisboa). File of 
Antonio Rodrigues Mogadouro, letter from Francisco Paes Ferreira attached to the file. 
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Dividing society into “pure” and “impure” groups, they excluded the converted from 
competition. 
This legislation provided the basis for a new institution that was introduced in Spain 
in 1478 and in Portugal in 1536, namely the Court of the Holy Office of the Inquisition. 
The concept of “purity of blood” was used by the Inquisitorial regime and applied 
effectively for three centuries.8 
2. THE INQUISITION IN PORTUGAL AND BRAZIL 
The New Christians guaranteed the Inquisition an economic basis to maintain itself.9 As 
a socio-economic group independent of religious involvement, the conversos were 
therefore the subject of the Holy Office. It can be said that the Holy Office of the Inquisi-
tion in the Iberian countries was introduced as result of antisemitism that had been in 
the ascent since the conversions and the massacres of 1391. Iberian antisemitism also had 
a fundamental biological factor in the form of “blood.” The Inquisition was based on 
genealogical research, which was aimed at finding the ethnic origin of the New Chris-
tians.10 
The main objective of this paper is to show how the Inquisition applied this racial 
legislation was applied across the Portuguese empire by the Inquisition, particularly in 
Brazil. On the basis of several examples, it will show how these factors hindered the 
economic, social, and cultural development of this Portuguese colony from the 16th to 
the 18th century. 
The main purpose of the Holy Office of the Inquisition was to control the religion of 
the New Christians—Jews who were all forcibly converted to Christianity in 1497—and 
their descendants. The existence of the Court of the Inquisition in Portugal made it very 
dangerous for the New Christians to live and work there. Many converted Jews there-
fore decided to move to Brazil, where it was easier to escape the vigilance of the Inquisi-
tion. The economic possibilities attracted the converts, who found better opportunities in 
the New World. From the beginning of the 16th century, many New Christians arrived 
in Brazil. They concentrated mainly in the northeast of the country where the sugar 
industry was more developed.11 
Although there was no Court of the Inquisition in Brazil, life was not absolutely se-
cure. For three centuries, its agents—familiares, comissários e visitadores (officials of the 
Inquisition)—persecuted and arrested New Christians suspected of being secret Jews. At 
first, the agents operated in the northeast of the country. In the 18th century, they also 
operated in the southeast, Minas Gerais, and Rio de Janeiro, after gold and diamonds 
were discovered there. 
The Portuguese Inquisition had one main interest: revenue. 
The opportunity to assimilate and integrate into mainstream society was greater in 
Brazil than in Portugal. Many New Christians ceased living as Jews, but a certain group 
                                                                                                                                                       
8 Anita Novinsky, Cristãos novos na Bahia (São Paulo, Perspectiva 1972) p. 43. 
9 Ibid. 
10  Anita Novinsky, “Anti-semitismo, os marranos e a fluctuation animi,” in Maria Luiza Tucci 
Carneiro, O anti-semitismo nas Americas (São Paulo, EDUSP 2007) p. 31. 
11  Anita Novinsky, “Jewish Roots of Brazil,” in J. Elkin and G. Merx (eds.), The Jewish Presence 
in Latin America (Boston, Allan A. Unameris 1987) pp. 33-44. 
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remained loyal to their ancient faith for centuries, while externally they behaved exactly 
like the Old Christians. 
At the end of the 16th century, the Inquisition intensified its Brazilian activities in 
Bahia and Pernambuco.12 Many New Christians were denounced as secret Jews and 
transported to the inquisitorial prisons in Portugal. 
From a traveler’s diary, we know that Brazil spared from the Inquisition for a rela-
tively long time, but that the latter eventually became so rigorous that merchants were 
imprisoned and all their goods were confiscated on the slightest suspicion.13 
Portuguese legislation was also applied in Brazil. Laws regarding the New Chris-
tians were issued during the colonial period. In Rio de Janeiro, conversos were prohibited 
from becoming elected officials. A Royal Decree of 1611 stated that all candidates for 
municipal offices should be selected from among the noblest people and without “any 
trace of Jewish blood.”14 In 1643, another municipal decree stated that in Rio de Janeiro 
people should not be elected from “the nation,” meaning Jews.15 
In Inquisitorial documents, one finds many opinions about the New Christians from 
their neighbors, business partners, friends, companions, and even their children’s 
godfathers and godmothers. Most of them testified that, externally, the New Christians 
were good Catholics, following all the practices imposed by the Church. But they were 
unaware of what they did in the privacy of their homes. 
All conversos were baptized, received the sacrament of confirmation, grew up as 
Catholics, and behaved exactly as the Old Christians. Their external behavior was 
corroborated by their neighbors but many times accompanied by a certain suspicion. 
They were “good Christians, but… New Christians.” 
One example concerns the case of a woman who lived in Rio de Janeiro on her fa-
ther’s plantation, where there was a chapel. After she was married, she continued living 
on the plantation. The commissioner of the Holy Office of the Inquisition in Rio de 
Janeiro declared that she had always been a true Catholic and that he never had doubts 
about her faith. But he did not know if she went to mass or what she did when she was 
at home.16 Another priest said of the same woman that she was a good Christian in her 
                                                                                                                                                       
12  The Visitações of 1590-1595. See Primeira Visitação do Santo Ofício às Partes do Brasil, pelo 
Licenciado Heitor Furtado de Mendonça (Denunciações de Pernambuco, 1593-1595), Introdução de 
Rodolfo Garcia (São Paulo, Série Eduardo Prado 1929); Primeira Visitação do Santo Ofício às Partes do 
Brasil, pelo Licenciado Heitor Furtado de Mendonça (Confissões de Pernambuco, 1594-1595), Introdução de 
José Antônio Gonsalves de Mello (Recife, Universidade Federal de Pernambuco 1970); Primeira 
Visitação do Santo Ofício às Partes do Brasil, pelo Licenciado Heitor Furtado de Mendonça (Confissões da 
Bahia, 1591-1592), Prefácio de J. Capistrano de Abreu. 2. ed. (Rio de Janeiro, Liv. Briguiet 1935); 
Primeira Visitação do Santo Ofício às Partes do Brasil, pelo Licenciado Heitor Furtado de Mendonça 
(Denunciações da Bahia, 1591-1593), Introdução de J. Capistrano de Abreu (São Paulo, Editor Paulo 
Prado 1925). 
13  D. Ruiters, “A Tocha da navegação,” 269 Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geografico Brasileiro 
(1965) p. 80. 
14  Apud Maria Fernanda Baptista Bicalho, A cidade e o Império: o Rio de Janeiro na dinamica coloni-
al portuguesa, séculos XVII e XVIII, mimeo. Tese, FFLCH-USP (São Paulo 1997) p. 354. 
15  J.J. de A. Silva, Colleção cronológica da legislação portuguesa—compilada e anotada (1640-1647) 
(Lisboa, Imprensa de F.X. de Souza 1856) p. 439. 
16  IAN/TT/IL, File of Brites de Paredes, Inquisição de Lisboa n. 399, Inquirição do Rio de Janei-
ro, 10 de julho de 1713. 
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exterior behavior. But as she lived on a plantation, far from the city, he did not know if 
she believed in the Church sacraments.17 
There was thus always some uncertainty about the faith of the New Christians. 
3. THE NEW CHRISTIANS IN BRAZIL 
The ethnic origin of Brazilian families was known by the majority of the population of 
Rio de Janeiro, since they had been established there since the 16th century. François 
Froger, a French traveler who visited the city in 1695 estimated that three-quarters of the 
white population was of Jewish origin.18 Other documents confirm his opinion. 
From the latest research, we know that the New Christians represented around 20-30 
percent of Rio de Janeiro’s free white population during this period. Part of this New 
Christian community lived in the city and engaged in urban activities. Around 50 
percent of the community was dedicated to agricultural activity, mainly the cultivation 
of sugar cane and sugar production. Some were owners of large sugar plantations, and 
some were small-scale farmers. It is interesting to note that some of the sugar-mill 
owners and farmers were also lawyers, doctors, or businessmen, maintaining a house-
hold in the city and upholding a strong family network.19 
The same families were involved in urban activities, the liberal professions, sugar 
cane plantations, manufacturing and trade, and trade with the mining region. The work 
of these families was divided among their members. 
One member of the family would be engaged at the sugar mill, another in the city, 
and a third at the mines, in a typical colonial society relationship, which was patriarchal 
and agrarian, with large properties and slave labor (the plantations). The rural clan was 
the main cell of political and social organization, shaping a network of people linked to 
the clan and interconnected by a wide range of interests.20 These clans were the favored 
victims of the Court of the Inquisition, enabling it to arrest entire families. 
When the Inquisition arrived at the beginning of the 18th century, panic reigned 
among the conversos. More than 300 people were arrested and had their properties 
confiscated. 
More than 20 percent of the sugar mills of the region that belonged to New Chris-
tians fell into the hands of the Church, including their businesses, houses, and slaves, as 
well as their jewelry, gold, and silver. 
The Brazilian colony suffered the economic consequences of these confiscations. 
4. IMPACT OF THE INQUISITION IN PORTUGAL 
There was a critical mentality in Portugal among those who understood the harm that 
the Inquisition was doing to the Portuguese economy. The Ambassador of Portugal to 
                                                                                                                                                       
17  Ibid. 
18  François Froger, Rélation d’um Voyage fait em 1695, 1696 et 1697 aux cotes d’Afrique, detroit de 
Magellan, Brésil, Cayenne et Isles Antilles par um escadre des vasseaux du Roi, commandée par M. de 
Gennes, faite par lê Sieur Froger, Ingenieur volontaire sur lê vaisseu Le Faucaun Anglais, Amsterdam, chez 
lês héritiers d’Antoine Schelte, MDCXCIX, pp. 74-75. 
19  Lina Gorenstein, A Inquisição contra as mulheres: Rio de Janeiro, séculos XVII e XVIII (São Paulo, 
Humanitas 2005) p. 71. 
20  Ibid., at p. 83. 
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the Court of Louis XIV, D. Luis da Cunha, wrote that the Inquisition had discovered 
“the mine of the Jews in Rio de Janeiro,” and confiscated their properties to a point that 
the King had to intervene himself.21 
Similar criticism was expressed by Antonio Nunes Ribeiro Sanchez, a famous hu-
manist and physician, who also understood that the confiscation of the sugar mills was 
ruining the sugar trade.22 
Father Antonio Vieira also recognized the importance of the New Christians to the 
Portuguese economy, and he advised the King to adopt a more tolerant attitude, men-
tioning that the Jews were only discriminated against in Portugal and that they lived 
openly as Jews in the Holy City of Rome. Father Vieira also proposed that the King 
should welcome back all the Portuguese scattered across Europe, particularly the busi-
nessmen who had substantial experience in the field of international trade.23 
Father Vieira attributed the misery of Portugal to antisemitism, which continued to 
drive the most important, cultivated, and prosperous Jews and secret Jews from the 
country. 
Portuguese antisemitism was responsible for the backwardness of the Portuguese 
economy and culture. The Portuguese crown prohibited any development of the colony, 
including the existence of universities, and they censored books even more rigorously 
than those included on the Index by Rome. Most of the Portuguese population was 
illiterate, but all the New Christians condemned by the Inquisition knew how to read 
and write, including 50 percent of the women arrested.24 
The anti-Jewish actions of the Church and the state did away with the most cultivat-
ed Portuguese poets and writers of the period. Bento Teixeira, who was considered the 
first poet of America,25 died in the dungeons of the Inquisition in Lisbon in the 16th 
century. Antonio Serrão de Castro,26 a well-known apothecary and poet who was one of 
the founders of the first Literary Academy of Lisbon, was incarcerated for ten years and 
finished his life begging on the streets of Lisbon. Antonio José da Silva, one of the main 
dramaturgists and greatest writers of the Portuguese language in the 18th century, 
whose plays are still staged today, was burned at the stake.27 
After more than ten generations, the descendants of converted Jews were still dis-
criminated against by law. To obtain important jobs and offices, a person had to submit 
                                                                                                                                                       
21  D. Luis da Cunha, Testamento Político (São Paulo, Alfa-Omega 1976) p. 87. 
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diversas partes da Europa,” in Obras Escolhidas (Lisboa, Ed. Sá da Costa 1951) Vol. IV, Obras Várias 
II, pp. 27-71. 
24  Gorenstein, supra n. 19, at p. 208. 
25  Eneida Ribeiro, “O Marranismo no Brasil Colônia através do processo inquisitorial contra 
Bento Teixeira,” in Helena Lewin (coord.), Judaísmo e Modernidade: suas múltiplas inter-relações (Rio 
de Janeiro, UERJ/Programa de Estudos Judaicos 2007) pp. 92-102. 
26  Benair Ribeiro, Um morgado de misérias—o auto de um poeta marrano (São Paulo, Humanitas 
2007). 
27  Lina Gorenstein, “A ameaça da intelligentsia brasileira: a família de Antonio Jose,” in Helena 
Lewin (coord.), Judaismo e Modernidade: suas múltiplas inter-relações (Rio de Janeiro, UERJ/Programa 
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detailed information on his ancestors to prove his “purity of blood.” Even so, the New 
Christians achieved high positions in society and managed to gain acceptance to the 
University of Coimbra, returning to Brazil with academic degrees.  
During this period, Portugal had a peculiar administration, and laws were frequently 
ignored, depending on the interest of the moment. The conversos constituted the intellec-
tual part of society and had the most advanced ideas. They represented the opposite 
mentality of the conservative, fanatic, and intolerant ruling class. 
In the 18th century, the King’s minister, the Marques de Pombal, decided to improve 
the kingdom’s backward economic situation. He changed Portugal’s political landscape 
by eliminating the distinction between the Old and the New Christians and ending the 
Portuguese division between the “pure” and “impure.” Discrimination subsequently 
diminished, and the New Christians were gradually absorbed by society as a whole. In 
the 19th century, there was no more persecution, but the Inquisition continued as a 
respectable and venerable institution until its end in 1823. 
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Antisemitism in Contemporary Poland 
Marek Kucia* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Poland is one of the most significant countries in Jewish history. In the Middle Ages, the 
Jews found a safe haven in the Kingdom of Poland. In subsequent centuries, they grew 
into a large community that contributed to the country’s welfare and developed a 
vibrant culture. In the 19th century, 80 percent of the world’s Jewry were living on the 
territories of what was then the Commonwealth of Poland and Lithuania. Because of 
migrations in the 19th and 20th centuries, many Jews in Israel, America, and other 
countries have roots in Poland. In the period between the World Wars, three million 
Jews were living in the Republic of Poland. Constituting 10 percent of the country’s 
population, they were the largest Jewish community in Europe. In 1939-1945, more than 
90 percent of the Jews of Poland perished in the Holocaust. The annihilation of six 
million European Jews occurred largely in what had been Poland. The Nazi German 
death camps of Auschwitz, Bełżec, Kulmhof, Majdanek, Sobibór, and Treblinka operated 
there. After World War II, Poland became a country with hardly any Jews. The Jewish 
community declined, as a result of migration, from 240,000 in 1946 to 40,000 according to 
estimates—or 1,000 by self-identification—in 2002.1 
II. REPORTED POLISH ANTISEMITISM 
Despite its rich and tragic Jewish past and low number of Jews today, Poland—now an 
established member of the free world (a member of NATO since 1999 and the European 
Union since 2004)—is reported to be a rather antisemitic country. For example, a survey 
that was carried out for the Anti-Defamation League in 2009 found that 55 percent of Poles 
share the antisemitic opinion that “Jews have too much power in the business world” (see 
Figure 1). It is of little consolation that the results in Hungary and Spain were higher. 
III. RESEARCH 
The question of the extent and character of antisemitism in today’s Poland and how it 
has changed in recent years are issues that I addressed in a sociological research project  
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American Jewish Year Book (2003) gave the figure of 40,000 Jews in Poland. A total of 1,055 people 
identified themselves as Jews in the national census in 2002. 
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Figure 1: Anti-Defamation League Survey 2009: “Jews have too much power in the 
business world” (percentage responding “probably true”) 
 
Source: Anti-Defamation League (2009). 
carried out in January and June 2010.2 The project consisted of two parts—quantitative 
and qualitative. The quantitative part consisted of a survey that was designed by me and 
conducted by the Polish member of the Taylor Nelson Sofres network OBOP on January 
7-10, 2010 through face-to-face interviews with a country-wide random sample of 1,001 
respondents representative of the population of Poland aged over 15 years. The maxi-
mum statistical measurement error was +/- 3 percent for the estimate of 95 percent. The 
qualitative part of my research project consisted of three focus group interviews that my 
students and I conducted in June 2010 with different groups of Catholics in different 
locations: (a) members of the Club of Catholic Intelligentsia in Kraków (six persons); (b) 
members of the Family of Radio Maryja in Rzeszów (nine persons); and (c) Catholic 
intellectuals in Lublin (five persons).3 
In designing the survey and analyzing its results, I drew on Polish sociological re-
search into antisemitism from 1992, 1996, and 2002. The 1992 and 2002 projects were 
conducted by Ireneusz Krzemiński, a professor of sociology from the University of 
Warsaw, and his teams from the Institute of Sociology at the University of Warsaw and 
the Jewish Historical Institute in Warsaw (Krzemiński 1993, 1996, 2004). The surveys 
were carried out by the PBS opinion polling organization on samples of 1,011 (in 1992) 
and 1,098 (in 2002) respondents representative of Poland’s population aged over 18 
years. The 1996 survey was designed and analyzed by Helena Datner (1997), a sociolo-
gist from the Jewish Historical Institute in Warsaw who was also a core member of 
Krzemiński’s team in 1992. Datner’s survey was conducted by the CBOS polling organi-
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zation on a sample of 1,097 respondents representative of Poland’s adult population (18 
years and above). 
The main objective of my survey was to determine the level of three kinds of anti-
semitism: (a) modern antisemitism, expressed in the opinion that Jews have too much 
power or influence; (b) religious antisemitism, which consists of the belief that Jews are 
culpable in Christ’s death; and (c) what I call post-Holocaust antisemitism, expressed in the 
opinion that it is good that there are hardly any Jews in Poland as an effect of the Holo-
caust. 
Modern antisemitism was measured by the questions that were designed by Datner 
and used in her and Krzemiński’s surveys: 
1. Do you agree with the statement that Jews in our country have too much influ-
ence on…? 
(a) political life 
(b) economic life 
(c) press, radio, and television 
2. Do you agree with the opinion that Jews have too much influence in the world? 
The three items in the first question (used in 1992, 1996, and 2002) probed the political, 
economic, and media-related antisemitism at domestic level, while the second question 
(asked in 1992 and 2002) measured what may be termed international antisemitism. 
Each of these four items was given a four-grade scale to choose one answer: “strongly 
agree,” “somewhat agree,” “somewhat disagree,” or “strongly disagree,” with a few 
other options: “I don’t know, I am not interested,” “I am undecided,” or “difficult to 
say.” 
The four items together constituted the index of modern antisemitism and anti-
antisemitism as designed by Datner (1996). The positive answers (“strongly agree” or 
“somewhat agree”) to the four items constituted the scale of modern antisemitism: from 
four positive answers standing for strong modern antisemitism to no positive answers 
indicating no modern antisemitism. Analogically, the negative answers (“strongly 
disagree” or “somewhat disagree”) to the four items allowed one to construct the scale 
of modern anti-antisemitism: from four negative answers meaning strong rejection of 
modern antisemitism to no negative answers expressing no rejection of antisemitism. 
Religious antisemitism was assessed by means of a question that Datner designed for 
the 1992 survey and Krzemiński also used in 2002: 
Sometimes one hears the opinion that Jews have so many troubles because God pun-
ished them for the crucifixion of Christ. Do you agree with this opinion or not? 
To measure post-Holocaust antisemitism, I designed the following question: 
One sometimes hears the opinion: “It is true that the Holocaust—the annihilation of 
Jews—was a major crime, but it is good that as an effect of it there are hardly any Jews 
in Poland.” Do you agree or disagree with this opinion? 
As in the case of modern antisemitism, respondents to the questions concerning the two 
other kinds of antisemitism were able to choose an answer from the same four-grade 
scale. In addition, there was the “difficult to say” option. 
The qualitative part of the research was intended to deepen selected results of the 
survey. The participants in the focus group interviews were asked, inter alia, to discuss 
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what they thought when they heard the various questions that measured antisemitism, 
particularly what they meant by the word “Jews.” 
IV. RESULTS 
1. General findings 
The survey revealed the following (see Figure 2): 
Figure 2: Antisemitism and anti-antisemitism in Poland, 2010 (percentage agreeing 
or disagreeing with antisemitic statements) 
 
1. A minority of Poles agree with various antisemitic opinions, that is, the majority of 
Poles are not antisemitic. 
2. However, antisemitic opinions are fairly widely spread in Poland. 
a. In particular, there are many supporters of international antisemitism, which is 
expressed through the opinion that “Jews have too much influence in the world.” 
Forty-five percent of Poles agree with this statement. On a positive note, it is the 
only antisemitic opinion that has more supporters than opponents (33 percent). 
b. Many Poles—34 percent in each case—agree with the opinions that show domes-
tic political and economic antisemitism, that is, that the “Jews in our country 
have too much influence on political life [and] economic life.” Also, 27 percent of 
Poles agree with the statement of domestic media-related antisemitism, namely 
that “Jews in our country have too much influence on the press, radio, and tele-
vision.” 
c. For a country where most of the Holocaust took place and that lost almost its en-
tire Jewish community as a result, a surprisingly large number of Poles—one-
fifth (20 percent) of the population—are supporters of post-Holocaust anti-
semitism, which is conveyed by the opinion “It is true that the Holocaust—the 
annihilation of the Jews—was a major crime, but it is good that as an effect of it 
there are hardly any Jews in Poland.” 
d. The level of religious antisemitism is disturbingly high. In a Catholic country that 
is the birthplace of Pope John Paul II—who declared any antisemitism to be a sin 
that has to be confessed and repented for and who recalled that the Church de-
nounced its former teaching that the Jews are culpable in Christ’s death—as 
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many as 16 percent of people agree with the statement that the “Jews have so 
many troubles because God punished them for the crucifixion of Christ.” 
3. Despite the fairly high levels of various kinds of antisemitism in Poland, there are 
more Poles who reject antisemitic opinions than those who share them (with the ex-
ception of international antisemitism). 
a. What is particularly encouraging is that 68 percent of Poles reject the statement 
of post-Holocaust antisemitism and 65 percent dismiss religious antisemitism. 
b. What is also positive is that the opinions that express domestic political, eco-
nomic, and media-related antisemitism each had a relative majority of oppo-
nents. 
2. One antisemitism or many antisemitisms? 
The research design adopted for the survey presupposed the existence of several kinds 
of antisemitism. At the first level, these were the kinds that were measured by each of 
the six survey questions: political, economic, media-related, international, religious, and 
post-Holocaust. At the second level (based upon the categorization of survey questions), 
one can speak of four kinds of antisemitism: domestic (comprised of political, economic, 
and media-related), international, religious and post-Holocaust. The theory of anti-
semitism and the results of earlier research allow one to discern three kinds of anti-
semitism at the third level: modern (encompassing the three domestic kinds and the 
international kind), religious, and post-Holocaust. A deeper statistical analysis (the 
factor analysis) of the 2010 survey data revealed a very strong correlation among politi-
cal, economic, media-related, and international antisemitism.4 This confirmed the 
theoretical assumptions and the findings of Datner and Krzemiński and proved that 
there exists among Poles a pattern of antisemitic views that are otherwise known as 
modern antisemitism. Interestingly, the statistical analysis of the 2010 data also showed 
a fairly strong correlation between religious and post-Holocaust antisemitism,5 which 
 
Figure 3: Variety of antisemitism in Poland, 2010 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
4 The categorial principal components analysis for categorial variables (CATPCA) that was car-
ried out by a member of my research team, Mateusz Magierowski, showed the following values for 
the results of the four items: political 0.923, economic 0.933, media-related 0.871, and international 
0.885. 
5 The CATPCA component values for religious and post-Holocaust antisemitism data were 
0.834 and 0.883 respectively. 
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allows one to discern a kind of antisemitism that may be termed historical. The modern 
and historical kinds of antisemitism belong to the forth level. In sum, the research 
carried out in Poland indicates that antisemitic views seem to fit into a five-level struc-
ture (see Figure 3) in which the modern and historical varieties are largely independent 
entities. 
3. Changes in modern antisemitism and anti-antisemitism 
A major problem that I address in my research is how the antisemitism of Poles, particu-
larly the modern variety, has changed in recent years and whether it has increased or 
decreased. Also, I am interested in how anti-antisemitism has evolved. 
The analysis of strong modern antisemitism, which is measured by the positive an-
swers (“strongly agree” or “somewhat agree”) to the questions about political, eco-
nomic, media-related, and international antisemitism (cf. Datner 1996), showed that it is 
represented by 22 percent of adult Poles (aged over 18 years).6 Twenty-three percent of 
Poles strongly reject modern antisemitism (“strongly disagree” or “somewhat disagree” 
answers to all four items). Since the previous survey in 2002, strong antisemitism has 
declined by five percentage points, and its strong rejection has increased by seven 
points. Compared to the results of the first survey on antisemitism in 1992, the level of 
strong antisemitism in 2010 was somehow higher, but its rejection was much higher (see 
Figure 4). Thus, in 2010, for the first time since antisemitism has been surveyed in 
Poland, the number of strong antisemites among Poles is lower (albeit only a little) than 
the number of those who strongly reject antisemitism. This and the decline of strong 
modern antisemitism between 2002 and 2010 and the steady increase in the strong 
rejection of antisemitism from 1992, through 2002, to 2010, are positive developments. 
Figure 4: Strong modern antisemitism and strong modern anti-antisemitism (percent-
age agreeing or disagreeing with four antisemitic opinions; respondents aged over 18) 
 
Comparing the data for the three domestic components of modern antisemitism, one can 
confirm positive developments (see Figure 5). The political, economic, and media-
                                                                                                                                                       
6 The precise result was 21.5 percent (for respondents aged 18 or above), while the entire sam-
ple, which consisted of respondents above the age of 15, had strong modern antisemitism at 21.8 
percent. 
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related kinds of antisemitism were all lower than in 1996 and, except for media-related 
antisemitism, also lower than in 1992. 
Figure 5: Domestic antisemitism: political, economic, media-related (percentage 
agreeing with antisemitic opinions; respondents aged over 18) 
 
The data for the rejection of domestic antisemitism proved even more positive (see 
Figure 6). All three components—political, economic, and media-related—increased 
considerably to reach the level of relative majorities. 
Figure 6: Rejection of domestic antisemitism: political, economic, media-related 
(percentage disagreeing with antisemitic opinions; respondents aged over 18) 
 
All in all, Poles in 2010 proved to be less antisemitic and more negative about anti-
semitism than ever before. What is not encouraging, however, is that about one-third of 
the adult population of Poland still holds antisemitic opinions, including one-fifth who 
are strongly antisemitic. 
4. Who are Polish antisemites and anti-antisemites? 
An important research question was what socio-demographic categories of people in 
Poland adhere to antisemitic opinions. It was also interesting to see which categories in 
particular reject antisemitism. 
From the results that could be expected given the previous research, two are particu-
larly worth discussing. They concern the relationship of antisemitism to gender and age. 
Gender influences antisemitism and anti-antisemitism. In the case of modern anti-
semitism, more men than women agree with antisemitic opinions, but more men than 
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women also declare their rejection of those opinions. In the case of religious anti-
semitism, the opposite is true: women are both more in favor and more against than 
men, although the differences are smaller than in the case of modern antisemitism. One 
might therefore conclude that gender relates to whether or not one shares antisemitic 
opinions rather than to what particular antisemitic opinions one shares. 
Age also has an impact on antisemitism (and anti-antisemitism). Generally speaking, 
the older the respondents are, the more antisemitic they prove to be. Also, the younger 
the respondents, the more negative they are about antisemitism. This concerns all kinds 
of antisemitism: modern, religious, and post-Holocaust. The differences are usually 
fairly substantial. In the 2010 survey, for example, there were almost twice as many 
strong modern antisemites in the oldest cohort of respondents, aged 60 years or above, 
than among the 20 to 29-year-olds (28.1 percent v. 15.7 percent). The earlier surveys 
revealed similar differences. But anomalies also occur. In the 2010 survey, for example, 
there were more strong modern antisemites in the youngest cohort, of 15 to 19-year-olds, 
than among 20 to 29-year-olds (17.7 percent v. 15.7 percent). However, another research 
project that I carried out in 2005 among students aged 12-17 prior to their visit to the 
Auschwitz-Birkenau Memorial and Museum proved the general tendency: antisemitism 
in this youngest group ever to be surveyed was minimal (see Table 1). 
Table 1: Modern antisemitism among Polish adults and youth (adults: from 18 
years of age; youth: 12-17 years of age) 
Scale Adults 1992 Adults 2002 Youth 2005 




































Total 1,011 100.0 1,098 100.0 977 100.0 
Sources: Krzemiński (1996); Krzemiński (2004); and Kucia (2007). 
The differentiation in antisemitism according to age from the least antisemitic younger 
cohorts to more antisemitic older cohorts that featured in the surveys in 1992, 1996, 2002, 
and 2010 and the low levels of antisemitism in the youngest cohorts in 2005 generate a 
series of questions. If the earlier research reveals such low levels of antisemitism among 
the young, why does the later research show higher antisemitism after the young have 
grown older? Is antisemitism a developmental characteristic? To what extent is it age-
dependent? What factors of a socio-economic nature influence the growth of anti-
semitism in the course of life? The surveys show that antisemitism correlates with self-
assessment of one’s own economic situation: the less one is satisfied, the more one is 
antisemitic. The qualitative research reveals that people who feel that they have little 
influence on or little participation in political life are more antisemitic than others. To 
what extent do these economic and political deprivations, which are after all age-related, 
explain higher antisemitism among older cohorts? In order to answer these questions 
further research is necessary. 
ANTISEMITISM IN CONTEMPORARY POLAND 313 
Alongside the expected but nevertheless puzzling results, the survey also produced 
several unexpected outcomes. Two of them are particularly important. The first concerns 
the relationship between antisemitism and education; the second concerns regional 
differentiation in antisemitism. 
In regard to education, the survey showed that there are comparatively many sup-
porters of antisemitic opinions among those Poles with a higher education or still in 
education. Although the level of strong modern antisemitism among those who have 
studied at university is the lowest among all education groups (18.5 percent v. an aver-
age of 21.4 percent), one might expect an even lower result. At the same time, the re-
spondents with higher education show more domestic political and media-related 
antisemitism and international antisemitism than the average. Students of upper secon-
dary schools (ages 16-18) exhibit less strong modern antisemitism than the average (19 
percent v. 21.4 percent), yet one might expect an even lower result given the many 
Jewish history, Holocaust, and tolerance educational programs that are taught in Polish 
schools. Thus education does not eradicate antisemitic stereotypes, but merely helps to 
decrease them slightly. 
The most interesting finding of the survey concerned the regional differentiation in 
antisemitism. As far as the various components of modern antisemitism are concerned, 
Poland is composed of four parts: (1) the most antisemitic provinces of eastern Poland—
Podkarpackie,7 followed by Podlaskie, but not Lubelskie, another eastern province; (2) 
the moderately antisemitic provinces of central Poland (Łódzkie, Mazowieckie, and 
Świętokrzyskie), southern Poland (Małopolskie, Opolskie, and Śląskie) and the eastern 
Lubelskie province; (3) the considerably less antisemitic western and northern areas that 
were granted to Poland after World War II (Dolnośląskie, Lubuskie, Warmińsko-
Mazurskie, and Zachodniopomorskie); and (4) the least antisemitic areas of the former 
Prussian partition (Kujawsko-Pomorskie, Pomorskie, and Wielkopolskie). This composi-
tion does not overlap with the division of today’s Poland into its former Austrian, 
Prussian, and Russian partitions.8 that was considered important in reference to anti-
semitism by Krzemiński (2004).9 Antisemitism is the highest in the formerly Austrian 
Podkarpackie and the formerly Russian Podlaskie. The Małopolskie province, which 
largely belonged to Austria, is almost as antisemitic as the formerly Russian Świętokrzy-
skie and Łódzkie. Only formerly Prussian Wielkopolskie stands out as one of the least 
antisemitic. What is striking is that modern antisemitism is higher in areas where there 
were more Jews before World War II: first in today’s eastern Poland (except for Lubel-
skie, which had a large Jewish population but where antisemitism is at an average level) 
and then in the central and southern areas. In areas where there were few Jews before 
                                                                                                                                                       
7 The Podkarpackie province is also at the top of the list in terms of religious antisemitism and 
post-Holocaust antisemitism. 
8 In 1772, 1793, and 1795, Austria, Prussia, and Russia partitioned the Commonwealth of Po-
land and Lithuania. Between 1795 and 1918, Poland did not exist as a state. The territory of today’s 
Poland comprises vast areas of what in 1914 were the Austrian, Prussian, and Russian partitions 
and a part of Prussia—by 1945, the Third Reich—that was granted to Poland after World War II. 
9 Krzemiński discovered the most widespread modern antisemitism in the former Austrian 
partition, above average modern antisemitism in the former Russian partition, and the lowest, 
below average modern antisemitism in the former Prussian partition (Krzemiński 2004: 95). He did 
not consider the areas of Germany that were granted to Poland. 
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the war, antisemitism is lower: in the former Prussian partition and the territories 
granted to Poland after the war (except for Opolskie, where antisemitism is higher). 
Interestingly, there is more antisemitism in the granted territories where there were very 
few Jews and hardly any Poles before the war than in the former Prussian partition that 
formed the western provinces of pre-war Poland, with few Jews and a mixed Polish and 
German population. The long-term impact of the regional differentiation in the number 
of Jews and their share in the population of a given area on today’s antisemitism in this 
area may be interpreted through the socio-culturally inherited memory of Polish-Jewish 
relations, stereotypes, and prejudices. If this is true, it is amazing how long-lasting the 
bad memories, negative stereotypes, and prejudices are! 
The number and proportion of Jews before the war, the memory of Polish-Jewish re-
lations, and the inherited stereotypes and prejudices seem to be the most important 
factors in the regional differentiation in antisemitism in Poland and Polish antisemitism 
in general. These factors do not, however, explain the peculiarities and anomalies of the 
regional differentiation in antisemitism. Two non-regular cases are worth discussing: the 
peculiarity of the western and northern provinces and the anomaly of the Lubelskie 
province. It is also worthwhile analyzing the case of the Podkarpackie province, where 
the factors identified as key issues coincided with others and produced the highest 
antisemitism of all kinds in the country. 
The western and northern areas of today’s Poland have antisemitism below the 
country’s average but higher than in the neighboring provinces of the former Prussian 
partition, where it is the lowest. The western and northern territories belonged to Ger-
many and were granted to Poland in compensation for its war losses and the loss of its 
pre-war eastern areas to Russia. Before the war, there were few Jews and almost no 
Poles there. After the war, the remaining Germans were expelled and Poles from eastern 
and central Poland moved in. Given the fact that the migrants were coming from the 
areas of the densest Jewish settlement in Poland before the war, one might expect an 
average or above average amount of antisemitism, if the hypothesis of the socio-cultural 
inheritance of bad experiences, negative stereotypes, and prejudices were to be applied. 
However, the below average level of antisemitism of the first, second, and third genera-
tion of Polish migrants to the western and northern provinces illustrates how much 
migration and a new environment weaken the socio-cultural transmission of bad experi-
ences and negative stereotypes. 
The Lubelskie province, one of the three eastern provinces of the country that share 
many socio-economic characteristics,10 has antisemitism at the average level, like the 
central and southern provinces. There are several factors that appear to explain the 
positive anomaly of Lubelskie, as qualitative research has shown (e.g., the above-
mentioned focus group in Lublin, the capital city of the province). First and most impor-
tantly, the province’s religious leader, Archbishop Życiński, is a strong denouncer of 
antisemitism. He has condemned antisemitic statements by politicians and the media, 
including Catholic ones. On a more positive note, he ordered the inclusion of teaching 
on Judaism and Jewish history in the curriculum of seminaries. Following his example, 
priests-to-be, priests, and lay Catholics participate in rituals to commemorate the local 
                                                                                                                                                       
10  The three provinces are predominantly rural and economically underdeveloped, with poor 
infrastructure, low levels of education level, and high level of religion and conservatism. 
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Jews who perished in the Holocaust. The rituals involve reading psalms in Jewish 
cemeteries and (at the site of.) synagogues. Second, local enthusiasts, mostly devout lay 
Catholics, have established and developed non-governmental organizations whose 
objective is to preserve Jewish heritage. The best known is “Brama Grodzka” in the city 
of Lublin, but there are many similar organizations in the former shtetlekh of the Lubel-
skie province. Third, the Catholic University of Lublin, the only university of its kind in 
the country, at which Cardinal Wojtyła taught before he became Pope John Paul II and 
of which Archbishop Życiński is Great Chancellor, has contributed to greater levels of 
education among regional elites. Fourth, apart from receiving many school groups from 
the region to visit the site of the former extermination camps—the annihilation centers 
for the Jews of the area—the Majdanek Memorial and Museum and its Bełżec branch 
offer various kinds of educational programs to teachers and the young. The impact of 
these and other factors have resulted in a lower level of modern antisemitism than 
elsewhere in eastern Poland. 
The Podkarpackie province is the most antisemitic area of Poland from all perspec-
tives. Before the war, this area had a sizeable Jewish community that constituted a large 
proportion of its entire population. This facilitated the development of bad experiences, 
negative stereotypes, and prejudices that flourished, in particular, at times of severe 
economic hardship. During the 40 years of Communist rule, when Poles did not have 
much influence on politics, the inhabitants of the Podkarpackie province felt particularly 
alienated, as the agrarian parties that had represented them before the war were banned 
and their predominantly peasant social background did not qualify them to join the 
Communist Party. This alienation was fostered by the stereotype of żydokomuna—the 
opinion that the Jews ruled the Communist Party and had imposed communism in 
Poland. Today, the inherited antisemitic stereotypes and prejudices are sustained and 
developed through a combination of various factors, as qualitative research has shown 
(e.g., the focus group in Rzeszów, the capital city of the province). These factors include 
a relatively low assessment of one’s own economic situation and a perpetual feeling of 
little or no influence on politics.11 However, the most important influences prove to be 
those of the conservative clergy, particularly the leader of the local church, Archbishop 
Michalik, and of the extreme nationalist and often overtly antisemitic media outlets of 
Father Rydzyk—the Nasz Dziennik newspaper, Radio Maryja, and Trwam television. 
5. Qualitative results 
As a key component of the qualitative research, the participants of the focus group 
interviews were requested to comment on the survey questions that measured various 
kinds of antisemitism and, in particular, to elaborate on the concept of “Jew” in those 
questions.12 Here are the most striking of their comments. 
The “Jews in our country…” were understood as: “Polish-language politicians,” 
“Polish-language Jews who rule the country,” and “Poles who have Jewish roots” 
                                                                                                                                                       
11  The Law and Justice Party of Jarosław Kaczyński, which has been very popular in Podkar-
packie, lost the 2007 elections, and President Lech Kaczyński perished in an aircraft crash on April 
10, 2010. The ruling Civic Platform and its presidential candidate, now President Komorowski, 
were perceived as alien. 
12  The members of the focus groups were of course not informed that the survey measured 
antisemitism. 
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(Rzeszów). It was felt that the word “politicians” in power in Poland is synonymous 
with the word “Jews.” The adjective “Polish-language” was meant to downgrade the 
person concerned as barely Polish-speaking and even non-Polish. 
The “Jews [who] have too much influence in the world” were considered to be: “Jew-
ish upper class,” “Jewish oligarchs,” “not ordinary Jewish people,” and “Jews in banks 
in America” (Rzeszów). 
The statement of religious antisemitism, “Jews have so many troubles because God 
punished them for the crucifixion of Christ,” evoked a comment that shows that modern 
and religious kinds of antisemitism are related: 
Yes, Jews do not have their land. They did crucify Christ and said “his blood on us 
and on our offspring.” … And really, there are Jews all around the world and there-
fore they have influence on the politics of the whole world. (Rzeszów) 
The same religious antisemitic statement resulted in a quick and unanimous reply from 
the entire group in Kraków: “No! This is a heresy!” This group, although not fully free 
from modern antisemitism, proved to have internalized the teaching of the Second 
Vatican Council and the Polish Pope on religious antisemitism. 
The opinion that entailed post-Holocaust antisemitism, “it is good that as an effect of 
the Holocaust there are hardly any Jews in Poland,” was rejected by all groups. Asked 
why, a Kraków participant said: “Jews are humans and therefore one cannot say it is 
good that they perished.” A woman from the Rzeszów group commented: “John Paul II 
taught us that Jews are our elder brethren in faith.” Yet elsewhere during the interview 
the same person stated: “Poland was Jewish before the war. If the Jews had not perished 
at Auschwitz and at other annihilation camps, we would have still been under the 
influence of Jewry.” 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
There is a considerable amount of antisemitism in Poland, yet less than is commonly 
believed. Despite the shocking antisemitic comments that one may hear in Poland, the 
majority of Poles are not antisemitic in any meaning of the term. There are two distinct 
kinds of antisemitism in Poland: (a) modern antisemitism, consisting of the belief that 
Jews have too much influence in Poland’s politics, economy, and the media, as well as in 
the world; and (b) historical, including religious antisemitism, with its belief that the 
Jews are being punished for the crucifixion of Christ, and post-Holocaust antisemitism, 
expressed through the opinion that “it is good that as an effect of the Holocaust there are 
hardly any Jews in the country.” Antisemitism is differentiated according to various 
variables, with regional differentiation being the most interesting, as it reveals the 
impact of such factors as Jewish settlement before the war, socially inherited memories, 
stereotypes and prejudices, migration, and the positive or negative role of religious 
leaders and the Catholic media. The results of the 2010 research show a decline in all 
kinds of antisemitism and an increase in anti-antisemitism. Let us hope that one day 
there will be no antisemitic Poles at all. 
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Anti-Jewish “Propaganda” in Brazil 
under Dutch Occupation 
Daniela Levy* 
From 1580 to 1640, Portugal went through a period known as the Iberian Union. During 
this time, the King of Spain governed Portugal. Due to the establishment of repressive 
policies by King Felipe II of Spain against Holland, which had recently declared inde-
pendence from the Spanish crown, the commercial relationship between the Dutch and 
the Portuguese was damaged. Up to this point, Portugal had depended on Holland’s 
financial and technical assistance in the refining and trading of its share of Brazilian 
sugar production. After Felipe II ordered the confiscation of all Dutch ships anchored at 
port in his dominions across Europe, Africa, Asia, and America, the Dutch West India 
Company, in an attempt to minimize the losses caused by this crisis, decided to find a 
way to obtain sugar directly from the northeastern region of Brazil.1 
The Dutch tried to occupy Brazil twice, in 1624 and 1630. They were unsuccessful in 
their first attempt (Luso-Brazilian troops defeated the Dutch after a year), but in 1630 
they succeeded and occupied a large part of northeastern Brazil, where they remained 
for 24 years.2 
At the time of the occupation, Brazil was quite cosmopolitan, with multiple ethnic 
groups and cultures coexisting. Jews, eager to find a refuge in Brazil, arrived from 
countries such as Portugal, Spain, Poland, France, and England. They moved to Brazil 
hoping for freedom. They were eager to find a place to live, a community where neither 
their place of birth nor their religion would be a reason to marginalize them or treat 
them as pariahs. Additionally, Jews from Amsterdam already engaged in trade with the 
Dutch envisioned increased opportunities for financial growth in the newly-conquered 
                                                                                                                                                       
* Researcher, Laboratory for Studies on Intolerance, University of Sao Paulo. 
1 The Dutch West India Company was an enterprise of Dutch merchants founded in 1602 using 
both State and private capital. Its purpose was to expand Dutch economic power in America 
through the conquest of land and the accumulation of capital. The company’s many shareholders 
provided the financial capital to equip its ships. The company’s fleet and maintenance costs were 
jointly accounted, and investors received dividends in the form of profit per share based on the 
overall results of the company, thereby diluting the risks of each individual voyage. It was based on 
the same model established by the Dutch East India Company that operated in the Orient. Both 
companies integrated capital, armed force, and decision making power, dividing the risks and the 
profits in proportion to each individual investment. 
2 The Dutch conquered the regions of Pernambuco, Maranhão, Rio Grande do Norte, Paraíba, 
and Sergipe. Some areas were recaptured by Luso-Brazilian defense militias shortly after and others 
remained under Dutch occupation until 1654. 
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territories. Soon after they arrived in Pernambuco, the Portuguese-Dutch Jews estab-
lished a community similar to the Sephardic orthodox community of Amsterdam. 
During the 24-year Dutch occupation, Pernambuco experienced an extremely pros-
perous period, both culturally and materially. The religious tolerance that Holland 
extended across the northeast of Brazil created an opportunity for scientific research, 
literary production, and artistic creation to flourish. The Jews engaged in intense intel-
lectual activity under Dutch rule in Brazil and were able to build a synagogue, schools, 
and welfare agencies.3 
Jewish scholars, poets, and writers lived in Dutch Recife. They included the famed 
calligrapher Yehuda Machabeu and the rabbis Mosseh Rafael d’Aguillar and Isaac 
Aboab da Fonseca, both of whom wrote treatises in defense of equality among men. 
Daniel Levy, also known as Don Miguel de Barrios, a Portuguese from Holland, 
wrote poems based on the lives of Jews in the Brazilian colony. He dedicated a poem to 
an esteemed member of the Jewish community of Dutch Recife, Abraham Cohen.4 
As businessmen, the Jews played an important role in the establishment of new 
Dutch commercial enterprises in Brazil. This was mainly because the Sephardim, who 
arrived directly from Amsterdam, were familiar with both the Portuguese and Dutch 
languages, a fact that made them indispensable.5 
The directors of the Dutch West India Company indeed had a material interest in fa-
voring religious coexistence, but the cultural diversity of the population in northeastern 
Brazil did not always result in harmony between Catholics, Protestants, and Jews. 
Several documents from this period show that the various ethnic and religious groups 
did not always live together peacefully. Portuguese and Dutch chroniclers expressed 
antagonism, particularly against the Jews, their way of life, and their activities. 
The historiography of this period frequently stresses the religious tolerance and 
freedom that the Jews enjoyed in Recife. However, it is important to understand the 
social reality that caused conflict between Jews, Christians, and Calvinists. “Tolerance” 
was mandatory according to the Dutch West India Company, but competition among 
businessmen and merchants led to disagreements. 
During this period, Manoel Calado do Salvador, a Catholic friar who belonged to the 
Congregation of Serra d’Ossa of the Order of Saint Paul, expressed intense antisemitic 
feelings. In his book, entitled O Valoroso Lucidero e o Trinfo da Liberdade, written during 
the guerrilla war between Luso-Brazilian and Dutch troops (1645-1648), he described the 
city of Recife as “a true paradise before the arrival of the heretic Jews.” He accused the 
Jews of illicit gains, corruption, and rape, as well as other defamations of character. He 
wrote that the Jews transformed “Recife into a Sodom and Gomorrah.” 
Calado attacked Jews and New Christians (conversos) in many ways. One of his main 
accusations was the fact that some New Christians, along with the newly-arrived Jews 
from Holland, were trying to build a Jewish congregation. Since the New Christians 
were all baptized, they were deemed Catholic heretics as soon as they returned to 
Judaism and were circumcised. 
                                                                                                                                                       
3 See Arnald Wiznitzar, Os Judeus no Brasil Colonial, Ed. Pioneira, Sao Paulo, 1966, pp. 55-67; 
Charles Boxer, Os Holandeses no Brasil, 1624-1654, Sao Paulo, Cia. Editora nacional, 1961. 
4 Rabino Y. David Weitman, Bandeirantes Espirituais do Brasil—séc. XVII, Ed. Mayaanot, 2003, 
pp. 132-297. 
5 The Jewish community of Amsterdam was formed at the end of the 16th century by Portu-
guese refugees from the Inquisition. 
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Calado also condemned the dissimulating character of the New Christians. He wrote 
that they were betraying Portugal, as many seized the opportunity to return to old 
Jewish traditions, associating themselves with the Amsterdam Jews to obtain economic 
advantages.6 The Catholic friar made it known that, in his opinion, the New Christians 
and Jews were getting rich very fast and without effort, becoming sugar mill owners and 
profiting from the best opportunities in the region.7 
The Christian merchants accused the Jews and New Christians of greed, with the 
knowledge that their ability to speak both Dutch and Portuguese helped them in their 
commercial enterprises.8 Friar Calado took advantage of these complaints and trans-
formed his sermons into diatribes against the Jews.9 
At this point, the old stereotypes and anti-Jewish myths that had existed since medi-
eval times took root in Pernambuco; accusations of corruption and fraud gave Jews a 
bad reputation that did not correspond to reality. 
After 1645, the Luso-Brazilian militia reorganized and began to exercise leadership in 
the fight to regain control over the Dutch occupiers. In August, a ship laden with cargo 
belonging to Dutch merchants and three Jews left Itamaracá island for Recife and sunk 
near Pau Amarelo, a region that had been conquered by the militia. Four merchants 
were arrested and sent to Bahia. One Jew managed to escape, but the other two Jewish 
merchants were held and later sentenced to death by hanging. As baptized Christians, 
they were given the right to receive Christian instruction before being executed. It is at 
this point that the stigmas of heresy and treason became confused. They were to die for 
treason to the homeland (collaborating with the Dutch). However, they would also die 
as Christians. Manuel Calado had been granted the mission to “remove the blindness by 
which the Jews led their lives.” He was overjoyed because, according to him, he was 
able to confuse the Jews and eventually made them declare themselves to be happy in 
the belief that their souls would be saved by Jesus who, in his mercy, would take them 
out of the hell they were living. Of course, in the end, they were both hanged.10 
Over many years, several historians leveled accusations against the Jews as traitors 
and collaborators with the Dutch. However, by the end of the 1970s, research conducted 
by Anita Novinsky demonstrated that many New Christians remained loyal to the 
Portuguese in the war to repossess the territory. There are many examples of such 
loyalty. Two masters of the sugar works, Diogo Lopes Ulhoa and Diogo da Serra, helped 
to defend the territory during the Dutch invasion of Bahia by building forts and trenches. 
                                                                                                                                                       
6 Some New Christians submitted themselves to circumcision when they returned to Judaism. 
Among them were Gaspar Francisco do Costa, Baltazar da Fonseca and his son Vasco Fernandes 
Brandão, and his sons Miguel Rodrigues Mendes, Simão do Vale Fonseca and Simão Drago. See 
Padre Manuel Calado, O Valoroso Lucideno e o Triunfo da Liberdade, Vol. 1, Belo Horizonte, Itatiaia, 
Sao Paulo, EDUSP, 1987, p. 101; Wiznitzer, op. cit. n. 3, at p. 51. 
7 Calado, op. cit. n. 6, at p. 101: “Todavia, depois que os holandeses a ganharam (Recife), (os 
judeus) haviam tirado o rebuço com que andavam encobertos, e se circuncidaram, e declarara por 
judeus publicamente, e estes tinham muitas fazendas de raiz na terra, mancomunaram-se uns com 
os outros, e prevaleceram e se fizeram senhor de engenho … e apoderando-se do melhor da terra … 
se circuncidaram com grande escândalo do povo cristão….” 
8 Ibid., at p. 117. 
9 Ibid., at p. 48. 
10  Padre Manuel Calado, O Valoroso Lucideno e o Triunfo da Liberdade, Vol. 2, Belo Horizonte, 
Itatiaia, Sao Paulo, EDUSP, 1987, pp. 81-83. 
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Others, such as Domingos Alvarez de Serpa and Matheus Lopes Franco, joined a special 
commission that was part of the Governor’s plan to raise funds for the purpose of 
recovering Pernambuco from Dutch occupation. Twenty-seven of the 180 donors (15 
percent) were New Christians.11 
The Dutch West India Company sent Count Maurice of Nassau to Recife in 1636 to 
govern the new colony. The two Portuguese who received him, João Fernandes Vieira 
and Gaspar Dias Ferreira, both wanted to establish grounds for coexistence between the 
local inhabitants and the new conquerors. According to Friar Calado, when the Old 
Christian João Fernandes Vieira approached Maurice of Nassau, he had the noble 
intention of guaranteeing the safety of the inhabitants.12 On the other hand, according to 
Friar Calado, the New Christian Gaspar Dias Ferreira personified the stereotype of a 
“traitor Jew,” as he was only concerned with his own interests, eager to get rich at the 
cost of “the inhabitants blood.” In Calado’s words, he saw in the “friendship with 
Maurice of Nassau many opportunities to become illegally rich.” Calado accused him of 
embezzling crates of sugar that were to be offered as a gift to the Count by the masters 
of the sugar works. When judging the characters of João Fernandes Vieira and Gaspar 
Dias Ferreira, Manuel Calado explicitly took their origins into consideration.13 The 
Jewish collaboration with the Dutch in the conquest of northeastern Brazil is a myth, 
constructed with the help of Friar Manuel Calado, which was subsequently passed on to 
future generations by historians.14 
The animosity of the Calvinists toward the Jews was mainly due to commercial 
competition but always came with an alleged religious pretext. Some Calvinist ideolo-
gists that had planned the conquest of northeastern Brazil supported the idea that 
religion should go together with arms in defense of the land granted by God.15 
Constant complaints by leaders of the Dutch Reformed Church were sent to the 
Governor of the Dutch West India Company in annual reports. They complained about 
the “arrogance” of the Jews and their dishonesty in trade. They also expressed concern 
over the danger of mixed marriages between Jews and Christians.16 
As a result of these complaints and pressure from the Calvinist clergy under Maurice 
of Nassau’s government, the two synagogues in Recife were closed for a short period.17 
They were only given permission to reopen after the Jews promised not to carry out any 
rituals that could be considered too “noisy,” such as the religious celebrations of Simchat 
Torah and Purim.18 
                                                                                                                                                       
11  Anita Novinsky, A Historical Bias: The New Christians Contribution to the Dutch Invaders of Bra-
zil (17 Century), Fifth World Congress of Jewish Studies, 1972, pp. 141-154. 
12  João Fernandes Vieira subsequently became a leader of the resistance against the Dutch oc-
cupation. 
13  Calado, op. cit n. 6, at p. 102. 
14  The main accusation that Calado makes about the Jews is that they were traitors to the home-
land. Ibid., at pp. 48 and 51. 
15  José Antônio Gonsalves de Melo, Gente da Nação, Ed. Massangana, Recife, 1996, p. 205. 
16  Hermann Waetjen, “A Egreja no Brasil Holandês” (The Church in Dutch Brazil), in O 
Domínio Colonial holandês no Brasil (The Dutch Colonial Domination in Brazil), Rio de Janeiro, CEN, 
1938, pp. 350-353. 
17  The synagogues remained closed from January 5 to January 10, 1638. 
18  During the celebration of Simchat Torah and Purim, Jews sing and dance with joy. See 
Wiznitzer, op. cit. n. 3, at pp 64-65. 
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A report sent to the Dutch West India Company in 1641 accused the Jews of domi-
nating the sugar trade and professing their faith in public places. The Protestant clergy 
and the Christian merchants both requested in their reports that Jews should be prohib-
ited from participating in auctions and becoming civil servants or tax-collectors.19 
Demands for further ostracism of the Jews were made on a continuous basis. The 
Protestant clergy often cited the restrictions imposed upon Jews in other countries, such 
as the requirement to wear a badge on their clothes, or a red hat, or a yellow insignia on 
their chest to identify them, in order to prevent them from cheating or robbing Chris-
tians. Perhaps the most anti-Jewish complaint of all can be found in the following words:  
everyone knew of the methods used by the sons of Judah, who lied, fooled, and used 
false means that made competition difficult for Christians who do not resort to such 
treachery. … Because of their usury practices towards farmers, they are a true plague 
in Brazilian lands. Brazil belongs to Christians and not the damned sons and daugh-
ters of Israel who desecrate the name of Jesus. The Israelites are not needed here; 
Christians are able to do what they do!20 
The Dutch West India Company regarded the Jews who came from Amsterdam as 
important political allies, given its interest in intensifying the import and export trade. In 
addition, the company could not take any drastic action against them, such as agreeing 
to the request to exclude them from the retail business, due to the influence of its Jewish 
shareholders. Therefore, the only measures that were taken included prohibiting the 
construction of a new synagogue and imposing economic restrictions, such as the rule 
that two-thirds of brokers had to be Christians. 
Maurice of Nassau became aware of the growing conflict. He advocated religious 
freedom for all inhabitants in the belief that tolerance could only benefit the Dutch 
government. He believed that taking a hard line against religious groups would only 
increase the chances of a revolt. Calvinist ministers, however, pressured him into issuing 
statements that were unfavorable toward Jews.21 
The tolerance that Maurice of Nassau manifested was deeply appreciated by the Jew-
ish community. In 1642, knowing that the Count had to return to Amsterdam, Jewish 
representatives offered him a sum of money for each year that he prolonged his term of 
office so that he would remain as governor in Brazil. 
The concerns of the Jewish leadership in Amsterdam were borne out by the fact that a 
Calvinist Synod was established in Recife in 1642 by bishops from the Reformed Church. 
The Synod had executive and deliberative power over all matters related to the internal 
organization and moral behavior of the population of Dutch Brazil. They advised the 
government authorities to use coercive or punitive measures in those cases judged to be 
scandalous and deserving of censorship or punishment. Judgment and punishment were 
regulated by a civil court at the request of the civil or religious authorities.22 
                                                                                                                                                       
19  Ibid., at p. 64. The sugar mills (engenhos) that had been left behind by the Luso-Brazilians 
during the conquest of the land by the Dutch were auctioned off. At these auctions, it was possible 
to acquire a sugar mill at a price below its market value. 
20  Waetjen, op. cit. n. 16, at pp. 350-353. 
21  Wiznitzer, op. cit. n. 3, at p. 66. 
22  João Henrique Santos, “A Inquisição Calvinista—O Sínodo do Brasil e os judeus no Brasil 
Holandês” (The Calvinist Inquisition—The Synod and the Jews in Dutch Brazil), in Angelo Faria de 
Assis, Nara M. C. Santana and Ronaldo S.P. Alves (eds.), Desvelando o Poder—Histórias de Estado, 
DANIELA LEVY 324 
The Synod’s main concerns regarding moral behavior centered on five issues: the 
marital situation of couples living in concubinage; prostitution; concerns relating to 
invocations, blasphemies, heresies, and apostasies; transgression of the Sabbath by Jews 
and slaves; and freedom of religion for Jews and Catholics. 
Notwithstanding the installation of the Synod in Brazil in 1642, the Class Assem-
blies—the name given to the meetings between the Dutch colonial government and the 
representatives of the Reformed Church—had discussed issues related to the Jews since 
1637. Repeated criticism arose in these meetings over the freedom of Jewish worship, the 
“scandalous” Jewish religious practices, and the unfair competition in business dealings. 
In the same year that the Synod was created in Pernambuco, a new set of regulations 
was created for all Jews. Under these regulations, Jewish men would have been prohib-
ited from marrying Christian women and children of mixed marriages in which the 
mother was Jewish would have been raised by Christian parents. However, the leaders 
of the Jewish community spoke to the directors of the Dutch West India Company and 
the resolutions of the Synod were never put into practice.23 
Trials against Jews were rare. The only known case was of a Jewish woman in 
Paraíba, part of the territory occupied by the Dutch, who was accused of “sacrilege,” in 
that she had spoken out against the name of “our Savior Jesus Christ and the Holy 
Baptism.” The Synod concluded that the case was not serious and that the woman 
showed promise of being converted, as she had started to attend church frequently.24 
A ferocious anti-Jewish attack came from a Calvinist bishop named Vicente Joaquim 
Soler, who rendered services to the Dutch West India Company. In several letters, he 
accused the Jews of “sucking the blood of the people,” “stealing the Company,” and 
benefiting from “privileges that hurt Christian merchants.”25 These letters also reveal the 
Calvinists’ deep concerns over the increase of the Jewish population. With the continu-
ous influx of Jews from Holland and the increase in their birth rate, they could have 
become the majority group in the region.26 
The reconversion of many New Christians to Judaism also raised concerns in anti-
Jewish circles. In 1641, an Escolteto (a post combining the duties of a district attorney and 
a police officer) by the name of Paulo Antônio Daems requested that Gaspar Francisco 
da Costa, a rich New Christian, be banned from trading and his assets confiscated 
because he had reconverted to Judaism and submitted himself to circumcision.27 
Among the various demonstrations of antisemitism in Pernambuco, there is the case 
of a Jew, accused of blasphemy, who was tortured and killed by a mob inflamed by the 
speeches of priests. The Jewish community of Amsterdam, always aware of what was 
                                                                                                                                                       
Religião e Sociedade (Power Revelation—Stories about the State, Religion, and Society), Ed. Vício de 
Leitura, Niterói, Rio de Janeiro, 2007, pp. 107-124. 
23  Ibid., at p. 121. 
24  Wiznitzer, op. cit. n. 3, at p. 55. 
25  Brasil Holandês: Dezessete cartas de Vicente Joaquim Soler (Dutch Brazil: Seventeen Letters of 
Joaquim Soler), Ed. Index, Rio de Janeiro, 1999. 
26  On February 5, 1638, two ships—De Soutcas and Graeuw Paert— arrived in Recife from Am-
sterdam with 200 Jews, led by Manuel Mendes de Crasto (Manuel Nehemias), on board. See José 
Antônio Gonsalves de Melo, Gente da Nação, Ed. Massangana, Recife, 1996, p. 223. 
27  Daems’ duties were of an executive nature, and he also appointed judges. For several years, 
he was also general secretary of the government of Maurice of Nassau, having demonstrated on 
many occasions his aversion toward the Jewish people. 
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going on in Brazil, reacted with indignation and accused the Dutch government of 
Recife of supporting the persecution of Jews. They also complained that the Escabinos 
(lay members of a mixed court) of Mauricia should have let this case be tried by the 
Council of Justice, as they did in Holland for cases of blasphemy. They argued that the 
Escabinos lacked standing to judge this matter.28 
Several attempts were made to prevent Jews from practicing their religion freely. 
However, when the Ecclesiastic Council of the Calvinists decided that the two syna-
gogues should be closed again, the Jewish community of Recife contacted the Council of 
the Elders (Sanhedrin) in Amsterdam, who wrote a petition in 1645 to request that no 
distinction be made between Jews and Christians in the Dutch colonies. In reply to this 
petition, a document entitled Patente Honrosa (Honorable Patent) was addressed to the 
Supreme Council of Brazil and the Governor. As a result, both synagogues remained 
open, and the Jews were able to continue their religious practices.29 
Antisemitism flourished vigorously in the economic realm. Several episodes reveal 
that competition and business disagreements led to discrimination against the Jews. 
Moisés Abendana, a sugar trader who had debts with several Dutch creditors (amount-
ing to 12 florins), was found hanged under mysterious circumstances. The authorities 
concluded that he had committed suicide. The Council chamber of the Escabinos, led by 
Escolteto Daems, forbade his burial and determined that his body be displayed hanging 
as an example of the dishonesty of the Jews. The Jewish community leaders of Recife 
went to Governor Maurice of Nassau to defend the honor of Abendana, claiming that he 
was a victim of murder. In an attempt to avoid humiliation, they offered to pay Aben-
dana’s debt plus a bonus for the inconvenience created by the incident. When the Gov-
ernor declined their offer, they went directly to the creditors. On receiving the money, 
the creditors allowed the burial to take place.30 
The Portuguese continually tried to reconquer the lost territory, and in 1645 the Luso-
Brazilians organized an insurrection. The Dutch reinforced their defenses while simultane-
ously becoming stricter in religious matters. Jews were accused of not respecting the Sabbath 
by working and opening their schools. Christians began to insult Jews in the street.31 
The period of the Dutch occupation of Brazil in the 17th century was one of the few 
times when Jewish life flourished at this time in history. However, it only lasted for a 
short period, and it cannot be said that it was entirely free of anti-Jewish feeling. In 1654, 
when the Dutch were forced to leave Brazil, the relative freedom of the Jews ended.32 
The Jews left with the Dutch, only to experience new difficulties in the Caribbean and 
back in Amsterdam. 
                                                                                                                                                       
28  de Melo, op. cit. n. 26, at p. 269. The Council of the Escabinos was a chamber of magistrates, 
the position of judge was an elected office, and any person was eligible. The chamber was presided 
over by an Escolteto. 
29  de Melo, op. cit n. 26, at p. 254. 
30  Wiznitzer, op. cit. n. 3, at p. 76; Santos, op. cit. n. 22, at pp. 120-122. 
31  de Melo, op. cit n. 26, at p. 305. 
32  In 1648, the Dutch experienced the beginning of their defeat in Brazil, when their territories 
were reduced to the shores of Pernambuco. A big battle in proximity to Recife, in Guararapes, 
marked the end of the Dutch occupation in Brazil. At the beginning of 1654, the war between Dutch 
and Portuguese troops ended with a capitulation agreement according to which the Dutch would 
have three months to leave the area. See Jacob R. Marcus, The Colonial American Jew, Vol. 1, Wayne 
State University Press, Detroit, 1970, p. 209. 
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Antisemitism According to Victor Klemperer 
Miriam Oelsner.* 
People of Abraham, fighting against obstacles of all kinds are working their way upwards to 
humanity.1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
… Nazism permeated the flesh and blood of the people through single words, idioms 
and sentence structures which were imposed on them in a million repetitions and 
taken on board mechanically and unconsciously. Words can be like tiny doses of ar-
senic: they are swallowed unnoticed, appear to have no effect, and then after a little 
time the toxic reaction sets in after all.2 
Victor Klemperer (1881-1960) was born in Germany to a Jewish family and later became 
an outstanding specialist of French literature.3 As a full professor of Latin letters at 
Dresden Technical University from 1920, he had strong ties to the works of Montes-
quieu, Voltaire, and Diderot. He was impregnated with the “illuminist” way of thinking, 
and his free-faculty thesis was about Montesquieu, under the advisement of Karl 
Vossler, dean of Munich University.4 Klemperer spent the early years of his career in 
Munich, where one of his colleagues, also advised by Vossler, was another famous 
Latinist, Erich Auerbach, the author of Mimesis. 
The importance of speaking about Victor Klemperer in the context of antisemitism 
relates to his analysis of the totalitarian Nazi regime, after he and his wife spent the 
twelve years of terror in Germany. It has to be said that this analysis was essentially 
oriented toward language, since Klemperer had discovered that language was a very 
powerful weapon used by the Nazi terror. The Nazis manipulated language with the 
general purpose of embedding the Nazi ideology and the particular purpose of dissemi-
nating antisemitism among the German people. 
So, what is this analysis? Why did Klemperer and his wife stay in Germany instead 
of leaving the country as most Jews did? To answer these questions, it is important to 
know more about him. 
                                                                                                                                                       
* University of Sao Paulo. 
1 Published about the Jewish Emancipation in the German magazine Sulamith in 1811. 
2 Victor Klemperer, The Language of the Third Reich: LTI, Lingua Tertii Imperii: A Philologist’s 
Notebook, translated by Martin Brady (London, Continuum 2002) p. 15 (hereinafter, LTI.). 
3 According to the Brockhaus Encyclopedia of 1925. 
4 Vossler was a contemporary of the Italian philosopher, historian, and politician Benedetto 
Croce, with whom he maintained close cultural contact. 
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2. ABOUT VICTOR KLEMPERER 
Klemperer was a true representative of the dream of so many Jews, ever since the Jewish 
Emancipation was promoted in Germany by Moses Mendelssohn at the end of the 18th 
century, to be accepted by the German society. 
This had also been the dream of his parents, for whom he was the ninth and last 
child. As emigrants from the Prague ghetto, they settled down in Breslau, now Wroclaw 
(Poland), where his father, Wilhelm Klemperer, earned a doctorate in Jewish philosophy 
and theology. He became a rabbi, initially in small communities and ultimately at the 
Reformist Synagogue in Berlin. It is therefore not entirely surprising that three of his 
four sons converted to Lutheranism, taking into account that the Reformist ritual was 
relatively close to Lutheranism. His four daughters did not have enough autonomy for 
attitudes of this kind. Nevertheless, Klemperer’s mother is known to have been fairly 
advanced for her times as far as her Bildung (cultural education) was concerned. The 
whole family had the burning wish to be a part of the German society. They craved a 
kind of Jewish-German syncretism, associated with the concept of Bildung expressed by 
the German Jewish poets and writers Heinrich Heine (1797-1856) and Berthold Auer-
bach (1812-1882). According to George Lachmann Mosse (1918-2001), the German Jews’ 
search for Bildung was related to a search for a personal identity beyond the boundaries 
of religion and nationality.5 
The new ways of thinking about and organizing society represented a rupture with 
the traditional Jewish concept of a “nation in exile,” insofar as they would make it 
possible to include the Jews in the German nation. Berthold Auerbach used to say that 
“the old religious life started from Revelation, whereas the new one would start from 
Bildung.” 
Victor Klemperer had a strong connection to the spirit of the French Revolution, the 
Century of Lights, and the ideas of liberté, égalite, fraternité, which led his professional life 
toward the Latin letters, of which he became a full professor at the University of Dres-
den in 1920. He lost this position in 1935 upon the advent of the anti-Jewish Nuremberg 
Laws. Given his domestic environment, which was devoted to modernity and primarily 
oriented toward the aforementioned concept of Bildung, Klemperer avoided any contact 
with National Socialism, with its retrograde and racist mentality. He saw it as an exoge-
nous epidemic that would be unable to survive in “his” Germany. Nazism was a perfect 
combination of a diabolical rationality at the service of the utmost irrationality. 
National Socialism grew stronger and stronger before people’s very eyes, at the same 
time as it promoted the full-scale destruction of the incipient yet already decadent 
Weimar Republic. A great part of the German population did not accept the Weimar 
Republic, as they were nostalgic for the power of the Empire and the assumed protection 
of the Kaiser. Even after reading Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf, Klemperer was unable to 
believe that “his” Germany would let itself be infected by the virus of fascist totalitarian-
ism. In his posthumous book Geschichte eines Deutschen,6 Sebastian Haffner explains that 
it was inevitable that some false messiahs would appear at the height of German hyper-
                                                                                                                                                       
5 George L. Mosse, German Jews Beyond Judaism (Cincinnati, Hebrew Union College Press 1985) 
p. 2. 
6 Sebastian Haffner, Geschichte eines Deutschen (A German’s Story), 8th ed. (München, Deutsche 
Verlags Anstallt 2001). 
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inflation. Hitler was only one of them. That explains why he was initially not taken 
seriously when Mein Kampf, the only book he ever wrote, was published in 1925, expos-
ing his racist and antisemitic way of thinking. 
The foundations of nationalist, racist, and totalitarian thinking aimed at preserving 
the “purity of Northern Aryan blood” against the “Jewish Bolshevist democratic interna-
tionalism” date back to this period, which marked the beginning of the struggle between 
the Übermensch (the Aryan) and the Untermensch (the inferior Jew). 
Klemperer and his wife Eva Schlemmer, a Lutheran pianist, chose not to leave Ger-
many despite the increasing Nazi influence. A great number of university professors 
joined Hitlerism. Klemperer’s professional environment became extremely dark. His 
brother George, a famous doctor, and his cousin Otto, the famous maestro, emigrated 
from Germany to the United States in the early 1930s, while Victor Klemperer was 
eventually forced into confinement at Dresden during the twelve years of terror from 
1933 to 1945. He was first allowed to stay in his home, but from 1940 onward he had to 
stay in one of the three well-known Judenhäuser (Jews’ houses). He stayed there until 
February 1945, when Dresden was bombed by the Allies, which miraculously and 
paradoxically made it easier for the Klemperers to escape. They therefore survived the 
Shoah, just like his “Diaries,” which had been hidden thanks to his wife’s courage. She 
had entrusted them for safekeeping to the equally brave Dr. Annemarie Köhler, a doctor 
with whom they were friends. 
According to Peter Gay, Klemperer is one of the most important German diarists. 
His notes on the Nazi period are one of the fundamental documents of the testimonial 
literature, as Elie Wiesel described it. In the immediate aftermath of the war, he was 
asked by a Dresden editor to publish them, yet he chose to write a new book in which he 
would present testimony on everything he had experienced from the viewpoint of the 
professor, the educator, the sociopolitical analyst, the philologist, the etymologist, the 
historian, the thinker, the philosopher, the Jew persecuted by racism, and, finally, the 
“survivor.” Klemperer was aware of the fact that this book would be the first step in his 
attempt to understand what this terrible, malignant phenomenon called Nazism had 
been. His basic question was whether the roots of Nazism could have been truly Ger-
man, as shown by his analysis in Chapter 21: “German Roots” of the book. 
He also wondered about the role of fanaticism and the fundamental role played by 
the Jews with regard to Nazism, as he explains in Chapter 26: “The Jewish War”: 
The Jew is the most important person in Hitler’s state: he is the best known Turk’s 
head of folk history and the popular scapegoat, the most plausible adversary, the 
most obvious common denominator, the most likely brackets around the most diverse 
of factors. Had the Führer really achieved his aim of exterminating all the Jews, he 
would have had to invent new ones, because without the Jewish devil—“anyone who 
doesn’t know the Jew doesn’t know the devil”—without the swarthy Jew, there 
would never have been the radiant figure of the Nordic Teuton.7 
Klemperer’s “Diaries” were only published after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1995. 
The book Klemperer published in Berlin in 1947, LTI—Lingua Tertii Imperii: Notizbuch 
eines Philologen, based on his “Diaries” written during the Nazi period, attracted little 
                                                                                                                                                       
7 Klemperer, LTI, supra note 2, at p. 274. 
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interest. The survivors were concerned with finding food and getting a roof over their 
heads, as well as with finding their scattered relatives and retrieving their former jobs. 
But there was actually much more at stake. Nobody wanted to hear about the atrocities 
that had been committed, let alone in the form of a book. Everybody wanted to hide 
from the facts and deny their participation.  
There were people who came to Klemperer to ask him for a letter stating that they 
had not taken part in anything, so that they could regain their place in society. He 
refused them all. If everybody denied their participation in the whole tragedy, then who 
had been the executioners? 
Had he only published his “Diaries,” there would have been even less interest. While 
he was writing them, he never knew if he would still be alive the next day. Most of the 
people who belonged to Klemperer and his wife’s circle succumbed, either in the exter-
mination camps or by suicide. Klemperer’s “Diaries” are among the most tragic books 
ever written. Besides hunger, illnesses, deportations, and murders, they show the 
cynicism and cruelty of the Nazi regime toward the Jews, the few remaining opponents 
of the regime, and some Catholic priests. It is frightening. There were cases, for instance, 
when the authorities sent an explanation for the death of one of the inhabitants of a 
Judenhaus in a camp, along with a small funeral urn, stating that the cause of death was 
an MI (myocardial infarction). Klemperer wrote that they would even allow burials, 
with the recital of kaddish and a sermon, but not without countless cynical acts. As the 
number of deaths increased during the war, the urns were no longer sent. 
3. THE IMPORTANCE OF KLEMPERER’S NOTES 
The analysis of Nazi speech in Victor Klemperer’s LTI is fundamental to our under-
standing of how totalitarianism is imposed on people, because it is an in-depth study of 
the fascist mental structure.8 It starts with an examination of how the German language 
was manipulated by those in power between 1933 and 1945. Many researchers of the 
National Socialist period have used LTI in their work, including the German writer 
Martin Walser (1927), the French historian Jean-Pierre Faye (1925), Professor Steve E. 
Aschheim of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem,9 George L. Mosse (1918-2001), Ritchie 
Robertson of Oxford University, Renato Lessa of Rio de Janeiro, Paola Traverso of the 
Free University of Berlin, and others. They all regard Klemperer as the pioneer of the 
study of totalitarian language. To Aschheim, for example, Hannah Arendt’s Men in Dark 
Times would have been immeasurably enriched by Klemperer’s LTI, which appeared in 
1947.10 As to why this was not in fact the case, he provides the answer himself: Hannah 
Arendt did not know Victor Klemperer. 
Anne Frank’s diary and Klemperer’s “Diaries” and LTI are different to other testi-
monial literature, because they were written outside the concentration camps. This kind 
of narrative presents other perspectives on the true life of Jews in an urban environment. 
For instance, the Klemperers were able to stay together, in contrast to most survivors of 
the extermination camps, who lost all their loved ones. The tragic end of Anne Frank is 
                                                                                                                                                       
8 According to the Brockhaus Encyclopedia of 1995. 
9 Steve E. Aschheim, “Victor Klemperer and the Shock of Multiple Identities,” Scholem, Arendt, 
Klemperer: Intimate Chronicles in Turbulent Times (Cincinnati, Hebrew Union College Press 2001) p. 70. 
10  Ibid., p. 71. 
ANTISEMITISM ACCORDING TO VICTOR KLEMPERER 331 
not in her diary. Another statement by Aschheim, quoting the work of Paola Traverso,11 
argues that Klemperer’s LTI and “Diaries” are read so much because they provide the 
reader with a happy ending, since the couple ultimately survived. 
To write LTI, Klemperer deconstructed the new language of Nazism. He sensed from 
the beginning of the Nazi regime that the German language was undergoing a change 
and named it lingua tertii imperii—the language of the Third Reich. He discovered that it 
was a manipulated language, aimed at preventing the population from thinking for 
itself, as those who think do not let others manipulate them. He thus got to the heart of 
the language manipulation developed by Goebbels, the Nazi propaganda minister. It 
was a language very poor in vocabulary and content, due to the use of vulgarizing 
commonplaces that erased the subtleties and complexity of culture. It was meant to 
reduce the capacity to think and prevent critical analysis. The spoken and written 
language were very similar to each other, always formulated in a declamatory, artificial, 
and easily memorized style, devoid of any ethics. While working on this mental impov-
erishment, Goebbels also targeted the innermost essence of any human being: faith. He 
went to great efforts to influence people to surrender—body and soul—to the totalitari-
an regime that would provide them with all they might need by worshipping Hitler, the 
Führer. Goebbels used every available method to convince the population, including the 
Nazi party’s newspaper, radio broadcasts, speeches, military exhibitions, and parades, 
as well as the terror of constant murders and arrests—a diabolical combination of 
seduction and coercion. 
Whether or not the roots of Nazism are typically German is another question that 
permeates the entire book. Klemperer considers this issue at length. Irrationalism leads 
to the destruction of reason. It is the perfect combination of a diabolic rationality at the 
service of the utmost irrationality. In Chapter 21: “German Roots,” he indulges in blunt 
auto-criticism: 
How was the terrible disparity possible between contemporary Germany and every 
single period of Germany’s past? I had always found the traits éternels, the abiding 
features of a national character of which the French speak, to be born out in practice, 
or at least that’s what I believed, and I had always stressed them in my own work. 
Was it all wrong? Was there any intellectual connection between the Germans of the 
Age of Goethe and the people who supported Adolf Hitler?12 
4. GERMAN ANTISEMITISM 
With the rise of the Bavarian Illuminati in the late 18th and early 19th century, more and 
more demonstrations of antisemitism began to occur in Germany. After the Napoleonic 
wars and those conducted by Bismarck, after poor crops and other adverse events in the 
German economy, antisemitism gained currency. The Jews had entered the labor mar-
ket, the universities, and the most cultivated and competitive circles of society. By the 
end of the 19th century, the German antisemitic party was founded. Heinrich von 
Treitschke, a prestigious history professor at the University of Berlin, a prominent 
                                                                                                                                                       
11  Paolo Traverso, “Victor Klemperers Deutschlandbild—Ein jüdisches Tagebuch?” in Deutsch-
landbilder: Tel-Aviv Jahrbuch für Deutsche Geschichte, Vol. 26 (1997) pp. 307-44. 
12  Ibid., p. 129. 
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antisemite, and the author of the famous sentence “die Juden sind unser Unglück” (the 
Jews are our misfortune), was a major disseminator of antisemitism. In 1893, the Central-
verein Deutscher Staatsbürger Jüdischen Glaubens, a Jewish association for the defense of 
the Jews’ civil rights, was founded in Berlin, and braches were later established in 
several other German cities. During its entire existence, until the Kristallnacht of Novem-
ber 1938, the members of the Centralverein were able to have more than 500 people 
arrested for having committed antisemitic acts. The strengthening of antisemitism, the 
rise of ultra-rightist parties, and exacerbated nationalism all began after Germany lost 
World War I. The confluence of all these negative factors deserves a whole separate 
study. 
Klemperer’s importance has grown in the years leading up to the 50th anniversary of 
his death in 1960. In August 2010, a conference entitled “Le langage totalitaire d’hier à 
aujourd’hui. En hommage à Victor Klemperer” was held in his honor in Normandy 
(France), in the presence of the renowned historian Jean-Pierre Faye, the author of 
Totalitarian Languages and other works. 
5. THE EUPHEMISMS 
Much has already been written about the euphemisms created by the senior hierarchy of 
the Nazi regime. Klemperer exposed many of these half-truths. He wrote not only about 
these euphemisms but also about the ability to generate preconceptions, create stigmas, 
and turn into normal what is abnormal and inhuman. In LTI, for example, he analyses 
the stigma created by the obligation for Jews to add the names “Sara” or “Israel” to their 
names, the stigma of the “yellow star,” which isolated the Jews from the rest of the 
population, the boycott against Jewish businesses, and the cities “sanitized” of Jews, 
with signs announcing that a particular place, park bench, or building was judenrein 
(Jew-free). Klemperer comments on how the population started to see this procedure as 
“normal.” Persons who were unaware of his Jewish origins came to him to declare the 
“disgust” they felt for Jews. 
Klemperer’s notes on euphemisms and paraphrases give his book a special signifi-
cance. In recognition of that fact, Professor Hannes Heer of Hamburg University pro-
duced Im Herzen der Finsternis (In the Heart of Darkness), a book in which eleven 
professors comment on interesting paraphrases noted by Klemperer and quoted by 
those who studied his work. In this book, the authors make special mention of the 
comments of Professor David Bankier, who was also a Klemperer scholar. 
After the fall of the Berlin Wall, all the literature of the former DDR (German Demo-
cratic Republic) surfaced. This included Klemperer’s two books, which caused an actual 
frenzy upon their (re)launch. During a visit to Sao Paulo in 2002, David Bankier, then 
Director of the Yad Vashem International Research Institute, explained that people 
wanted to read Klemperer because he mentioned all those who helped him and his wife. 
This is in addition to the fact that, as Leopold von Ranke wrote, he told everything as it 
actually happened (“wie es eigentlich gewesen”). 
George Steiner,13 another linguist, wrote the following about Victor Klemperer’s LTI: 
                                                                                                                                                       
13  George Steiner, “The Hollow Miracle,” Language and Silence: Essays on Language, Literature, 
and the Inhuman, 10th ed., translated by Gilda Stuart and Felipe Rajabally (Sao Paulo, Cia. das Letras 
1988) p. 134. 
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The [Nazi] language no longer stimulates thinking, but confuses it. Instead of charg-
ing each expression with the greatest available energy and lack of circumlocutions, it 
loosens and disperses the intensity of sentiment. The language ceases to be an adven-
ture (and a living language is the greatest adventure the human brain is capable of .). 
In summary, the language is no longer experienced; it is only spoken. 
… 
As I republish this essay, I do it also because I believe in the validity of its argument. 
When I wrote it, I did not know Victor Klemperer’s remarkable book “Notes of a phi-
lologist”, published in East Berlin in 1947. … In a much more detailed way than I did, 
Klemperer, a professional linguist, outlines the submission of German to the Nazi 
slang and the linguistic-historical priors of this submission. 
6. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS 
After the Nazi experience, Klemperer’s attitude changed. He realized that he had also 
been a German with a feeling of national superiority. As he used to say, he believed in 
the traits éternels (eternal features) of each people. However, experiencing and surviving 
racial prejudice showed him how wrong this was.  
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Antisemitic Anti-Zionism Within 
the German Left—Die Linke 
Sebastian Voigt* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This essay analyzes the antisemitic anti-Zionism of the radical left in Germany and 
focuses mainly on the far left party Die Linke.1 For several years, Die Linke has played an 
increasingly large role within the German political spectrum. The party was founded in 
2007 as a result of the fusion of two other parties: the successor of the Eastern German 
Communist Party (SED) and the Election Alternative for Social Justice (WASG), a group 
of disgruntled social democrats and labor unionists who had split from the moderate 
left-wing Social Democratic Party (SPD). Currently, Die Linke is a hodgepodge of differ-
ent, sometimes contradictory political ideologies ranging from orthodox Stalinists to 
moderate reformers. The evolution and composition of the party is thus hard to predict. 
Still, one thing is certain: Die Linke has become a major player in German politics and has 
a strong influence on the European left in general. In Germany’s last parliamentary 
elections in 2009, it gained 12 percent of the vote. In addition, it is the fourth strongest 
party in the Bundestag—Germany’s federal parliament. Several of its members hold seats 
in the European Parliament. At the present, it is the most important party in the Euro-
pean Left, an association of leftist parties in the European Union.2 Die Linke is repre-
sented in 13 of Germany’s 16 state parliaments and is part of the governing coalitions in 
two states, including Berlin. In elections held during the past two years, Die Linke in-
creased its share of the vote to 28 percent in the Eastern states of Germany (former GDR) 
and to an impressive 20 percent in some Western parts of Germany. This information is 
crucial to understanding the relevance of the following analysis. 
2. OVERVIEW OF KEY DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN THE GERMAN LEFT SINCE 
REUNIFICATION: THE EMERGENCE OF A LEFTIST PRO-ISRAEL POSITION 
Recently, a small but audible segment of the German left has started to consider criti-
cism of antisemitism—and equally of anti-Zionism and anti-Americanism—as central to 
                                                                                                                                                       
* Simon Dubnow Institute for Jewish History and Culture at the University of Leipzig. I wish 
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Koss and Jonathan Olsen, The Left Party in Contemporary German Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
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the renewal of a progressive view of modern society. This includes support of Israel, 
which is in direct opposition to the position of the mainstream left.3 
The emergence of a pro-Israel left is connected to developments in German society 
since reunification in 1990. The debate within the left should be regarded as a result of 
the profound political changes that took place at this time. Reunification was seen by 
many leftists as a reversal of the outcome of the Second World War. The reunification of 
Germany coincided with a wave of pogroms and racist attacks against foreigners, 
asylum seekers, and Jews. This led to fears of a “Fourth Reich” and the re-emergence of 
German imperialism. In retrospect, these fears were completely unfounded. Neverthe-
less, they were a direct consequence of a decisive rupture in German and European 
history. The decline of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War caused the world 
view of many leftists to collapse, even if they had never supported Soviet-style commu-
nism. The apparent victory of capitalism and of liberal democracy turned the established 
ideology of leftist thinking on its head and caused a fundamental disorientation. 
At the time, a debate about the history of the left and its mistakes slowly started to 
emerge, and a small segment of the German left began to deal self-critically with anti-
Zionism, anti-imperialism, and its relationship with the State of Israel. Several leftist 
magazines even supported the second Gulf War in 1990-1991.4 More members of the left 
supported the war against the Taliban after 9/11, and some unexpectedly supported the 
overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship in Iraq in 2003.5 
3. THE BAK SHALOM GROUP 
These changes within left-leaning groups did not fundamentally affect Die Linke until 
2007, when a group called BAK Shalom was founded with the purpose of exposing and 
combating antisemitism, anti-Zionism, anti-Americanism, and what was described as 
regressive anticapitalism within Die Linke.6 
                                                                                                                                                       
3 On this trend, see the recent article by Jeffrey Herf, “Fresh Air in Central Europe,” The New 
Republic (August 2010). The article is available online at: <http://www.tnr.com/blog/foreign-
policy/77228/fresh-air-in-central-europe> (last visited September 29, 2010). A good summary of the 
historical genesis of this pro-Israel leftist position can be found in an interview with the Austrian 
researcher and Stop-the-Bomb activist Stephan Grigat: “Communism, anti-German criticism and 
Israel. An interview with Stephan Grigat by Jens Misera,” first published in Israel Nachrichten (the 
German daily newspaper in Tel Aviv) in 2004, first published in English at: <http://info.interactivist. 
net> in 2005, available at: <http://www.cafecritique.priv.at/interviewIN. html> (last visited Septem-
ber 29, 2010). 
4 The most important leftist magazine at this time was (and still is) konkret, which featured a 
long and difficult debate about the Second Gulf War. Some authors supported the war, which led to 
the loss of half the readership. See the homepage of konkret at: <http://www.konkret-verlage.de/ 
kvv/kvv.php> (last visited September 29, 2010). There was also an extensive debate in the left in 
general. See, for example, Klaus Schönberger and Claus Köstler, Der freie Westen, der vernünftige 
Krieg, seine linken Liebhaber und ihr okzidentaler Rassismus oder wie die Herrschaft der neuen Weltordnung 
in den Köpfen begann (Grafenau: Trotzdem-Verlag, 1992). 
5 The most important book on this discussion is Jihad und Judenhass by Matthias Küntzel. The 
book was also translated into English. See Matthias Küntzel, Jihad and Jew-Hatred: Islamism, Nazism, 
and the Roots of 9/11 (New York: Telos Press Publishing, 2007). 
6 See the English version of the declaration of principles by BAK Shalom, available at: <http:// 
bak-shalom.de/index.php/english> (last visited September 29, 2010). 
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Although I have never been a member of Die Linke, I have been in touch with many 
of its members. In addition, I once received a scholarship from the Rosa-Luxemburg-
Foundation, which is closely linked to Die Linke.7 I was myself a founding member of 
BAK Shalom and have written articles and given talks about antisemitism and anti-
Americanism. As a result, I was accused of being an agent of imperialism and called a 
Zionist traitor and a neo-liberal racist. Nevertheless, BAK Shalom managed to make this 
discussion, which had been going on for several years, a part of the overall framework 
of Die Linke. BAK Shalom received considerable media attention and for some time I was 
so optimistic that I believed it might be possible to substantially influence the political 
discourse within Die Linke.8 Unfortunately this was not to be. I was obviously too opti-
mistic or may have been too naive—as I was often told from the very outset.9 
4. THE CORE IDEOLOGY OF DIE LINKE 
The predominant fundamentalist ideology of Die Linke is anti-imperialist, adamantly 
opposed to the existence of Israel, and both overtly and covertly antisemitic. The most 
recent evidence of this ideology was revealed during the confrontation on the Mavi 
Marmara on May 31, 2010, when a commando of the Israeli Defense Forces stormed the 
ship after the captain refused to comply with the instructions of the Israeli navy. Nine 
people were killed in the ensuing struggle. Two current and one former member of the 
German Bundestag were on board the Mavi Marmara. All are members of Die Linke: 
Norman Paech, Annette Groth, and Inge Höger. They were arrested by the Israeli army 
but were released shortly thereafter. 
It is noteworthy to look at what happened when they returned to Germany. They 
were not taken to task by Die Linke for cooperating with an organization with suspected 
terrorist links. Neither did they have to justify their support for radical Islamists who are 
well known to be reactionary to the very core and blatantly trample on the most basic 
human rights—especially women’s rights. Instead, the chairwoman of Die Linke, Gesine 
Lötzsch, expressed pride in their so-called mission.10 The only voice from within Die 
Linke that criticized the actions of her colleagues was Petra Pau, vice-president of the 
German parliament.11 She subsequently faced a storm of criticism from within Die Linke. 
                                                                                                                                                       
7 See the English version of the homepage of the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation: <http://www. 
rosalux.de/english/foundation.html> (last visited September 29, 2010). 
8 Members of BAK Shalom have published several articles in important newspapers. See Sebas-
tian Voigt and Benjamin Krüger, “Let the Left Go Forward,” Jerusalem Post, December 9, 2009, 
available at: <http://www.forum-ds.de/article/1385.let_the_left_go_forward.html>; or Sebastian 
Voigt, “An Israels Seite,” Der Tagesspiegel, May 5, 2008, available at: <http://www.tagesspiegel.de/ 
meinung/kommentare/an-israels-seite/1237002.html> (last visited September 29, 2010). 
9 A discussion between Jan Gerber and this author was published in the German leftist weekly 
Jungle World. See Sebastian Voigt, “Sich jetzt endlich einmischen,” and Jan Gerber, “Austreten, aber 
schnell,” Jungle World 23, June 5, 2008, available at: <http://jungle-world.com/artikel/2008/23/21943. 
html> and <http://jungle-world.com/artikel/2008/23/21944.html> (last visited September 29, 2010). 
10  See the newspaper article by Miriam Hollstein and Thomas Vitzthum, “Wir sind stolz auf 
Ihren Einsatz,” Welt Online, June 2, 2010, available at: <http://www.welt.de/die-welt/politik/article 
7879320/Wir-sind-stolz-auf-Ihren-Einsatz.html> (last visited September 29, 2010). 
11  Petra Pau wrote an open letter to the Jewish Community in Bremen and criticized the mem-
bers of Die Linke who were on board the ship. See: <http://www.swr.de/report/-/id=6636856/ 
property=download/nid=233454/mvqbrq/index.pdf> (last visited September 29, 2010). 
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The above-mentioned three politicians referred to themselves as “survivors of the 
Israeli massacre” and went on a propaganda tour of various German cities in order to 
tell the story of their heroism firsthand. During one of those events, Norman Paech, a 
former member of parliament and retired professor of law, went so far as to suggest that 
the next Gaza freedom flotilla should be accompanied by the German maritime forces 
that patrol the Lebanese border. If this request were to be carried out, it would amount 
to using the German military against Israel. The audience roared loudly in response to 
this suggestion, and one member of the audience was so fired up that he expressed his 
desire to hit the fascist State of Israel next time. Norman Paech called that “an idea.”12 It 
needs to be emphasized that this scandalous response was made by a former member of 
the German parliament and former foreign policy expert of a legitimate German party 
that is represented in the Bundestag. 
Alas, statements like these are merely the culmination of a process that has been in 
the works for some time. In 2006, for example, Wolfgang Gehrcke, a member of the 
Bundestag for Die Linke, wanted to invite representatives of Hamas to a conference. 
However, they were denied entry visas to Germany.13 Many members of Die Linke 
regard Hamas as the legitimate, democratically elected government of the Palestinians. 
The organization’s ideology and highly undemocratic structure does not raise a red flag 
within Die Linke, which conveniently ignores the virulent antisemitism of Hamas. 
During the Lebanon War in 2006, Christine Buchholz, a hardcore member of Die 
Linke and currently a member of the Bundestag, referred to Israel and the United States 
as warmongering countries, adding: “Hezbollah represents, along with the peace 
movement in Israel and the international antiwar movement, the opposite side in the 
conflict. This is also the side that I am on.”14 Buchholz then went on to describe the 
“demonization” of Hezbollah as one of the most egregious prejudices expressed by the 
media during the war. For a politician of the left to say that she sides with a terrorist 
organization such as Hezbollah is almost beyond belief, but it also constitutes irrefutable 
proof of a very crucial shift in leftist politics and ideology. 
5. THE UNDERLYING REASONS FOR THE LEFT’S HATRED OF ISRAEL 
There are several explanations for the left’s bottomless hatred of Israel. One key factor is 
anti-imperialism, which is informed by a dichotomous view of the world. According to 
                                                                                                                                                       
12  This “event” was recorded by radio journalists of the independent station Freies Sender 
Kombinat (FSK) in Hamburg. Afterwards, they produced a 60-minute radio program entitled: Wie 
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this world view, the world and society are split into two opposing groups: one group 
wants peace and the other group wants to pursue imperialism. In other words, there is 
an exploiting First World and an exploited Third World. This is as simplistic a concept of 
the complexity of modern societies as one could possibly imagine. It inevitably leads to 
the personification of social relations, which makes it easy to pinpoint the persons 
responsible for exploitation and oppression. This encourages all those who refuse to use 
knowledge and rationality to understand the complex world we live in to entertain wild 
conspiracy theories. On the basis of old, deeply entrenched prejudices, Jews are per-
ceived as those pulling the strings, while Israel is seen as the spearhead of Western 
imperialism in the Middle East and as an artificial state that is a foreign object in the 
organic body of Arab societies.15 
6. ORTHODOX COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY 
The anti-Israel ideology of Die Linke has two roots. The first one is the communist 
ideology and politics of the German Democratic Republic (GDR). The GDR was not an 
antisemitic country per se, although it mounted several anti-Zionist campaigns that 
made ample use of antisemitic stereotypes. The so-called Merker trial in the mid 1950s, 
during which Paul Merker and other leading members of the Communist Party were 
convicted of having collaborated with Israel and the United States—the imperialistic 
archenemies—is but one example. The GDR considered itself to be an anti-fascist state 
and engaged in the self-righteous self-deception of having eliminated the roots of 
fascism by nationalizing heavy industry and expropriating the reactionary Prussian 
landowners.16 The hegemonic notion of fascism in the GDR stemmed from the orthodox 
communist view, as expressed by Georgi Dimitrov in the mid 1930s. Fascism in power, 
he said, is “the open terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary, most chauvinistic, 
and most imperialist elements of finance capital.”17 
If fascism is regarded as the supreme form of capitalistic dictatorship, the antisemitic 
ideology has to be put on the back burner. Antisemitism was not recognized as the core 
of Nazi ideology but as a means of distraction employed by the ruling class to divide the 
proletariat. Auschwitz and the annihilation of the European Jews was not recognized as 
a rupture in civilization itself, as Dan Diner has pointed out.18 In the communist coun-
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tries of Eastern Europe, Jews were not acknowledged as a distinct group of victims. 
Instead, communists and antifascist resistance fighters were the most important people 
to be memorialized. As a result of this delusion, adequate research of the Holocaust 
never took place. In addition, the GDR did not see any reason to normalize relations 
with Israel and rejected all claims for compensation by Holocaust survivors. After 1945, 
the continued existence of antisemitism, which was very much alive in a large part of the 
population, was never addressed or dealt with because—according to the ideology of 
orthodox communism—the socialist nations were seen as the true winners of history 
bringing progress to the world. 
Besides the historical context of the Cold War and the strong relations between the 
Soviet bloc and the Arab states, this ideology played a major role in explaining the 
undiluted ferocity of anti-Zionism and the enduring comparison and equation of Israel 
with Nazi Germany in the GDR. This was not a legitimate form of political criticism but 
a fierce form of antisemitic anti-Zionism.19 To this day, this pernicious hatred of Israel 
deriving from orthodox communist ideology is alive and well in a large part of Die Linke. 
7. THE ANTI-ZIONISM OF THE WEST GERMAN LEFT 
The other justification of hatred of Israel in Die Linke is to be found in the history of the 
radical left in West Germany. Its relations with Israel differs from those of the GDR. 
Until the Six-Day War, the majority of leftists in West Germany had a pro-Israel attitude. 
However, the tremendous historical shift that followed this decisive war unleashed a 
fierce hatred of the Jewish state, which in turn became an integral part of the left’s 
identity. This hatred has all the attributes of a pathological aversion. Israel was no longer 
regarded as a socialist experiment, with its kibbutzim and its egalitarian ethos, but as a 
country of oppressors—by no one less than the recent murderous persecutors of the 
Jews. It was henceforth referred to as a racist, occupying power that deprived the Pales-
tinians of their human rights and their national homeland.20 
This hostility toward Israel can only be understood in the context of the widespread 
romanticization of revolution itself. Since Western democracies had given up on revolu-
tions and since the proletariat that was supposed to be the carrier of the revolutionary 
banner was ignorant of its historical obligation, the longing for a revolution had to be 
transferred to the Third World. The ideology of tiermondisme was on the rise, and the left 
began to support all kinds of national liberation movements in the Third World as a 
redirection activity, an alternative for what was missing under their very own noses. 
Some groups even supported the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, but the Palestinians 
became the main object of solidarity. Their terror attacks were justified as the actions of 
an oppressed underdog fighting a powerful enemy. The Palestinians fitted neatly into 
the leftist cult of the noble guerrilla. Leftist radical groups like the Rote Armee Fraktion 
even received military training in Palestinian camps. Leftist West German groups went 
so far as to commit antisemitic crimes. On November 9, 1969, the thirty-first anniversary 
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of the Night of Pogroms (Kristallnacht) of 1938, a group called Tupamaros West-Berlin 
planted a bomb in front of the Jewish Community Center in Berlin and justified this 
attack as a necessary response to the so-called “fascist” crimes of the Zionists and as an 
expression of solidarity with the fighting fedayeen as the avant-garde of worldwide 
revolution.21 
8. SECONDARY ANTISEMITISM 
In addition to the above-mentioned explanations, it is obvious that neither East nor West 
Germany can be compared to other countries. When all is said and done, the fact re-
mains that contemporary Germany is the successor to Nazi Germany. Thus, another 
feature has to be added to the leftist hostility toward Israel in order to explain this 
particular brand of anti-Zionist antisemitism.22 
After 1945, the official expression of traditional antisemitism became taboo in both 
Germanys. Unofficially, however, antisemitism was expressed both overtly and covertly 
without restraint. In the following decades, the ever-present antisemitic resentment had 
to find a different venue to express itself. After the Holocaust, every Jew personified the 
crimes committed by Nazi Germany. Jews were perceived as an obstacle to the devel-
opment of a national identity and a positive identification with Germany and its history. 
Jews were seen as permanent accusers who perpetuated Germany’s bad conscience and 
exploited German guilt by demanding reparations. This antisemitism is perfectly ex-
pressed in the following paradoxical statement: the Germans will never forgive the Jews 
for Auschwitz.23 This bizarre and twisted thinking eventually resulted in the externaliza-
tion of German guilt. Nazis were consequently seen everywhere, but most specifically in 
Israel. In due course, Jews were—and continue to be—accused of having learned noth-
ing from the Holocaust and acting like Nazis. On the other hand, Palestinians are re-
garded as the new Jews, the victims of the former victims. By demonizing and 
“Nazifying” Israel and opposing its existence, German leftists are able to construct an 
anti-fascist continuity for themselves and fight the anti-fascist battle that their Nazi 
parents and grandparents never fought. 
The advantage of this secondary antisemitism to German leftists can be observed on 
an individual, psychological level (in West Germany) as well as on a collective level (in 
East Germany). The defamation of Israel as a fascist country and Zionism as a fascist 
ideology conveniently strengthens the anti-fascist self-deception. Because antisemitism 
was never recognized for the core evil that it was, and because fascism was merely seen 
as a different kind of capitalistic oppression, the Holocaust was not recognized as the 
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worst genocide ever committed in the history of all of humanity and consequently lost 
its abominable horror. 
The most common example of current manifestations of secondary antisemitism is 
anti-Zionism. Although these ideologies are not identical, they overlap to a large extent. 
According to Léon Poliakov, Israel has become the Jew among the nations; it serves as 
the collective Jew.24 This antisemitic anti-Zionism is not exclusive to the German left but 
expresses itself in Germany in a highly unadulterated form. 
9. IGNORANCE ABOUT IDEOLOGY AND THE INFORMAL LEFTIST-JIHADIST 
ALLIANCE 
Ignorance concerning the destructive power of ideologies seems to be a particular blind 
spot of the leftist world view. This critical blind spot is repeated in the leftist attitude 
toward Islamism. It is also evident in Die Linke and has grown in significance during the 
past few years. In previous decades, the German left supported various so-called national 
liberation movements but mainly secular ones. It supported the PLO and the PFLP but 
nowadays supports Hamas—a fanatically religious and oppressive organization. 
This development was recently labeled the leftist-jihadist “Querfront” (cross-front) 
by the German Journalist, Ivo Bozic.25 Some parts of Die Linke openly proclaim their 
collaboration with radical Islamic groups against the United States and Israel. Asked 
how they could have cooperated with radical Islamic organizations and fascist groups, 
the parliamentarian members of Die Linke either claimed that they did not know who 
had organized the Gaza freedom flotilla or baldly denied that fascist or Islamist groups 
had indeed participated. Under a highly benign interpretation, one might consider such 
behavior naive. However, it is much more probable that these collaborators with radical 
Islamists know exactly what they are doing. 
A certain convergence of orthodox leftist and Islamist ideology is obvious. Both 
share an anti-imperialist ideology, a deep hatred of Israel and the United States, and a 
dystopian yearning for a simple, pre-modern world. Both ideologies also reject global-
ization and financial capital as a symbol of the exploitative capitalist society. Both tend 
to simplify the complexity of the modern world into a clear-cut, black and white para-
digm without shades of gray. Both feel morally superior and self-righteous and delude 
themselves in thinking that they are fighting for a higher cause and that they are always 
on the side of the global underdog and the oppressed masses. At the global level, the 
leftist-jihadist collaboration manifests itself in the alliance of Venezuela and Iran: the 
self-proclaimed socialist paradise of the twenty-first century and the reactionary dicta-
torship of the mullahs. 
10. CONCLUSION 
Die Linke cannot and must not be dismissed as an irrelevant radical fringe on the left of 
the German political spectrum. That would be the height of irresponsibility. Because it 
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does not operate under the same political restrictions as the mainstream political parties, 
Die Linke often expresses widespread anger and hatred toward Israel more openly than 
those parties. The many examples of antisemitic anti-Zionism involving politicians of all 
parties are shocking,26 but only parliamentary members of Die Linke could participate in 
the Gaza freedom flotilla and still be supported by their party leadership. In no other 
party is the left’s ingrained hatred of Israel as rampant.  
In regard to Israel and the conflict in the Middle East, Die Linke may appear to be the 
avant-garde of German society. I hope that this is an overly pessimistic interpretation, 
and I would gladly be proven wrong in this regard. Still, I fear that my presumptions are 
not totally over the top. This is illustrated by the following incident that took place 
shortly after the incident involving the Mavi Marmara, namely when the German 
Secretary for Development, Dirk Niebel, was refused entry into the Gaza strip by the 
Israeli authorities. Even though it is widely known that Israel prohibits official visits by 
foreign dignitaries to Gaza so as not to legitimize the Hamas government, the German 
Bundestag passed an unanimous resolution condemning Israel’s actions, including the 
blockade of the Gaza Strip.27 Even conservative politicians who are in general consid-
ered to be pro-Israel praised Die Linke for its opposition to the blockade.28 This resolution 
serves as proof that all German political parties presented a united front against Israel. 
Needles to say, this new and alarming development undeniably strengthened Hamas. 
Finally, it is important to note that the debate within Die Linke is not yet over and 
done with.29 The organization’s ultimate direction will be crucial for people on the left 
not only in Germany but also throughout Europe. 
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Two Thousand Years of Antisemitism: 
From the Canonical Laws to the Present Day 
Anita Waingort Novinsky* 
My interest in antisemitism began during long years of studying, researching, and 
teaching about the Holy Office of the Inquisition and the converted Jews in Portugal and 
Brazil (New Christians, conversos, marranos, and anussim). 
In this paper, I want to ask a question that was formulated a few years ago at a con-
ference in Paris sponsored by the Jules Isaac Association:1 “Antisémitisme—a-t-il encore 
aujourd’hui des racines chrétiennes?” 
One of the conference participants, Alain Finkielkraut, gave a positive answer, but 
said that we have to understand this question considering its paradox. On the one hand, 
the Church is today dialoguing with the Jews, but on the other hand present-day anti-
Jewish propaganda is repeating the old slogans and defamatory arguments against 
them.2 Nostra Aetate has abandoned the infamous references to “Jewish deicide” and 
“treacherous Jews,” but if we compare the language and the vocabulary used by the 
present antisemites to that used in past centuries, we will still find a strong influence of 
the Church doctrine against the Jewish people. 
Let us go back to the sources. 
Reading the canonical laws and analyzing the expressions, opinions, and ideas that 
appear during the Church councils, we find terms like “abominable Jew,” “impious 
people,” “hard-hearted,” and “unbelievers.” If we decode the discourse of the language 
and find the hidden significance of the author’s experience, we will understand that the 
sense and the defamation message are the same as in the 20th and 21st centuries. 
During the Visigothic period (4th and 5th centuries), there was a similar phenome-
non to the forced conversion of the Jews to Christianity that occurred in Portugal in 
1497. A clandestine Judaism flourished for more than a century in high medieval Spain, 
and we can compare, in many aspects, this early marranism to crypto-Judaism in the 
modern era (16th to 18th centuries).3 
Izidoro (560-636), the famous Bishop of Seville, can be considered the ideologist for 
the discrimination against the Jews and one of the most ferocious antisemites of the 
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Church. His statements anticipated Nazi antisemitism.4 by more than a thousand years. 
He tried to denigrate the Jewish faith, attacking the most sacred Jewish symbols—the 
synagogue and the Jewish Sabbath. To the holy place of prayer, the synagogue, he gave 
a sexual label; the Jewish Sabbath he considered a repulsive holy day, originating from 
luxurious sins.5 
Physically, the Jews were characterized as having a “bad smell,” which was a sign of 
their spiritual deterioration and biological evidence of a gradual dehumanization.6 
Here we find the same accusation as in Germany in the 20th century, namely that 
Jews were “worms” and not human beings. Baptism will not help, said the Bishop of 
Seville, as nothing can change the evil nature of these people, for they are all the anti-
christ and carry the forces of Satan.7 
The accusation that Jews are not human beings may be considered the most extreme 
example of all the cruel designations that were imposed on the Jews. One thousand one 
hundred and forty years before the rise of Nazism, Izidoro, together with the high 
clergy, spread the idea that Jews were different creatures with a different nature and 
that no human reaction could be expected from such creatures.8 
Canonical law prohibited intermarriage and sexual intercourse between Christians 
and Jews. Jews were not permitted to eat together with Christians,9 to hold public 
office,10 to employ Christian servants or have Christian slaves,11 or to walk in the street 
during Passover.12 It was ordered that the Talmud and other Jewish books should be 
burned,13 and Christians could not use the services of Jewish doctors (even though all 
Portuguese kings had Jewish doctors). 
From the 13th century onward, Jews were obliged to wear a badge on their clothes.14 
and were forbidden to build new synagogues.15 The Synod of Breslau (1267) imposed 
compulsory ghettos on the Jews,16 and at the Council of Basel (1434, session XIX) they 
were forbidden to obtain academic degrees.17 
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According to the Church, nothing noble could ever originate from the Jews, Christ 
could never have been a Jew, and not even Isaac could have given birth to the Jewish 
people.18 
As in Germany in the 20th century, Jews were considered by canonical law as infect-
ed and the disseminators of all sickness that existed in the kingdom. Julian, Bishop of 
Toledo (642 AC), suggested the need for a special prophylactic against the disease 
spread by the Jews. Sickness was considered by the bishop as a metaphor for the malig-
nity of the Jews.19 The kingdom was divided into healthy and infected parts, exactly as 
in Spain and Portugal during the inquisitorial centuries and by the Germans during 
Nazism. 
The Visigoths developed the foundation for the future demonization of the Jews. The 
idea that no conversion could change them because nothing could eradicate the maligni-
ty they carried was adopted by the Inquisition in the Iberian countries. And in 1449, in 
Toledo, professional corporations excluded all descendants of the conversos, under the 
pretext of “impurity of blood” but in reality to eliminate New Christian competition.20 
After having lived in the Portuguese and Spanish Empire for more than 15 centuries, 
Jews were declared foreigners, and there was no place for them any more. The Holy 
Office of the Inquisition was officially introduced in Portugal in the year 1536 by the 
King D. João III, solely due to the existence of converted Jews suspected of being follow-
ers of the Jewish faith.21 The Jews were the only people in the world for whom a specific 
court of justice was established to observe and arrest them. Historians that are not 
familiar with the inquisitorial documents can never be aware of the extent of the obses-
sion against the Jewish people and the dimensions of the falsehoods spread among the 
Portuguese population. 
The Catholic clergy was mostly responsible for the doctrine of hate that convinced 
the Portuguese to participate happily in the mass spectacles of burning at the stake of 
New Christians (marranos).22 The inquisitorial agents followed every step of the conversos 
and had the right to arrest them and deliver them to the Inquisition. All assets were 
immediately confiscated and divided between the Crown and the Church. Other here-
sies besides Judaism, such as sodomy, bigamy, and witchcraft, gradually also became 
subject to the Inquisition, but the majority of the trials were connected to crypto-
Judaism. 
The court of the Inquisition was a political institution that worked together with the 
Church. For several periods during the 17th century, the governor and the Inquisitor 
were the same person. Both the Church and the State acted with hypocrisy. The Inquisi-
tors handed down the death sentences, but as the Church could not spill blood the 
victims were delivered to the King’s functionaries, who killed them. 
The portrayal of the conversos during the Visigothic period was repeated during the 
Inquisition and again in the 20th century. Jews were regarded as spies, traitors, and 
betrayers of their fatherland. If Christians were not alert, in a hundred years the Jews 
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would occupy all the land. They were regarded as a highly dangerous group that caused 
a lot of harm because their main purpose was to conquer the world. The same idea was 
mentioned by the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, published in the Soviet Union in 1897 and 
still sold today. 
All kinds of lies were invented in Portugal as they were during the Visigothic period. 
Pamphlets and posters were hung on church walls to persuade the population to take 
up arms against the Jews and eliminate “every Jew dog.” Books were written and 
published against Jews and conversos in the 17th and 18th centuries in Spain, manu-
scripts were distributed, sermons were delivered from church pulpits to convince people 
that the Jews must be blamed for every calamity that had happened. During the Acts of 
Faith, the long sermons were not directed at the different heresies, against faith and 
behavior, but mainly at the “Jewish nation.” We must point out that, in practice, the 
objective was not only the Portuguese crypto-Jewish population but all Jews as a people. 
All the discriminatory measures and accusations from the canonical laws were re-
peated by the Inquisition in the Portuguese kingdom and later by the Nazis: the myth of 
pure blood (1935), the prohibition to walk in the streets on certain days (1938), the 
burning of Jewish books (1938), the destruction of synagogues (1938), and the prohibi-
tion of relations with Jews (1941).23 
After the Holy Office of the Inquisition was abolished in Portugal (1821), the country 
took a new direction politically and some of the descendants of the New Christians—
poets, intellectuals, and writers—tried to tell the history of the previous dark centuries, 
with a certain degree of philosemitism. However, the majority of the Portuguese histori-
ography ignored and erased this picture from the Portuguese landscape. It took more 
than a century for historians to start to research the Inquisition. Some antisemitic works 
appeared in Portugal at the beginning of the 20th century, and there are still authors 
today who try to minimize the effects and cruelty of the Holy Office. 
During the three centuries of Inquisition activity involving the persecution and ex-
termination of the New Christians, no one cared about their destiny. Not one nation 
protested against the genocide; not a single voice spoke out officially in favor of the 
miserable Portuguese Jews. The cultivated conversos, who were able to flee to Holland, 
wrote beautiful poetry expressing their sympathy and sorrow for the victims, in words 
and in tears. But besides Menashe ben Israel, who went to England to speak to Crom-
well about the readmission of the Portuguese Jews, the world remained silent. 
One man in Portugal, a Jesuit, who cannot be forgotten, had the courage to speak in 
favor of the Jews: Father Antonio Vieira. He went to Pope Innocent XI and asked him to 
help the innocent people who were burned at the stake in his country. Afterwards, some 
measures interrupted the court of the Inquisition’s work for a while, but activities soon 
resumed, and the fire continued to burn for the unfortunate Portuguese conversos.24 
There are, nevertheless, some differences between the Inquisition and Nazism that 
are interesting to consider. The victims of the Inquisition had a name, and the trials 
lasted for relatively long periods. For months, or even years, the New Christian was 
                                                                                                                                                       
23  R. Hillberg, The Destruction of European Jews. (Nova York: Holmes & Meier Publishers 1985) 
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called before the Inquisitorial panel. There was a genealogy; he had a family. The pro-
cess had a number, but the prisoner was a human being. For the Nazis, the Jew was not 
human, only a number on his arm and a label on his clothes. And the end of his life was 
faster, in the gas chambers, compared to the hours at the stake. The Inquisition was 
punishing a doctrine, an idea, a “weltanschauung”—a crime. For the Nazis there was no 
specific crime—it was only the “Jew”—and all were guilty, as they all contaminated the 
soil, the body, and the soul. Even in the Edict of Expulsion of the Jews from Spain (1492), 
the danger of “contamination” was mentioned. In 1493, Rome was stricken by a heavy 
leprosy epidemic that was called Pest marranorum. Prophylactic measures were ordered 
to exterminate the parasites and dangerous bacilli. 
At the Conference on Global Antisemitism organized by the International Associa-
tion for the Study of Antisemitism at Yale University (August 23-25, 2010), I saw a video 
about the Arab propaganda against the Jews, and I thought how unbelievable it was 
that, in a changing world like ours, 1,300 years after the Christian medieval councils, we 
still hear the repetition of the same defamatory concepts, the same accusations, the same 
lies, the same demonization, and even the same vocabulary. 
From the Visigothic Kingdom, via the Inquisition, to Nazism, the defamatory lan-
guage remains the same, be it anti-Judaism and antisemitism or anti-Israelism and anti-
Zionism. The significance, sense, and purpose are the same: the destruction of the Jews. 
From the past to the present, new elements have been added to the old inquisitorial 
and Nazi antisemitism: Israel and Zionism. Even if times have changed and the histori-
cal circumstances of the world are different, there are, as the historian Ephraim E. 
Urbach has also pointed out, certain similarities and parallels.25 
The antisemitism that was so widespread in Portugal, a country that was traditional-
ly tolerant, and where the population coexisted amicably for centuries with the Jews, did 
not start with lower classes. It came from above, from the high clergy and the nobility. In 
Nazi Germany, the intellectuals were the first adherents of what later emerged as a 
genocidal regime demonstrating that the major danger to society stems from ideologies 
adopted by intellectuals.26 
The purpose of this paper is not to explain the reason for this long hatred of the Jews, 
but to show that its Christian roots continued to exist in the Nazi period and similarities 
can still be found in modernity. 
Conversion and assimilation did not help. The Inquisition investigated as far back as 
seven or eight generations to identify Jews. Nazism only went as far back as the third or 
fourth generation. The Portuguese and the Germans hated the assimilated Jews more 
than their orthodox coreligionists. 
For Zygmund Bauman, the factors and mechanisms that made the extermination of 
the Jews possible during Nazism continue to exist. There are reasons to worry, because 
we live in the same society that made the Holocaust possible. 
In the words of Umberto Eco, if the past had not provided the hate and the defama-
tion against the Jews, the Holocaust would never have happened. 
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